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Abstract
This  thesis  argues,  through  a  careful  analysis  of  cosmopolitan  theorising,  that  an 
educational  stand  can  be  identified  which  influences  the  theorist's  theorising  of 
cosmopolitanism. An engagement with their mostly unwritten educational norms can 
contribute to a new way to approach to concept of cosmopolitanism. Firstly examining 
the works of Thomas Pogge, Seyla Benhabib and James Ingram in the contemporary 
era, it identifies a struggle between universalism and particularism through the lens of 
struggle and conflict, and an overwhelming reliance on Kantian arguments. This thesis 
then engages directly with Kant's works, reconstructing his political and cosmopolitan 
scheme  from  the  ground-up.  It  identifies  a  series  of  hierarchies,  exclusions,  and 
normative  assumptions  of  human nature,  and a  foundation  of  pure  practical  reason, 
religion  and,  crucially,  education  which  his  political  and  cosmopolitan  project  is 
designed to develop and expand globally to establish a singular cosmopolitan morality. 
The  exclusionary  nature  of  Kant's  interwoven  project  leads  to  an  exploration  of  a 
contemporary theorist of his; Johann Herder, who’s cosmopolitanism differs radically 
from Kant. Herder's cosmopolitanism, whilst still aimed towards the idea of freedom is, 
in  contrast  to  Kant's  hierarchical  system,  anti-dualist  in  nature,  and  based  on  the 
necessity of a holistic understanding of humanity’s intellectual capabilities which treats 
reason  and  emotion  as  one,  and  establishes  communication,  language,  culture,  and 
history as core concepts. It also, crucially, rejects a Hobbesian premise of selfishness 
that must be incorporated and responded to, as well as relying on institutionalisation, 
and bureaucracies to organise human existence. Herder further emphases education and 
bildung as  ongoing  processes  of  progress  and  change  by  which  his  version  of 
cosmopolitanism (humanität) could be achieved, not in an Enlightened Age, but as an 
ongoing  Age  of  Enlightenment.  This  thesis  then  argues,  through  an  exploration  of 
contemporary cosmopolitan educators, that Herder's works align with their own. As a 
result, Kant's premises and logics on the meaning and purpose of education are shown 
to be at odds with contemporary understandings of cosmopolitanism. This thesis then 
concludes  by  arguing  for  a  'nonbinary  Cosmopolitan'  re-framing  of  cosmopolitan 
theorising.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
“ Liberal character traits and political virtues do not... ...come about "naturally" or 
by the deliverance of an "invisible hand."” (Macedo 1995, p.240)
Contents
1.1. Introduction
1.2. Cosmopolitan Meanings
1.3. Education and Cosmopolitanism
1.4. Kant and Herder
1.5. Chapter Summations
1.6. Conclusions
1.1 Introduction
This  thesis  explores  the  idea  and  importance  of  education  in  the  theorising  of 
Cosmopolitanism, focusing on both the Enlightenment period and the contemporary era, 
to understand and critique how the concept has been interpreted in the past, how it is 
now utilised, and ways to engage with it in the future.
The key argument this thesis makes is that the role of education, both through a formal 
educational system and through one's situated experiences and interactions with others 
(as culturing, socialisation, tradition, or Bildung), was a fundamental component in the 
proposed future construction of a cosmopolitan world during the Enlightenment period. 
This holds true not just from the arguments of Kant in his writings on pedagogy, his 
overt  support for the Philanthropinum Institute and his conception of an ethico-civil 
community, but also from other cosmopolitan theorists such as Johann Herder, Johann 
Fichte,  Christof  Weiland,  Le  Marquis  de  Condorcet  and  Georg  Forster.  Its  relative 
absence  from  contemporary  theorising  has  led  to  a  skewed  and  overly  objectivist 
perspective,  firstly,  within  the  academic  field  of  politics,  as  a  'top-down' 
cosmopolitanism located within the International Relations discipline, and focussed on 
the global and institutional and political levels. Secondly, philosophically as a deeply 
personal and  individualistic, 'bottom-bottom' dynamic1, embedded with the idea of an 
individual as an agent free and the ability to act, in theory at least, without obvious and 
overt  bias,  able  to  recognise  and  reject  the  'claims  of  culture',  and  which  as  a 
consequence  serves  to  weaken  cultural  and  communal  ties.  These  perspectives 
downgrade the centrality of education in the creation, nurturing and cultivation of a very 
specific type of identity, whose purpose was to foster cosmopolitan attitudes of self-
1  By this I mean the active cultivation of individuality through the development of a particular spread of  
(both  pre-existing  and  desired)  quasi-universal  norms  (moral,  cultural,  linguistic,  societal,  capitalist, 
patriarchal, racial, ableist, endosexed, heterosexist, allistic etc.)
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agency, morality,  and human equality,  alongside a sense of community2 membership 
and global citizenship.
Principally, this thesis takes as its starting point the importance that Kant himself gives 
to education; that “Education is the greatest and most difficult problem that can be given 
to the human being” (Kant 1803, p.441). From this, it both explores and critiques the 
ramifications of education in his overall scheme for a cosmopolitan world, as well as its 
impact upon its contemporary usage. Because of the way he identifies education as the 
only route out of 'animality'  to humanity,  it  as a result examines the system that he 
designs to facilitate this movement, as well as the normative assumptions that justify his 
approach. The consequence of this examination of Kant's works reveals, with regards to 
his position on religion, gender, culture, civil society, identity and human nature, the 
layered and hierarchical nature of his cosmopolitan vision (See Chapter 3). As a result,  
this  thesis  proposes  another  theorist's  works,  Johann  Herder  (Chapter  4)  as  an 
alternative way to understand cosmopolitanism, again focussed through education, by 
which humanity could be envisioned, and explored, in its future theorising.
This thesis provides a critique of current interpretations of Cosmopolitanism and of its 
history,  and  presents  a  loose  'Anti-dualist'  framework  for  future  theorising,  re-
incorporating  its  wider  philosophical,  social  and  aesthetic  discourses  back  into  the 
political arena through the lens of education. It does this by exploring and developing 
the following six main areas: 1) Presenting a brief historical analysis of the theorising of 
cosmopolitanism, and the multiples of meanings that have been assigned to the idea of 
cosmopolitanism.  2)  Examining  key  contemporary  cosmopolitan  theorists’ 
interpretations and uses of the concept of cosmopolitanism and the underlying norms of 
education  that  are  implied  in  their  works.  3)  Exploring  in  depth  the  writings  of 
Immanuel Kant and reconstructing his 'true' cosmopolitan vision from the 'bottom up', 
which  identifies  the  underlying  importance  of  education  through  pure  reason.  4) 
Presenting  the  works  and  arguments  of  Johann  Herder,  and  his  understandings  of 
humanity,  culture,  education  and  identity  through  his  interpretation  of  the  idea  of 
besonnheit  – the reflective capacity of the mind 5) Exploring existing contemporary 
approaches to a 'cosmopolitan education' within the discipline of education itself, and 
their impact on contemporary cosmopolitan theorising within the social sciences. The 
thesis then concludes with the development of 6) An Anti-dualist framework for future 
theorising.
2 Whether that be incorporated in a Kantian ethico-civil community, or a Herderian volk. 
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As a part of the arguments of this thesis, I note and respond to the partial and selective 
use of Immanuel Kant's writings that contemporary cosmopolitan theorists have used, 
either to support their  own advancements upon the theory of cosmopolitanism or to 
reject his works  in toto in their own variant interpretations of cosmopolitanism. This 
selectivity, often argued as a simple and logical decision to focus attention on the most 
pertinent parts of his writings (e.g. his political or philosophical works) or to emphasise 
his lack of relevance, also serves to erase, downgrade or ignore certain aspects of his 
thoughts and arguments, for example on race, gender and religion. This erasure of the 
oft-considered unnecessary, problematic or irrelevant parts of his works prevents a more 
comprehensive understanding of the complexities of his works and how they inter-relate 
and interact with each other to create a fuller understanding of his vision of, and for, 
humanity. Into this also falls his writings on education, which this thesis argues is, and 
always was, a fundamental part of his cosmopolitan vision and impacts on every part of 
his  philosophical and political  theorising.  When incorporated back into his  works,  I 
demonstrate in chapter three that his cosmopolitan vision presents a radically different 
and  far  more  problematic  plan  for  his  proposed  future  cosmopolitan  world  than  is 
typically recognised.
This thesis also responds to arguments as to the fractured nature and interpretation of 
the concept of cosmopolitanism itself. In response it provides a brief historical analysis 
of cosmopolitan theorising.  It  both situates the multiplicity of understandings of the 
concept into their historical setting, and identifies two key themes of theorising on 'how 
one becomes a cosmopolitan' and uncovers a methodological shift from traditionalism 
to criticality that parallels a move from a reliance on Kantian cosmopolitanism and the 
pre-eminence of universalism, to an avoidance of his works and an emphasis on situated 
and subjective experiences. This provides answers, in part at least, to the reasons for the 
unclear,  diffuse,  conflicting,  and  often  contradictory  uses  of  the  term  in  the 
contemporary era, and clarification as to the reasons why the role of education faded 
from cosmopolitan discourses over time. 
This thesis then explores the works of Immanuel Kant and Johan Herder. The former is 
explored  in  more  detail  than  is  customary  firstly  to  present  a  wider  and  more 
comprehensive  understanding  of  how  his  cosmopolitan  vision  connects  to  his  less 
overtly political works, through the idea of education. This analysis identifies the ways 
in which his arguments on human nature, religion, community, society, gender and race 
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also played a  crucial  role  in his  cosmopolitan vision,  and in turn contributed to  his 
position on education and identity,  or 'personality'.  All  of these are reliant upon his 
development  of  pure  reason  and  his  desire  to  downgrade,  mitigate  or  remove  the 
influence of emotions on the path and progress of humanity. 
The  latter,  Johann Herder,  is  presented  as  an  alternate  cosmopolitan  theorist  whose 
works envisaged cosmopolitanism in a radically different way – arguably in a far more 
inclusive and situated way - than Kant's own rigorous and, as I suggest in this thesis, 
necessarily and deliberately elitist and exclusionary cosmopolitan vision. I do this by 
examining  key  areas  of  his  argument;  on  the  importance  of  the  reflective  mind 
(besonnheit), culture (Kultur), history, progress, humanity (humanität), and cultivation 
(bildung)3 in Herderian theorising, and the influence they have over the importance and 
direction of his educational arguments. I further makes use of his understanding of his 
response  to  the  philosophical  conundrum  of  'The  One  and  the  Many'.  Part  2  also 
highlights the differing arguments on human nature, society, and identity etc. and their 
implications  for  contemporary  cosmopolitan  theorising.  The  perceived  nature  of 
humanity, the influences and purposes of societies, communities, cultures, and nations 
and their  intra-  and inter-  dynamics,  and the  ways in  which  our  identities  could or 
should develop all play their part in determining not just what education could/should 
be, but the ways in which we are educated and the ways in humanity should as a result 
be educated into or towards cosmopolitanism.
Finally, this thesis re-situates the importance of education that both Kant and Herder 
placed  on  human  progress  and  cosmopolitanism  back  into  the  centre  of  the 
contemporary educational discourses on cosmopolitanism, combining the arguments of 
the theorists explored in chapter two with the cosmopolitan texts of David Hansen and 
Hannah Spector from the perspective of education, as well as Mark Bracher (2013), 
who links  Education  and Cosmopolitanism to  the  'cognitive  sciences'  and literature. 
This final exploration establishes the Herderian nature of contemporary cosmopolitan 
education, then leads to the presentation of an anti-dualist 'Herderian cosmopolitanism' 
framing by which to  reconsider  existing approaches  to cosmopolitanism, and which 
suggests future directions for cosmopolitan theorising.
1.2 Cosmopolitan Meanings
This section explores the multiple meanings of cosmopolitanism. I initially follows an 
3 The precise meanings that Herder gives for these terms is explored in more detail in Chapter 4.
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historical  approach,  touching  on  the  periods  most  often  referred  to  by  traditional 
theorists, starting with the earliest uses of the term 'cosmopolitan'. This history, as Inglis 
(2014a)  suggests,  is  at  odds with  understandings  of  cosmopolitanism outside  of  the 
political and philosophical disciplines, and touches on concerns that some theorists have 
raised as to both its history and trajectory. I then explore the use of the term to an ever  
widening number of historical theorists before examining the contemporary era's use of 
the word. It then concludes with a discussion of the tensions implied by these ongoing 
developments.  Taken  together,  these  three  aspects  of  its  story  raise  fundamental 
questions as to its historical meaning(s), its direction, and what education might mean to 
these variations of cosmopolitan, and its role in its conception.
When considering the historical meaning of cosmopolitanism, “Kosmo Polis” or Citizen 
of the World, Diogenes' quote serves to set the scene for the concept. He declares that “I 
am a citizen of the world”4 and that phrase, used in such a way, provides us with the 
direction of his  perspective.  He  declares this.  He thrusts  this  statement out into the 
world, asserting his position and status within a non-governed global polity. Not only 
does he have the power to make this assertion (as a man and a philosopher), but it relies  
on him being heard, and that message being received, communicated, and responded to. 
He makes it personal and affirming. He claims the position himself rather that it being 
awarded to him or being born into it. The use of 'am' denotes here an integral aspect of 
his personhood, and his use of the concept of the citizen infers not only that he has 
power in this global polity, but that he possesses status in the form of citizenship, just as 
others do too, as his equal citizens, and he will treat them according to this perspective. 
Further, that as a citizen of a demos with no sovereign and no formal constitution, he 
allows himself to be bound by some form of self-adjudicated 'collective' agreement, but 
he owes allegiance to no one, and his duty to others is an expression of agency-decided 
duty, viewed through the lens of a global citizenship framework, and not determined by 
the local polity he was within. This simple statement positions the role of the citizen of 
the world in a very specific way – it gives agency to the individual yet also requires 
equality with others – at the same time that it erases communal identity. It encompasses 
all humans, yet is a singular assertion, not a collective one and for Diogenes it was “a 
rebellious reaction against every kind of coercion imposed by the community on the 
individual” (Hadas 1943, p.108).
4 In chapter five I examine Hansen's uses of a variant translation. He uses the phrase “inhabitant of the 
world” (2011, p.45).
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The  position  of  Diogenes  and  the  Greeks  in  general,  in  so  many origin  stories  of 
cosmopolitanism, sets the scene for the direction that its theorising progresses from. A 
rejection of, not a movement towards, is the primary reason given for his statement. 
Borgman suggests that “I am a cosmopolitan...  was part  of his (Diogenes') effort  to 
criticize if not subvert the conceits of local civilisation” (1992, p. 131) and Diogenes 
described himself as “cityless, homeless, without a country, poor, a wanderer, living life 
from day to day” (cited in Douzinas 2007, p.154). His voluntary self-positioning at the 
margins of society 'allowed' him to then see the culture he was encountering from a 
different  and  more  authoritative  perspective,  and,  because  of  his  'distance'  (which 
echoes  traditional  approaches),  he  was  able  to  reject  their  relativistic,  and  partial 
experiences of human living in favour of something that he believes is greater. In effect 
he is, firstly, deciding to turn away from the local to, secondly, move to the 'universal'. 
As such, the foundation of the term positions cosmopolitanism as a binary of opposition 
from the local and towards universalism - and it starts from a position of agency. What 
is though quite crucial to this chapter of the origins of cosmopolitanism is that Diogenes 
had the ability  and choice  to reject the security and dictates of local citizenship and 
identity. He was not 'an outcast' in the way that Hansen suggests (2011, pp.37-39) - he 
was not made an outcast by birth, nor assigned it because of his gender or nationality, 
rather he chose to  act and was outcast as a result. His ability to make the choice of 
incorporation  or  distance  from  the  local  community  implies  then  that  he  was 
approaching  from a  position  of  power5 from where  his  choice  could  have  a  wider 
meaning to those around him. He was not powerless before this choice, and he was not 
living a powerless life because even whilst living as an outcast, he could have changed 
his mind and regained a local status.
The next step in the history of cosmopolitanism then moves to Roman additions such as 
Seneca and Marcus Aurelius6 before it then leaps forward to Immanuel Kant and the 
Enlightenment  (Inglis  2014a,  p.103).  From this  point,  cosmopolitanism is  presented 
variously as “best found in the works of Immanuel Kant and his  ethical and  political  
writings” (Beardsworth 2011, p.19, my emphasis); or “The most important contribution 
to this body of thought can be found in Kant's writings” (Held 2010, p.41); or that “The 
modern  idea  of  cosmopolitanism originated  in  a  series  of  essays  written  by  Kant” 
(Douzinas 2007, p.160) or “Immanuel Kant is the de rigueur point of reference for any 
5 i.e. That he is recognised as male in a society where only men had political agency, he is educated to 
an elite level, which is recognised by his peers, and he possesses a local citizenship to reject.
6 And their contributions to its institutional and legal aspects, as well as the idea of ‘stepping into the 
experiences of another’.
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discussion on cosmopolitanism” (Mendiata 2009, p.244). The language varies, but the 
meaning  remains  essentially  the  same:  to  provide  the  historical  grounding  for 
contemporary cosmopolitanism, Kant is the 'go to guy'.
This collective, narrow and partial approach is explored by McMurran in her historical 
analysis  of  contemporary  cosmopolitanism,  where  she  raises  the  issue  of  the 
prominence of  Kant,  specifying further  that  “Immanuel  Kant's  political writings  are 
consistently singled out as the progenitor of theories of cosmopolitanism” (2013, p.xx; 
my emphasis). This selectivity of Kant's works is focussed on his “ethical and political 
works” and excludes his own thoughts on education, human nature, culture, religion, 
identity,  race,  and  gender  that  he  built  his  cosmopolitan  vision  from,  which  as  a 
consequence provides a skewed interpretation of his position and arguments, and of the 
history of cosmopolitanism itself.
This  is  not  to  say  that  only  Kant  is  mentioned  though.  Other  enlightenment 
cosmopolitan theorists are occasionally commented on, by a small number of theorists, 
for example Daniele Archibugi's brief contemplation of Anacharsis Cloots (Archibugi 
1992, pp.302-303). The typical approach though is to raise the ‘cosmopolitan’ angle of 
the  alternate  Enlightenment  theorist  and then  to  immediately move to  dismiss  it  as 
unsuitable  or  not  truly  cosmopolitan  after  all  (ibid,  pp.302-303).  At  this  point,  the 
theorist returns to Kant, but for most instances, there is no mention of another theorist at 
all. This selectivity also expresses in a second way - to strip out a wider consideration of 
Kant's works, such as on education, geography or religion. This reliance on a partial 
understanding  of  Kant's  is  also  something  that  those  who  critique  contemporary 
cosmopolitanism often refer to, for example David Harvey's Cosmopolitanism and the  
Geographies  of  Freedom (2009),  Charles  Mill's  Black  Rights/White  Wrongs:  The  
Critique  of  Racial  Liberalism  (2017)  and  Mendiata's  From  imperial  to  dialogical  
cosmopolitanism (2009).
McMurran takes this critique further, arguing that the narrowing of its history extends 
more deeply than being merely restricted to a selective use of Kant's works. She sources 
Kant's current role and interpretation in much of contemporary cosmopolitan theorising, 
whether in the political and philosophical fields, or indeed more widely, as proceeding 
almost  directly  from  Nussbaum's  article  Patriotism  and  Cosmopolitanism (1994). 
Nussbaum's impact on Cosmopolitanism is one widely recognised as bringing it into the 
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academic  'mainstream'  although  I  disagree  with  McMurran  in  one  minor  aspect7; 
Nussbaum's article was not a bolt out of the blue, but rather was able to have the effect 
it did because it appeared after a slow but significant increase in articles in the years 
proceeding her own8 on the topic of cosmopolitanism, aligning with the ending of the 
'Cold War'. Between them, they helped to contribute towards this 'Nussbaum effect', but 
their  intellectual  heritage  in  turn  drew  from  Charles  R.  Beitz's  intervention  into 
international  relations  –  where  he  injected  morality  through  Kant's  Cosmopolitan 
focussed texts (1975; 1981; 1983) into the theorising of international politics arena that 
Thomas Pogge and Brian Barry each also contributed to long before Nussbaum's article.
That  aside,  McMurran's  critique  argues  that  Nussbaum's  presentation  of 
cosmopolitanism both misrepresents Kant's arguments on cosmopolitanism, as well as 
ignoring  the  wider  body  of  literature  from other  cosmopolitan  theorists  during  the 
Enlightenment period. Much of the latter theorising and exploration of cosmopolitanism 
takes  Nussbaum's  presentation  of  cosmopolitan  and  her  later  works  relatively 
unproblematically,  without  an awareness of  these structural  (historical)  issues.  From 
this,  they  fail  to  acknowledge  both  its  complex  heritage  and  the  many-stranded 
developments and advances that occurred during and after the Enlightenment period. 
There is effectively a triple filtering of cosmopolitan theorising that directs the theorist 
firstly to the Enlightenment, absent all save Kant, before it then filters away all those 
texts not directly pertinent to his political, philosophical and cosmopolitan texts. The 
final stage is the re-framing of this process through Martha Nussbaum's article.
The re-writing, or ignoring, of its historical heritage, and the concepts, scenarios, and 
experiences that the term cosmopolitanism is now applied to, and the multiple meanings 
implicit in its use, suggests a far wider and messier story than the narrow and simple 
sketch that is used by so many. Pollock et al. responds to this issue by pointing out that  
“We  are  not  exactly  certain  what  it  is,  and  figuring  out  why this  is  so  and  what 
cosmopolitanism may be raises difficult conceptual issues” (2001, p.1), and it is these 
difficult conceptual issues that this thesis in part looks to explore. Figuring out what 
cosmopolitanism is requires questioning its past because, as Derrida asks us; “Where 
have we received this image of cosmopolitanism from? And what is happening  to it? 
(1997, p.3, his emphasis). His questioning looks to the past to situate an understanding 
7 This echoes my critique of Ingram's arguments on the impact of Nussbaum in section (2.4.1).
8 See e.g. Waldron (1989 and 1992), Kaldor (1991), Archibugi (1992), Held (1992), Robbins (1992) and 
Pogge (1992a & 1992b)
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in and of the present, and not just from a theoretical perspective. By asking 'where' he 
incorporates a  sense of physicality and location.  He particularises it  and he gives it 
specificity  before  questioning  the  present  because  where  the  meanings  of 
cosmopolitanism  have  come  from  determines,  or  at  the  very  least  influences,  our 
understanding and the subsequent uses we attempt to put it to. Further, “Where have we 
received?”  does  not  pre-determine  or  require  a  singular  source  but  allows  for  a 
multiplicity of sources that combine and as such, of the possibility of a multi-faceted 
idea that strains beyond attempts to fit it  into any simplistic thumbnail sketch. If, as 
Pollock et al., Derrida (and others) suggest, there are fundamental questions, confusions 
and uncertainties over its meaning, then the story of where it comes from has pertinence 
to any discussion of what it means, where it is going, and how it means to get there.
Within  political  theory  and  philosophy  that  Nussbaum,  Appiah,  Pogge,  Benhabib, 
Douzinas  and others  explore,  it  is  presented relatively consistently,  as  suggested  by 
Inglis'  'thumbnail  sketch',  which  it  takes  from Kant  and  follows  the  historical  path 
detailed above.  But when looked at  more widely,  it  is  messy,  and as  Herder  would 
suggest  of  human  nature  and  progress  in  general;  fragmentary,  contradictory,  and 
dialectical9.
This is, I believe, part of both the weakness and strength of contemporary approaches to 
cosmopolitanism, which raise  necessary and fundamental  challenges  to  its  meaning, 
purpose  and  propagation.  This  vagueness  and  the  multiples  of  meanings,  often 
contradictory and conflicting, from theorist to theorist and discipline to discipline, with 
unexplained exclusions or inclusions of meaning, approach, interpretation and historical 
narrative, permit or perhaps even encourage what I suggest is a vagueness almost to the 
point of irrelevancy within a Kantian dualist framing. From a Herderian perspective 
though, focussed through his thin moral cosmopolitanism of individuality, freedom and 
agency, and taking into account Hansen's reinterpretation of cosmopolitan as “inhabitant 
of the world” rather than citizen, they can cohere in clusters, some of them by necessity 
contradictory and conflicting, connecting in multiple ways to each other.
Extending from this, the determination of who was or was not a cosmopolitan theorist is 
one that can continually, almost endlessly, widen. From a simplistic history of a single 
re-presenter (and developer) of the concept; Immanuel Kant, it  allows for an almost 
9 See Chapter four.
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endless array of variations on different and related themes10.
1.3 Education and Cosmopolitanism
The previous section explored the multiple meanings of cosmopolitanism, and it is from 
this variable source that fundamental questions arise as to its connection to education. 
Not  so  much  that it  is  linked  to  education  historically,  but  rather  that  what 
cosmopolitanism is, or what it is conceived to be, determines what type of education 
could, should, or indeed already does, occur.
With such a wide and in many cases contradictory understanding of its many meanings, 
education's connection to it as a result varies from the Kantian conscious reconstruction 
(or revolution) of one's identity as an adult man (1803), and Beck's meta-forces of world 
risk  inducing  a  cosmopolitanisation  of  humanity  from  above  (1996),  through  to 
Nussbaum's liberal arts education at university developing sympathy and compassion 
through  literature  (1997),  and  Delanty's  hybridization  or  creolisation,  as  cultures, 
communities  and  societies  interact  (2009),  all  the  way  to  Appiah's  rooted 
cosmopolitanism (2006) and Ingram's radical cosmopolitics from below (2013).
The idea that education contributes to the formation of an individual's identity and their 
perception of the world is, I believe,  an unproblematic assumption to make. We are 
taught,  in  specific  ways,  for  specific  purposes,  and  this  directs  and  influences  our 
interpretation of the world around us as we interact with it. We make use of the tools we 
are provided with, such as language, cultural norms, our abilities to use our bodies and 
10 A short (but in no way comprehensive) list of historical theorists and philosophers now or in the past 
assigned the label of 'cosmopolitan' includes:
Immanuel Kant of  course;  Johann  Herder,  who  rejected  Kantian’s  Cosmopolitanism  as  elitist, 
exclusionary and a danger to humanity (Scrivener 2007);  Jeremy Bentham (Skrivener 2007);  Jean-
Baptiste du Val-de-Grace, Baron de Cloots (Anarcharsis Cloots) who argued for the expansion of 
(French) cosmopolitan ideals across the globe (Kleingeld 1999a; Archibugi 2005);  Le Marquis de  
Condorcet (Rothschild 1996, Valdez 2012);  Auguste Comte (Inglis 2014b);  Emile Durkheim (Inglis 
2014b,  Pendenza  2017);  Franz Fannon (Go 2013);  Johann Wolfgang von  Goethe who helped  to 
develop the idea of Cosmopolitan Literature and was a student of Johann Herder) (Qing 2014); Georg 
Forster who critiqued Kant's arguments on both race and happiness) (Gray 2012; Kleingeld 1999a); 
Dietrich Hermann Hegewisch who developed a vision of capitalist cosmopolitanism, building on both 
Adam Smith and Kant's works (Kleineld 1999a); Alexander von Humboldt (Ette 2001); David Hume 
(Glowienka 2015);  Karl Marx (Cheah 2006);  Michel de Montaigne (Brown 2009,  Hansen 2011); 
Montesquieu (Delanty 2009); Friedrich Nietzsche (Gagnier 2010); Georg Philipp Friedrich Freiherr  
von Hardenberg (Novalis) who explored romantic cosmopolitanism (Kleingeld 1999a);  Alain Locke 
(Harris  1997);  John  Locke (Binney 2010);  John  Stuart  Mill (Agathocleous  2010;  Appiah  2001); 
Thomas Paine (Walker 2000); The Abbe Saint Pierre (Kant); Friedrich Schiller (Laursen 1993); Adam 
Smith (Ahmed 2014; Forman-Barzilai 2010; McMurran 2013; Preparata 1996);  Ferdinand Tonnies 
(Delanty 2009, Inglis 2009); Francisco de Vitoria (Catta 2016, Mignolo 2000); Christof Weiland (who 
popularised  the  term cosmopolitan  during  the  Enlightenment  period,  prior  to  Kant's  own works) 
(Appiah 2006; Beck 2007; Kleingeld 1999a) and Mary Wollstonecraft (Scrivener 2007).
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minds, and a variety of techniques which are imparted to us, to find a place within that 
society, communities and groupings, and through our often-subconscious interpretations 
of the meanings of these norms, we then produce or reproduce new variants of them, or 
indeed rejections of them. There is, further, considerable literature (see Callan 1997; 
McDonough & Feinberg 2003; Hansen 2011 etc.) on the deliberate creation of citizens 
of  particular  inclinations  and  perspectives,  whether  from  a  political,  societal, 
community, economic, gendered or religious perspective, or indeed from the perspective 
of  the educators  themselves.  This ranges  across formal  citizenship education,  subtle 
gender  and  relationship  norms  underlying  educational  policies,  all  the  way  to  the 
forcible displacement and re-education of indigenous populations by colonial powers or 
dominant groups within a state to a minority group. It also includes, for example, the 
seemingly  ever-present  fear  by  governments  and  peoples  that  'the  wrong  kind  of 
education'  can  change a  person's  sexuality  or  gender  and break down the  bonds  of 
society itself11, just as it underlies the belief in and use of conversion therapy to attempt 
to change a person's gender or sexuality.
To a great extent this is influenced by the ways in which bounded political ideologies 
are  harnessed  by  political  parties  within  the  Westphalian  state  system,  in  direct 
competition  with  each  other  for  political  power.  This  in  turn  is  expressed  through 
decisions on the form, function and purpose of education, and on the preferred structure 
of a society's  norms in terms of morality,  identity,  expression,  and duty towards the 
nation state. Cosmopolitanism by contrast, lacks a specific national political presence 
because of its perceived focus on either the individual, which leads to a distancing of 
them from identifying with the nation-state or their local community, or on the global. 
Its use as a descriptor to denote something that happens to individuals or people as a 
result of some form of global influence also suggests that cosmopolitanism is something 
that just happens to an individual because of globalisation. This lack of direct usefulness 
to the state, and its lack of intra-national support influences the importance that the idea 
of cosmopolitanism has for specific national educational approaches directed for the 
benefit of the state - unless it can be linked to specific aspects of globalism that nation-
states  approve  of,  such  as  global  capitalism,  liberal  universalism,  or  through moral 
concepts such as religious belief, universal human rights or ideas of 'equality'.
Cosmopolitan attitudes or identities are instead often presented in direct  opposition to 
11 The  recent  furore  over  the  provision  of  LGBT education  to  children,  currently  receiving  much 
attention in the UK media, is one such case in point.
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the needs of a nation-state or a community. This is variously linked to different, and 
unwanted, religious or cultural identities, for example Jewish people in cold-war Soviet 
Union (Brooks 1992) or throughout much of Europe historically (Boehm 1935) or well 
educated, supposedly parasitic individuals in the US and elsewhere, who are perceived 
to possess little or no sense of local community identity12. Given the multiple ways in 
which cosmopolitanism is used to present undesirable attitudes or identities, to want to 
encourage the education of 'cosmopolitan individuals' makes little sense from a state's or 
a bounded moral perspective. These types of undesirable cosmopolitan identities are, 
given the  multiples  of  negative connotations  used  to  describe  them over  successive 
decades and generations, presented in direct opposition to a nation-state's survival or 
well-being on the global stage, and labelled as parasites, unpatriotic, feckless, footloose, 
and so on. The current, commonly understood configuration of cosmopolitanism within 
international relations such as those discussed by Beardsworth (2011) or Held (1995) 
place  cosmopolitanism  at  odds  with  a  sense  of  local  and  communal  identity  and 
cohesion. Its erasure, or the downplaying of approaches to cosmopolitanism that link 
with  the  incorporation  of  subjective  experiences,  positions  cosmopolitanism  as  a 
rarefied  and  arguably  unrealistic  standpoint  more  akin  to  radical  libertarian 
individualism, than contributing to a state's determination of what a moral or situated 
education would or should be designed to produce.
In  contrast  to  this,  the  rarefied  sense  of  a  cosmopolitan  moral  education,  carried 
primarily by Kant's philosophical writings, projects the idea of the genius and moral 
cosmopolitan as one who acts in some way as both the conscience of the state and the 
exemplar of universal morality itself. This can be seen to occur, in part at least, in the 
privileged  educational  systems  and schools  that  provided (and continue  to  provide) 
states  with  individuals  that  served  the  purpose  of  the  state  as  if  it  were  the  best 
representative of humanity. Alongside this, Kant explicitly argued that education for the 
commonality should be designed to provide a level and type of education specifically 
for the functioning and reproduction of the state,  and to channel  humanity's  natural 
asocial  sociability  into  economic  but  not  military  rivalry.  This  education  would  be 
designed  around  cosmopolitan  norms,  but  would  not  incorporate  an  education  in 
cosmopolitan virtue13. The former empowering national universalism and the latter both 
12 This was an area of exploration in the field of sociology from the 1940's – 1990's in the US, where  
assumptions of a binary of opposition between cosmopolitan, and local, identities led to a series of  
empirical studies and a wide body of literature that expanded to the UK in the 1970's. See e.g. Merton  
(1968), Abrahamson (1965), Gouldner (1957), Hanh (1974), Harvard (1964), Lammers (1974).
13 See chapter 3 on Kant for more detail on this.
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liberal functionalism and global capitalism, all under the needs of the state - and each 
deliberately failing  to  either  connect  or  encourage  a  situated  cosmopolitan  identity, 
experience or expression.
If organic imagery were used here, the idea of the state as a body, developed during the 
Enlightenment period proves adequate. Elite schooling was designed to contribute to the 
higher functioning of the state, the commonality were to act as the state's limbs. The 
cosmopolitan 'geniuses' that would appear regardless of environment, would then act as 
the conscience in the centre of the mind, ready to contribute to the development and 
refinement of the civil constitution that would be the precursor to a global cosmopolitan 
society, or its poorer cousin, the pacific federation. Crucially though, this also meant the 
rejection,  chaining,  or  the  deliberately  enforced  powerlessness  of  the  sources  of 
emotions (i.e. the heart).
The issue then, for cosmopolitanism, is what cosmopolitanism itself means, and what 
role education as a result  should have.  Cosmopolitanism is,  after  all,  presented as a 
'progressive' or utopian theory that, far from trying to simply accommodate 'what is', 
looks to 'what could be' and attempts to move towards it. For Kant and his inheritors 
such  as  David  Held,  Daniele  Archibugi  and  Thomas  Pogge,  this  requires  the 
formalisation of humanity in a global-institutional way, continually moving closer and 
closer to the 'perfect system' and for the most part appearing to rely on existing systems 
of education, but the further removed from the institutional approach, the more removed 
the argument is on what education should be to promote cosmopolitanism. 
Hansen  suggests  that  we  consider  the  encounter  with  difference  under  the  idea  of 
'moving closer apart and further together' (2011), and a number of theorists emphasise 
the educational power of literature to teach empathy14. Ingram, by contrast, produces a 
cosmopolitan framing that 'teaches' cosmopolitan values as the product of the dialectic 
between universal oppression and marginalised resistance,  as a 'bottom-up' response, 
whereas Beck's is about cosmopolitanisation from above and its imposition on those 
below.  Appiah's  rooted  cosmopolitan  sits  somewhere  in  the  middle  as  a  curiously 
middle-class  response  to  the  power  of  meta-forces,  globalisation  and  changing 
economic and political realities on third-world community living, in encounters with the 
other in a “global village” (2005, p.217).
14 For example Aboulifa (2009); Adorjan (2001); Alexander (1947); Bielsa (2014); Bracher (2013) etc. 
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If cosmopolitanism is a process, then education needs to be understood as a dynamic of 
that process which leads towards more cosmopolitization, whether it be from above in 
Beck's  case,  somewhere  in  the  middle  with  Appiah  and  Nussbaum,  or  below  with 
Ingram and Hansen. If it is practice then it requires a different response, just as it needs 
different  techniques  if  it  is  a  philosophy or  way of  life.  If  it  is  at  odds  with  local 
affiliation then it needs to emphasise its global and universal aspects, whereas if it is 
understood to be an attitude that  can  only be created in  the  subjective  then  a  very 
different and more delicate approach is required (Biestla 2013). 
1.4 Kant and Herder
Both Immanuel Kant and Johann Herder understood the reality of a world where people 
live  very  different  lives,  grouped  in  different  polities,  with  a  spread  of  different 
perceptions  on  morality  and  identity,  but  their  responses  to  reality  was  radically 
different. Kant sought a way to harness the intellect, to move beyond the chaotic impact 
of human experiences and interactions through constitutional measures and educational 
practices that direct the practice and expression of morality in a single very specific 
way. For Kant, ultimately the problem he is responding to is difference and change, and 
his solution to this was the development of pure reason that involves a need to believe 
in God, and which would lead to the deliberate construction of a single moral-religious-
social identity. This required for him a civil constitution, asocial sociability, economic 
commerce, an international federation, and the refinement of education into a science. 
His pedagogy would produce individuals who would over time become more and more 
cosmopolitan as they grew older, and as the science of pedagogy was refined further. 
They would exert their social status onto the state and its citizens, influencing social 
norms, the practice of education, and the establishment of laws, from which collectively, 
a  cosmopolitan  identity  could  most  easily  be  developed  from.  Only  then  could 
cosmopolitanism  come  into  being  as  both  a  practice,  process,  and  philosophy  and 
approach his Kingdom of Ends.
Kant  saw  the  need  for  overarching  global  systems  (Cosmopolitan  Right,  a  Pacific 
Federation and his nine Propositions). Alongside this was the active determination to 
erase  moral  difference,  a  cosmopolitan  education  for  the  intellectual  elite,  and  the 
neutralisation of the masses through the development of a practical schooling system 
geared to the service of the state that would direct their asocial sociability through trade 
and  enterprise.  Behind  it  all  would  exist  Kant's  social,  religious  and  educational 
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enterprises, in conjunction with Nature and Providence, slowly working on 'the masses' 
through  the  weariness  of  unending  conflict  that  would  lead  men  to  create  a  civil 
constitution. Kant from here saw firstly the need to turn education into a science – and 
thus to improve, over succeeding generations, the way by which one could be turned 
from a flawed, emotionally driven individual into a cosmopolitan man with the same 
exact  moral  code as  all  other  cosmopolitan men.  His second angle consisted of  his 
development  of  the  ethico-civil  society;  the  actions  of  these  cosmopolitan  men 
moralising  the  masses  and  themselves  through  public  moral  acts  that  others  could 
emulate and learn from, even if they could not self-cultivate their morality through pure 
reason. Kant's justification for such an approach was, quite simply, that emotions were 
too dangerous and too powerful and, when joined with any use of reason, they would 
inevitably led to evil unless a pre-constructed moral-religious-cosmopolitan personality 
could be developed to short-circuit emotionally driven reason. Elite (moral) education, 
whilst  not feasible for a variety of reasons15 to  give to  all,  and not strong and sure 
enough to give humanity as a whole the strength to resist, was a necessary aspect that 
would help to contribute to human progression, and which would give humanity the 
tools by which a civil constitution could be created.
Herder, by contrast, looked to accommodate a plurality of cultural and moral identities 
in a fragmentary way that was wary of constitutional,  institutional,  and bureaucratic 
routes  because of their  tendency to dominate and prolong their  own existences.  His 
approach  rejected  the  idea  of  pure  reason  and  universal  moral  constructs,  arguing 
instead for a holistic understanding of human nature. He also saw, in common with 
many of the negative views towards cosmopolitanism today, that any universal system 
or project would become a way in which already dominant groups would reinforce their 
dominance and serve to solidify cultural difference in an artificial and damaging way. 
For Herder, difference and change is the point of humanity, not the problem. 
This required a recognition of our situated existence, and besonnheit (reflection) was the 
process that humans already used, which could be developed further into a way that we 
could learn, through acceptance of our own flawed natures, and from differences and 
commonalities in ourselves and The Other. This reflection, in his approach, because it 
involved both emotions and reason as a single mental capability, could be reframed as a 
process  of  humanität that  carried  with  it  a  moral  imperative  to  act  on  injustice, 
inequality,  and unfreedom. Education,  as a  result,  in  Herder's  framing,  was not  just 
15 See chapter three for a more in-depth discussion on this.
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about coming to terms with difference, but a project to facilitate the ability to reflect. 
Essentially being the best self-reflective 'process of becoming' that one could express, 
and how an individual, and the families and communities that they were a part of, would 
in turn contribute to a culture where this was both prized and normalised.
The  cultivation  of  this  holistic  mentality  through  reflection  was,  for  Herder,  the 
cultivation of genius, which he believed all  humans, no matter their gender or race, 
possessed (Herder 1778).  Because of this, education for him needed to be focussed on 
humanity's cognate-sensate capabilities through formal education, with an emphasis on 
using  happiness,  joy and  enthusiasm to  embed,  channel  and  drive  forward  positive 
attitudes throughout an individual's life, especially in their formative schooling years. 
On to this he added his arguments on the essential role and importance that families, 
communities, cultures and societies play in providing the linguistic, emotional, cultural 
and  rational  frameworks  by  which  we  understand  and  interact  with  and  influence 
ourselves  and  the  world  around  us,  and  the  feedback  mechanisms  by which  those 
frameworks, cultures and communities grew, developed, changed and faded over time16. 
He saw the importance of such communities as essential and unique sites of human 
experience – something that we as humans are 'already always' a part of. This meant 
that they needed protection from dangers such as capitalism and European expansion, or 
indeed any other  hegemonic influences that would prevent culture and growing and 
changing through balanced interactions between cultures through intellectual and social 
commerce. He perceived any attempt at universalising humanity in a Kantian way as not 
just  inherently  flawed,  but  an  attack  on  human  diversity,  the  primary  gateway  to 
European domination of the world, and a fundamental hindrance to the development of 
a shared humanity.
1.5 Chapter Summations
In Chapter two I explore the normative assumptions on education and cosmopolitan 
identity  which  underlying  the  works  of  Thomas  Pogge,  Martha  Nussbaum,  Seyla 
Benhabib  and  James  Ingram.  Whilst  this  chapter  highlights  the  relative  absence  of 
exploration on the role of the creation of a cosmopolitan identity (either through formal 
educational  systems,  or  through  cultural  education  –  Bildung),  I  piece  together 
underlying norms that they rely on in their works to construct an understanding of the 
principles  and  educational  assumptions  implicit  in  their  writings.  Thomas  Pogge's 
16 Bildung and his interpretation of the concept of 'tradition'.
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approach to, and interpretation of cosmopolitanism, presents a traditional, universalist 
approach  that  aligns  closely with  Kant's,  secularised  for  the  contemporary era.  His 
approach emphasises the replaceability of each individual within his framework, under 
'individualism', and behind Rawls' “Veil of Ignorance” (Rawls (1971) 1999, pp.118-122; 
Pogge 1983; 1992). For him, there is a necessity of a single moral standard and of the 
positioning of  cultural  or  personal  differences  and experiences  into  the  category of 
lifestyle choices that can be overcome or changed through formal education and the 
personal exertion of one's will.
Benhabib's approach identifies Pogge's position as an aspect of the 'generalised other' 
who's purpose is to achieve universalised justice, but which only has reversibility when 
personal  experiences  and  moral  encounters  of  the  'concrete  other'  are  ignored  or 
dismissed into the private realm. In addition, that Pogge's approach (and thus Rawl's) 
corresponds to the concept of the archetypal male figure.  Her response to this  is  to 
emphasise the experiences of the concrete other and the role of the 'Good Life', which 
she proposes through an approach using discourse ethics to produce reversibility for 
both the generalised and concrete other. 
James Ingram argues that cosmopolitanism can only manifest 'from below' – from the 
locality that Nussbaum argues cannot correspond to a cosmopolitan approach. He sees 
cosmopolitanism from below as a necessary corrective to the tendency of universalisms 
to dominate when driven from an ethical perspective that is then politicised, and locates 
cosmopolitanism  as  the  site  where  conflicts  occur  “through  which  universals  are 
articulated” (2013, p.5). From this, cosmopolitanism is the steps taken to resolve, rather 
than an end goal, and as such, cosmopolitanism is the interruptions to conceptions of 
universality,  not  the  point  of  resolution.  The  political  is  where  he  sees  these 
cosmopolitan  moments  occurring,  and  as  such,  they  only  manifest  when  there  is 
resistance to universalising movements that interrupt and redefine the universal, before 
it  in  turn  is  interrupted.  These  series  of  dialectics  contain  echoes  of  Kant's  own 
argument on 'antisocial sociability' as it relies on an imperfect universalism that changes 
through the negative experiences for whom the universalism does not fit  and who's 
political responses are produced as a result. Essentially, it relies on the suffering of these 
groups, and in turn the ability of them to turn it into a political response that those for 
whom the universalism fits more closely can in turn combine with to produce a new 
universal that potentially fits both groups better.
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The conclusions to chapter two reveals that the main 'problem' with cosmopolitanism is 
the  nature  and  importance  of  human  groups.  Pogge  sits  firmly  on  the  side  of 
universalism.  Benhabib  attempts  to  introduce  some  form  of  balance  between 
universalism and particularism through her use of the generalised and concrete other, 
but still has underlying issues with the idea of culture. Her rejection of cultural identity 
under the premise that talking about culture reifies it is a weakness to her attempted 
balance.  When  added  to  her  democratic  iterations  that  support  the  civil  state  over 
cultural experience, and her enthusiasm for Kant's Cosmopolitan Right17 reveals a clear 
preference for universalism over particularism. For Ingram, he locates the  process of 
cosmopolitanism in the resistance to universalism, in a dialectic that produces new 'false 
universalisms' awaiting challenge from below, but he fails to elaborate on what that 
means, instead retreating from the issue of replicated hierarchies within these groups, 
and failing to engage with the idea of culture in any meaningful way.
Chapter three re-examines Kant's writings in more depth than is customarily the case, 
incorporating the majority of his writings from 1764 onwards, and including his works 
on religion, aesthetics, morality, judgement, anthropology, race, and the state, adding 
structure, complexity, depth, and additional context to his Cosmopolitan world system. 
This chapter presents a new interpretation of his overall works, highlighting neglected 
aspects such as the role of religion and his arguments on community and human nature, 
into his  final  international  politically themed writings.  By doing so,  building Kant's 
cosmopolitan world from its foundational philosophical, ethical and religious principles 
upwards, it highlights not just the crucial role of education, but also of religion, society 
and identity re-creation that contributes to his arguments on education, and emphasises 
the partial, elitist and exclusionary nature of his cosmopolitan vision. It also reveals that 
an  underlying  Hobbesian  structure  informs  Kantian  cosmopolitanism,  principally 
through the emotions of fear and desire.
Whilst Kant does not assert that humans are selfish by nature, he does still argue that it  
is necessarily to assume that they are,  and so his system requires a response to this 
factored into his scheme. This is expressed through the importance he places on trade 
and commerce as 'peaceful' expressions of the manifestation of asocial sociability, as 
well as in the use of Cosmopolitan Right as a one-side tool that justifies the right to 
17 I examine cosmopolitan right in the section on Benhabib in section (2.2.4) as well as exploring it in 
the chapter on Kant in section (3.6.3).
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access and intrude on 'natural societies' (but not societies recognised as possessing a 
civil constitution). Cosmopolitan Right's main purpose here is to expand the reach of 
cosmopolitan norms through commerce,  either through the establishment of colonies 
and institutions, or through the normalisation of economic practices that contribute to 
the pragmatic education of the state that would in turn lead to its incorporation into a 
pacific federation. Education, for Kant, is the principle means by which all other moral 
and  cultural  expressions  can  be  slowly  erased  from  all  civil  societies,  and  his 
educational  system,  both  formally  and  through  bildung,  is  designed  to  normalise 
cosmopolitan norms into the fabric of all  societies.  The final point that this  chapter 
reveals  is  that  Kant's  system elevates  the  moral  philosopher  to  the  position  of  the 
conscience of the state, and that all of his writings on moral education and deliberately 
directed towards the production of this rare individual through the conclusions reached 
from the development of pure reason, and not, as is commonly assumed, for the masses.
In chapter four, I engage with the works of Johann Herder, presenting his writings on 
Humanität not just for his significantly different interpretation of humanity, but also as a 
cosmopolitan  theorist  in  his  own  right.  This  chapter  explores  his  works  and  his 
combining  of  emotionality  to  rationality  as  a  proto-  critical  theory  academic,  and 
comprises  his  ideas  of  global  society,  community and  identity  through language.  It 
presents  Herder's  works  are  of  a  surprisingly contemporary nature,  with a  focus  on 
empathy and the recognition and importance of shared experiences of vulnerability and 
suffering  to  facilitate  interactions  with  the  other.  In  so  doing,  these  two  chapters 
highlight the historical importance of education in their arguments.
Chapter five examines the writings of contemporary educators who have specialised in 
the theorising of cosmopolitan education. By exploring the works of David Hansen, it 
establishes  the  surprisingly  Herderian  nature  of  his  arguments  and  approaches  to 
cosmopolitanism,  as  well  as  the  importance  of  re-framing  of  cosmopolitanism  as 
'inhabitant of the world'. I engage with Mark Bracher, whose use of cognitive theory and 
psychological  approaches  to  cosmopolitanism  through  literature  allows  for  a 
clarification both of the base moral expectation of cosmopolitanism, and the subsequent 
route by which cosmopolitan sentiments of compassion (which incorporates a moral 
imperative  to  act)  can  be  instilled  in  a  person,  through a  literature  education.  This 
approach requires the breaking down and reformulating a series of paired binaries by 
which humans are assigned into different mental categories of man vs animal, and man 
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vs woman. I then explored Hannah Spector's cosmopolitan approach to imagination, 
where  she  argues  that  economistic  approaches  to  education,  in  conjunction  with 
increasing  bureaucratisation  has  both  negatively  impacted  on  the  likelihood  of  the 
productive imagination, and skewed reproductive imagination in economistic ways. I 
then  examine  Ling’s  trialectical  approach  to  world  politics  (2017)  as  a  way  of 
introducing nonbinary concepts into the idea of cosmopolitanism.
The  chapter  concludes  by arguing that  a  nonbinary re-framing of  cosmopolitanism, 
which  breaches  the  implicit  binaries  inherent  in  Kant's  cosmopolitanism  and  his 
inheritors, can serve to produce new ways of thinking about the meaning and purpose of 
cosmopolitanism itself.
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Chapter 2:  Re-presenting 
Contemporary   Cosmopolitanism
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2.3. Seyla Benhabib
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2.3.2. The Claims of Culture
2.3.3. Cosmopolitan Right
2.3.4. Education
2.4. James Ingram
2.4.1. Top Down, and Bottom Up, Cosmopolitanism
2.4.2. Contestatory Cosmopolitanism
2.4.3. Education
2.5. Conclusions
2.1 Introduction
This chapter examines the works of three prominent cosmopolitan theorists: Thomas 
Pogge, Seyla Benhabib and James Ingram. I initially present the main thrust of their 
respective works before delving more deeply into some of the key arguments of each of 
the theorists. I explore how, whilst they do not explicitly explore the idea of education 
in any detail, their approaches still give us insight into the underlying norms on human 
nature, identity, culturing, and cosmopolitanism itself that they rely on. From this, I lay 
out and expand on how their arguments relate to education, and the kind of education 
implicit in their arguments.
Whilst  education is  the primary focus of this  thesis,  this  claim, as one of my main 
assertions is that education is (mostly) absent from contemporary international relations 
and political understandings of cosmopolitanism, when historically it was considerably 
more important. As such, proving a negative through the relative absence of explicit 
discussions on education is not in and of itself sufficient to justify this, because their 
works and arguments contain within them implicit norms of how we as human beings 
are shaped through education,  either of a formal type in a schooling setting (and of 
course not just what we learn but also how, where and why we are taught), or of an 
informal type through culturing and socialisation. Because of this, the expectations of 
how humans act, react, perceive themselves and others, develop, change, and connect to 
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other  humans are critical.  An assumption of  humans as isolated units,  or  as always 
already  a  part  of  cultures  and  communities,  or  that  humans  are  by  nature  selfish, 
deceitful, violent, or evil, or perhaps altruistic or innocent at birth, all bring with them 
different expectations on how identity is present in a new-born, and then shaped, and as 
a consequence what role the many types of education take in achieving this. What we 
are taught and what we learn, whilst obviously not the same things, are both heavily 
influenced by the assumptions on what is being shaped in the process, the methods 
taken to educate, the locations in which it happens and the social environment, and the 
many different desired outcome(s). Since education itself is rarely explored in any great 
detail within political discussions of cosmopolitanism, a wider analysis is needed that 
takes  account  of  expectations  of  human  nature,  identity  creation  and  development, 
because implicit within these are assumptions about what it means to be and grow as a 
human being, and on how, or even whether, education shapes our identities (and if so, to 
what degree).
There are  a  number  of  other  theorists  who have  contributed  to  the  development  of 
political cosmopolitanism in the contemporary era18, and in addition there are those not 
specifically writing within the field of politics, whose works have an impact on political 
cosmopolitanism19, yet both Thomas Pogge and Seyla Benhabib frequently serve as key 
initiators to many of these theorists' own developments. According to Google Scholar, 
Thomas Pogge's article  Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty  (1992b), is one of the most 
cited  articles  that  has  appeared  on  cosmopolitanism20,  and  Seyla  Benhabib's  book 
Another Cosmopolitanism (2006a)21 has impacted in a similar way. Only Derrida's book 
On  Cosmopolitanism  and  Forgiveness  (2001)22 which  was  mentioned  in  the 
introduction, and Martha Nussbaum's  Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism  (1994)23 have 
exceeded theirs. As such, their works and arguments are seminal to understanding the 
current status of cosmopolitan theorising. My selection of James Ingram, although his 
works are much more recent than Benhabib and Pogge, is due to his quite different and 
more unusual approach. Whilst other theorists outside of politics typically explore the 
idea  of  bottom-up  cosmopolitanism,  very  few  of  them  have  explored  it  from  an 
18 e.g. Daniele Archibugi, Charles R. Beitz, Gillian Brock, Garrett Wallace Brown, Steven Caney, Fred 
R. Dallmyr, Costas Douzinas, David Held, Mary Kaldor, Martha Nussbaum, Onara O'Neill, Samuel 
Scheffler, Jeremy Waldron, Thomas C. Walker,  and others.
19 e.g. Anthony Appiah, Ulrick Beck, Gerard Delanty, Pheng Cheah, Robert Fine, David Inglis, Nikos 
Papastergiadis, Florian Pitchler, Bruce Robbins, Lee Trepanier etc.
20 1274 citations; Google Scholar, 04-07-18.
21 1260 citations; ibid.
22 2364 citations; ibid.
23 1917 citations; ibid.
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explicitly political and theoretical perspective. His inclusion allows me to cast a wider 
net and present a broader spectrum of meaning through their works.
2.2 Thomas Pogge
Thomas Pogge's works have been directed towards global ethical issues, with a focus on 
poverty  and  global  injustice,  best  characterised  as  an  analytical  and  political 
philosophical approach. His earliest works were for the main part either responses to the 
writings of John Rawls, or redevelopments of his ideas24. He argues largely from within 
a Rawlsian framework, but with an emphasis on the global, a significant aspect of which 
focusses on global health and socio-political issues (Lake 1992, p.474). For this reason, 
Pogge's approach could be categorised as a universalisation and modification of Rawls 
arguments rather than a distinctly new approach (although some of his 'tweaks' are not 
inconsiderable  in  their  own  right  and  produce  significantly  differences  in  their 
conclusions). From the early 2000's, Pogge moved more explicitly towards focussing on 
global injustice, health and poverty25. As a part of this, he re-characterises the idea of a 
positive  moral  response  to  alleviate  suffering  worldwide  (through  charity  and 
philanthropy etc.) into a negative duty, arguing that we (as in western developed nations 
and  the  people  therein)  are  actively  complicit in  the  suffering  of  others  through 
maintaining and supporting an institutionally biased economic system (1989 & 2008b). 
This section commences with a brief overview of his works, before focusing on three 
key  areas  of  Pogge's  research.  Firstly  his  much  quoted  'three  aspects  of 
Cosmopolitanism' (2.2.1) where I highlight the difference between individualism and 
individuality. Secondly, I explore his approach to human groupings and his arguments 
on  essential  and  additional  rights  (2.2.2).  Finally,  in  section  (2.2.3)  I  examine  the 
underlying  Rawlsian  norms  that  Pogge  makes  use  of,  and Susan Okin's  critique  of 
Rawls,  alongside  Pogge's  own  writings  on  education,  to  explore  the  unspoken 
educational  grounds  of  Pogge's  cosmopolitanism.  I  then  conclude  by  arguing  that 
Pogge's scheme is designed to reject the particular whenever it comes into conflict with 
the  universal,  and  contains  normative  assumptions  of  justice  as  fairness,  which 
naturalises the dominant culture within the state, and rejects the political nature of the 
domestic  sphere.  Whilst  there  is  cultivation  to  cosmopolitan  particularity  (i.e. 
socialisation)  within  the  family,  primarily  from  the  female  carer,  all  other  levels, 
24 See Pogge (1983, 1988, 1992a, 1992b, 1994, 1995, 1998, 1999, 2000a, 2001d, 2001e, 2002a, 2002b 
and 2004a), but see especially Realising Rawls (1989).
25  Pogge (2005, 2008a, 2008b, 2010 and 2011).
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whether  socialisation,  formal  education  or  institutional  requires  and  prioritises 
universality, as does his presentation of group identity as a voluntary association that 
can be dismissed or rejected at will. 
2.2.1 Three Aspects of Cosmopolitanism
The first area that I explore is featured within Thomas Pogge's  Cosmopolitanism and 
Sovereignty (1992b). In this, he presents his much referenced and repeated 'three aspects 
of cosmopolitanism' which a number of other theorists have made use of in their own 
arguments, and it forms a core element of contemporary cosmopolitan theorising (e.g. 
Cavallar 2011, p.7)26. Pogge commences the section that this quote is taken from by 
simply by stating that “Three Elements are shared by all  Cosmopolitans”, and in so 
doing implicitly rejects the cosmopolitanism of cosmopolitan theorists who do not agree 
with him. He then continues: 
“First, individualism: The ultimate units of concern are human beings, or persons 
- rather than, say, family lines, tribes, ethnic, cultural, or religious communities, 
nations, or states. The latter may be units of concern only indirectly, in virtue of 
their individual members or citizens. Second, generality: This special status has 
special force. Persons are ultimate units of concern for everyone – not only for 
their  compatriots,  fellow  religionists  and  such  like.  Third:  universality:  The 
status of ultimate unit of concern attaches to every living human being equally 
not  merely  to  some  subset,  such  as  men,  aristocrats,  Aryans,  whites,  or 
Muslims.” (Pogge 1992, pp. 48-49, his emphasis). 
There are three main aspects to this formation to be considered: firstly, two of the points 
he  lists,  Individualism  and Generality, could  as  easily  refer  to  a  bordered  liberal 
ideology such as Rawls presents. The addition of Universality effectively establishes it 
as a borderless liberal  ideology.  This suggests that Cosmopolitanism for Pogge27,  is, 
broadly speaking, the universalisation of liberalism rather than a specifically different 
set of ideas, ideals and meanings28.
26 David Held describes it  as a part  of the 'third conception of cosmopolitanism', which he suggests 
comes from Beitz, Pogge and Barry (Held 2010, pp.39-44). He also refers specifically to this text 
(ibid. pp.44-46) when doing so. He locates the Stoics as the first, and the second occurring during the  
Enlightenment period (solely with reference to Immanuel Kant), which suggests a kind of 'parity of 
importance' to these three conceptions and also aligns with Inglis' thumbnail historical sketch. Daniele 
Archibugi follows a similar although somewhat less elevated path; in his case “...build[ing] upon the 
definitions introduced by Charles Beitz... Thomas Pogge... and David Held” (Archibugi 2004b, p.20) 
and Stan Van Hooft quotes verbatim the whole section of Pogge's text (Van Hooft 2009, pp.4-5) from 
which he then develops his own arguments.
27 As it is for Brian Barry (see Bacon 2003) and others.
28 See also Beardsworth (2011) who follows on from Pogge and links liberalism and cosmopolitanism 
together in a similar way.
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Secondly, whilst Pogge emphasizes the fundamental importance of the individual over 
that of the groupings that humans form in this formula, he fails to explain (either here or 
elsewhere) the importance of the individual as an individual or what it means to be an 
individual. I am referring here to a distinction between the meanings of individualism 
and individuality. The latter I take to be suggestive of that which makes an individual a 
unique and irreplaceable person, and the former indicative of the idea of an individual - 
the concept of the interchangeable individual, irrespective of geographical location or 
social environment (see also Simmel 1917/2007). Pogge's arguments align specifically 
with this understanding of individualism rather than that of individuality. Because he is 
projecting from the global downwards, as “...The ultimate units of concern are human 
beings...” in the plural (1992b; my emphases) as a collectivity of human beings, who 
can only be incorporated into his theorising of humanity in general in this way and his 
positioning  of  an  individual's  particularity  to  indirect  concerns emphasises  the 
generality aspect further29. 
Individualism also aligns closely to Kant's arguments, where he emphasises the absolute 
necessity  of  a  single  underlying  moral  system,  which  requires this  level  of 
interchangeability. As a 'successor' and 'progressor' of sorts, of Kantian arguments on 
cosmopolitanism, this also corresponds to Pogge's own position on morality and ties in 
to his support for Rawls' Veil of Ignorance. Pogge's approach, to explore humans only in 
their conceptual collectivity as humanity in toto (but tellingly not in the collectives that 
humans  create  and  gain  political,  legal,  and  social  recognition  from,  such  as 
communities, cultures and societies) skirts around but does not directly engage with the 
arguments  of  other  theorists  such  as  Benhabib,  where  importance  is  placed  on  the 
recognition that each human is both a unique individual, and an inextricably connected 
to  one's  ongoing  group  ties  (familial,  social,  cultural,  societal  etc.).  Instead,  Pogge 
downgrades the factors that contribute to our uniqueness as optional aspects that we can 
chose or discard at will other than what is gained through formal education30. As such, 
these optional extras, for Pogge, do not contribute to who we  truly  are – the core of 
one's identity - as they are aspects that anyone could possess at will31.
29 See also section (2.3.1) for a more in-depth exploration of the generalised other.
30 This is the main topic for section (2.2.3).
31 I examine this area in section (2.3) where I explore Benhabib's works. I widen and distinguish the 
differences between these two terms further, through her interpretation of the generalised and concrete 
other (1992, pp.148-177). I situate Pogge's approach in the generalised other position, with Benhabib's 
focus on the concrete other as the site in which one's individuality is expressed through subjectivity. In 
addition,  I  explore Benhabib's  attempt to  develop concrete 'reversibility'  and respond to this  with 
Young's idea of reciprocity.
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The third main aspect to this is in response to the way that he presents humans through 
individualism  whilst  simultaneously  diminishing  the  social  and  cultural  aspects  of 
human existence. He refers to them as  indirect concerns, and as such, the subjective 
environment, experiences and potentiality of different 'natures' is placed outside of the 
individual. The first point mentions familial, ethnic, religious and political structures – 
those most commonly explored in sociological and cultural explorations, but in the third 
point,  he  uses  a  mixture  of  physical  traits  (men,  white),  class  status  (aristocrats), 
pseudo-scientific  racial  groupings  (Aryans)  and once  again  religion  (Muslims).  This 
array of groupings with organisation into types, or recognition of their differences is one 
that at first glance appears curious but of no great significance, as humans are often 
identified  in  such  ways  through  appearance,  mannerisms  and  dress.  What  it  does, 
however,  do  is  place  this  mixed  selection  of  different  ways  in  which  humans  are 
grouped into the same conceptual 'bag' – and as a result gives them the same conceptual 
significance.  Given the significant differences between these groups, it  suggests that 
any  aspect of difference that humans collectivize around would also be interpreted in 
much the same way by Pogge. As such, any group is, or should be considered, 'the same' 
as any other, whether it be a group formed through similarities of gender, sex, sexuality, 
life experience, geographic environment, or physical or mental differences.
Whilst  he  suggests  that  his  three  points  are  shared  by  all  Cosmopolitans,  his 
individualism makes  no  allowance  for  the  types  of  choice-less  individuality  I  have 
mentioned.  His  individualism  instead  approaches  and  corresponds  to  the  idea  that 
humans  are  essentially  interchangeable,  within  a  collective  of  all  other  individuals, 
subsumed behind a generality of human nature, sourced from the Kantian moral subject, 
with no distinction between lifestyle choices, cultural experiences or even biological 
realities. Further, his approach assumes, along with Kant, that humans are progressing 
ethically and that  religious,  racial  and cultural  ties  and differences  will  be resolved 
simply through greater levels of respect being expressed between different groups.
2.2.2 Human Groupings
In the previous section I discussed Pogge's three aspects of Cosmopolitanism, which 
raised  a  number  of  concerns  with  his  structuring  of  cosmopolitanism,  and  the 
terminology he uses. It  examined, as it  related to these aspects, his approach to the 
distinction between individualism and individuality, and Pogge's clear favouring of the 
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concept of individualism, over the existence and experience of individuality, and the 
different needs that arise as a result. I then started to explore the approach that Pogge 
takes  to  the  idea of  human groupings,  where  he  groups a  wide variety of  different 
characteristics, experiences, and life histories into the same conceptual bundle.
This section develops this angle further, raising additional issues with his approach to 
human groups, and as a direct consequence, how Pogge interprets difference itself - as 
an optional extra that we can chose to possess or discard at will. Pogge explores his 
understanding of human grouping further, when he approaches the idea of group rights 
and ethnicity, which Gillian Brock (2002) engages with, where she notes that “Pogge 
argues  that  whatever  we  demand  from  a  just  and  fair  political  process  for  ethnic 
minorities, we should also demand for any other minorities: If enough citizens share a 
certain  identification  and  are  willing  to  form  a  coalition  for  the  sake  of  securing 
representation  for  themselves  in  a  legislature,  irrespective  of  the  type  of  their 
identification... In this case, it may be plausible to go well beyond our standard group 
types (ethnic, religious, linguistic, lifestyle) to include also dentists, dog-lovers, stamp 
collectors, war widows, socialists and Porsche drivers” (Pogge 1997b, p.180 & Pogge 
2010, p.201, paraphrased in Brock 2002, p.289).
As was noted in the previous section, his grouping together of widely different human 
interests, possessions, experiences and alignments creates a direct equivalence between 
lifestyle choices, professional associations, emotional tragedies and the ownership of 
property, to those of family, ethnicity, race, and even gender. But Pogge takes this still 
further, asserting that “deciding what group rights we, as society, may or should grant to 
various  groups,  we  ought  not  favour  groups  of  one  type,  as  such,  over  groups  of 
another” (p.187).  It  is  here that  he places  a  moral,  political,  and social  equivalence 
between  groups  that  ignores  the  numerous  conceptual  and  empirical  differences 
between these different types of groups. He clearly refuses to accommodate or account 
for a fundamental difference between any of these types of groups – those we chose as 
an act of expression of our personality (stamp collecting, owning vehicles), groups that 
are  chosen for  us  (ethnicity,  race,  religion,  linguistic),  those  for  which  we have  no 
choice (gender, sexuality, physical and mental divergences or typicalities) and of course 
those which blur the boundaries between the ideas of nature, nurture, and agency. 
Instead, he allows for the possibility of stamp collectors being placed on the same value 
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level as family ties or gender and he appears to conceive of human beings as having 
both the capacity and the opportunity to take up or discard all of these affiliations and 
connections  through  conscious  choice  alone  –  as  autonomous  units  who can  chose 
freely and objectively,  and can perhaps even exist without any sense of or need for 
social community. Pogge's decision to place racial, cultural, familial, and other choice-
less groupings in the same conceptual position as stamp collectors, Porsche drivers or 
dog-lovers – and perceiving that their self-declared requests  could be viewed with the 
same level of importance becomes, in his view of cosmopolitanism, a matter of how 
effectively those groups of people connect politically and then acts on their desires for 
special consideration. From this, he places their wants as a factor of  additional rights 
(but not essential ones, which would be based on need, not want); but only in so far as 
those rights and wants would be equal or equivalent to those of any other group that  
decide to also organise and act.
Pogge’s approach neglects the rare, and unusual individual whose  needs, perceptions 
and experiences are markedly different and cannot help but be so, and is, I believe, a 
key attribute that is too often overlooked in political cosmopolitan theorising because its 
theorising tends to gravitate to either the global level, or on how cultural and ethnic 
groupings specifically are impacted by global dynamics in 'cosmopolitan' ways. There is 
a  vast  differential  between  the  political  connections,  social  status  and  economic 
advantages of Porsche owners desiring cheaper fuel, faster driving lanes, or lower taxes 
on  vehicle  insurance,  and  that  of,  for  example  a  disabled,  transgender,  bisexual, 
working-class  woman  who  needs  access  to  essential  healthcare32;  or  perhaps  of  an 
intersex person who requiring uniquely specific protections at birth (or perhaps even an 
entirely different legal category of gender and/or sex being recorded and recognised by 
the state) as essential rights for them, which are not required by others.
Natural inequalities, for example in the case of disabilities, are only relevant to Pogge's 
conception  of  justice  if  they impact  on  the  institutional  structure  of  a  'just'  society 
(Oosterlaken 2013,  p.205).  Because  of  this,  rights  for  Pogge become essential  only 
when  it  is  possible  to  determine  through  a  causal  chain  of  logic  (ibid.  p.211)  that 
institutional injustice exists and contributes to injustice. Yet curiously, in his example of 
disabled people and traffic lights (2002a)33, whilst he acknowledges it as an institutional 
32 For her this would be an essential right, incorporating social norms like marriage, as well as less overt 
social,  political  and  religious  stigmatising  and  persecution,  the  opportunity  to  access  life-saving 
medical care, as well as fundamental changes to the institutional systems that regulate her life.
33 Pogge considers traffic lights to be a part of the institutional order and thus an ‘essential right’.
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injustice - blind people cannot see the lights and thus are unsafe when attempting to 
navigate crossing roads - his response is to suggest guide dogs be given to them. This 
implies  that  compensation  for  injustice  (providing a  'tool'  to  navigate  traffic  lights) 
appears to be a more appropriate response for Pogge than a change to the institutionally 
unjust system (modifying traffic lights so that blind people can navigate them without 
tools). Pogge seems reluctant to respond to the obvious institutional injustice with a 
revision to the institutional system, whereas elsewhere he has a much more positive 
response to inequality (e.g. health care and global poverty) when they are  not framed 
through specific and localised human groupings, but rather seen as amorphous global 
issues that require an institutional change. 
Even  more  surprisingly,  when he  contemplates  the  existence  and needs  of  disabled 
people he concludes that “Nearly all persons with special mental or physical needs or 
disabilities today would be perfectly capable of leading happy and healthy lives if they 
were not suffering the effects of severe past (and present) resource deprivation” (1992b, 
p.186, my emphasis). His response to disability is a response to a perceived historical, 
cultural, and social inequality, but not an institutional inequality, or to accommodate a 
factor of human variation. He presents, effectively, disabled people as the problem to be  
fixed and not the institution. As a consequence, with the 'right' institutional system these 
problems can be resolved, and one must assume as a consequence that for Pogge, once 
this is in place, 'nearly all' disabled persons would no longer (need to) be disabled – that 
disability would essentially 'be resolved' - and should disabled people still exist after 
this resolution, they would fall outside of his framework of institutional justice and into 
other  areas  (p.190)  – which  would  be framed as  additional rights,  to  responded to 
through compensation as a kind of bargain that all groupings of humans can and have an 
equal right to engage in.
Pogge  does  suggest  that  different  ethical  and  moral  positions  could  be  a  factor  in 
resolving  these  inequalities,  but  his  analysis  of  these  different  groups  as  political 
equivalents, and his assessment of them as requiring the same essential rights, suggests 
that the aim of his works is not just not aimed at the existence or removal of structural 
(cultural) inequalities, but that it is also not aimed at accommodating human difference 
at  all  at  the  level  of  essential  rights.  He  instead  sees  difference  itself  as  either  an 
'optional extra',  and thus not within the scope of his  idea of justice at  all  (Ward & 
Wasserman 2015), or he sides with the institutional system when it comes into conflict 
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with cultural and group rights (Pogge 2002a). As a result, Pogge position appears to 
clearly support this hierarchy of needs, established from his philosophical base that he 
takes from Kant, through Rawls, and is resistant to the idea of local-group led variances 
influencing his overall global rights system.
On top of this, and linked to the political capabilities of different groups to achieve 
additional rights through activism and economic power, is that the struggle to achieve 
them in  his  hierarchical  system does  not  start  from a level  playing field.  It  instead 
privileges those further up the hierarchy – and crucially,  those who's essential needs 
already fit  within the borders  of  Pogge's  hierarchical  needs system. As a  result,  his 
conclusions  seem both  overly simplistic  and structurally  incapable  of  achieving  the 
equality  he  argues  for.  It  suggests  rather  that  his  desire  to  protect  and  support  his 
theoretical structure for the rights of individuals is made at the cost of many of the 
things  that  contribute  to  our  individuality  and  give  our  lives  specific  and  personal 
meaning, and also of those which make us different, through no choice of our own, and 
influence the development of our identity and experiences).
2.2.3 Education
The  previous  section  explored  Pogge's  approach  to  human  groupings,  and  his 
positioning of their needs or wants as justifying additional rights granted based on their 
ability to act politically and successfully argue for their rights in such a context. I also 
commented on his shift of what I argued should be considered  essential rights to the 
additional rights bracket, based on the appeals from a (local) group approach (such as 
disabled  people)  rather  than  when  perceived  on the  global  level.  This  section  now 
explores the few times that Pogge directly engages with the idea of education. To build 
this  understanding  further,  I  explore  the  underlying  philosophical  and  normative 
premises that both he and Rawls share, through Okin's critique of Rawls. I then consider 
how the previous sections on the three aspects of cosmopolitanism and his views on 
human groupings contribute to a wider understanding of his position on education.
Given Pogge's assumptions of the conceptual similarity between the different types of 
groups explored in the previous section, and his stance that membership can be taken up 
or cast aside at will, his perspective on education continues in this vein, which he places 
on both a formal and 'elevated' footing. Whilst the various particulars of our experiences 
are  secondary  to  the  individual,  and  considered  optional  extras,  Pogge's  view  of 
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education by contrast is that “their educational background is a permanent trait” (1983, 
p.156). His approach takes identity as something we are formally educated into (and as 
such, a prerequisite to his cosmopolitanism) and from there, that this education is (both 
simply  and  profoundly)  the  process  by  which  the  tools  to  (re)create  oneself  are 
provided, and the method by which one is shaped into a specific type of person. He 
approaches  this  from  the  position  of  'educational  equality'  (pp.67-68)  because  he 
recognises that “Education (as health) is a vital good in its own right, access to which 
has a fundamental impact even on the kind of person we are to become” (pp.75-76, his 
emphasis) and that once acquired “their educational background is a permanent trait” 
(p.157).  His  analysis  of  the  impact  of  education  establishes  it  as  a  permanent 
enhancement or alteration to a person, which changes the direction of the rest of their 
life and he places it as an equitable, rather than equal need, which recognises those with 
less capability requiring more than those with 'natural endowments' (pp.154-155), and 
his 'Opportunity Principle' requires that disadvantages be minimised. 
The mode of education that I identified in Pogge's works is public and general in nature, 
and corresponds to his use of individualism. The point I made at the beginning of this 
section,  about  the  interchangeability  of  individuals  underlying  his  assumptions  on 
human nature, must also be so for the subject and purpose of the educational experience 
itself.  Pogge  implicitly  positions  education  at  the  core  of  his  approach  to 
cosmopolitanism, but other than determining that it is critical to a person's identity, and 
that some form of global equity in education is necessary  (pp.156-157) he takes this 
angle no further. Socialisation through community, culture, ethnicity, by contrast, and 
choice-less variances by implication, are assumed by him to be aspects that can be taken 
up, discarded, or 'traded' in similar ways to one hobby being swapped for another, and 
the acquisition of possessions producing similar aspects of a person's interest.
Frustratingly, Pogge goes no further in explaining what this 'permanent trait' means - 
whether there are better  or worse 'traits',  whether this trait  is  something that can be 
attached at any time in a person's life, or whether it is a requirement for a cosmopolitan 
identity. Nor does he explore why other forms of education and learning from a cultural 
or even familial perspective are not granted this elevated status. But given that Pogge's 
emphasis is on individualism rather than individuality, that he considers humans in their 
generality,  and  that  these  should  be  universal,  what  comes  across  is  firstly  that  a 
universal standard of education appears to be the type he would be most in favour of, 
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and  secondly,  that  there  is  an  absence  of  awareness  of  the  profoundly  particular 
influence that 'education' and socialisation before and outside of formal schooling has 
during one's childhood. 
Pogge only gives hints to the underlying educational norms contained in his works, but 
when he does,  he makes similar assumptions  to John Rawls.  In  World Poverty and 
Human Rights  (2008b) for  example,  he intimates  that  humans are by nature selfish 
because when they are in a  position of strength they attempt to  avoid moral norms 
“designed to protect  the livelihood and dignity of the vulnerable” (p.5).  This  aligns 
closely with Rawls' own first assumptions when considering the reason for his Veil of 
Ignorance  because  “Somehow we must  nullify  the  effects  of  specific  contingencies 
which put men at odds and tempt them to  exploit social and natural circumstances  to  
their own advantage” (Rawls 1991, p.118, my emphases). Both simply assume this and 
take as a norm a base level of understanding of human nature embedded within Kant's 
works, which he in turn builds in response to the possibility of a Hobbesian nature.
Because of this, I turn to John Rawls' approach to human nature (in the absence of a  
specific examination by Pogge himself), which situates and gives the home environment 
a profound position in the development of an individual's intellectual and emotional 
capabilities, and as a result Pogge's own works. Whilst conclusions drawn from Rawls' 
arguments  are  not  necessarily  identical  to  Pogge's,  there  is  a  significant  level  of 
similarity to their normative grounds on human nature, which is of importance here and 
indicates that a Rawlsian understanding of human nature and a child's environment can 
be interpreted and transposed under Pogge's position. Other theorists, such as Henry 
Richardson suggest that Pogge “approaches Rawls’s texts with a philosophical frame of 
reference not that distant from Rawls’s own” (2011, p.230), and Valentin Stoian notes 
that  Pogge  accepts  Rawls'  “normative  premises”  but  disagrees  with  his  empirical 
premises (2012, p.139). Further, Thomas Pogge himself asserts at numerous times that 
he approaches Rawls from a Rawlsian framework (1987; 1989; and 199434). Whilst he 
may  and  indeed  frequently  does  disagree  with  the  theoretical  and  empirical 
developments of Rawls' arguments, the underlying framework, the pure philosophy and 
theoretical construction, as it were, of what, how and why the human 'is', even if the 
direction the human 'goes' is seen differently, stays approximately the same. They both, 
in addition, take a great deal of their arguments and developments from Kant's own 
works, which adds another layer of similarity to their normative assumptions.
34 Pogge states here “In my own extension of Rawls's framework” (p.195).
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Essentially, the argument here is that Rawls (and consequentially Pogge) prioritises the 
male archetype figure's characteristics in their works, and their focus on (or dismissal 
of) particular types of justice and morality follows this framing, which are woven into 
their decisions on what resides in the public and private domains of life. Susan Okin, 
Seyla Benhabib and Iris Young each critique Rawls on this from different perspectives, 
but I will restrict myself to Okin's critique here, as I explore other aspects of Benhabib's 
Rawlsian/Poggesian critique (and Young's response to Benhabib) in the next section. 
Susan Okin's three articles where she critiques Rawl's approach to the family35 from a 
gender perspective36 serve as the basis for this part of the section. Okin's approach, it 
should also be noted,  while  focussed more on gender,  also has  implications  on the 
privileging of a particular type of human with his arguments.
Briefly, Okin's main objection is to Rawls' use of the idea of a 'head of a household' (the 
man) as one of the institutional foundations for his works, and both the implicit and 
explicit assumptions about the private domain within the household that this entails. 
This  has  a  “fundamental  effect  upon  their  accounts  of  moral  subjects  and  the 
development of moral thinking” which, due to the strong Kantian influence on Rawls, 
forces  him to  make  “unacceptably  egoist  assumptions  about  human  nature”.  Rawls 
presents  his  works  in  such  a  way  that  it  is  “sometimes  viewed  as  excessively 
rationalistic, individualistic, and abstracted from real human beings” and one of Okin's 
main thrusts in her articles is to argue that even though Rawls presents his argument in 
this way, he relies on “a voice of responsibility, care, and concern for others” (1989, 
p.230) but is unable to present it as such because of his reliance on Kantian language, 
which rigidly separates reason from feeling. His assertion that the Veil of Ignorance is 
implicit in Kant's works (p.231) further strengthens this stance and gives it more of a 
cosmopolitan aspect. 
For Okin, Rawls is “unwilling to call explicitly on the human qualities of empathy and 
benevolence in the working out of his principles of justice and in his lengthy description 
of the process of deliberation that leads to them.” (p.234). From this, Okin suggests that 
Rawls'  account  of moral  development  is  clearly unable to be founded on a Kantian 
account of rationality with the splitting off of reason and feeling (p.235). This is because 
35 He asserts; “given that family institutions are just” (Rawls 1991, p.429).
36 Reason and Feeling in Thinking about Justice (1989), Political liberalism, Justice and Gender (1994) 
and Justice and Gender: An Unfinished Debate (2004).
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although he situates moral development in the family unit,  which he suggests is the 
western  nuclear  family (i.e.  heteronormative,  and with  a  male  head)  he  makes  this 
foundational  by asserting “that a  just,  well-ordered society will  be stable  only if  its 
members continue to develop a sense of justice” (ibid. my emphasis). He then goes on 
to present the argument that both justice and right are founded on loving a child, which 
in turn drives a child's admiration of the parent – and a desire to be the kind of person 
their  parents  are.  Moral  development,  for  Rawls,  requires  “love,  trust,  affection, 
example, and guidance (TOJ, p.467)” (Okin 1989, p.236; Rawls 1991, pp.406-7), and 
from this foundation of love, trust and affection the child grows and takes on new roles, 
more responsibilities, and has new experiences “as we assume a succession of more 
demanding roles with their more complex schemes of rights and duties” (Rawls 1991, 
p.411). It is this which allows the individual to cast a wider net into which they can “put 
ourselves into another’s place and find out what we would do in his position” (Okin 
1989, ibid.; Rawls 1991, p.410).
Okin goes on to suggest that “This whole account of moral development is strikingly 
unlike that of Kant” (ibid.) but I would disagree with her here. Rawls' account of moral 
development is founded on love – primarily driven by the “loving ministrations of those 
who  raise  small  children  from the  earliest  stages”  (p.237)  which  develops  through 
multiples of revisions of experiencing different roles and responsibilities, as a person 
with agency. Kant's approach37 also starts with a parent's love, because he recognises the 
underlying power and influence of emotionality unless it serves the purpose of reason - 
but Kant's approach to formal education - primarily from a male tutor figure in a male 
only environment - is designed to help  supplant it  with a  revolution of thought  that 
occurs later in life. The person's subsequent experiences serve to strengthen and fortify 
this through the exercise of their will in the service of their duty. The difference here is 
not love as the base of a child's experience, but rather that Rawls sees this as an ongoing 
and continuous development, as reason contributes to a foundation of love, essentially 
layering  morality  on  top  of,  rather  than  reconstructing  it  through  a  Kantian  moral 
revolution of thought, where reason  replaces love. The crucial difference here is that 
Kant is frightened of the power of emotionality38, and so wants to side-track and divert 
its influence as much as possible whereas Rawls' system firstly relies on it within the 
home environment, develops reason from this foundation, and then wants to ignore it 
37 See Section (3.6.1).
38 I explore this aspect further in chapters 3&4 (See Sections (3.3) and (4.2.3.2)) as well as touching on it 
again in chapter five.
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when considering the public realm.
The points I take from Okin's re-reading of Rawls here is that it is not just because of 
love and emotional closeness that we are able to position ourselves into the place of the 
other (which is her main point), but that we firstly put ourselves into the location of 
those emotionally closest  to  us,  through a positive emotional  connection with them. 
Each succeeding repositioning of ourselves through taking different familial, cultural, 
economic,  societal,  authority  or  group  etc.  roles,  as  we  develop,  allows  us  to  put 
ourselves further into the place of the other who is more and more distant in some way 
from  us.  This  suggests  that  closeness  to  ourselves  (whether  conceptually, 
geographically, or through other frames of reference, but starting within the family) and 
experiencing many different roles (as we grow develop and change), is rooted in, and 
extends from, an echoing of love for the other that starts in the family, primarily linked 
the main care-giver. This is Rawls' essential, and under-explored, deduction of a child's 
moral development which he relies upon.
The  hierarchical  nature  of  the  home  environment  and  of  wider  society  then,  in  a 
Rawlsian/Poggesian  framing,  with  lines  of  commonality  and difference,  depends on 
their cultural, familial, and societal framing of what is or is not the same or different, 
and critically, how different we are told that they are by those in positions of authority 
above us and who have influence over us in some way, and how this is reinforced over 
time. Each angle presents different ways in which humans align to these three factors. 
Closeness, then, could be towards 'an Other', and make use of the historical emotional 
closeness we have had to a person through the conceptual positioning of them in our 
minds  as  'mother',  'brother',  'sister'  etc.  This  is  then  transposed  onto  someone  who 
reminds us in some way of our mother, brother or sister. They become 'like mother', 'like 
brother'  or 'like sister'  and this  allows us to  form bonds between us and them. The 
different roles we take, and the experiences we have then serve as templates which we 
subconsciously or consciously test  or place against other  roles and experiences.  My 
experience in the role of daughter to others, or my role as 'Asian woman' that I can align 
conceptually to your experience as a 'black woman' etc. Different types of experiences 
and identities that we (can) unconsciously associate with each other.
The implications of this is that Rawls's approach to the universal, as I suggest is also the 
case for Pogge's, is framed as a particular experience which is then reframed through 
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such devices as Rawl's 'Original Position'  and his 'Veil of Ignorance',  as a  universal  
norm of experience, built on the idea of the family unit being just, as well as binary,  
heterosexual  and  monogamous,  situated  in  a  western  liberal  (or  perhaps  social) 
democracy, and regulated in a gendered and hierarchical way that is already inherently 
unequal and, according to Okin (and indeed Young and Benhabib) institutionally unjust. 
Okin's  critique and suggested progression of  Rawls'  stance  is  one that  he explicitly 
rejects, through his later publication  Political Liberalism  (1993), where he strips the 
issue of injustice within the family from his institutional structure of the family unit that 
he relies on - Okin's primary angle for her critique of his works. He instead doubles 
down on the family unit needing to be considered an ideal type and moves on. 
The family unit,  especially the head of the family,  for Rawls,  is  considered a basic 
institutional unit, and as such should be considered both public and political in nature, 
yet at the same time he also argues that “The political is distinct... from the personal and 
familial” (Rawls 1993, p.137; cited in Okin 1994, p.26). From this, Okin concludes that 
Rawls'  clarification  between  “the  political  and  the  nonpolitical  coincides  with  his 
distinction between the public and the nonpublic” (Okin 1994, p.27). When he discusses 
slavery via race as constituting “social death”, but does not see the virtual slavery of 
women raised in religious communities in a similar way, he actively reinforces the split 
between these  two poles.  This  is  compounded  still  further  with  what  Okin  sees  as 
Rawls'  move to an even more Kantian account of the development of one's virtues, 
focussing further  on autonomy and intellectualism,  which is  even less  relational,  or 
concerned with moral feelings (p.34). Whereas in A Theory of Justice Rawls situates the 
development  of  virtue  in  the  home,  in  Political  Liberalism he  simply suggests  that 
people acquire political virtues by living under “basic institutions” (Rawls 1993). 
When I bring forward Okin's understanding of Rawl's assumptions and norms, and then 
connect them to Pogge's, there seems to be little to suggest that Pogge sees this all that  
differently. The differences between Pogge and Rawls' arguments is not so much about a 
different starting point (a Kantian approach to human nature and Rawls' assumptions of 
familial dynamics), as where they go from there, in relation to the international realm. 
This is something that Schwarzenbach also infers in her critique of both Pogge and 
Rawls'  understanding  of  fraternity  and  friendship  (2011,  pp.40-41),  and  Rawls  and 
Pogge have been critiqued in similar ways by a number of theorists for the way in 
which  their  universalisms  “neglect(s)  other  hierarchical  social  relations  of  power, 
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including those of gender and race” (Robinson 2006, p.7)39. From this, it seems clear 
that  Pogge  avoids  context  and  particularity  in  his  approach,  and  as  a  result  his 
arguments are entirely 'generalised' in nature.
Pogge's  arguments  are  characteristic  of  a  top-down dynamic  based on the universal 
taking priority over the particular whenever they might disagree on institutional matters 
– including the household - and his favouring of institutional responses to global issues 
(like health, poverty) as essential, over issues that particular communities or groupings 
of people experience globally (like the rights of disabled people, the gendered nature of 
health,  the  racial  dynamics  of  poverty  etc.  within  a  specific  state)  as  additional, 
demonstrates clearly where his focus, priority, and normative assumptions are situated. 
This of course plays back into the educational dynamic, because whilst Pogge relies on 
a Rawlsian understanding of family dynamics rooted in emotional bonds, he favours the 
institution of formal education to provide the rational, objective, moral grounds of a 
person's approach to life.
In  conclusion,  this  section  has  argued  that  the  Poggesian  cosmopolitan  system  is 
designed  to  always  favour  the  universal  institutional  system  over  the  particular 
experiences of groups – and the appeals that groups make to issues of justice should be 
considered an appeal to additional rights rather than essential rights. Pogge implicitly 
relies on the Rawlsian use of the western liberal democratic ideal family unit  as an 
institutional norm, and as a consequence supports its removal from the right to make a 
claim to institutional injustice based on the gendered nature of the familial dynamic that 
Rawls relies on which favours the male archetype figure – and as a consequence the 
other  characteristics  that  are  implicit  in  it  –  that  the  male  archetype  figure  be 
heterosexual,  cisgender,  able-bodied,  and  neurotypical.  In  addition  to  which,  it  is 
suggestive of a level and type of education consistent with a middle-class environment 
that both relies upon, but also discounts and genders, emotional education, and which 
corresponds to that of a 'dominant culture of the state'  experience within the polity. 
These  layered  attributes  and  experiences  are  then  'foundationalised'  as  the  'normal' 
attributes and experiences which essential rights are developed to respond to and cater 
for, with all those falling outside interpreted as requests for additional rights.
2.3 Seyla Benhabib
39 See also Gould (2007) who makes a similar point about gender, and Mills, who responds to Rawls'  
hierarchical blindness towards race (2017).
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This  section explores the works and arguments of Seyla Benhabib.  Benhabib rarely 
engages directly with the idea of education in her writings, and this lack of exploration 
of  the  subject  necessitates  a  closer  examination  of  the  related  aspects  of  identity, 
culturing, and cosmopolitanism which she explores most prominently in  Situating the  
Self (1992),  the  Claims  of  Culture (2002),  and  their  interplay  with  her  move  to 
cosmopolitan theorising in Another Cosmopolitanism (2006). I first explore her writings 
on the idea of the generalised and concrete other (2.3.1), followed by her critique of 
culture and cultural identity (2.3.2). The third section (2.3.3) examines her stance to 
Cosmopolitan Right, and the final section (2.3.4) explores those times when she directly 
presents  her  views  on  education,  seeking  to  find  some  coherence  to  them,  in 
combination with the underlying norms that  are contained within them, which were 
revealed in the previous three sections.
Seyla Benhabib's works,  as with Pogge's, commenced long before the contemporary 
expansion of the examination of cosmopolitanism. In her case, she pursued a path that 
features both sides of the critical and traditional divide through Critical Theory, with her 
movement into cosmopolitan theorising passing through a wide range of philosophers, 
starting with Hegel,  and including Kant,  Habermas and Arendt.  Her works come in 
three  main  stages  (Aramburu 2015,  p.519);  firstly,  the  philosophical  and theoretical 
exploration of the universal and the particular, which starts with Hegel and natural right, 
and is a response to Hobbes, Locke and Kant's presumption that “the individual is prior 
to  the  community logically,  temporally and psychologically”  (1977,  her  emphasis40) 
which she refers to as “practical egotism”, and of Hegel's rejection of their position that 
“the self is one of logical and practical egotism”41. In essence, this issue is between the 
origins  of natural  rights,  which eventually develop into universal human rights,  and 
Hegel's response that “the "original" rights of the individual, can only be given when the 
individual is treated as a member of a human community” (p.2).
In the second stage of her works she engages with empirical exploration, incorporating 
the  dynamic  and  conflicts  between  a  number  of  different  liberal  democracies,  and 
cultural identity (with a focus on immigrant communities, the experiences of women, 
and polity residence) before moving to global dynamics in the 2000's and onwards. The 
main theme of her 2004 Berkley Tanner lectures, which was subsequently published 
under  the title  Another Cosmopolitanism (2006) is  her  attempts to grapple with and 
40 This text does not have a page number for the quote. It is on the 4th page of the microfilm document.
41 This response is similar to Herder's, which I explore in Chapter four.
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resolve some of the core contradictions between cosmopolitanism and democracy42 as 
they relate to Kant's  Cosmopolitan Right. As she points out in an interview not long 
after the lecture “...we are caught within this puzzle... democracies require our borders, 
they require boundaries... It is possible to have an empire without borders... [but] I don't 
think it's possible to have a democracy without borders and so this creates... the sort of 
philosophical and moral dilemma that I have been trying to address in these lectures. 
Can you reconcile cosmopolitanism and democratic... self-governance?” (2004). To a 
great extent this exemplifies the direction of her works from this point onwards. 
2.3.1 The Generalised and Concrete Other
Turning  now more  directly  to  her  development  of  the  concepts  of  the  'Generalised 
Other' and 'Concrete Other' (1992, pp.148-177), Benhabib presents the pair as a critical 
development from a single universalist standpoint (i.e. the generalised other) focussed 
on ethical orientations of right and justice. Pogge, as we saw in the previous section 
dismissed  social,  cultural  and  familial  factors  as  simply optional  extras  or  lifestyle 
choices, and elsewhere shows less awareness of the nuances of structural inequalities 
and marginalised experiences. Benhabib's works though explore this area in far more 
detail, through the idea of the concrete other, at the same time incorporating aspects of 
the universalised angle of cosmopolitanism within her reformulation of the generalised 
other, with its own focus on ethical orientations of care and responsibility (p.152). 
The distinctions  between these  two positions  are  ones  that  Benhabib defines  as  the 
differences  between substitutionalist  and interactive universalisms43,  with the former 
focusing on 'justice' as representative of the experiences and perspectives of the male 
archetype  figure,  and the  latter  on  'the  good life'  as  representative  of  the  woman's. 
Benhabib interprets them as exhibiting the dynamic of the 'gender-sex system' – in that 
“While  the  bourgeoisie  male  celebrates  his  transition  from  conventional  to  post-
conventional morality, from socially accepted rules of justice to their generation in light 
of the principles of the social contract, the domestic sphere remains at the conventional 
level” (p.155) with the domestic realm – the location of the woman “relegated to the 
realm of nature” (ibid). Her development of the generalised and concrete other is her 
attempt to establish a sense of parity between these two areas, and thus to allow the 
principles of reversibility and universability (p.152). This would then extend beyond the 
interactions of only the generalised other, where Pogge, Rawls, and Kant's arguments 
42 This is also a key aspect of Ingram's works. See especially section (2.4.2).
43 See especially (Benhabib 1992, pp.164-5 & 227-8).
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are  situated,  and into that  of  the concrete  other  (1999b,  pp.353-4),  just  as  concrete 
actions extend into the general.
Benhabib's concept of the generalised other and concrete other (1992, pp.148-177) is, 
as  she  puts  it  “two  conceptions  of  self-other  relations  that  delineate  both  moral 
perspectives and interactional structures” (p.158), with the moral perspective relating to 
the generalised other, and the latter to interactional structures. The generalised other's 
standpoint (both for the self and for the other) is the basis for universalisation and the 
assumption of objectivity, just as the concrete other's standpoint (both for the self and 
for the other) is for the unique individual (p.159) and therefore of subjectivity.  This 
approach, developed from Carol Gilligan's research into cognitive and developmental 
moral  psychology  (1980)44,  provides  a  powerful  insight  into  the  dynamic  between 
traditional and critical conceptions of cosmopolitanism such that it explains, as I will 
develop further, the difference between traditional cosmopolitanism as the location of 
the  generalised  other,  and  critical  cosmopolitanism  as  the  conceptual  realm  of  the 
concrete  other.  Whilst  Benhabib  explores  this  idea  mainly from the  perspectives  of 
feminism and immigrant  status,  this  dynamic can  also be applied  to  a  multitude of 
different experiences by other marginalised groups. Essentially, it is not just that the 
concrete other manifests in the personal interaction in the private realm, but that this 
point of interaction appears to be the essence of her 'concrete cosmopolitanism'.
Extending Benhabib's position further, the concrete other is then encountered through 
personal  and  subjective  interactions,  initially  and  primarily,  inside  the  domestic 
environment,  through  'webs  of  interlocution',  and  surrounded  by  wider  cultures, 
communities,  societies,  and states  where  universalising  and  'universalised'  norms  of 
justice  already  exist  and  are  given  impetus  through  a  variety  of  formalised  and 
institutional means. This creates a dynamic between the generalised and concrete other, 
where one promotes the idea of 'the Universal equating to individualism', which as a 
consequence closes around and polices the boundary between the private and the public. 
This then restricts the fundamentality and importance of the concrete other - the self-
defined-self  -  and  a  person's  individuality,  to  the  private  realm.  As  a  consequence, 
principles designed for the encounter with the generalised other, in the public domain, 
do not require a critical evaluation of the other's individuality to establish the mode of 
encounter  (and  thus  does  not  require  the  re-evaluation  of  the  self  since  these  are 
44 Gilligan's arguments should be considered a critique of, and a second strand of moral theorising that 
runs alongside the first, rather than just a critique of Kohlberg's earlier work (Jorgensen 2006).
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subsumed within 'universal norms' such that they can be assumed, but do not need to be 
critically engaged with). This is because the mode is already determined through the 
prioritisation of a form of justice which excludes, downgrades or dismisses the moral 
validity of the concrete other's experiences. What I mean by this is not that the concrete 
other – the person whose concreteness is being considered - is not a moral person, but 
rather that the source of morality is positioned and prioritised within the attributes given 
to the generalised other.  The difference between these two perspectives can be then 
thought of as  justice as fairness, following on from Rawls, and  justice as care from 
Gilligan.
In essence then, in the generalised other's world, I do not need to know who  you are 
because I  can safely assume that  I  know enough about  what you are,  based on the 
prevailing norms of the public environment: liberalism, democracy, tolerance etc. The 
generalised other  that  I  encounter  must  therefore be one who accepts,  abides by or 
tolerates these principles as the norm - and that this other possesses or expresses these 
norms in common with myself.  It  is the similarities between us; the norms, not the 
differences, which determine our interaction. Once that is established, what you do in 
the public sphere as a generalised other is established and takes precedence over who 
you are in the private as a concrete other, since the public interaction requires the 'what' 
and the material expression of one's identity, not the 'who' and the encounter with the 
other's internal sense of self. Whoever you are or whatever else you might be outside of 
a generalised other is not important to the functional level of interactions that relies on 
these norms, and as a consequence for society at large. Within an economic, political 
and societal environment which promotes, for example, atomisation under these kinds 
of  meta-narratives,  as  well  as  where  established  hierarchies  of  power  (gender,  sex, 
sexuality, class, ethnicity etc.) already exist, this reinforces the normative nature of these 
meta-narratives. 
I do not as a result need to know the ‘who’ of you – your uniqueness - and so too do I 
not need to know or perceive myself as unique either. Firstly because the binary of self 
and other collapses into a functional 'self that is as other'  and secondly,  because the 
generalised self is universalised as the location of these norms - which are both 'neutral' 
and  'natural'.  This  then  leads  (through  these  hierarchies)  to  a  conflation  with,  for 
example, the other (male) person being perceived as the norm, and thus 'like the self'. As 
the same kind of 'natural' (or perhaps rather that it is necessary to perceive the other as 
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the same as the self)  because the publicly recognised and enforced sense of justice, 
right, morality etc., come from that public sphere.
Essentially,  the  issue  that  Benhabib  is  trying  to  resolve  here,  through  her  desire  to 
incorporate the concrete other's experiences and perspective into cosmopolitanism, is 
one that Rawls' Veil of Ignorance deliberately and explicitly rejects. The generalised 
other  interaction  is  the  public  (male)  interaction,  which  is  normalised  and  as  a 
consequence the concrete other interaction as the private, female interaction, is othered. 
Whilst this othered concrete position, in its interaction, is the source of justice as care – 
which is necessary in the family - it is also as a consequence the source of particularity 
and thus overt  bias,  as well.  Rawls'  system requires the denial  of these 'normalised' 
aspects of the unique concrete others and their interactions (in general) at that level, as a 
valid and potentially alternative source of morality, justice and right.
Whilst Benhabib then goes on to argue that the woman is positioned in the realm of 
‘nature’ (1992, p.161), which I agree is the case, where I disagree with her is that the 
male archetype figure is  also positioned into the realm of nature – as both the natural 
possessor, and the natural source of the determination of all justice, right, morality etc. 
They are an essential aspect of their intellectual and reasoning capabilities, which is 
established through  formal  education  and reinforced in  the  social  environment,  and 
privatised in the family environment. The woman, whilst also positioned in the realm of 
nature is the source of, and possessor of caring as an aspect of her biological otherness, 
which is kept privatised by Rawls. The woman is, essentially, privatised and discounted 
because her ‘nature’ is to care - because her nature in Rawls’ system is emotional.
Whilst the 'generalised-self-as-other' reduces (or perhaps even negates) the requirement 
for  criticality  because  it  is  'backgrounded'  and  naturalised  into  the  fabric  of  social 
existence,  the  concrete  other  relies  upon  the  different  to  be  seen  to  exist,  to  be 
recognised,  and for  it  to  be  both  perceived  and  responded  to  in  some  way  as  an 
equivalent expression of human diversity. If the other is seen as the self though, there is 
no  substantive  difference  between  the  two,  and  thus  the  opportunity  to  widen  the 
boundaries by which the generalised other is understood is denied, because these come 
about  from  an  encounter  with  the different.  This  is  highlighted  perhaps  best  in 
Benhabib's positioning and arguments on the reversibility aspect of her cosmopolitan 
formulation. She suggests that we should 'put ourselves into the shoes of the other' and 
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through doing so, we can ensure a sense of reversibility, but, as Young then points out, 
“The ideas of symmetry and reversibility that Benhabib relies upon evoke images of 
mirror sameness... but such images of reflection and substitution, I suggest, support a 
conceptual projection of sameness among people and perspectives at  the expense of 
difference” (Young 1994, pp.167-8). 
To understand another, my own experiences, knowledges and logics which provide the 
framing and lens  through which  I  understand the  world  cannot  help  but  be  carried 
through in my interpretation of the other that I am trying to position myself into the 
shoes of. As a consequence, I do not see them, rather, I see my interpretation of them 
through the lens of myself, with all its particularity and normative assumptions45, and 
which cannot be anything other than an educated guess – and inevitably inaccurate to 
some greater or lesser degree. The importance of the idea of positioning into that of the 
other refers to both the desire and the ability to be able to reverse standpoints, yet from 
Young's perspective, it carries with it the impossibility of true reversibility. This means 
that,  according  to  Young,  both  myself  and  the  other  not  only  cannot  be  perfectly 
understood, but cannot ever be perfectly understood from a concrete perspective. Whilst 
it might be possible to have this level of reversibility between generalised others46, this 
is not the case for the concrete other that Benhabib describes. Any level of reversibility 
is and can only ever be an approximation, and one in which pre-existing hierarchies of 
structural privilege and oppression would inevitably tend to favour one side more than 
the other (p.171).
The encounter between concrete others is one where less is assumed and so more must 
be  discovered,  in  a  historical  way,  before  concrete  interactions  can  have  relational 
meaning. Under the principles of reversibility, this means that, in Benhabib’s approach, 
the more I know about you, the greater the possibility that I can deduce more closely 
who the  'true'  you  is,  and to  see  more  closely how this  other  differs  from the  self 
(myself), until the point comes about where I can attempt to put myself into your shoes.  
But this is still only, and can only ever be, an approximation. In this respect, concrete 
engagements which provide information and insight on the formative elements of an 
individual's identity fall outside of universalised or generalised norms only if they are 
not reversible.  When  my  rational  mind  fails  to  provide  a  self-derived  accurate 
45 This is essentially one half of Johann Herder's  besonnheit  - the capacity of the reflexive mind. See 
section (4.1.3).
46 Kant's works are directed specifically towards this through his Categorical Imperative, just as Rawls' 
is through the Original Position.
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comprehension of the other, it falls outside of its universalisation because it falls into the 
realm of my capacity to imagine, which is entirely subjective. This suggests, logically 
and somewhat self-evidently, that for Benhabib, the closer the comparability of the other 
to the self is  before discourse (i.e. the closer the generalised  and concrete normatives 
are), the greater the possibility of a more accurate understanding of the other there is,  
and  the  further  removed,  the  harder  it  is.  This  also  then  suggests,  since  not  all 
normatives will be encountered in a single discourse, that the longer the interaction(s) 
occur  for,  the  more  capable  one  might  be  to  mirror  the  other.  This  then  applies 
regardless of whether it is an encounter of generalised others or concrete others, and it 
implies a historical nature to the process of mirroring and reversibility.
In section (2.2.3) I explored the familial dynamic that Rawls relies upon for his ideal 
family unit, and the way in which a child learns to carry out this process of identifying 
with the other, starting with a foundation of emotional connection to those closest to us, 
and then expanding further outwards through distinct lines of identification that pre-
given to us and follow gendered, and cultural routes. What is perhaps most interesting 
with Benhabib's approach is that she also chooses the same environment - the family - 
where  one  would  from  a  'common  sense'  perspective,  expect  to  see  the  greatest 
understanding of the other occurring. The length of time and nature of the discourse, 
starting  at  one's  birth  all  the  way  to  adulthood  and  beyond,  provides  both  the 
opportunity,  and  in  theory  the  almost  inevitability  of  a  deep  and  ongoing  level  of 
interaction from which to base one's understanding of the other – yet even at this level 
the  widespread failures  of  children and parents  to  understand each other  does  raise 
concerns over her approach (just as it does for Rawls's use of the 'just family' as the 
basis for his arguments).
If we then include any number of the choice-less individualities mentioned previously47 
the reversibility level would likely drop - almost precipitously if multiple choice-less 
differences are involved, and especially if one or more of these aspects is culturally 
perceived to be 'disordered', 'broken', or aberrant – as being neither a generalised other, 
nor a concrete other, but an utterly other48. This is essentially49 because normative ideas 
of both the right and the good combine with the dominant hierarchy of male power that 
is  culturally normalised  within  a  family dynamic.  What  is  both  right  and good are 
47 For example sexuality, gender, sex, mental or physical ability, race, class, culture, ethnicity etc. 
48 Whilst this veers sharply from the topic of this thesis, this suggests a third category to the generalised  
and concrete other, and from this, how mirroring, reversibility, and reciprocity might function.
49 There is a second aspect to this – through language. See chapter four.
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experiences that are perceived to be 'ordered, 'whole' and 'normal'. The further removed 
one is from that normative experience, and therefore the orientation of the quintessential 
generalised other, the more deviations are produced from even seeing the other as a 
concrete individual, something which I think Young's suggestion of reciprocity rather 
than Benhabib's reversibility is able to more deftly respond to.
Returning to Benhabib,  whilst  an 'enlarged mentality'  may well  be of use in greater 
levels  of  interpretative  and  narrative  skill  to  more  accurately  understand  the  other 
(Benhabib 1992, p.54),  it  also positions the dynamic of power to the one  doing the 
interpreting, rather than the one being interpreted. This is itself derivative of a Kantian 
approach (through Arendt) that privileges the normalised standpoint - and the idea of 
enlarging works on the expansion of the generalised category,  rather than through a 
dynamic of some kind between the generalised and concrete.
Benhabib's system relies on both reversibility and universality for both the generalised 
and concrete concepts to function - and is I think a powerful response to the primacy of 
the existing (gendered) generalised other standard. What concerns me is that the weight 
of numbers will, inevitably, fall on the side of universality under the generalised other's 
perspective, not least because, politically and socially, those in a position of structural 
dominance (which favours the existing generalised system) will tend to maintain their 
dominance if given the choice, and even if this is not overtly desired. As was discussed 
in the section on Rawls/Pogge, they assume a 'just' male archetype figure led household 
– where the concrete other initially develops primarily under the care of the female 
archetype figure – whilst at the same time denying the relevance of justice as fairness 
from the institution to the household. This socially reinforces the structural dominance 
of the male figure through its societal wide normalisation.
It  is  because of Benhabib's  drive towards symmetry rather  than reciprocity that  this 
issue still arises and complicates her schema for Young (1994, p.170). If our positions 
are reversible, then there must be at its core an interchangeableness to our identities, 
perspectives, and experiences, which implies that no matter the context, I, or you, could 
mirror ourselves to any other person, and any other person could mirror themselves to 
me,  regardless of experience or difference. If this is the case, then my concern is that 
Benhabib's  approach  is  widening  the  category  of  the  generalised  other,  rather  than 
putting forward the concrete other as an equally important but substantively different 
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category - what also needs to happen to maintain balance is to show how the concrete 
category  is  widened.  The  underlying  principle  of  the  generalised  other  is  that  it  is 
universal, so if the concrete other is also universal (because of its reversibility) then how 
are, could or even should they be considered different to each other? Benhabib quotes 
Hilary Putnam when discussing a related point (a critique of Jean François Leotard's 
radical  untranslatability which has parallels  here)  in  The Claims of Culture. Putnam 
suggests that: 
It is a constitutive fact about human experience in a world of different cultures 
interacting in history while individually undergoing slower or more rapid change 
that we are, as a matter of universal human experience, able to do this; able to 
interpret one another's beliefs, desires, and utterances so that it all makes some 
kind of sense" (Putnam 1981, p.117, cited in Benhabib 2002, p.31)
But  whilst  Putnam emphasises  sense in her text,  from my perspective the emphasis 
should also be on some kind of as well. This is an approximation, an estimation, which 
does not allow the kind of reversibility that Benhabib argues is not only possible, but 
essential for her formula to work. 
Benhabib's approach, whilst attempting to walk the line between traditional and critical 
approaches  through  the  Frankfurt  School,  perhaps  inevitably  fails  to  achieve  this 
because the introduction of a new universal system, no matter how widened, is still 
ultimately a universal system that tries to accommodate everything into it. Essentially, it 
cannot  accept  concrete  human  choice-less  individualities,  nor  can  it  incorporate 
radically  different  experiences  because  it  is  ultimately  seeking  to  fold  those 
individualities into an admittedly much widened, but still generalised, individualism. At 
the same time, the enlargement of the generalised other as the location of the male 
archetype figure is I think necessary because it incorporates aspects of justice as caring 
which are typically excluded from the 'nature' and identity of the archetype male figure. 
What concerns me here is that whilst the category of the generalised (male) other is 
widened, the category of the concrete (female) other is effectively transported into the 
widened male category rather than continuing to exist and be recognised as different, or 
that the male category transported into a widened female category. Since Benhabib's 
purpose in using these concepts is to justify the need for a balance between the two 
perspectives, this appears to be a problem, because the widening of one through the 
subsumption of the essential characteristics of the other manifestly does not achieve this 
goal.  
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What  this  means,  in  practical  terms,  is  that  she  uses  the  universal,  general,  male, 
position to justify a response to a hierarchy that already privileges these same connected 
norms, albeit in a different configuration. The leaning to the universal that is appealed to 
is,  because of the dynamics and links between reason, justice as fairness, universal, 
generalised  other  and public,  are  all  connected  to  the  male  archetype  figure.  These 
concepts mutually reinforce each other, and as a result, the problem she sees with the 
sexist nature of, for example, the generalised other dynamic of the First Nations (2002, 
pp.53-54),  with  all  its  normative  aspects,  requires  recourse  to  a  larger  and  more 
powerful, 'more universal' generalised other, with its own normative aspects - but which 
also connects them to the male archetype figure. The male 'figure' is different, without 
doubt, and all the normative elements would vary both in context and content, but it is 
still the male, generalised 'perspective' that is privileged over the concrete other female 
'perspective'. Essentially, by privileging the universal, this has a knock-on effect that 
supports the general over the concrete, fairness over caring, the public over the private 
etc. as well. The sexism has changed, and is quite possibly less - and would most likely 
express differently - but it is still the male archetype that decides, because that is where 
justice and power resides.
2.3.2 The Claims of Culture
The previous section examined Benhabib's approach to two different framings of the 
self  and other  –  as  generalised  and concrete  -  and how they correspond closely to 
gendered norms. The former aligning with the dominant male archetype figure and a 
'natural'  possessor  of  the  concept  of  justice,  and  the  latter  with  caring.  I  further 
suggested that her principle of reversibility opens up her arguments to the critique that if 
they are reversible, then it is unclear how the generalised other and concrete other can 
be both distinct from each other, and yet serve to balance each other. Rather, I argued 
that her approach both serves to widen the category of the generalised other as it widens 
the category of the universal, in an attempt to accommodate aspects of what she has 
framed the concrete other, rather than creating a balance between the two. In addition to 
which, recourse to the universal to resolve particular inequalities also brings with it an 
implicit recourse to the different configurations of those interconnected norms within 
the larger 'universal' that instigated the recourse.
This section now explores her approach to the idea of culture, in relation to her support 
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for liberal democracy. I do this firstly by identifying how she approaches the idea of 
culture in the polity as an 'always problematic' concept that could be accommodated, but 
must  ultimately  always  be  subordinate  to  “constitutional  and  legal  universalism” 
(Benhabib 2002, p.ix). Her purpose here is for the creation of a “deliberative democratic 
model that permits maximum cultural contestation within the public sphere” and the 
combative nature of this interaction is further emphasised by her analysis that the idea 
of culture and identity as identity politics which “draws the state into culture wars” 
(2002, p.1), and that we are “we are daily confronted with culture “skirmishes,” if not 
wars” (ibid.). Her framing of identity politics is based primarily on a gendered critique 
of immigrant cultures and communities that, relies on culture being the problem 'from 
the beginning'  –  that  culture,  cultures,  the concept  of culture etc.  -  they are always 
problematic.  Her  solutions,  and  the  examples  she  uses  in  response  to  these  are 
invariably turns to the universal. This leads to her turning to society, democracy, and 
cosmopolitanism,  are  her  attempts  to  resolve  this  problem,  which  always  occur  in 
favour  of an iteration of the dominant  universal,  which as  I  argued in the previous 
section, raises its own problems.
The first point that I need to touch on, although only briefly at this point as I examine 
these areas in more detail in chapter four, is in the beginning of her book The Claims of  
Culture (2002). Benhabib refers to Johann Herder on a number of occasions50, firstly in 
clarifying distinctions between  Kultur,  civilisation and  Bildung (pp.2-4) as well  as a 
brief discussion on the idea of 'genius'. The conclusion she reaches from this is to argue 
that:
“much  contemporary  cultural  politics  today  is  an  odd  mixture  of  the 
anthropological  view  of  the  democratic  equality  of  all  cultural  forms  of 
expression and the Romantic,  Herderian emphasis  on each form's irreducible 
uniqueness... one assumes that each human group "has" some kind of "culture" 
and that the boundaries between these groups and the contours of their cultures  
are specifiable and relatively easy to depict” (p.4, my emphasis). 
Whilst she is correct, in some ways, on the first part – that Herder does indeed hold the 
view that each expression of culture is unique, the conclusion she links this to – that 
culture is bounded and easy to depict – is far from Herder's position. Herder's arguments 
on culture  are  far  more  intricate  and interwoven than the  quote  Benhabib uses.  He 
presents cultures as multiple, multi-layered, with porosity to their boundaries that are 
themselves diffuse and constantly shifting over time. Herder was a social constructivist 
50 Primarily through Joshua Parens (see p.2-4), as well as Charles Taylor (see p.55-57).
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and an inter-culturalist, and he also believed that people did not so much possess culture 
as that they are in a relationship with multiple cultures which they are co-creators of. At 
the  same  time  Herder  does  think  that  it  is  possible,  on  careful  consideration  and 
reflection of a person, people, community or group, to be able to point and say 'that is a  
snapshot  of  their  culture,  and that  is  not  their  culture'.  This  I  think is  a  reasonable 
determination to make, and is something that, for all the diffuseness and complexity of a 
concept like culture, is a common occurrence. What he would not say though is that 'this 
is their only culture', just as he would not say 'these things define their culture'. 
In  addition,  her  interpretation  of  Herder's  arguments  on  the  nature  of  genius 
fundamentally  misunderstands  his  position  that  genius  is  a  holistic  and  balanced 
expression of an individual, rather than the contemporary, far more Kantian perception 
of a single exceptional aspect of a person's personality or capabilities. Her analysis of 
Herder's  position on the meaning of these two terms is  much closer to  the position 
Immanuel  Kant  takes  than  Herder.  I  set  out  their  (Kant  and  Herder's)  respective 
arguments in chapters three51 and four52, and in chapter five I briefly return to Benhabib.
The  'claims  to  culture'  which  Benhabib  refers  to  in  her  book  arise  within  modern 
democracies and come about as a result of cultural elites, and the groups they represent,  
making claims to dominant political groups which have the power to bestow or deny 
legal recognition. This move to be recognised by a dominant power's legal, social, and 
institutional  systems  formalises,  reinforces,  and  hardens  aspects  of  their  cultural 
experiences  and  identity,  as  well  as  the  interactions  between  the  dominant  and 
supplicant cultures. This both 'distorts' and further reifies recognition and experiences 
of the weaker culture closer to the desires of the cultural elites of that group. Benhabib 
refers these types of groups, and their formalisation through their desire for recognition 
as corporate identities, and is primarily concerned with the interplay between: 
“group identities based on their  individual  members'  experience of language, 
gender, race, ethnicity, religion, and culture, on the one hand, and forms of group 
identity  recognized  by  the  state  and  its  institutions  as  legal  or  quasi-legal 
collective  entities,  by virtue  of  which  their  members  are  the  granted  certain 
rights and privileges, on the other.” (Benhabib 2002, p.72)
Her concern with this formalising, and their claims, is that “Many traditional cultures, 
for example, still consider women's and children's rights as an aspect of their ethical 
51 See especially Sections (3.4.2), (3.5.2) & (3.5.3).
52 See section (4.2), but especially (4.2.3).
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life-world” (p.40) which she clearly sees as problematic in nature and a result at least in 
part of this fixing of cultural identity. Her response both here and elsewhere is to lay out 
how  response  to  this  issues  make  use  of  “universalist  moral  language”,  and  each 
example she brings up generally proceeds in a similar way53.
Her  turn  to  discourse  ethics,  democratic  iterations,  and  cosmopolitanism,  are  her 
attempts to resolve this problem, which she defines when she argues that political and 
legal  philosophy  “share  faulty  epistemic  premises:  (1)  that  cultures  are  clearly 
delineable wholes;  (2) that cultures are congruent with population groups and that a 
non-controversial description of the culture of a human group is possible; and (3) that 
even if cultures and groups do not stand in one-to-one correspondence, even if there is 
more than one culture within a human group and more than one group that may possess 
the same cultural traits, this poses no important problems for politics or policy.” (p.4) 
which she calls the “reductionist sociology of culture” (ibid.).
The issue that comes across most strongly to me though, with Benhabib's approach to 
culture  and group identity,  is  not  the  overall  development  of  her  argument  and the 
method  she  takes  to  reach  there.  I  am broadly  in  agreement  with  the  logic  of  the 
argument she develops on that level, and find it mostly convincing. Where it fails for 
me, and the concern I have with the overall argument she makes here is that she relies 
on  her  development  of  the  generalised  and  concrete  other  that  she  constructed  in 
Situating  the  Self  (1992)  to  then  locate  her  philosophical  and  political  position  on 
culture somewhere between the universal and the particular. The arguments I made in 
the previous section as a result also apply to her arguments on culture here, in that there 
is always a leaning to the universal over the particular, and which by implication leans 
towards the male over female,  public over private etc.  Her identification of cultural 
inequalities  as  struggles  and  potential  'wars',  in  conjunction  with  her  democratic 
iterations system also reinforces this leaning. As a brief comparison, when considering 
the  claims  of  a  marginal(ised)  group,  the  smaller,  weaker  culture  is  situated  in 
particularity (and thus 'femininity' etc.) in relation to the larger, more dominant, in a 
similar way that post-colonial writers argue occurred during the colonial period. They 
are powerless, or at least have less power, and thus are 'feminised' in and through the 
processes of the interaction. The 'fixing' that occurs from this claim not only allows for 
53 See for example when she discusses “the Scarf Affair” (Benhabib 2004, pp.52-61) as well as her 
consideration of First Nation rights of self-determination vs women's rights for equality (Benhabib 
2002, pp.53-54).
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recognition of their particularity and culture, but also institutes a 're-masculinisation' of 
the group because it gives institutional support to the generalised other dynamic within 
the 'culture'. Their particularity is, roughly speaking, (locally) universalised.
There are two key comments she makes which epitomises her position on culture, which 
she expands later to incorporate more generally 'corporate group identities'. Firstly that 
“movement  for  maintaining  the  purity  or  distinctiveness  of  cultures  seems  to  me 
irreconcilable with both democratic and more basic epistemological consideration” and 
secondly that “Struggles for recognition that expand democratic dialogue by denouncing 
the exclusivity and hierarchy of existing cultural  arrangements deserve our support” 
(Benhabib 2002, p.ix). The use of the words like 'purity', “exclusivity” and 'hierarchy' 
each serve here to position the issue of cultures as essentially and always problematic, 
and this is due to the way in which cultural identity is, according to Benhabib, fixed 
primarily through the appeals to recognition, and the process that they are forced to 
undergo to  maintain  their  distinctiveness.  This  appeal,  of  course,  makes  use  of  the 
power of the larger universal (i.e. the state, which is of course in reality still particular,  
but a  de facto universal within the state) over the particular, which makes it doubly 
problematic in that the claim for particularity, granted by the larger allows it to become 
its own smaller quasi-universal.
It is this fixing process that Benhabib has a problem with, and which I agree with her is 
a problem - for the types of examples she uses - but the situation is one where Benhabib 
has, essentially, a problem with the way in which  states require the fixing of cultural 
identity in some way to justify and codify their recognition and incorporation because of 
inequality within the culture. But this fixing is also often desired by the marginalised 
cultures and communities  themselves at a wider level, in the face of overt and covert 
levels  of  discrimination  etc.  against  them by the  host  state,  antagonistic  groups,  or 
hostile  individuals within it.  Whether  during second-wave feminism, “consciousness 
raising”  and the  deliberate  construction  of  communities  and safe  spaces  that  would 
“consist only of women”54, or in the US for black people, the situation was that “Before 
a group can enter the open society, it must first close ranks. By this is meant that group 
solidarity is necessary before a group can operate effectively from a bargaining position 
of strength in a pluralistic society.” (Carmichael & Hamilton 1967, p.42). As well as it 
being a common feature of non-white immigration and black and Asian communities in 
the UK. Resistance to group-targetted inequality (often) forces group cohesion.
54 The Women's Action Alliance (WAA), Consciousness-Raising Guidelines (1975, p.10).
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Benhabib's arguments respond primarily to the gendered hierarchy that exists in this 
solidarity and formation, at the same time she requires democratic dialogue to allow for 
the partial accommodation of cultural difference. I agree with her that “recognition of 
the radical hybridity and polyvocality of all cultures; cultures themselves, as well as 
societies, are not holistic but polyvocal, multilayered, decentered, and fractured systems 
of  action  and  signification.”  (Benhabib  2002,  pp.26-7,  my  emphasis),  yet  her 
assessment that these systems may well be fractured is a clear indication that principles 
of logic, reversibility and universality cannot accommodate them – logic breaks down if 
it  is  'fractured'  -  yet  on the individual level,  extending to  the limits  of her webs of 
interlocution,  her  mirroring  and  reversibility  suggest  otherwise.  She  continues  that 
“Politically, the right to cultural self-expression needs to be grounded upon, rather than 
considered an alternative to, universally recognized citizenship rights” (ibid.) which is 
again a clear affirmation for the universal  instead of the particular. I say instead here 
rather than incorporation, because this cultural self-expression must fit into the universal 
to allow for its 'particularity'.
What I want to do here now is link Benhabib's views on culture to the categories of the 
generalised and concrete others, through language and identity, to what I have referred 
to  previously as  ‘choice-less’ individualities,  groups,  identities,  attributes  etc.55.  Her 
preferred cluster of understanding of cultures is that; a) they have no clearly delineable 
wholes, b) they are incongruent to population groups, c) all descriptions of culture are 
controversial,  and d) they pose important problems for politics or policy.  Given this 
understanding,  it  significantly widens the possibility of  recognition  for  cultures  that 
vary markedly from simply a  determination  by ethnicity,  religion,  class  or  working 
practices that the word is typically used in relation to.
If we consider for example variant sexualities such as homosexuality and/or bisexuality; 
those  who  perceive  themselves  to  be  homosexual/bisexual  do  not  form  clear  and 
distinctly discrete cultures merely through their existence, at the same time there are 
multiples of cultural dynamics based around different norms related to homosexuality 
that vary over time. They are geographically spread across a population, although there 
are also clusters based on prevailing dominant norms that influence their movement, 
55 There is a considerable body of research which identifies acceptance of choice-less individualities to 
be higher when the aspect or attribute is perceived to be predominantly essential and biological, rather 
than when it is believed to be more socially constructed and impacted. See for example Belsky & 
Diamond (2015). The more choice-less it is, the more accepted it is likely to be.
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and the number and proportions of people who identify as homosexual and/or bisexual 
varies across populations as well as nation-states. Both homosexuality and bisexuality 
are also not easy to define – not least because there are multiple ways in which they are 
conceived, as well as different ways they are both internalised and externalised. In some 
cultures, for example, being 'the top' or 'bottom' in a relationship impacts on how that 
person's  sexuality  and  gender  is  perceived  (the  top  is  ‘more  male'  and  ‘more 
heterosexual’, the bottom more 'female' (Herek, 2000)). In addition, the classification of 
what  is  heterosexual/bisexual  is  gendered,  as  well  as  influenced by other  norms.  A 
bisexual man is, for example, more likely to be seen as homosexual if they engage in 
any same sex relationship or interaction, whereas a woman is more likely to be seen as 
heterosexual but merely 'fooling around'. Finally, they are a 'problem' to politics and 
policy because they interact in different ways with politics and polity, and the polity is 
not set up for their accommodation or incorporation, not least because they might not 
even be recognised by the polity. The polity might, for example, have a mandated policy 
of their murder, should they be identified as such - just as they might be considered 
politically, socially and culturally divergent or aberrant in multiples of different ways.
The clustering I referred to is also affected by the level of hostility to the possession, 
expression, or perception, of that identity – and the geographic clustering of people with 
similar  attributes  does  have  a  tendency  to  produce  and  influence  the  expressions, 
experiences and understandings of homosexuality and bisexuality. Language is involved 
in  and comes from this dynamic,  because one of the most common (and profound) 
experiences of homosexual and bisexual people is when they find, for the first time, 
language, terms and definitions that attempt to 'explain'  to them what about them is 
different to those around them. This discovery of language and meaning carries with it 
the possibility of fellowship and relations with others, based on the 'possession' of the 
attribute, as well as alienation and othering. Firstly, because the dominant polity/group 
has typically created language that in some way pathologises the attribute, characteristic 
or expression - and allows, facilitates, or is tolerant of a social environment where their 
attribute  is  presented  in  a  mostly  or  wholly  negative  fashion.  Secondly  those  who 
possess this attribute and learn they are not alone in this possession are able to engage in 
a  process  of  co-creation of  the language that  is  used to define them, which in  turn 
requires the pre-existence of others who possess that attribute and have been able to 
enter into discourse with each other. Terminology changes, additional meaning become 
connected  to  them and change over  time,  and social  practices,  originally  'from'  the 
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dominant  social  group, or imported from outside,  or created within then establish a 
diffuse, poly-vocal, fractured cluster of elements that allow for their use, which then 
allows us to and say, even if not entirely accurately, and reliant on contradictory and 
confusing elements, that that is 'gay culture' or a 'gay community'. 
Language and discourse contributes to, even if it does not determine, their choices and 
self-other  perception.  The  result  of  a  dominant  polity  view  of  a  choice-less 
characteristic  or  attribute  dominates,  even  if  in  a  rough  and  incomplete  way,  the 
linguistic  structure  and  boundaries  for  generalised  other  as  well  as  concrete  other 
interaction.  Pathological  language  determines  the  possessor  of  this  choice-less 
characteristic, attribute or being in public discourse not as generalised or concrete, but 
as  utterly other. This generalised pathologisation and attribution of language, meaning 
and social context - and the particularised (re-)claiming of language and insistence on 
community can be seen not just for homosexuality, but also for other choice-less aspects 
like intersex, transgender and neuro-diversity. 
This  utter  othering  effectively  situates  choice-less  individualities,  to  one  degree  or 
another, outside Enlightenment binaries of logic which universalised humanity in the 
absence  of  their  acknowledged  or  incorporated  existence.  Crucially  though,  the 
relationship between the utterly other and the concrete other is less distanced than that 
between the utterly other and the generalised other, because the generalised other is the 
already dominant setting whereas the concrete other is seen to be particular, emotional, 
biased, caring etc. as well as marginal. What is also particularly interesting in this is that 
the possibility of acceptance of the utterly other, which may lead over time to a slow 
accommodation  of  them  into  the  universal,  comes  firstly  from  the  particular  (i.e. 
women, in this context (Herek, 1988)). Utterly others (or choice-less individualities) are 
invariably  accepted  in  concrete  circumstances  before  they  are  accommodated  in 
generalised ways56. This then suggests that the polity and the generalised other public 
discourse acts, initially at least, as a limiter to acceptance,  not a facilitator. This then 
raises the question of how the importance of the interactions between concrete others – 
the uniquely expressing individuals - can come about and be placed at the centre of the 
purpose of interactions between individuals because Benhabib situates mirroring and 
reversibility arising from this interaction, and expressly wants to balance this with the 
universalising generalised interaction.
56 See e.g. Herek (1988, 2000 & 2009) r.e. Lesbian and gay people; also Norton & Herek (2013) r.e. 
Transgender people. In each case, acceptance is higher from women than men.
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Benhabib's  wider  support  for  democratic  systems  (specifically  self-ascription  in 
consociationalist or federative societies (2002, p.19)) suggests that cultures are fine so 
long as they are voluntary in nature and change through discourse with the member of 
other cultural groups and the wider politic that is moral, ethical, and political-pragmatic 
in  nature  (p.12).  Essentially,  that  the  source  of  a  person's  characteristics  is 
flexible/plastic/variable,  and can  as  a  result  change over  time.  Whilst  this  might  be 
feasible for cultures centred on religion, ethnicity or nationality, the inverse is true for 
choice-less  attributes  that  are  perceived  to  be  essential.  The  perception  of  their 
essentiality counter-intuitively increases their acceptance and accommodation, and the 
less they are constructivised and questioned, or 'engaged in discourse' - the more it is 
accepted and accommodated within generalised interactions57. 
The movement for non-essentialised cultural identity/affiliation comes across far more 
tellingly as a requirement for the group to change to fit the polity, rather than the polity 
itself adapting its own 'nature' to accept (rather than accommodate or incorporate) the 
group. It is where she raises issues with the question “Is Universalism ethnocentric” that 
her concerns with the idea of culture in general extends further. She suggests here the 
idea that “universalism is ethnocentric often also presupposes a homogenizing view of 
other cultures and civilizations” (p.24) and uses this angle to justify universalism. Her 
argument  does  have  a  certain  validity  to  it,  but  at  the  same time  it  is  an  artificial 
construct because cultures  can only be carefully examined  if they are considered in 
some way homogeneous entities. This is a similar issue that also touches on issues of 
race,  gender  and  sexuality.  They  are  assumed  to  be  more  homogeneous  and 
'essentialised'  than  they  are,  especially  when  engaging  with  them  in  a  theoretical 
manner,  because  more  accurate  representations  of  them  that  acknowledge  their 
complexity and historicism introduce ever-increasing variables into them and weaken an 
often deliberately 'strategic alliance' between different elements within the culture for 
the purpose of resisting oppression or achieving recognition.
When it comes to the process of discourse within the polity,  there is again an issue 
which arises as the process of discourse is one that is influenced by one's membership of 
a group – and how influential one's perspective and positionality is translated to other 
57 Slogans like Stonewall's “Some people are gay. Get over it!” tap into this dynamic, with an implicit  
essentialising of their sexuality, at the same time attempting to end discussion by simply suggesting  
you 'get over it’.
Sahra Taylor Page 61 of 300 Feb 2019
groups and the polity at large. Whilst Benhabib has an issue with the polity fixing group 
identity,  what strikes me is  that the discourse approach  also  fixes group identity,  as 
different ways of framing them in relation to the structurally dominant groups inevitably 
produces different responses. From this, dominant internal elements of these marginal 
groups would still produce 'elites', defined by their interplay and public contestation.
Benhabib's deliberative system has two aspects to it, the first of which is critical to, and 
mandated by, the state. This is that “it accepts both legal regulation and intervention 
through direct and indirect state means”. This imposes requirements and restrictions on 
the group that, whilst perhaps not as strong as the 'fixing' of cultural identity discussed 
earlier suggests, still essentially requires appeals both to the state, and through public 
discourse to the structurally dominant groups. As a result, again, the force and direction 
of  that  discourse  will  proceed  along  already  existing  preferential  paths  that  will 
privilege  certain  sub-groups  and  individuals  who  more  closely  correspond  to  the 
dominant society.
2.3.3 Cosmopolitan Right
This  section  now  explores  Benhabib's  critique  of  Kant's  Doctrine  of  Cosmopolitan 
Right (2006). In this, I engage with her use of Kant's formula, and her progression, and 
then suggest the idea of a 'Zeroth law' - a cosmopolitan identity,  perspective and/or 
orientation - which corresponds to her idea of the concrete other, and an environment 
that support it in some way, is a pre-requisite to a doctrine of cosmopolitan right. As 
such, how this identity comes about and is cultivated is of critical importance. 
Benhabib summarises  Kant's  doctrine  of  Cosmopolitan Right  as  follows:  1)  Posited 
relations of right: The interaction of individual with state (domestic law) 2) Rightful 
relations between states: The interactions between states (Voelkerrecht) 3) Cosmopolitan 
Rights a) Interactions between individuals (Weltbuergerrecht) b) Interactions between 
the individual and Global Civil Society (Benhabib 2006, p.21).
As originally presented by Kant, and developed further by Benhabib, it is not so much a 
question of how to create a cosmopolitan world, or how a cosmopolitan world would 
interact once created; rather it is how cosmopolitan and non-cosmopolitan people, and 
institutions, can interact together in the already existing non-cosmopolitan world that 
leans towards a traditional conception of human nature and of the international system. 
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Benhabib's  interpretation  of  Kant's  Right  of  Hospitality  is  functionally  a  question 
concerning the right of hospitality between individual and state where both may or may 
not be cosmopolitan, but it makes the assumption that they should be, and it also makes 
no distinction between critical and traditional versions of cosmopolitanism (although 
the implication is that this refers to traditional framings). Yet if both state and individual 
proceeding  from  the  generalised  understanding  of  cosmopolitanism  (or  some  more 
contemporary  approximation  such  as  Pogge  presents),  then  there  would  be  no,  or 
considerably less issue with, problems of refusal of access or domicile etc. from either 
the traditional or critical side, since following the principles of cosmopolitanism would 
counteract the negative connotations of the many concerns typically raised.
Benhabib's  support and exploration of Cosmopolitan Right here is, paradoxically,  in 
direct  tension  with  her  argument  for  the  concrete  other,  since  it  relies  on  the  pre-
eminence of the Rawlsian concept of both human nature and the state, and a Poggesian 
international  state  dynamic  having  power  over  and  determining  the  what  of  the 
individual (i.e.  the generalised other) who wishes to visit  and remain,  in contrast  to 
Benhabib's suggestion of the inclusion of the concrete other, and some form of balance 
being maintained between the generalised and concrete other. The tension implicit in 
Kant's Cosmopolitan Right, which she explores, is one that relies on disproportionate 
power relations in addition to disproportionate relations of justice and right58, located at 
the examination of an individual's generalised identity59, with  neither side necessarily 
projecting from the position of any form of cosmopolitanism in the first place. It relies, 
in effect, on a scenario of at best the generalised other that the host state expects the 
visitor to conform to over the concrete other that the individual might or might not be 
(and which might well be in direct tension to the generalised other). The concrete other's 
unique  individuality  is  passed  over  or  ignored  in  favour  of  the  generalised  other's 
individualism. Kant's Cosmopolitan Right reinforces this dynamic instead of placing the 
interaction of the concrete cosmopolitan at the forefront of (or perhaps parallel to), the 
critical question of who is granted hospitality and why, because as Benhabib puts it 
“hospitality is  not  to  be  understood  as  a  virtue  of  sociability,  as  the  kindness  and 
generosity  one  may  show  to  strangers  who  come  to  one’s  land  or  who  become 
dependent  on  one’s  act  of  kindness  through  circumstances  of  nature  or  history; 
hospitality is  a  right  that  belongs  to  all  human beings  insofar  as  we view them as 
potential participants in a world republic” (2006, p.22, her emphasis). This makes clear 
58 i.e. fairness instead of caring.
59 i.e. the 'what' of the person.
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that care, neither to a generalised other, nor a concrete other, are contained within this. It 
is purely a question of justice as fairness.
Bonnie Honig's  critique of Benhabib's  stance on the idea of Cosmopolitan Right  of 
Hospitality (which occurs in the same book) raises, from a different direction (primarily 
through  Derrida),  a  similar  response;  although  in  her  case  she  names  Benhabib's 
understanding of hospitality a product of “Enlightenment universalism” (Honig 2006, 
p.106). She further points out, tellingly, that “what those rights point to in Benhabib’s 
account  is  not  an  open  futurity  dotted  by new or  emergent  rights  but  a  normative 
validity that launches us into a subsumptive logic in which new claims are assessed not 
in  terms  of  the  new worlds  they may bring into  being but  rather  in  terms  of  their  
appositeness to molds and models already in place: incomplete, but definitive in their 
contours”. (p.110). Benhabib emphasises this position still further when she asserts that 
“all future struggles... will be fought within the framework created by the universalistic 
principles  of  Europe’s  commitments  to  human  rights,  on  the  one  hand...  and  the 
exigencies of democratic self-determination on the other” (Benhabib 2006, p.61, my 
emphasis). Far from trying to tie in the concrete and general as distinctly different but 
necessary to  each other,  she relies  upon the already existing universal  principles  to 
determine what is acceptable, and rejects the characteristics of the concrete other.
By itself, the indication that Benhabib always favours the universal seems unmistakable, 
but there are levels and more complexity to Benhabib's universal, which she elaborates 
on through her use of the idea of “Democratic Iterations”. In brief, this idea posits that 
each new claim to rights by new political actors draw upon “experiences that could not 
have guided those rights in their initial formulation, they open up new worlds and create 
new meanings” (Benhabib 2006, p.159). Each new iteration transforms and enriches the 
meaning  of  the  universal  in  “ever-so-subtle  ways”,  but  my  earlier  critique  of  the 
universal always winning out due to the already existing universal being inevitability 
prioritised by those with the power to decide,  applies here too.  Honig suggests that 
Benhabib's approach subsumes the particular into the universal, and Benhabib argues 
that the universal subtly changes – and both are possibly right, on occasion, but the 
probability is on the side of subsumption rather than hybridity, which Benhabib herself 
implicitly  acknowledges  through her  use  of  the  word  subtle.  Change,  of  course,  is 
always occurring, such that any encounter with the different will produce something 
new –  but  what  it  produces  and how that  propagates  forward  is  telling.  States  are 
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essentially designed to resist change, and as a result are far more likely to subsume the 
different than to be changed by the encounter with the different into something new.
Further,  whilst  things may change, whether subtly or not, in certain locations at the 
institutional level - rights may be granted in new ways to new groups of people, or 
existing rights may be changed to accommodate the different – they can always be 
reversed or be denied because the members of the state are still 'culturally' virtually the 
same60, with all the norms that it carries with it. In this case the prioritisation of the 
generalised other over the concrete other still applies. Correspondence or conformity to 
the  identity of  the  generalised,  state-sanctioned other's  moral,  ethical,  historical  and 
societal codings may contribute to the possibility of retaining rights, but correspondence 
to the choice-less identities we are either raised into, perceived to possess, or bring with 
us in  some way,  whether  they be cultural,  historical,  gendered,  sexual  or  biological 
generalised other, also matter. This can be seen in the US – where the election of a black 
president was touted by many as radical change simply because he was black, with all 
the  cultural  history  of  slavery  and  racial  discrimination  that  that  implied,  yet  the 
underlying  meta-norms  never  really  shifted.  At  the  same  time  that  Obama's 
administration was granting new rights to new peoples in new ways (e.g. gay people, 
transgender people,  illegal  immigrants,  women etc.),  he was also a  supporter  of the 
widening of neoliberal economic policies, and the ongoing military stance of the US, 
albeit expressed in drone warfare form. With the election of Trump, the rights of those 
same gay, transgender, immigrants and women are in the process of, or already have 
been,  reversed,  with  even  more  radical  regressions  still  possible.  This  is  precisely 
because the  subtle  changes  through 'iteration'  that  Benhabib  relies  upon do little  to 
change the existence of the boundaries, or the underlying norms of the 'universals' that 
they rely upon. 
Benhabib's democratic iterations don't appear to be profound enough in their effect on 
the populace, even if they affect the state apparatus, to produce  new iterations. What 
seems to be lacking here, with regards to Benhabib's notion of Cosmopolitan Right, is a 
fourth  right  –  a  'zeroth'  law – which would come before and bind the  three points 
together. This could be summed up as 'the Right and opportunity for the individual to 
develop as a concrete cosmopolitan individual rather than a strictly generalised liberal 
individual (whether bounded or boundless)'. From this, each of the three Cosmopolitan 
60 'Cultures' do, of course, always change and are always changing, but not generally fast at the structural 
level, even if on the surface more visible aspects like popular culture might alter more rapidly. 
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Rights she takes from Kant must ground in an underlying fourth, or zeroth law: 1) If 
there is no emphasis on the creation of concrete cosmopolitan individuals, then there 
cannot be a cosmopolitan state because that state will not develop along cosmopolitan 
lines; 2) If there is no state populated with these cosmopolitan individuals, then the 
interactions between states cannot follow cosmopolitan principles of self-limitation and 
human  equality,  regardless  of  laws  passed  or  institutions  created  that  might  appear 
cosmopolitan in nature. 3) If there are no cosmopolitan individuals, then the interactions 
between  the  individuals  themselves  and  between  the  individual  and  global  society 
cannot be enacted in a cosmopolitan way, driven by cosmopolitan principles. 
Benhabib positions part of the idea of cosmopolitanism in the location of the concrete 
others  (it  is  unclear  in  her  arguments  where  the  weighting  would  fall  between  the 
generalised and concrete other), which she positions in the domicile and the location of 
the  construction  of  the  female  archetype  identity.  The  environments  in  which  one 
becomes, and is engaged with as a concrete other through communication and discourse 
are key aspects of the construction of her cosmopolitan world yet  she requires their 
specific  exclusion  from  Cosmopolitan  Right.  This  cuts  to  the  heart  of  what  are 
effectively  three  different  aspects  of  cosmopolitanism  in  Benhabib's  arguments  – 
cosmopolitan  institutional  systems  and  structures  at  the  top  filtering  through  a 
democratic  state  system,  through  a  cosmopolitan  social  environment,  to  individual 
orientations.
This  section  has  explored  Benhabib's  engagement  and  use  of  Kant's  Doctrine  of 
Cosmopolitan Right, and of the contradiction between her earlier emphasis on a balance 
between the concrete and generalised other, and hospitality, which emphasises only the 
generalised  other.  The  next  section  examines  those  areas  where  Benhabib  directly 
explores the idea of education,  and widens this  with the findings from the previous 
sections so far explored.
2.3.4 Education
When Benhabib's engages directly with education she reveals her perspective to be one 
in direct contrast to her support for Kant's cosmopolitanism elsewhere. She rejects the 
Kantian logic of “a self-transparent and self-grounding reason, the illusion of a dis-
embedded subject, and the illusion of having found an Archimedean moral standpoint 
situated beyond historical and cultural  contingency” (1994b, p.174) on which Kant's 
vision  was  built.  Her  stance  is  rather  for  the  interweaving  of  formal  and  'cultural' 
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education  which  together  contribute  to  the  constitution  of  the  self  “in a  human 
community” (ibid, my emphasis). Her stated purpose though, rather than specifically 
education, is to examine the dialectic of universalism and discrimination that is unique 
to  the  post-Enlightenment  era,  through  discourse  ethics,  where,  critically,  “the  two 
principles of moral respect and egalitarian reciprocity are always already implied... and 
hence cannot... be established only as their result” (p.176). 
But the capability to engage with this process is not one that she sees for all, rather, that 
the  ability  to  do  so  requires  a  “certain  level  of  cognitive  and  psychological 
development” (p.177) and as such, this suggests that the determination of 'the moral', as 
well as its expression, is of necessity restricted to those with this level of development. 
In this, whilst she rejects one part of Kant's arguments, she falls in line with Kant's 
justification for his own hierarchical system of education and morality that I examine in 
chapter three61. As a result, the grounds by which one determines what a 'certain level' 
means – and by implication who determines what this standard is or should be becomes 
crucial. Does it, or should it, come from the discriminated, or the universal? Or from the 
dialectic?  If  it  is  from the concrete,  then care is  primary,  whereas  if  it  is  from the 
general, then fairness has priority. The social and public space of discourse, if it is in the 
location of the dialectic, is the place were society essentially decides what is reasonable, 
and can be cared for, but the care is less at this point than in the concrete interaction and 
at the concrete level.
Within  discourse  ethics  itself  it  also  creates  a  circular  argument  -  effectively  that 
selective  exclusion  is  a  prerequisite  to  the  response  to  selective  exclusion  -  which 
Benhabib's modifications were supposed to resolve (p.176). There are similarities here 
between  those  who  can  be  excluded  from  behind  the  Rawlsian  Veil  of  Ignorance, 
although  of  a  different  contextual  level,  since  Benhabib's  desire  to  incorporate  the 
attributes and experiences of the concrete other  into the category of the generalised 
other does significantly widen the boundaries of who and what is included, and her 
discourse  ethics  approach  allows  much  more  information,  and a  far  wider  level  of 
argument to be included, as well as shifting the site of their inclusion into the public 
domain rather than behind a veil. On the other hand though, those who are deemed by 
the state (which manages the public discourse in Benhabib's system) to be disordered, 
mentally ill etc., and those who cannot be involved in the discourse because they cannot 
or  do not  meet  the criteria  to  be considered worthy to  be  an agent  are  excluded – 
61 See especially Sections (3.5) and (3.6).
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whereas the personal experiences of those who meet the criteria have a stronger voice. 
Benhabib  both  widens  the  knowledge  permitted  in  the  discourse,  and  expands  the 
groups  of  people  permitted  to  be  involved  in  the  discourse,  but  still  retains  an 
intellectual standard that must be passed before inclusion and involvement.
When we consider her desire to develop a dual strand of justice from both the concrete 
and generalised other, her clear favouring of the generalised other in border issues of 
hospitality and immigration, as well as internally cultural and societal matters, suggests 
a fundamental contradiction to the purpose and usefulness of the concrete other in her 
system. The conclusion I draw from this is that Benhabib is in reality widening the 
nature of the generalised other position at the expense of the concrete other. She gives 
more depth and complexity to the male archetype figure that it is the essence of the 
generalised other but fails to do so from the concrete other's perspective. The universal 
(generalised  interaction)  extends  further  downward  into  the  particular  (concrete 
interaction), but the particular does not expand upwards. As a consequence, the implicit 
priority in Benhabib's arguments is for the generalised other, not the concrete other, and 
even though she makes clear that she rejects the Kantian perspective when it comes to 
education, she relies on it when it comes to international, institutional, state, and societal 
matters.
Benhabib  sees  the  nation-state  playing a  key role  not  just  in  the  production  of  the 
generalised other through state driven educational systems, but also of enforcing group 
difference62 through  the  legal  recognition  of  their  existence.  Acknowledgement  and 
codification of specific differences for their accommodation and needs is required for 
their equal inclusion as a function of some form of a modern welfare system. Implicitly 
interwoven  into  her  argument,  then,  is  the  drive  by  these  cultural  groups  receive 
(official)  recognition,  which  through  these  very  drives  (which  are  themselves  in 
responses to perceived inequalities, lack of opportunities or rights), solidify and cement 
cultural signifiers and experiences into aspects of one's self-identification. Essentially 
that the very struggle for identification as a project becomes a process in which one's 
cultural  identification  is  clarified,  made more  distinct,  and formalised.  Because  this 
struggle is multiple - it involves multiple people in the struggle, and it impacts multiple 
people after its conclusion - this shifts the direction and self-perception of the people 
who are a part of that struggle.
62 She uses the phrase “Corporate Group Identities” (1999c, p.4&16).
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Whilst formalised schooling is one of the locations of homogenisation within a state, 
one's  familial  nurturing and home environment,  with all  of  its  cultural  signifiers,  is 
where “Intimacy and domesticity together contribute to the nourishment and unfolding 
of individuality”. This suggests to her that “the primary moral and cultural purpose of 
the  household  under  conditions  of  modernity is  the  development  and flourishing of 
autonomous  individualities.”  (1993,  p.108).  Personal  morality  is  produced,  driven, 
cultivated, or nurtured primarily in the home environment, where these unique elements 
combine, because this is where we are most often recognised and, paradoxically, given 
that children are generally understood to hold little structural power in such situations, 
they also have the strongest sense of personal agency. As Taylor puts it "My identity is 
defined by the commitments and identifications which provide the frame or horizon 
within which I can try to determine from case to case what is good, or valuable, or what 
ought to be done, or what I endorse or oppose?... to know who I am... is a species of 
knowing where I stand" (Taylor 1989, p.27).
Key to  these  arguments  then  is  the  idea  of  historicity.  From the  Kantian/Poggesian 
model, identity is 'emphasised' in an ahistorical sense through its universalisation and 
the primacy of the generalised other, primarily through formal schooling and the justice 
system, but its  moral tone comes far more from the content of that schooling.  This 
produces the interchangeable generalised other's moral stance in Pogge's framework. 
From Benhabib's perspective though, the stronger sense of morality is through these 
intimate  webs  of  'interlocution'  (2002,  p.15),  or  narrative  threads,  which  combine 
through conversation to produce an ongoing and historically nuanced sense of self-in-
relation-to-other,  and  where  morality  that  is  focused  through  context-dependent 
experiences in sites of “love, care, sympathy and solidarity”, corresponding to the moral 
categories of “responsibility, bonding and caring” (Benhabib 1992, p.159). 
This  then  implies  that  any  change  to  the  dynamics  of  either  the  home  or  school 
environment must impact on the future path of morality itself, regardless of the type of 
morality being taught. Take for example a shift in earnings from parents necessitating 
working longer, later, or antisocial shifts, or a forced need to work further from home. 
This would naturally lead to a reduction in the amount of interaction possible with a 
child – impacting on these webs of interlocution and the times in which these narrative 
threads can be developed and as a consequence, the embeddedness of a family driven 
moral code is altered, as is the opportunity to know the other as a concrete other.
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In conclusion, the problems that Benhabib struggles with is the impact that uniqueness 
and difference has on a universal system, any universal system, no matter how widened 
it becomes. Her critique of culture and her favouring of the generalised other position 
on immigration, as well as the need for reversibility are the causes of this contradiction. 
Her  use  of  democratic  iterations,  whilst  useful  in  some  ways  to  increase  the 
accommodations of a state, complicate the institutions but do not change them. 
2.4 James Ingram
I now move on to James Ingram's works, which are of a much more recent nature and as 
such, build on and respond to many of the arguments so far discussed. The course that 
Ingram's works have followed so far involves the exploration of liberalism, democracy, 
and cosmopolitanism, in, as he puts it, a 'radical' sense. His stated aim of approach is to 
position  cosmopolitanism more directly into  the  realm of  practice  first,  with  theory 
following, rather than the typical way of developing the theory and then applying it to 
practice63. Whilst both Pogge and Benhabib to a great extent accept Cosmopolitanism 
from its Kantian source very much as is (with some tweaking or re-framing from other 
theorists  to  make it  pertinent  to  the modern  era),  Ingram starts  with a  genealogical 
analysis  that  identifies  underlying  norms  of  cosmopolitan  explorations  throughout 
history, which he then responds to in this analysis. His approach both recognises and 
responds to the arguments that “any serious attempt to realise cosmopolitan aims could 
proceed only by means of enormous violence” (2016, p.71) as well as accusations of 
unrealistic utopianism (2013, pp.263-272).
Ingram's most significant contribution to date is his monograph Radical Cosmopolitics:  
The Ethics and Politics of Democratic Universalism  (2013),  In combination with his 
previous publications, he builds upon a close and ongoing engagement with the ideas of 
radicalism  as  expressed  through  universalism,  democracy;  and  of  course 
cosmopolitanism64. Between them all, there is a clear path of exploration of political 
agency within a democratic setting, expanded to the global level. He makes the case for 
an approach to cosmopolitics 'from the Bottom Up' and from the 'edge to the centre' 
(2018, p.21). He clarifies this through the use of the term cosmopolitics in the title of his 
latter works rather than cosmopolitanism because he locates cosmopolitanism as “an 
63 Both Pogge and Benhabib would fall into this category, as would Kant himself.
64 Radical Cosmopolitics and the Tradition of Insurgent Universality (2018); Can Universalism Still be  
Radical? (2005); Between Liberalism and Radical Democracy (2006).
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ideal and a project” i.e. the theory. Cosmopolitics for Ingram, by contrast, is the critique 
expressed through action, as “a critical politics of universalisation, a practice that asserts 
universal values against what denies them here and now” (p.8). In this he locates it in 
the practice of politics and democracy during the moment (or process) of change, as 
particular experiences respond to and influence the universal through the struggle of the 
marginalised, discriminated against, and excluded.
This section explores three main areas in its analysis of Ingram's arguments. Firstly, I 
examine and critique Ingram's rejection of top-down cosmopolitanism in favour of a 
bottom-up approach. Ingram uses the arguments of a number of different theorists to 
clarify,  distinguish  and  support  his  position65,  many  of  whom  would  likely  object 
strenuously to the label of cosmopolitan66 being applied to them (even if they might 
appreciate his own particular interpretation of it) to reach his conclusion. Secondly, I 
examine his idea of contestatory cosmopolitics, and consider the ramifications of this 
from  the  perspective  of  the  groups  that  he  identifies  this  cosmopolitics  occurring 
through. From this I conclude that there is a fundamental lack of consideration of the 
social elements of intra-group dynamic that complicate his relatively under-considered 
use of 'groups' at the core of his schema. In addition, that his arguments rely on both 
Hobbesian and Kantian premises; his formulation rests on the necessity of suffering of 
the marginalised, excluded and discriminated against, through change, in the latter; and 
he is unable to escape the dynamic of the state's exercise of power over people (2013, 
p.249) in the former, even though his re-framing explicitly tries to avoid this. The final 
section gathers together the arguments of the previous sections, and develops the strands 
of thought he presents that are connected to education. I then conclude and suggest that 
his  exclusion  of  “Arendt['s]...  philosophy as  activism”  (p.224)  from his  analysis  of 
cosmopolitanism to date is the absent angle from which firstly education could provide 
a  core element  to  his  cosmopolitics,  through the practice of radical  democracy,  and 
secondly where his critical engagement with the cultural elements of his scheme would 
benefit from. This would allow him a route where the suffering of the marginalised, 
excluded and discriminated against, even if it could not pragmatically be avoided, might 
perhaps be mitigated.
65 Principally Immanuel Kant, pp.67-76, 106-143; Judith Butler, pp.56-59, 151-176; Pierre Bourdieu, 
pp.170-182;  Claude Lefort,  pp.  190-202,  252-253;  Hannah Arendt,  pp.190-209,  239-259;  Etienne 
Balibar, pp.130-131, 207-219; Jacques Ranciere, pp.213-224, 254-257; Jurgen Habermas, pp.93-99, 
133-142; and Seyla Benhabib, pp.159-172, 241-249.
66 Judith  Butler,  Pierre  Bourdieu,  Hannah Arendt,  Etienne  Balibar  and  Jacques  Rancier,  although  a 
number of theorists position Arendt in the general area of cosmopolitanism (see Benhabib 2008).
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2.4.1 Top Down and Bottom Up
This section examines Ingram's approach to cosmopolitanism, and his justification for a 
bottom-up  approach.  It  initially  presents  his  assessment  of  previous  historical 
expressions  of  cosmopolitanism  to  date  as  top-down  expressions  of  universal 
arguments, inevitably turned to tools for dominion and imperialism. I then explore his 
development of a bottom-up approach as a response to this tendency, before considering 
some of the ramifications that are suggested from its framing.
Ingram identifies eleven specific locations, expressions and developments of top-down 
cosmopolitanism which starts with its Cynic origins and positions, as I argued in the 
introduction67 as a negative action – a rejection of social life in totality (2013, p.27) – 
which the Stoics later re-interpreted as compatible with political life and its expression 
in  the  particular  (p.29).  Christian  universalism sees  its  next  major  expression  with 
“Constantine's union of faith and empire” (p.31) and the Holy Roman Empire. The next 
stages,  firstly  of  the  development  of  international  law  through  such  luminaries  as 
Grotius, Pufendorf, and Vattel (p.32-34), and its subsequent expansion and theoretical 
redevelopment during the Enlightenment period (pp.34-35), was followed by Economic 
Cosmopolitanism which expanded “laissez fair cosmopolitan[ism]” (p.36) more widely. 
In conjunction with these last three physical expressions of cosmopolitanism can also be 
traced the continuing development of the ideas of, firstly, Perpetual Peace perhaps best 
exemplified in the works of Kant, but which saw featured a far greater number of other 
theorists like “Sully, the Abbe Saint-Pierre, Penn, Wieland, Bentham, and many others” 
(p.37).  Secondly,  “Revolutionary  Cosmopolitanism”  (p.38)  via  Anarchasis  Cloots, 
Thomas  Paine  and  Antonio  Gramsci68,  all  acting  as  counterpoints  to  hegemonic  or 
imperial cosmopolitan tendencies.
Ingram's “High Imperial Cosmopolitanism” era (p.39) is a period frequently ignored in 
the historical presentation of cosmopolitanism, but this is where he locates numbers of 
western nation's attempts to universalise their own particularities “to infinity” (p.40), 
which acted against the high aspirations of cosmopolitanism, but which also served to 
universalise “the field of theory as well as practice” (ibid.) and saw a significant move 
towards globalisation and historical progressivism. The final two 'moments' each occur 
at  the endings of periods of global war.  The first  of these is  the “Postwar Revival” 
(p.41)69 with  the  founding of  the United Nations  (UN),  universal  human rights  and 
67 See Section (1.3).
68  To which could be added Le Marquis de Condorcet and Franz Fanon.
69 One  could  also  perhaps  argue  that  there  is  a  half-moment  before  this,  post  WW1,  with  the  
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more, and the second at the end of the Cold War, with the intervention of Nussbaum's 
1994 essay70. He sums up this analysis with reference to Timothy Brennan's assessment 
that cosmopolitanism “is a discourse of the universal that is inherently local—a locality 
that’s always surreptitiously imperial.” (Brennan 2001, cited in Ingram 2013, p.7).
The  inevitability  of  repeated  movements  towards  the  idea  of  global  equality  and 
freedom turning  to  inequality  and  unfreedom,  through  its  tendency to  imperialism, 
arises  because  each  expression  of  the  universal  and  cosmopolitan  occurs  “in  the 
particular” (2013, p.42) and displays a number of “tensions - between exclusion and 
inclusion, elitism and egalitarianism, the actual and the ideal... they are part of the logic 
of universalism” (p.44). The eleven historical expressions of cosmopolitanism that he 
sets out each contain within them their own exclusions in their attempts to universalise, 
whether  it  be  slaves,  women,  the  un-propertied,  the  immigrant,  the  foreigner,  the 
transient, the disabled, the neuro-divergent, the child, the homosexual, the intersexed, 
the transgender, the left-handed, the black, the brown, the oriental, the primitive, the 
irrational, the emotional, the uneducated, the heathen, the atheist, the pagan, the Jew, the 
Muslim,  and  so  on.  The  situation  he  presents  is  of  the  continual  determination  of 
individuals and groups in their particularity to universalise their perspectives in their 
attempts  to  conceptualise  a  singular  project  of  humanity.  In  conjunction  with  the 
ongoing  globalisation  of  the  earth  also  occurs  a  re-framing  of  history  towards 
progressivism. From this, Ingram takes the existence of universals in a practical way, as 
simply 'always already there', and then reframes them as false universals, through Judith 
Butler arguments (p.26), awaiting their  necessary challenges from below  because of 
their falseness.
Ingram's  approach  to  cosmopolitanism,  based  on  this  assessment,  is  clearly  and 
understandably cautious in nature, because whilst he sees “Cosmopolitanism... [as] an 
attempt  to  realise  the  imperative  of  universalism”  (p.23),  it  inevitably  becomes  an 
attempt to realise the imperialism of universalism when its progression is taken on by 
political  elites.  Cosmopolitanism  is,  from  his  assessment  always repurposed  for 
imperial,  colonial  and/or  hegemonic  reasons,  or  as  ideologies  of  domination,  which 
throughout history “tend to go astray, typically by serving as cover for projects that do 
not share their noble aims or motives” (2016, p.67). Essentially, then, cosmopolitanism 
in this framing is its  own destructive dialectic.  Firstly,  between the theorising of its 
development of the League of Nations etc.
70 This  was  touched  on  in  section  (1.3)  but  Ingram  spends  a  good  deal  of  time  examining  her 
contribution (2013, pp.45-60).
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universal values, which are of a necessity normative in nature as it must be able to 
discriminate to be effective, needs to be framed from somewhere, against something 
(p.148). Secondly, through the inevitable positioning of a particular social and cultural 
environment, favoured by the privileged in their locale which the universal values are 
framed from, is identified by them as both the best example for the location of these 
values, and the most valid expression of those universal values. This in turn produces 
the seeds of its own downfall, as it betrays its own values of equality and freedom with 
the imposition of its particularity, through the utopian idea of the universal, typically by 
force and some form of violence (p.14) to achieve its aims.
Ingram responds to this  through the ideas of difference and equality,  and it  forms a 
major aspect  of his  arguments.  This drives his  desire  to centre  cosmopolitics in  the 
struggle for equality and liberty, incorporating Badiou's argument that the acceptability 
and accommodation of 'otherness' is conditional, relational, and ultimately ineffectual as 
“the self-declared apostles of... the 'right to difference'... are clearly  horrified by any 
vigorously  sustained  difference”  (Badiou  1999,  cited  in  Ingram  205,  p.564,  his 
emphasis)71.  Otherness  can  be  tolerated to  a  certain  extent,  but  never  truly 
accommodated or accepted, rather, it inevitably ends up as “Become like me and I will 
respect your difference” (ibid.). This response has echoes of Pogge's inclination to shift 
fundamental or significant difference into the category of additional rights that may or 
may not  be  recognised  and  incorporated,  as  well  as  Benhabib's  discourse  dynamic 
moderated by the sovereign state, and reinforces the power dynamic between the two 
positions72.  Ingram's  use  of  Badiou's  approach  reframes  the  dynamic  as  one  of 
inequality, which he uses to centre his idea of cosmopolitics as occurring when the other 
(who is inevitably the marginalised, excluded or discriminated against) uses political 
and moral means not to be accommodated within existing false universals, but rather to 
transcend them, and in so doing to constitute larger, wider, but still “false universal[s] in 
the name of the values that they betray” (Ingram 2013, p.iv). This movement always 
occurs  from lower  down,  as  the  universalism at  the  top  inevitably  already  closely 
represents the views of those at the top politically.
Cosmopolitanism  is,  then,  always  theoretically  framed  from  the  experience  in  the 
particular to the ideal of the universal, and claims against it are always made politically 
through  the  ideal  of  the  universal  from experiences  in  the  particular.  This  implies 
71 See also section (2.3.2) where I connect to this with the idea of the 'utterly other'.
72 See Sections (2.2.2) & (2.3.4).
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another type of dialectical interaction between two opposed aspects of the broader idea 
of  cosmopolitanism,  with  their  synthesis  indicating  a  'truer'  cosmopolitanism,  but 
understood as a 'false' cosmopolitan synthesis awaiting further claims against it from 
below. It is based on an assumption of the socially constructive nature of humanity, and 
therefore its endlessly shifting and changing expressions. Ingram's pragmatic suggestion 
is of a bottom-up approach as a corrective to the already existing norms of universal 
language,  a  globalised  world,  and  equality,  expressed  through  top-down  universal 
ethical systems which produce their own failures through their underlying particularity, 
their tendency to imperialism, and their normative need to discriminate. He justifies this 
argument  through  the  language  of  equality  and  the  right  to  difference  for  those 
discriminated against and excluded.
2.4.2 Contestatory Cosmopolitanism and Group resistance
The  previous  section  explored  Ingram's  justification  for  a  bottom-up  approach  to 
cosmopolitanism. This section examines his idea of contestatory cosmopolitanism, and 
the  role  of  marginalised  groups,  in  producing  movements  towards  'better'  false 
universals.
The second stage to Ingram's response to his concerns with cosmopolitanism, beyond its 
need for a bottom-up approach, is that “cosmopolitanism must be contestatory” (ibid. 
p.68,  his  emphasis).  His  solution to  this  is  to  frame “cosmopolitanism as  a  way of 
relating  to  a  given  set  of  circumstances”  (2013,  p.25).  Crucially  though,  whilst 
cosmopolitanism is often seen this way already (when driven from the theoretical to the 
practical) it is typically interpreted as a  personal  and private (i.e. internal) orientation 
towards the world, generally identified with the educated, well-travelled, and in many 
senses already privileged part of humanity. Ingram instead turns this about, expands it, 
and  redirects  it  as  “a  discursive  practice  or  political  move,  a  specific  kind  of 
interruption in  a  given  discursive  field”  (p.44,  my  emphasis).  He  situates 
cosmopolitanism as  both an attitude that  should be shared  across  humanity,  and an 
action of the marginalised in contest against their marginalisation, rather than simply an 
expression of the privileged towards global equality.
He initially uses the example of Nussbaum's (1994) intervention into the theorising of 
cosmopolitanism as such an interruption (pp.45-60), and devotes considerable attention 
to  the  complexities  that  arose  from her  intervention,  but  in  his  consideration  of  its 
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contestatory  nature  and  its  “political  move”,  he  looks  far  more  towards  the 
marginalised, excluded, and discriminated against instead. This aspect is raised partly 
through  the  somewhat  concerning  interaction  that  occurs  between  Nussbaum  and 
Butler73 (pp. 56-59) but more crucially from Wallerstein's argument that “those who are 
weak, or at least weaker, will only overcome disadvantage (even partially) if they insist 
on the principles of group equality. To do this effectively, they may have to stimulate 
group consciousness – nationalism, ethnic assertiveness etc.” (Wallerstein 1996, cited in 
Ingram 2013,  p.58).  It  is  the  necessary hardening  of  group  identity  to  coordinated 
resistance against so-called universal norms that forms the core of his decision to site 
cosmopolitanism in the way that he does, not just from the bottom-up, but in political 
action from political groups at the bottom.
As was explored in section (2.3.1),  Benhabib attempts to engage with this  dynamic 
through  her  development  of  the  generalised  and  concrete  other  primarily  on  the 
individual and familial level to develop her scheme of cosmopolitanism of democratic 
iterations through discourse ethics. This approach is designed to allow her to mitigate 
the level of recognition and fundamentality of group identity, formation, formalisation, 
and politicisation that Ingram relies upon. Benhabib's approach is to articulate, justify, 
and refine the already existing imposed universal through discourse. Ingram's approach, 
by contrast, (through Butler) is to view the struggle of the group, in a similar though not 
identical  way,  reframed  in  a  dialectical  fashion  –  as  a  way  to  expose  limits  and 
exclusions (p.159) – to use the group struggle as a justification to  reject the existing 
imposed universal in favour of a new (but still flawed) universal which those groups 
have had a hand in the creation of. Re-framing in this way also allows Ingram to link 
Butler's arguments to Bourdieu's “question of universalism [which is] not... a matter of 
interpretation, but of power” (p.171) and with his paired ideas of capital “as a form of 
accumulated relational advantage” and symbolic violence,  to view civil  society as a 
place  of  inequality  and  domination  that  can  be  examined  in  egalitarian  terms. 
Essentially, to centre on what is not universal, i.e. negative universalism (p.178). 
73 The example he uses raises questions about its suitability to support the argument he makes here – not 
least because the structural position of a prominent academic able to initiate this kind of shift  by 
themself, as he suggests occurred, hardly fits the profile of someone or some group at 'the bottom' or  
of his perception of the fundamentality of groups contesting universal norms. 
As I  discussed in Section (1.2),  it  was not the intervention of a  single individual,  but  rather  the  
arguments of a number of academics that Nussbaum's essay built upon, which aligned with the ending 
of the Cold War and the fall of the Berlin Wall. Considering the interruption to be the fall of the Berlin  
Wall  would more easily support  Ingram's  arguments,  rather  than focussing on the privileged who 
(re)directed our understanding of the impact of the interruption in a certain direction, after the fact.
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Ingram's use of Butler also raises two further points in their collective argument that 
“languages of liberation might be implicated in the very service of oppression, that the 
enfranchisement of 'women'... might require and institute a different set of hierarchies 
… turned against other marginal groups” (Butler 1991, cited in Ingram 2013, p.153) and 
secondly that “the identity categories often presumed foundational to feminist politics... 
simultaneously work to limit and constrain in advance the very cultural possibilities that 
feminism is supposed to open up” (ibid.).  Whilst Butler's arguments was directed at 
feminism (as was Benhabib's),  this  same nature of argument holds for any move to 
enfranchisement from a disaffected group at 'the bottom'.  
From this, the very act of resistance, of contest, in the way Ingram suggests, requires the 
stimulation  of  group  consciousness  and  its  formalisation,  out  of  which  coordinated 
responses can arise, as dictated to by the dominant power that the claim(s) of inequality 
are made against. This then necessitates on the one hand a certain level of external-
facing  fixing  of  dominant  elements  (from  activist  groups,  social  groups,  charities, 
groups  based  around  particular  experiences,  specific  communities  etc.)  within  the 
oppressed group, as the dominant power influences the power of these groups to affect 
it, and influences their formally recognised actions through prescribing acceptable ways 
of interaction. On the other hand, internally, those within the group(s) experience a self-
defining, 'claiming' or 'reclaiming' of the language and concepts used to refer to and talk 
about them, often rejecting outright or partially accepting for pragmatic reasons, the will 
of  the  dominant  power  that  has  excluded,  marginalised,  discriminated  against,  or 
misrepresented them (Carmichael & Hamilton 1967, p.42).
This  process  occurs  at  the  same  time  that  strategic  alliances  form  between  other 
marginalised (and likely similarly but not identically disadvantaged) groups, and the 
involvement  of  non-affected  elite  advocates  representing  their  views.  In  addition  to 
which  hierarchies  outside the  group  are  replicated  inside the  group,  such  that,  for 
example, lighter-skinned and/or 'westernised' black and Asians people, middle-class gay 
men and women, trans people who 'appear' cisgender', gender-binary presenting intersex 
and non(-)binary people,  disabled 'super'  athletes,  neuro-diverse social  affluents  and 
'high functioning' autistic people etc. are funnelled towards the top of their respective 
groups through both internal and external pressure and opportunities,  to become the 
more  acceptable  faces  of  these  groups.  The  various  groups,  through  these  ongoing 
processes, becomes at least in part defined by the struggles that they undertake, and the 
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compromises in language they are forced to accept from external pressure (or because 
internally one group has more social capital and is able to exert more control over the 
process), and the suffering that they continue to endure. The struggle, in effect, becomes 
a core aspect of the cultural identity of the group(s) because the struggle itself gives a 
common and dominant theme to the lives of the people in the group (and those they 
represent)  around  which  their  language  and  practices  are  forced  to  accommodate, 
accept, or privilege.
Intra-Cultural  norms  and  dynamics  are  inevitably  reshaped  by  these  contestatory 
processes (something which Benhabib repeatedly expresses concern with in relation to 
gendered ethnic dynamics, but with Ingram does not examine). They are also hardened 
through the requirement of the dominant power to produce a normative response to the 
claims against a failed universal, whether that be legal recognition of different ethnic or 
cultural  groups  or  changes  to  legal  systems  and  social  practices  to  accommodate 
different ways of living and interacting with others. This effectively manifests as the 
need for homogenisation of the group. Further, the 'problems of culture' are frequently 
given  in  cosmopolitan  discourse  as  issues  that  cosmopolitanism  is  supposed  to 
overcome74. This produces a contradictory setting where, in effect, the dominant powers 
require  internal  cultural/group  hardening  to  justify  shifts  in  political/legal/societal 
systems and norms based on universal values – to prove that their claim is valid - yet at 
the same time those same universal values are a means used to dismiss or discount 
group identity.
Ingram's lack of specificity, or engagement, with the intra- and inter-dynamics of the 
groups he bases his cosmopolitical scheme on is surprising, and this is compounded in 
two further ways. Firstly because he explicitly steps away from identifying such groups, 
and  refuses  to  provide  guidance  or  insight  into  what  claims  could  or  should  be 
considered valid. Whilst he does indicate that “exclusion of women” is an aspect of the 
political  realm  where  these  cosmopolitical  moments  can  occur  (p.214),  as  well  as 
inequality and discrimination, there is no exploration of the potentiality of competing or 
divergent  claims  from  these  groups.  This  is  an  inevitable  function  of  his  (false) 
universalism because, as was noted previously from Butler, the claims that succeed will 
inevitably be exclusive in some way and produce their own hierarchies and exclusions. 
But  more  significantly,  he  asserts  that  “we  cannot  simply  align  ourselves  with  the 
underdog in every one of the world's disputes... movements of underdogs are not always 
74 See especially Nussbaum (Ingram 2013).
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reliable vehicles for promoting freedom and equality... also... it may not be clear who 
the underdog is” (p.222). 
The question then arises as to how can this be determined, if cosmopolitics is, as he 
suggests, contestation from below? If the contestation has to come from below, but the 
judgement  of  the  'cosmopoliticality'  of  the  contest  comes  from elsewhere,  then  this 
suggests that it is not contestation from below itself, but rather the determination of the 
rightness of the contest that determines whether it is cosmopolitical. Secondly, and just 
as significantly, Ingram presents a very particular political system that, leading on from 
Arendt, requires a significant degree of activity in which the contest arises and can be 
acted upon. As with the problems for Benhabib's discourse ethics entering a domain 
where it is moderated by the state and will favour the least different, similar issues arise 
here.
Ingram's next step is to engage with the political aspects of the idea of cosmopolitanism, 
conjoined  with  democracy,  and  “to  rethink  democratic  politics...  as  a  domain  and 
activity”. As was the case earlier in this section, he again makes use of a number of 
theorists to define, clarify, and distinguish his position. Firstly, from Hannah Arendt, he 
takes her view of democratic politics “to show how political action can be understood as 
a  vehicle  of  democratic  transformation”.  To this  he  adds Claude Lefort's  “idea  that 
democratic politics is necessarily unfinished and conflictual and realises itself through 
contestation over democratic ideals”.  From Sheldon Wolin and Miguel  Abensour he 
thirdly argues that “politics can arise outside and against institutions in the form of a 
demand  that  they  become  more  democratic”  and  finally  from Etienne  Balibar  and 
Jacque  Ranciere  he  shows  how  “a  politics  of  transformation...  emerges  through 
challenges to particular obstacles to the expansion of the universal principle of equal 
freedom”  (p.223-224).  Between  these  critical  theorists,  and  in  response  to  Kant's 
cosmopolitanism and its neo-Kantian variants, Ingram, rather than simply repositioning 
cosmopolitanism as a purely contestatory theory as his arguments suggests, also recasts 
the ethics of cosmopolitanism as a  necessary cycling between two broad theoretical 
strains. 
Just as with Benhabib, who focused on and explored the idea of the concrete other in 
response to the predominance of universalising arguments  that  privilege the already 
powerful, Ingram's combination of a range of critical theoretical approaches into the 
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framing and re-conceptualization of cosmopolitanism allows him to give much needed 
attention to this 'bottom-up'  angle to the idea of cosmopolitanism, in relation to the 
wider and better known normative varieties. His focus on a bottom-up cosmopolitan 
approach though requires the theoretical developments of the universal to react against, 
(which he himself admirably demonstrates in his book) and this must  always follow 
hegemonic, universalising systems. In addition to which, through this cyclical system, it 
both normalises and essentialises this mode of (false) universal creation. Suffering, as 
the experience of these groups from which this contest occurs through, is necessary for 
his construct to work. This makes the struggle for survival, and then on and upwards 
towards  the  possibility  of  equa-liberty,  the  primary  trigger  for  the  possibility  of 
cosmopolitan  progress  towards  moral/political  advancement.  This  also  replicates,  in 
modern form, Kant's own assessment of social-unsociability and the suffering that is 
necessary to drive forward human progress.
I  will  leave  this  angle  under-developed  for  now,  as  responding  to  it  requires  the 
arguments I develop in chapter three, where I explore the underlying norms of Kant's 
works and arguments, and which is expanded still further with Herder's intra- and inter-
culturalism arguments in chapter four. I then return to and answer this in chapter five, 
but one underlying norm that I identify in chapter three which needs to be noted at this 
point is the prominence of fear and desire that drives Kant's own cosmopolitan vision.
Essentially, Kant's political system and the philosophy that both stands behind it and 
drives it forward are based on the emotional states of fear and desire, and it is these 
elements that combine to produce his antisocial sociability – which is the fertile ground 
from  which  oppression  and  inequality  grow.  Ingram's  schema  of  cosmopolitanism 
developing through contestation relies on this same premise because it is exists in the 
normative angle of cosmopolitanism that his contestatory response is built and designed 
to  respond  to.  The  primary,  and  not  insignificant  difference  between  the  Kantian 
approach and Ingram's is that Kant's 'struggle' is between an intellectual-moral elite and 
the  political-economic  pragmatic  elite,  presented  in  a  genteel  and  effusive  manner. 
Ingram's  system  concerns  the  struggle  of  the  disenfranchised,  dispossessed  and 
discriminated against as the moral, against the political-economic (and perhaps even the 
intellectual elite) as the pragmatic response to inequality.
2.4.3 Education
This final section on Ingram engages directly with education, something which, as is 
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typical for the majority of cosmopolitan theorists, he touches only briefly on. When he 
does, it is in response to approaches to education by other theorists, principally Martha 
Nussbaum (Ingram 2013, p.55 & 81) and Immanuel Wallerstein (ibid.  p.58)75.  From 
these it is possible to establish from his critique of their perspectives a somewhat rough 
understanding of what a cosmopolitan education would or would not consist of. 
With regards to Nussbaum, he responds to her view of a cosmopolitan education and the 
'cultivation of humanity', which she argues is to educate people “to recognise humanity 
wherever they encounter it, undeterred by traits that are strange to them, and be eager to 
understand  humanity  in  all  its  strange  guises.  They  must  learn  enough  about  the 
different  to  recognise  common aims,  aspirations,  and values,  and enough about  the 
common ends to see how variously they are instantiated in the many cultures and their 
histories” (Nussbaum 1994, cited in Ingram 2013, pp.55-5676). The issue that he has 
with Nussbaum's approach is that it  relies upon an already pre-existing idea of what 
humanity  'is'  -  the  'common'  -  rather  than  expressing  a  concern  with  assigning  a 
universal concept of humanity from her own particular perspective that corresponds to 
her own privileged experiences and position.
Ingram also  responds  to  Nussbaum's  assertion  in  Cultivating  Humanity  (1997)  that 
“only a human identity that transcends... divisions shows us why we should look at one 
another with respect across them” (p.67) which links to her arguments of the three main 
aspects  of  humanities  education  that  are  needed:  self-criticism,  identification  with 
different others; and the cultivation of a “narrative imagination” (Nussbaum 1997, cited 
in Ingram 2013, p.81). This time, Ingram expresses support for them - the ideas of self-
criticism,  identification  with  distant  others,  and  the  cultivation  of  a  narrative 
imagination - but he also argues that the three imperatives are in direct opposition to her 
'Capabilities'  (1997)  and  her  framing  present  a  paternalistic,  western,  top-down 
approach, where the west acts upon the rest (Ingram 2013, p.80). For Nussbaum those 
within the west need to be taught these three imperatives, in a certain manner, and when 
combined  with  her  'capabilities'  approach,  education,  development  and  'freedom', 
similar patterns are forced onto non-western people, which, he argues, simply serves to 
75 He also discusses education in relation to Pierre Bourdieu (p.175 & 177) but this does not contribute  
to understanding Ingram's overall position.
76 This  is  a  rephrased quote  from Nussbaum's  1994 article  Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism.  In  the 
original, she uses female pronouns: “to recognize humanity wherever she encounters it, undeterred by 
traits that are strange to  her, and be eager to understand humanity in its “strange” guises.  She must 
learn enough about the different to recognize common aims, aspirations, and values, and enough about 
these  common ends  to  see  how variously  they  are  instantiated  in  the  many cultures  and  many 
histories”. In the edited book by Cohen that Ingram refers to, it uses gender-neutral “they” pronouns.
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make  them  'more  like  us'.  Nussbaum's  main  concerns  are  'culture  and  tradition', 
specifically their cultures and their traditions, which situates the problem 'over there' i.e. 
in the non-west, or the non-western77, rather than “say, the international distribution of 
labour, commercialisation, the state or development” etc. (p.81). From this, it is possible 
to identify that Ingram supports the main principles of the three imperatives, but not the 
pre-existing assumption of humanity, nor the normative arguments of which capabilities 
are  the correct  ones to  be cultivated.  It  is  the western-imperialistic  project,  and the 
asymmetry between the west and the rest - and the actions which follow - that is the 
problem.
When Ingram explores Wallerstein's arguments, we encounter a quite different and on 
the  whole  more  positive  tenor.  Here,  Wallerstein  argues  that  “What  is  needed 
educationally is  not  to  learn  that  we are  citizens  of  the  world,  but  that  we occupy 
particular niches in an unequal world, and that being disinterested and global on one 
hand and defending one's narrow interests on the other are not opposites but positions 
combined  in  complicated  ways.  Some  combinations  are  desirable,  others  are  not78” 
(Wallerstein 2006, cited in Ingram 2013, p.58) and this is directed not towards one's 
cultures or traditions, but towards one's social and geographic situation. This contributes 
to  movements  towards  group  identity  and  solidarity  in  the  face  of  inequality, 
contributing  in  turn  to  developing  nationalism  and  ethnic  assertiveness.  Ingram's 
support for Wallerstein's argument, in light of his earlier position towards Nussbaum, 
suggests that to consider oneself a 'citizen of the world' is not actually necessary or even 
relevant to his cosmopolitan moment through contestation. Group identity and being on 
weaker side of power dynamics, on the other hand, are.
The process of cosmopolitanism as contestation therefore relies on the opportunities and 
capabilities of the oppressed – which produces a number of aspects through education. 
Firstly,  that  education79 when  linked  to  a  project  of  recognising  similarity  and 
commonality is, for Ingram, a gateway to  erasing  difference when projected from a 
position of power, but only for the other and not the self. Secondly, centring the ability 
to respond to false universals on the ability of the dispossessed inevitably privileges 
77 Benhabib's concern are similar but distinct – it is still their cultures and traditions, but over here rather 
than there. In immigrant and indigenous communities in the west.
78 This quote from Wallerstein continues “Some are desirable here but not there, now but not then”. This 
'time and location' factor resonates closely with Herder's own ideas, and connects to his understanding 
of the life-cycle of a volk (4.2.4) as well as history more generally (4.2.5).
79 This has considerable impact on the educational elements of 'International Development', although its 
exploration falls outside the remit of this thesis.
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those  within  the  dispossessed  groups  that  are  less  dispossessed.  The  elite  of  the 
marginalised are the ones who lead the charge, and they are also the furthest from the 
negative implications of their own dispossession. Further, that in combination with his 
critique of Nussbaum, education for the possessed as opposed to the dispossessed, for 
Ingram, must require a recognition of one's own hierarchical position, as well as those 
of others, reminiscent of an intersectional approach, but with a (necessary for Ingram) 
empirical evaluation so that genuine claims can be recognised by the possessed, and 
relative inequalities can be assessed to determine the order and magnitude of response.
The consequence of these points is that education for the possessed must come with a 
political project of recognising  and responding to inequality-difference by weakening 
one's own position in the dominant systems meta-norms. But to get to the point where 
the understanding – even the imperative of - democracy should be seen as the struggle 
of the dispossessed for equal-liberty rather than a civilised process of power distribution 
and  use  is  another  matter.  Ingram’s  arguments  require  a  wide-spread  belief  that  a 
primary purpose of the state is in the regulation of itself  against the regulation of the 
marginalised. It relies on a radical reformulation of how we as subjects, citizens and 
humans understand the concept of democracy, and of that understanding wending its 
way through the political  institution,  requiring fundamental  shifts  in  the practice of 
politics  at  all  levels.  More  than  that  though,  it  empowers  instability  against  a  pre-
existing requirement for stability, but is unclear of the means by which these contests 
can be judged valid (and who does the judging). Without this embedding throughout 
society all the way to global society, as a new norm of politics, it would inevitably be a 
path for the privileged (even if also dispossessed in certain ways) to contest for  their 
equa-liberty. The need for embedding is an underlying requirement – which education 
slots in to. It also makes the assumption that the only way is through contest – which is 
its  own Hobbesian  norm.  Further,  it  requires  suffering,  just  as  Kant  bases  his  own 
project upon. I would even go so far as to argue that it elevates suffering as the core 
principle of Ingram's radical cosmopolitics.
2.5 Conclusions
The previous sections of this chapter have explored the arguments of Thomas Pogge, 
Seyla Benhabib and James Ingram. For Pogge it identified, firstly, his location in the 
traditional approach to cosmopolitanism, presenting a universalisation of a historically 
state-bounded,  generalised  conception  of  humanity  focused  on  individualism.  He 
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develops this primarily from an enlargement of Rawls' works, and is an approach which 
both Benhabib and I attribute to the locus of the concept of the generalised other. This 
serves not so much to erase the importance of particularity, but to present a level playing 
field between all particular experiences and perspectives, regardless of their essentiality, 
importance  or  impact,  and  regardless  of  whether  they  are  experiences  that  can  be 
escaped from, taken up and cast  aside. As a result,  he dismisses structural issues of 
privilege, opportunity and agency that the possession of choice-less individualities (like 
race,  sexuality,  gender,  class,  physical  or  mental  ability  etc.)  impose  on  already 
marginalised  groups  which  he  repositions  against  voluntary  group  affiliations. 
Education,  for  him,  whilst  fundamental  to  the  development  of  cosmopolitanism,  is 
situated  primarily  in  the  formal  schooling  of  individuals  to  develop  rationality  and 
aligns closely with Kant's own arguments.
Benhabib's  approach,  in  contrast,  through  her  development  of  both  Gilligan's 
generalised and concrete other and extending from Habermas' discourse ethics, attempts 
to weave a path between the generalised other and the concrete other by incorporating 
the  idea  of  reversibility,  in  the  hope  of  levelling  the  historical  privileging  of  the 
generalised  other  (the  publicised  middle-class  male)  against  the  concrete  other  (the 
privatised middle-class woman), although the final balance between the two remains 
unclear.  This  positions  her  somewhere  near  the  middle  of  the  traditional/critical 
spectrum. She approaches from a self-avowed critical feminist perspective and her first 
main aim is to explore the dynamics and interactions of the concrete others, not just as a 
key source of human expression,  interaction and development,  but also as a way to 
justify its positioning at the same level as the generalised other through the principles of 
reversibility and universality. 
Her  goal  is,  in  effect,  the  location  of  the  dialectic  that  is  produced  between 
universalising (generalised) and particularising (concrete) approaches. It demonstrates a 
wariness of both approaches when considered on their own, in addition to concerns over 
the 'middle' location of cultural/group experiences, and the institutionalising effect that 
struggles  for  group  recognitions  have  over  their  culture's  growth,  development  and 
change. In her case, she acknowledges that her version of morality as communicative 
ethics  automatically  excludes  an  undefined  number  of  humanity who are  unable  to 
engage with the commitments that her system demands, but which appears to constitute 
an educational and capability barrier to inclusion. Further, that her method is only valid 
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for  those  who  can  engage  in  the  process.  Benhabib's  desire  is  to  establish  balance 
between the universal and the particular, explored through state-moderated discourse. 
This  is  expected  to  produce  newer  democratic  iterations,  although  I  argue  that  he 
emphasis  on  reversibility  fails  to  establish  this,  as  does  her  clear  favouring  of  the 
universal over the particular in areas like hospitality.
My exploration  of  James  Ingram established  the  importance  for  him of  a  counter-
narrative, rather than simply balance between the universal and the particular, and a 
recognition of the inherently imperialistic nature of cosmopolitanism. This imperialism 
can only be checked through the privileging of the struggles of the marginalised against 
its  universalising,  and generalising,  tendencies  and requires  the  reification  of  group 
identity  and  their  struggles  against  their  erasure  and/or  oppression.  What  was  also 
revealed though was that, because Ingram's is a  response to, it has to incorporate the 
underlying norms of fear and desire that are a core characteristic of the Kantian vision 
of cosmopolitanism.
The analyses carried out in this chapter reveals three key, chained aspects that serve to 
direct the theorising and analysis of cosmopolitanism in a very specific way. Firstly, that 
Pogge's  traditional  conception  of  cosmopolitanism  relies  on  the  development  of 
generalised  and homogenised  individualism through education.  Individual  difference 
could be accommodated, but it cannot be incorporated. Secondly, Benhabib's approach 
focusses on the development of individuality through familial,  domestic and cultural 
education, but in the disagreement between the universal and the particular on the plane 
of  culture,  it  prioritises  the  enlargement  of  the  characteristics  of  generalised 
individualism  over  concrete  individuality  or  cultural  identity.  Finally,  Ingram's 
arguments suggest that cosmopolitanism, rather than focussing on either individualism 
or individuality, is interested primarily in group identity, specifically when it responds 
against marginalisation, discrimination or dispossession.
The  current  approach  to  cosmopolitanism,  as  represented  by  Pogge,  Benhabib  and 
Ingram,  can  be  classified  in  specific  ways,  identifying  similarities  of  approach that 
highlight  a  critical  and  traditional  divide  within  the  social  sciences.  The traditional 
cosmopolitan approach embeds the fundamental equivalence and legal equality of the 
individual at the heart of its approach through its promotion of collective individualism, 
and it automatically aligns, through a lack of examination and focus on the political 
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side, to the creation of the individual with a pre-set liberal democratic education that 
privileges the generalised other. As a result, the underlying nature of the state, or indeed 
of the western-dominated world, is not one of the importance of the concrete other80, but 
rather  of  the  differently-identified  generalised  other  being  granted  temporary  and 
restricted equality.  This continues until either the institutionally accepted generalised 
self  is  threatened by external  factors  unless  or  the  differently-identified  generalised 
other surrenders, sacrifices or allows to fade (if possible) its differences and presents 
itself as the generalised other. Pogge sees their accommodation as expressed through 
additional  rights,  and  Benhabib  needs  these  concrete  aspects  to  be  reversible  and 
therefore  ultimately  incorporateable  into  the  generalised  other's  standpoint  through 
public discourses and democratic iterations. Ingram, by contrast, elevates the different 
and the marginalised as the key element of contestatory democracy and cosmopolitics.  
In essence, then, this chapter looked at the point of the ‘who’ over the ‘what’. The self-
creation of the ‘who’ as an expression of difference, but linked to some aspect of group 
affiliation,  over  the  other-determination  of  the  ‘what’  as  an  expression  of  universal 
commonality.  The  approach  that  the  traditional  side  presents  is  in  effect  of  the 
philosopher-king  determining  the  ‘what’ that  defines  the  individual  as  human  and 
worthy of rights because of its focus on individualism and universality. This 'what' is 
universally equal and grafted with specific rights that define that humanity, but it also 
encloses and limits it. The development and promotion of universal laws and rights, by 
theorists  and specialists  places  their  creation  and  alteration  outside  the  authority  or 
influence of the individual, or even the group, without some kind of public complaint, 
discourse or contest being undertaken.
80 Which Benhabib elaborates upon but then removes from consideration when examining hospitality 
and Cosmopolitan Right.
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Chapter 3: Kant and Cosmopolitanism
“Education is the greatest and most difficult problem that can
be given to a human being” (Kant 1803, p.441)
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3.7. Conclusions 
3.1 Introduction
This chapter explores Immanuel Kant's works in detail, expanding on the narrow and 
partial approaches typically taken and which were discussed in the previous chapters. 
This examination re-presents his arguments on Cosmopolitanism as resting on five main 
overt themes that run through much of his writings; the importance of religion, human 
nature,  reason, and education,  and the danger of emotions,  as well  as a further two 
implicit themes: elitism and exclusion. These all combine together to form the structure 
that  his  cosmopolitan  system  relies  upon.  I  approach  this  chapter  with  an  under-
examined aspect of his work, religion (3.2), before moving on to his understanding of 
human nature (3.3) and the groupings that humans form (3.4). The final two sections 
explore his arguments on education, firstly of a formal kind (3.5), which has seen much 
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exploration and critique (from the philosophical side at  least),  before examining the 
informal ways education works in Kant's political system. 
3.1.1 Situating Kant
In this  account  of Kant’s  cosmopolitanism, I  firstly demonstrate  how his arguments 
interconnect  and  work  as  a  relatively  cohesive  whole.  Secondly,  by  sourcing  his 
arguments directly from his texts, and referencing according to their original publication 
date,  I  highlight  how  these  seven  themes  extend  throughout  his  post  1770  texts, 
suggesting that Kant's approach to, for example, international politics, emotions, gender 
and race,  can only be understand as part  of  a  relatively comprehensive system that 
incorporates not just his empirical analysis of humanity as it was, or would progress, but 
also his critical development of how he believed that it should exist and progress, from 
pure  reason.  This  both  includes  and  relies  upon his  arguments  on  religion  and 
Providence, as well as his anthropological works, geography, elements of both Hobbes' 
and Rousseau's analyses of humans (atomisation and human animality/nature), inherent 
hierarchies of power, and notably for the purpose of this thesis, education81. 
His arguments on the construction of a civil society and the state, gender and human 
nature are embedded into his writings on perpetual peace, as are his arguments on God 
and religion, and just as his republican state relies on gendered exclusions, elitism and 
suffering to function. His moral person has to be the philosopher/cosmopolitan – a re-
representation of Kant himself, stripped of historicity; just as a moral personality in his 
system  can  only  be  acquired  by  a  white,  educated,  man.  So  too  is  education 
interconnected with, and embedded within Cosmopolitan Right,  Perpetual Peace,  the 
construction of a republican state, the development of an ethico-civil society and his 
writings on reason and religion. By treating Kant's works as separate elements that can 
be cut and pasted elsewhere, such as both Rawls and Pogge do (Molloy 2016, pp.10-
81
My approach  is  a  variant  of  what  Jay Rosenberg,  in  his  introduction  to  Kant’s  Critique  of  Pure 
Reason, refers to as an Appolonian approach and consists of “an especially close reading of the text, 
philological attention to nuances of interpretation, a careful tracing of intellectual influences, and a 
continuous awareness of the broader historical, cultural, and socio-political setting within which the 
work developed and emerged” (Rosenberg 2005, p.2).  I  turn this  approach inward towards Kant, 
expanding the texts to be considered, and establish his arguments within their own broader context.
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12), I argue that it not only fails to present the comprehensive nature of his works but 
also, I believe does a profound injustice to the purpose and direction of his works.
An important aspect of this approach involves his ‘critical turn’, and the period in his 
life  from 1770-1780  which  is  often  referred  to  as  his  “silent  years”  (Kuehn  2001, 
p.188). Contributing to this is that Kant makes clear in 1797, in discussions with his 
editor that 1770 should be the cut-off point for consideration of the republication of any 
earlier ‘minor’ texts (p.190). This typically means that any writings prior to this date are 
not considered relevant to his own critical period’s arguments, but instead are a feature 
of ‘The Magister’ years – and usually as a result ignored.
There are though a number of texts which breach this ‘before and after’ dynamic, and 
make a simple split between these two points less simple and definitive than is often 
considered.  For  example,  his  writings,  and even more  importantly his  teachings,  of 
anthropology, geography, and aesthetics, started well before – and extend through these 
silent years into the 1790’s when he stopped teaching. Although there are some changes 
to the texts he uses over these years, “the roots of his anthropology course lie… as early 
as  1757”  (Louden  2007,  p.2).  A similar  situation  occurs  with  Observations  on  the  
Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime (1764), the Programme of his Lectures (1765) 
and  his  lectures  on  Physical  Geography (1802).  Elements  from  Observations  also 
feature in Anthropology and his Critique of Judgement, and whilst this makes it easier to 
incorporate  these  into  my  analysis  of  Kant’s  arguments,  Observations was  never 
republished.  Guyer  (2007,  p.19)  notes  that,  whilst  it  contains  little  in  the  way  of 
aesthetic theory, it does still form a wider part of Kant’s anthropological exploration; it 
contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of his developing moral theory, and 
it provides considerable detail of his views on “gender, nationality, and race” (ibid.). In 
addition, Goldthwait draws attention to Kant’s handwritten comment in his own copy of 
Observations where  he  writes  that  “Everything  goes  past  me  like  a  river  and  the 
changing tastes and the various shapes of men make the whole game uncertain and 
delusive. Where do I find a fixed point in nature, which cannot be moved by man, and 
were I can indicate the markers by the shore to which he ought to adhere?” (1960, p.8). 
Johann Herder, whilst they were still friends, also observed in relation to Kant that “No 
cabal, no sect, no advantage to himself, no ambition, had the least influence over him 
compared with the development and illustration of the truth” (p.7).
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My approach to these texts, his own note, and the various theorists who have explored 
this  area,  is  that whilst  they contribute only marginally to his  critical  turn82 and the 
history of the development of his moral philosophy, they are far more crucial to the 
empirical exploration that contributed to his need to develop the critical turn. Many of 
the observations he makes in Observations extend throughout his later works, and as I 
demonstrate in this chapter, are crucial to a comprehensive understanding of his overall 
cosmopolitan vision. These empirical explorations were Kant’s early attempts to find a 
‘fixed point in nature’ which he then abandons for a fixed moral point that he believes 
can  link  the  noumenal  with  the  phenomenal;  his  ‘transcendental  deduction’  and 
synthetic  a  priori.  Because  of  this,  I  have  made  the  decision  to  include  his 
anthropological texts as empirical evidence that is used to justify his need for the critical 
turn, as well as the source of underlying norms by which he ‘judges’ human nature. His 
cosmopolitan  political  system,  and  his  educational  arguments,  as  a  result,  have  to 
respond to the empirical 'evidence' that justifies the need for the universal.
This then leads into the second aspect that is crucial for situating Kant in this chapter. 
Whilst  it  is  not  possible  to  go  into  great  depths  on  the  particularities  of  Kant’s 
philosophical  arguments on reason – this  has occupied philosophers ever  since they 
were published and there are ongoing differences of interpretation of how to engage 
with his works – I take the approach here that there are three ‘basic’ aspects to reason 
that  are  of importance.  Firstly,  pure theoretical  reason;  which is  related only to  the 
noumenal, and secondly, empirical reason; which relates only to the phenomenal. The 
third, crucial use is pure83 practical reason, which is Kant’s bridging between these two 
perspectives, through morality. This third use is, I believe, the main purpose of Kant’s 
philosophy – morality – which extends through his second Critique of Practical Reason 
(1788),  the  Groundwork  of  the  Metaphysic  of  Morals (1785),  and  of  course  The 
Metaphysic of Morals (1797) itself.
My engagement  with  reason in  this  chapter,  as  a  result,  makes  use  of  two distinct 
aspects. Firstly, that which has a ‘pure’ component and thus relates to morality – it has 
an aspect to it that is  a priori.  Secondly reason as the idea of reasoning – aesthetic 
judgment,  which  is  a  posteriori.  I  refer  to  them  respectively  as  pure  reason,  and 
empirical reason(ing). This is of course a simplification – not least because it conflates 
82 David  Harvey and  Michael  Foucault  both  suggest  that,  with  regards  to  Kant's  Anthropology and 
Geography, the impact is far greater, and that these text should be considered central to his critical  
turn (Foucault 2008; Harvey 2009, pp.21-23).
83 Kant frequently but not always drops 'pure' when he discusses reason. 
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pure theoretical reason and pure practical reason into one, and in addition Kant does not 
usually refer to empirical reasoning in this way. When he refers to reason, it is generally 
a shortening of pure reason - as is the case for the title of his second critique (Reath 
2010, p.3). In relation to the areas explored in this chapter, it  is sufficient to clearly 
distinguish between the universality of Kant’s moral arguments, and the particularity in 
his  non-philosophical  works.  Pure  reason  contains  a  (universal)  moral  component, 
whilst empirical reason, although it may contain a moral component, is sourced from 
empirical sources - and thus is not related to universal morality.
3.1.2 Chapter Summations
Section (3.2), starts by examining Kant's writings on religion and theology, for a very 
specific reason – because Kant repeatedly asserts that “Human reason  has need of an 
idea of highest perfection” (1783, p.341, my emphasis). This need is foundational to his 
works  through  the  idea  of  belief,  and  'highest  perfection'  refers  to  the  Christian 
interpretation  of  a  singular  God-figure.  His  philosophical,  political,  and educational 
arguments rely on a very particular conception of this God, of religion, the natures of 
good and evil, and the meanings of Nature and Providence, which he builds upon and 
are mentioned throughout his works, not least Perpetual Peace where he states outright 
that it is “guaranteed by no less authority than the great artist Nature!” (1795b, pp.108-
9). It situates his arguments on the strength and danger of emotionality (as the catalyst 
to evil thoughts and actions) and the necessity for the development of a specific form of 
education  designed  to  counteract  this  influence  through  the  cultivation  of  a 
cosmopolitan attitude reliant on the development of pure reason; so that education can 
serve its primary purpose for the good of humanity.
The next section (3.3) expands upon this through an exploration of human nature. It 
initially looks at his idea of the natural human and its relation to the idea of the 'noble 
savage' before moving on to the ways he sees humans becoming civilised, before I then 
move on to how man84 should be moralised to cosmopolitanism. The final part of this 
section looks into more detail on Kant's particular approach to essentialising men and 
women into a permanent binary of opposition, that connects back to the first section; his 
fears of emotionality and why emotions must be contained, and as a consequence why 
women must be contained and forever denied the right to a moral personality. This final 
part to this section features the first major exclusionary move that Kant makes, not just 
84 This refers specifically to men, not women or any other genders of humanity, and, as I develop further  
in the chapter, of a particular subset of men.
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because he deems women to be less than men and unable to be moral, but because he 
makes  this  exclusion  permanent.  His  framework  requires  women  to  fulfil  a  role 
determined  by Nature,  for  the  good  of  humanity,  and so  must  exist  outside  of  the 
possibility  of  human  agency and  be  permanently  denied  the  opportunity  for  moral 
development.
Section (3.4) takes the findings from the previous sections and explores the different 
types of societies that Kant identifies. The first  correlates with his understanding of 
'natural human animals', and the location of 'morality through innocence' prior to the 
development of reason i.e. the romanticised concept of the 'noble savage' that he takes 
from Rousseau. The existence of social communities, through culturing and empirical 
reasoning alone is one that he sees as inherently untrustworthy, resting, as he perceived 
it, upon emotions (most prominently fear and desire) rather than being developed from 
pure reason. The progression from there to a civil society brings with it the  reasoned 
construction of a civil constitution. This serves to give a legal (ethico-judicial) means to 
counteract  animality  and  promote  justice,  and  is,  according  to  Kant,  the  necessary 
response to humanity's asocial sociability,  and the endless wars and strife across the 
globe  that  drives  human  societies  to  construct  international  institutions  to  regulate 
commerce  and  facilitate  peace.  This  occurs  primarily  because  of  the  actions  of 
Providence (through the structure of Nature) but also through the manifestations of his 
'geniuses'  and  the  ongoing  development  of  the  art  of  education  to  the  science  of 
pedagogy, to produce elite individuals with the capability and opportunity to develop 
their moral personality. These moral elite then go on to form the 'invisible church', made 
up initially of individual ethico-civil societies but eventually, in the fullness of time, are 
expected  to  become  a  single  ethico-civil  community  connecting  all  of  humanity 
together.
Essentially, Kant's system indicates that whilst it is possible for there to be movement 
from a natural community to a social community, it can only become a  civil  society 
through a) the influence of Providence, b) the development of pure reason and c) the 
contributions  of  his  moral-cosmopolitan-religious  men  to  the  development  of  this 
constitution. This development occurs through 1) public discourse, 2) moral examples 
that are recorded for posterity to influence the already existing and future elite 3) formal 
education to prepare a new generation of cosmopolitan individuals 4) the development 
of a civil constitution 5) the creation of a single-state world, or failing that, a pacific 
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federation.  Civil  society  serves  as  the  location  of  the  struggle  between  humanity's 
animal nature and cosmopolitan man's moral development, and Kant's conception of the 
religious ethico-civil society contributes to this battle through public examples of moral 
acts by his geniuses, moral men, and those who copy their examples. Their contribution 
in turn relies on an elite level of education that Kant sees as feasible for only a select 
few, which also requires the opportunity to practice their reason and morality until they 
are able to revolutionise their thoughts and actions to pure morality for humanity. The 
right to vote, which he restricts to men of independent wealth is one such avenue for 
this to occur. The existence and actions of his ethico-civil society serves as the main 
avenue through which the exercising and propagation of cosmopolitan (moral) values 
was expected to spread from his cosmopolitan beings to the wider public who are able 
to  perceive good and evil  actions,  even if  they cannot yet  act  as good beings.  This 
process occurs through a curiously un-Kantian 'fake it till you make it' approach using 
self-deceit,  that  he  suggests  is  acceptable  for  non-cosmopolitan  citizens,  and of  the 
educational requirements needed to create the individuals that would be a part of this 
society. Kant's cosmopolitan world is the culmination of these layers, helping to secure 
a perpetual peace through the development of a world government,  or if  that is  not 
possible, a pacific federation.
This  section  also  sees  a  second  set  of  major  exclusions  of  Kant's.  The  first  is, 
surprisingly, his 'pragmatic' response to the expense of the kind of education needed to 
give the grounding from which to develop pure reason (and as a consequence moral 
men). Since he sees it as too expensive to be provided to all male children, he instead 
directs the majority to be distracted through commerce, and to receiving a lesser level of 
education  for  skill  and  prudence,  but  not  morality85.  The  second  is  through  Kant's 
wholesale removal of native Americans, Africans and other races that he groups with 
them, from the ability to develop skill and experience culturing – the necessary first 
steps and route to moralization. The third is through his distinction between citizens and 
subjects. A citizen is one who has the right to vote and as a consequence, because they 
are not economically beholden to others, are able to act freely and morally.
The final two sections (3.5 & 3.6) directly explore his writings on education, and how 
they fit into the sections explored previously. The first (3.5) looks at the role and system 
of formal education he develops, with the second part exploring the elements of indirect 
85 Although it should be noted that this moral standard is implied, and the groundwork is laid, in the way 
that they are disciplined and cultivated (See section 3.5)
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and cultural education that he weaves into his arguments. There are four elements to this 
first part, which starts with a) the disciplining of the child away from animality. The 
child is then b) cultivated by his teacher to skilfulness at the same time that they are c) 
culturing into civility, before d) the elite men are educated in virtue before educating 
themselves to morality through its practice. 
The second section (3.6) explores Kant's idea of  bildung and culturing, and the other 
informal measures he sees as necessary to cultivate mankind to humanity. This section 
initially examines the function of the family environment (3.6.1) before detailing how 
religion  and  the  ethico-civil  society  are  implicated  in  the  cultural  and  moral 
development of those who are denied an advanced level of education, just as they are 
used to support the internal struggle that is a function of a man's unceasing striving to 
morality (3.6.2). This final part of this section (3.6.3) sets out the way in which Kant 
relied upon his idea of Cosmopolitan Right and commerce to facilitate cultural  and 
moral  development  across  borders  into  other  states  (through  an  Enlightenment 
understanding of the meaning of commerce).
This  chapter  then  concludes  (3.7)  by  arguing  that  Kant's  cosmopolitan  system  is 
deliberately designed to promote a single moral code that would be cultivated in a select 
few thorough a Socratic-style cosmopolitan education system. They are expected to act 
as the conscience of the society they were a part of; as its 'moral centre'. His original 
'Kingdom of Ends'  was also the truer expression of his works, rather than his latter 
support for a pacific federation which he settles on for pragmatic reasons, and whilst his 
shift acknowledged the practical impossibility of achieving his final utopian future, it 
still  rested  upon  his  foundational  understanding  of  human  nature,  and  the  inherent 
danger of emotionality that justified its exclusionary nature.
The analysis presented here makes the case not just of the essential role that education 
and religious belief plays in his project of a 'Kingdom of Ends', but also to highlight that 
his  more  problematic  elements  are  also intrinsic  to  his  Kingdom  of  Ends.  His 
Cosmopolitan  world  relies  on,  and  is  premised  upon,  structural  inequalities  and 
embedded  norms  that  permanently and  necessarily  exclude  large  parts  of  humanity 
entirely  from the  opportunities,  political  agency  and  equality  that  are  the  assumed 
conclusions of his works. Consequently, the Perpetual Peace that his cosmopolitanism is 
designed  for  is  a  peace  provided  and  enforced  by  inherent  and  necessary  power 
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differentials;  not his  overarching concept  of Freedom and Duty.  Further,  that Kant's 
Cosmopolitanism is  by necessity an aloof,  Deist,  Christian  Cosmopolitanism world, 
rather than the secular versions that are most commonly presented.
Part 1: The Human
3.2 Kant's Religious Theology
The  first  part  of  this  section  examines  Kant's  writings  on  God  and  Religion  and 
identifies the role that education plays in Kant's concept of pure rational theology. The 
second  part  of  this  section  explores  Kant's  use  of  the  concepts  of  Nature  and 
Providence, and their relation to both God and education. The final section explores in 
more detail  Kant's  concept of Religion through his understanding of good and evil, 
highlighting the role of education in the creation of a moral identity, which he typically 
refers to in his works as either personality or character.
3.2.1 God and Religion
This section highlights the path that Kant argues must be taken to worship God, which 
he suggests must come at a later stage in a person's educational development than is the 
usual;  after the  individual  has  already  developed  their  ability  to  use  reason  and 
judgement. He suggests instead that:  
“[children]... should witness no acts of veneration... never even hear the name of 
God, it might be the proper order of things to guide them first to ends and to that  
which benefits the human being, to sharpen their power of judgement... then to 
add a wider knowledge of the structure of the universe, and only then to reveal 
the concept of a higher power... at first everything must be attributed to nature, 
but later nature must be attributed to God” (1803, p.480).
Picking this passage apart, this quote first imposes an embargo on the influence of the 
ecclesiastical system of religion, which Kant perceives to be of an emotional, or sensate, 
influence which precedes, but should not be confused with, the necessary development 
of pure religious faith (1793b, pp.139). Secondly, that the individual's education initially 
focuses on humanity's  ends, indicating a focus on philosophy as the “science of the 
human being... as he is and as he should be... in terms both of his natural function and of 
his  relations  of  morality  and  freedom”  (1798c,  p.288).  This  is  then  enhanced  by 
'knowledge  of  the  structure  of  the  universe'  although  what  Kant  means  by  this  is 
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questionable as he makes no mention of 'the universe' elsewhere in his writings. He does 
though suggest that  anthropology should be “considered as knowledge of the world, 
which  must  come  after  schooling”  (1798a,  p.231)  which  appears  to  be  the  closest 
approximation to his 'the universe' in this context. Finally, that whilst the revealing of 
the overt  concept  of  God,  in  Kant's  ideal  situation,  would occur  much later  in  life, 
occurring after his moral and practical education (1803, p.464), the existence of God is 
already implicit in all of the education that has gone before, which is initially ascribed to 
'nature'. The child's education prior to this point assumes and incorporates, but merely 
does not emphasise, God.
Kant's purpose for approaching in this way is due to his move towards a 'Pure Rational 
Belief86 (1793b,  p.151).  He firstly  recognises  the  historical  necessity for  the  use  of 
ecclesiastical  props  designed to generate  an  emotional  dependence  or  connection to 
God, and the role of priests in determining for others what morality should be, before 
rejecting its role in the future development of religious belief (1784a, p.3). Instead, Kant 
argues that determining the existence of God is never possible, due to his super-sensible 
nature, and so can only deduced by “a synthetic a priori proposition” (1793b, p.59).
Whilst Kant does suggest that “the moral concept of God reason gives us is so simple 
and obvious to the ordinary human understanding that not much cultivation is required” 
(1783, p.448), there are two issues with this. Firstly, whilst the concept is indeed, in and 
of itself, quite simple to grasp, this does not touch on the determination through pure 
reason of the need to believe in God. It relies, rather, on learning of the moral concept of 
God from others and for that to 'make sense' in some way – i.e. for it to follow some 
form of logic from its first presentation, or for it to be normalised culturally, societally, 
and/or in the education system, and then a posteriori reasoned. Secondly, the ability to 
make use of – to  apply that faith - according to the precepts of morality and reason, 
requires the individual  to  have an intellectual  background in the first  place.  This  is 
especially so since Kant places the discovery of nature as attributable to God well after 
the end of schooling. It also then requires faith to make that connection, as driven by the 
belief that humanity has an End, which determines the existence of God. As Kant puts it 
“he  [man]  needs  a  moral  Intelligence,  because  he  exists  for  an  end,  and  this  end 
demands a Being as the cause both of himself and the world with that end in view” 
(1790, p.274).  Further,  he talks  of the essential,  incentivised nature of morality that 
86 This is a part of his wider works on the distinction between pure theoretical, and pure practical reason,  
contained within his Critiques.
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requires this belief (1783, p.345) because otherwise there is no reason to assume that 
humans can even achieve true happiness. As he puts it  “why should I  make myself 
worthy  of  happiness  through  morality  if  there  is  no  being  who  can  give  me  this 
happiness” (1783, p.407). From this, the contentment he equates with happiness, which 
he describes as the emotional state achieved by a person performing their duty for duty's 
sake, comes from God, and would not occur in the absence of belief as there would be 
no incentive to follow their Duty and no God willing to grant this contentment.
What stands out here is not just the issue of a belief in God, but also the belief in a 
grand destiny of humanity – the reason for and purpose of our existence - which is 
situated as the underlying precept that determines the need and requirement for a belief 
in God because “without assuming an intelligent author we cannot give an intelligible 
ground of it [existence] without falling in to plain absurdities” (1786c, p.11). For Kant, 
the existence of humanity is meaningless without a purpose, and so a purpose must be 
presumed. In essence, this introduces a circular argument to his works: if an End of 
humanity is assumed, then this requires a Moral Intelligence, and if a Moral Intelligence 
is assumed, then humanity has an End; but neither can be determined from empirical 
means, according to his arguments, because God is outside the practical world and so 
can only be deduced as necessary and needed through  pure reason, i.e. it  is a moral 
argument. If God can only be deduced as  needed from pure reason, then this idea of 
man's destiny also requires that same level of deduction – as a moral argument, but Kant 
fails  to  justify this.  Instead,  he surprisingly states that  “I must thus be permitted to 
assume that, since the human race is constantly progressing in cultural matters... it is 
engaged in progressive improvement in relation to the moral end of its existence... I do 
not need to prove this assumption” (1793a, p.88, my emphasis). Kant's arguments here 
rests on two key assumptions to support his deduction from pure reason that God needs 
to  exist.  Firstly,  humanity  has  a  destiny,  and  secondly,  humanity  is  constantly 
progressing in cultural matters. But since the first is a circular argument involving only 
pure reason, and the second is an assumption that can only be deduced from empirical 
means,  the  latter  (according  to  his  own arguments  on  the  separation  between  pure 
reason and empiricism) should have no influence over the former.
This  juxtaposition  of  the  empirical  and  moral  are  instead  blurred  into  each  other, 
through the education of the child, and excused as the one necessary exception to their 
divide (1790, p.194). Rather than resolving this conflict, he instead uses discipline and 
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cultivation87 to force them together and shrouds this behind the idea that the world and 
its workings should be attributed to nature, and thus are  natural, which is only much 
later attributed to God, who therefore must exist since the whole basis of education 
predicates and normalises God's existence. The circle is closed off in the early formative 
years  of  the  child  because  “discipline  prevents  the  human being from deviating  by 
means of his animal impulses from his destiny: humanity” (1803, p.438).
Kant makes use of the same principles of reason to determine his arguments on religion. 
Firstly, God's super-sensible nature cannot be deduced from empirical means, but rather 
must  be  assumed  from  “a  felt  need  of  reason” (1786c,  p.12),  i.e.  a  remnant  of 
humanity's  original  good-innocence  through  intuition  that  is  God-given  via  Nature. 
Secondly, because “pure rational faith can never be transformed into knowledge by any 
natural data of reason or experience” (1786c, p.14). By this, he argues that the trappings 
of ecclesiastical faiths, whether led by a shaman of the Tungues or the European Prelate 
(1793b,  p.195),  would  neither  lead  us  to  a  true  worship  of  God,  nor  allow for  the 
freedom he prized so much. It would rather be little more than a stop-gap, and in the end 
“religion will gradually be freed of all empirical grounds of determination... the lead-
sting of holy tradition... becomes bit by bit dispensable” (1793b, p.151)88. 
More fundamentally, the sequence of Kant's arguments goes accordingly: theology is 
the “System of Cognition of the highest being” (1783, p.344), which is derived from 
pure  reason (and faith),  and “religion  is  nothing but  the  application  of  theology to 
morality” (p.342), where morality is also derived from pure reason (1790, pp.275-77). 
Religion is thus sourced from two aspects of pure reason, and is therefore pure rational 
belief, which by its nature does not, and cannot ever, have an empirical component to 
determine its necessity. It is therefore internal and theoretical in nature, and understood 
as “purely moral laws [which] each individual can recognise, by himself, through his 
own reason, the Will of God... …which lies as the basis of his own religion” (1793b, 
p.137, my emphasis). The possessive and personal nature of this phrase is crucial to his 
arguments because firstly it is produced from the individual's own pure reason and not 
determined from any empirical knowledge, whether that be teaching, experience, rituals, 
prayers, visions, a formal religious system, or the writings contained within a holy book. 
This argument rejects the importance of a visible church and the role of, as he calls it,  
87 See Sections (3.5.1) and (3.5.2).
88 He presents this argument in the same tone, and implies a conceptual link between them, when he also  
suggests that humans become adults when they give up “childish things” (1783, p.448, my emphasis).
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“guardians of the common mass” (1784a, p.55). It instead suggests an invisible church 
where  each  both  worships  and  expresses  their  belief  according  to  their  own 
determination of their duty (1793b, p.176). Secondly, this development of one's own 
religion (as  a  formal  system  of  religious  attitudes,  beliefs,  and  practices)  requires 
considerably more than the “not much cultivation” (1783, p.448) Kant asserts is the case 
to know God.
For Kant, the duty of the cosmopolitan, determined through pure reason, the moral law, 
derived from the same source, and pure religion belief – again from pure reason - are all 
a  part  of  the  same interwoven system,  rather  than  detachable  elements  that  can  be 
reassembled independently. They are interlocking (or complementary) structures (Kant 
1781,  cited  in  Kleingeld  2001,  p.201)89 -  with  each  reliant  on  the  crucial  role  of 
education to give the intellectual tools from which to reach and develop these duties and 
laws. The processes that these moral individuals establish within themselves are derived 
from the same processes and must lead to the same conclusions. For Kant, the moral 
person, the cosmopolitan person, and the religious person are the same individual.
3.2.2 Nature and Providence
The previous section explored Kant's views on God and religion, and their interplay 
with his ideas of education and reason. This section examines an area that has seen little 
attention to date90 – Kant's use of Nature and Providence and the importance he places 
on them, because of his assessment that men are unable by themselves to achieve a 
pacific federation.
Part of this issue is concerned with why Kant sometimes favoured one word over the 
other – and the connection to Kant's wider views on religion. More widely it emphasises 
the importance Kant gives God in the progress of humanity to his kingdom of ends 
because “a justification of nature - or better, of providence - is no unimportant motive 
for  choosing  a  particular  viewpoint  for  considering  the  world”  (1784b,  p.53,  his 
emphasis). These terms appear not just in his religious works, but also more widely91 
and as Pauline Kleingeld points out, for Kant, progress comes from “Providence alone” 
89 The translated  quote  Kleingeld  uses  is  "Under  the government  of  reason,  our  cognitions  are  not 
permitted to form a rhapsody; instead, they should form a system". 
This  is  interpreted  elsewhere  as  “Under  the  sway  of  reason  our  knowledge  must  not  remain  a 
rhapsody, but must become a system” (1781, p.386).
90 Although see also Kleingeld (2001, p.203) and Molloy (2017, p.ix & 14).
91 E.g. Perpetual Peace (1795b), Ideas for a Universal History (with a Cosmopolitan Purpose) (1784b), 
and in On the Common Saying: This may be True in Theory but it does not Apply in Practice (1793a).
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(Kant  1793,  cited  in  Kleingeld  2001,  p.203).  The  other  part  of  this  issue  is  the 
importance that Kant gives to the actions of Nature or Providence in his works to such 
an extent that “he asserts without further discussion that if the full development of the 
human rational predispositions were impossible, this would make these predispositions 
appear  purposeless  and in  vain,  "which would abolish all  practical  principles"(19).” 
(ibid, p.210). Whilst their presence in his texts are usually glossed over, their inclusion 
raises  interesting  issues  with his  works  because:  “what  means...  of  maintaining and 
accelerating this constant progress... depends not so much upon what  we do (e.g. the 
education  we impart  to  the  younger  generation)...  it  will  depend upon what  human 
nature may do in and through us, to compel us to follow a course which we would not  
readily  adopt  by choice  (1793a,  p.90).  Kant  even  goes  so  far  as  to  assert  that  the 
movement  towards  a  “perfect  constitution”  (which  comes  after  the  formation  of a 
pacific federation (p.47)) is “the realisation of a hidden plan of nature” (p.50). As with 
the previous section and the importance of God and religion to Kant's works, Nature, as 
“the  order in  nature” and Providence as “the  cause of  this  order” (Kleingeld 2001, 
p.214) are the components of Kant's arguments that he relies upon to such an extent that 
he asserts that his arguments are meaningless without them.
Nature is determined by God, and the dispositions that humanity has been imparted 
with,  both compassion (1798a, p.355) and the seeds of discord (p. 417), are sensate 
dispositions of humanity's nature. In the former, compassion, it is “planted in us... to 
handle the reigns provisionally until reason has achieved the necessary strength” (p.355) 
and in the latter  it  is the source of Kant's asocial  sociability which, post-fall,  drives 
humanity to  seek  refuge  within  a  civil  constitution.  Nature's  role  is  the  use  of  the 
positive,  emotional,  attributes  that  Providence  imbued  humanity  with,  until  the 
predisposition of reason (which is of man) is developed enough to supplant it. It makes 
use of the negative attributes to drive the cultivation of reason to create an environment 
where humanity is both able, through the development of pure reason, and forced, by 
endless  strife  and war,  to  construct  a  system where  it  can  restrict  itself  to  achieve 
Perpetual Peace.
As with the need for a belief in God, so too does Kant argue that duty demands him to 
make the assertion that humanity is driven to progress by Providence through Nature, so 
that  he  can  influence  the  succeeding  generations  who  will  in  turn  make  this  same 
argument (Kleingeld 2001, p.215)92 – and because of the need for this argument, it must  
92 “I base my argument on my innate duty to influence posterity,  in every member of the series  of 
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be so. Far from a reliance on logic, rationalism, or the primacy of pure reason, Kant is  
relying on the  need for belief, and the responsibilities that it places to ensure that this 
need will propagate through time. Again, this appears to be another instance where Kant 
relies on a circular argument as the means by which progress can occur: because it is 
possible to assert this, it must be asserted, and if it can be asserted, it can be made true 
through its assertion, which justifies the need to make the assertion.
The conclusion that  I  reach here is  that education can never be enough  by itself  to 
achieve Kant's Kingdom of Ends, and so humanity must rely on the force of Nature to 
achieve its progression. Education  is implicated in the process though, firstly because 
the propagation into posterity of the need for a belief in Nature, Providence and God 
that serves to teach those who come afterwards, can only come about when man realises 
through pure reason of its need93. Secondly, the course that humanity is forced to follow 
is one for which pure reason (as was explored in the previous section), and thus man's 
moralization  through self-education,  requires  the  construction  of  a  civil  constitution 
which is a prelude either to the reality of cosmopolitan world, or a pacific federation 94. 
This suggests that both are bound together and necessary, since without the conclusions 
that pure reason reaches this cannot be delivered through history, and a civil constitution 
cannot  be  reached  regardless of  the  will  of  nature.  Without  pure  reason,  humanity 
would endlessly endure wars and destruction, and be unable to move beyond it.
3.2.3 Good and Evil
The  previous  section  examined  Kant's  use  of  Providence  and  Nature,  and  the 
fundamental  role  that  they  play  in  the  development  of  his  works.  In  addition,  it 
highlighted how important the need to believe is within his works, and as a result, the 
development of pure reason. It finally presented the realisation of the need to record to 
posterity to teach those who come after.
This section explores his perspective on good and evil, and how his reconstruction of 
religion involves the creation and enforcement of a binary between pure reason (as the 
beginning of the path to good through evil) and emotions (as the original location of 
generations, in such a way that it continually improves (the possibility of which must hence also be  
assumed),  and that this duty can be rightfully passed on from one generation to the next.” (Kant  
1793a).
93 And of course to be able to reach the point of determining through pure reason requires an intense 
level of education in virtue (3.5), which also needs to be exercised (3.6).
94 Although Kant does argue that “a law-governed external relationship with other states” is both more 
important and comes before a perfect constitution, an imperfect constitution must come before this  
because otherwise a state cannot reach an agreement with another state (1784b, p.47).
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good, turned to evil by empirical reasoning), because “The first development of reason 
toward the good is the origin of evil... God wills the elimination of evil through the all-
powerful development of the germ [good] towards perfection... the means to good is 
placed in reason” (1783, p.412).
The reason Kant deduces that humanity is forced to endure warfare and violence is due 
to his analysis of the nature of evil. Reason, for Kant, is harnessed for two key purposes: 
in the first  instance,  it  is developed to counteract the perceived, or assumed, animal 
(bestial)  nature of man through discipline and training,  and secondly to identify the 
nature of this intertwined approach in constant  opposition  to the sensate nature of the 
person:
...we cannot start out in the ethical training of our conatural moral disposition to 
the good with an innocence which is natural to us but must rather begin from the 
supposition of a depravity of our power of choice... and, since the propensity to 
this [depravity] is inextirpable, with unremitting counteraction against it. Since 
this  only  leads  to  a  progression  from bad  to  better  extending  to  infinity,  it 
follows that the transformation of the disposition of an evil human being into the 
disposition of a good human being is to be posited in the change of the supreme 
inner ground of the adoption of all the human being's maxims in accordance with 
the ethical law (Kant 1793b, p.92, my emphasis)
Although Kant does not explicitly align with a Hobbesian view of human nature here, 
he deduces that we must assume that it is possible Hobbes was right, and so a system 
needs to be designed that takes this into account. Since he sees good and evil as two 
distinct and opposing ideas, rather than existing on a scale, a profound change is needed 
to establish good, rather than just being better95. This depravity comes from humanity's 
sensuous nature, principally the two main emotional drivers of fear and desire96.
Reason is therefore cultivated in a specific way to counteract the misuses that it can be 
put to, since just doing better isn't 'good enough'. Humans always already make use of a 
natural disposition to reason, and because of their instinct to good through innocence 
often attempt to or even succeed in doing better, but until they are able to develop their 
own moral deductions through pure reason, they are unable to direct it towards  good. 
Kant makes a distinction here between the “sensuous nature of the human being” (1793, 
95 Roughly speaking, this means that emotionally influenced (i.e. empirical) reasoning provides a scale 
of worse => better, but only pure reason can be good and only its deliberate reversal is evil.
96 I expand on this aspect in sections (3.3.1) and (3.3.2). See also Ingram, section (2.4.3).
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p.81) which, if it gains prominence, gives the human a bestial character, and evil, which 
requires active  will,  where “the human being...  is  evil  only because he  reverses the 
moral order of his incentives in incorporating them into his maxims... together with the 
law of self-love” (p.83, my emphasis) and thus is defined as a  deliberate act and the 
establishment of a new category of good97 rather than just a movement away from evil. 
Evil for Kant can only manifest from a warped moral reason, but that warping can only 
occur if the sensuous nature of the human is left unbridled. Since for Kant reason of a 
pure type is the only path to morality, religion, and cosmopolitanism, and pure reason is 
the only method away from evil, emotions are consequentially not, and can never be, 
the path to good, and therefore progress. They must instead be identified, interpreted, 
questioned and critiqued to  allow for  the  creation  of  intellectual  processes  that  can 
replace  the  emotional  response  (i.e.  through  discipline,  cultivation  and  nurturing  - 
education). Thus any aspect that incorporates the empirical world can be avoided and/or 
contained.  For  Kant,  good  can  only  come  from  pure  reason.  Emotionally  driven 
sympathy,  because  its  source  is  from  man's  animal  nature  is  an  inherently  less 
trustworthy driver since it is inevitably influenced by reason. Whilst it originates from a 
‘purer’ form of good, in a fallen world it is “nevertheless weak and blind” (1764a, p.30) 
and bound into the misplaced use of reason; self-love. 
This suggests that, far from sympathy being about extending to others, it is for Kant 
another form of egoism; “sympathy [and complaisance] are grounds for beautiful action 
that would perhaps all  be suffocated by the preponderance of a cruder self-interest” 
(p.31). In effect, I care for others and give to others because it makes me feel good. The 
implication being that if it does not make me feel good, then I would not do it, and so 
duty  would  be  determined  from one's  own happiness,  and  thus  be  self-duty.  Since 
children have not had the opportunity to develop their cognitive abilities to the level 
where they can chose their actions from pure reason98, and they do not yet have the 
agency to make decisions for themselves, they must instead “be prevented from any 
yearning, languishing, sympathising. Sympathising is... an evil which consists of merely 
bemoaning a thing” (1803, p.474)99.
97 In  this  respect,  good  in  the  Kantian  system,  from pure  reason  is  pure  good. Better  is  therefore 
practical good, from empirical reasoning.
98 This is of course a short-hand as for Kant pure reason establishes the universal moral maxim, not the  
empirical action in the particular.
99 This also suggests that acting on sympathy, at all, is not a moral good, because it always comes from 
emotions, although it may well make things better. Just as acts of philanthropy from empirical reason  
are not good, but might make things better than the existing situation. This also suggests more widely 
that any actions by non-cosmopolitan individuals would fall into this category
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Kant's presentation of his understanding of the nature of evil closely follows that of the 
bible. Evil comes to humanity only after it tastes the forbidden fruit – which represented 
the knowledge of good and evil. Prior to this, humans were in a state of innocence, led 
only by the God-given animal instinct of humanity, which by itself had no access to the 
ability to miss-use reason until after they had fallen because, crucially, the knowledge of 
evil is required before the ability to determine whether one is good or evil since ““the 
human being is evil” cannot mean anything other than he is conscious of the moral law 
and yet has incorporated into his maxim (occasional) deviation from it” (1793b, p.79). 
Prior to the fall, Nature maintained humanity in a state of innocence that was 'good'. 
After this fall, Nature continues to makes use of humanity's emotional, animal nature to 
try  to  progress  humanity  to  a  place  of  good-innocence  that  is  no  longer  possible. 
Nature's drive to use humanity's intuition (which is the route by which God delivers its  
message to humanity)  to good, instead of following this  original sensate-pure route, 
connects  to  humanity's  emotionality  combined  with  empirical  reasoning  –  which 
manifests as 'inherent' antisocial sociability – and which presents through endless wars 
and conflict. The development of pure reason is the only means by which humanity can 
move beyond this point, and the endless wars and strife force empirically reasoning 
humanity to construct constitutions to reign in human tendencies, and to redirect this 
antisocial sociability through trade and commerce.
As a result, the situation is such that the “human being must be educated to the good... 
but he is educated by a human being who still lies in the crudity of nature” (1798a, 
p.420). And it is from here that we see the reason for Kant's assumption that humanity 
can only progress by infinitesimal steps, as education to the good is carried out by those 
who are themselves flawed in a fundamental sense. Kant's solution to this is through the 
experimentation of education techniques until the art of education is  transformed into 
the  science  of  pedagogy (1803,  p.442).  When  Kant  states  that  “Good  education  is 
exactly that from which all the good in the world arises”, he means this in a  literal 
sense. Good is not a progression or movement from worse to better, it is a leap to a 
completely different position; just as good education does not mean better education, 
but  a  profoundly  different  means  of  educating  people.  This  establishes  a  profound 
problem with the current level of education during his time. If better does not lead to 
good, then better education can also not lead to good education if it is based on the 
emotional – i.e. education as an art. It requires development from pure reason and for 
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the art of education to be entirely set aside and replaced with the science of pedagogy.
Nature  forces  humanity  through  asocial  sociability  to  the  point  of  needing  a  civil 
constitution, but it is only through a pure-reason driven education where man is first 
taught of virtue, and then practices this until he is able to develop his morality in a purse 
sense,  that  he can counteract  the desire  to self-love with the duty imposed by pure 
reason (p.443). This allows him to develop the capacity for good that is required both 
for the Kingdom of Ends, and so that he can reach happiness as contentment in the 
fulfilling of his duty for the betterment of humanity, by contributing to the construction 
of a civil constitution (1783a, pp.411-412).
3.3 Kant's Nature of the Human Being
This section explores in more detail the 'nature of the human' that has already been 
alluded to in section two. It examines the attributes ascribed to the human, as a part of  
his  animal and human natures,  and their  implications.  This section is  split  into four 
parts,  the first  exploring humanity's  predisposition to  animality,  the second looks at 
those which are a part of his necessary human development in an empirical (sensate) 
world to becoming civilised, and the third examines his conception of the moral person. 
The final section explores Kant's analysis of women and men as gendered beings, and 
the reasons he gives for their essential and necessary differences. These different natures 
are crucial to the Kantian political project and the educational system needed to achieve 
his  goal  of  humanity's  progress,  because  human  nature  determines  what  method  is 
needed to reach this goal. Also, as was established in the previous section, how a person 
can move from merely doing better to doing good is crucial to this process, and nature 
also determines, in the Kantian system whether there is any reason to attempt to develop 
pure reason for some people.
Kant  distinguishes  between  humanity's  predispositions  to  animality,  humanity,  and 
personality  (1793b,  p.75),  which  correspond to  the  process  of  development  for  the 
human being “to cultivate himself, to civilise himself and to moralise himself” (1798a, 
p.420)100. The first two of these, 'Natural Animal' and 'Civilised Human' are sensate and 
empirical understandings and interpretations,  whilst  the final concept is  the artificial 
reconstruction of one's identity via the deductions of pure reason where “we... find in 
man two quite different elements... sensibility and understanding on the one hand... and 
on the other hand reason and free will” (1798b, p.289). He presents these three aspects 
100 See especially  Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1793b) where he examines human 
nature and our predispositions to good and evil.
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as in a process of development, not just in terms of formal education, but also when he 
discusses the communities that humans form and where culturing occurs.
In addition, Kant provides two distinct timelines for the process by which an individual 
progresses  from  animality,  to  civilisation,  and  then  to  moralization.  Firstly,  in  the 
footnotes  of  his  Conjectural  Beginning  of  Human  History  (1786a,  pp.169-170)  he 
suggests that a youth in 'nature' reaches their adulthood at approximately 16, but within 
the  civilised  condition  it  takes  an  additional  ten  or  so  years.  The  final  step  –  the 
revolution of oneself to morality (and here he uses the developments of skill, prudence 
and wisdom), he places at the ages of 20, 40 and 60 (1798a, p.330). Whilst these two 
timelines  do not  quite  correspond,  as  the former is  through culturing and the latter 
through education, the process of progression and development are key aspects of his 
understanding. To become civilised and to then achieve wisdom are not quick processes, 
but rather long, slow processes of culturing by others to reach the civilised and prudent 
positions, and by self-education to achieve wisdom (p.307).
3.3.1 Natural Human Animals
As was touched on in section (3.2.2), Nature, as an empirical representation of a super-
sensible God, determined the composition of the emotional, sensate self of humanity. It 
is a part of our natural dispositions, which are physical in nature and impacted upon by 
the sensate world. Sensibility and understanding have their role only within the physical 
realm and thus are entirely removed from pure reason. In essence, these two different 
elements are the original attributes of humanity, which is then followed by the 'acquired' 
knowledge of good and evil. As a consequence “the human being must be destined for 
two entirely different worlds” (p.289) with the first world consisting of the empirical 
and 'of God'; which is our animal nature; and the second world of the theoretical and 'of 
man', which is towards the development of morality and the progression of humanity. 
This analysis, as has been discussed earlier, places humanity into a precarious position 
of  only  functioning  'correctly'  either  in  a  pre-acquired-knowledge  state  where  our 
predisposition to good is led by instinct as the Voice of God (1786a, p.165), or in a post-
development state through pure reason. 
Humans  are  by  their  nature  good,  but  only  in  their  innocence  and  in  the  absolute 
absence of the use of reason. Any application of reason, which is needed to produce 
understanding and to interact with the world, must connect with these nature-derived 
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characteristics of humanity. But the first developments of reason are empirical, prior to 
the deductions made through pure reason and their consequential 'truths' of the moral 
law, which means that the course of each human will typically only range from bad to 
better. This is why Kant states that “the history of nature begins from good, for that is 
the  work  of  God” because  he  is  alluding  to  this  pre-historical  state  of  being.  He 
immediately follows this through by asserting that “the history of freedom [is] from 
evil, for it is the history of the human being” (1786a, p.169), specifying that man has 
both fallen from the good of innocence, and  he has been both in a state of progression 
from bad to better through empirical reason, and from evil to good, through pure reason.
When this is linked to the essential characteristics of our animal nature he identifies: 
self-preservation, the sexual instinct and culture (1793b, p.76), as residing within the 
totality of these original attributes, the ability to develop pure reason and free will seems 
precarious.  Yet  when  he  applies  this  to  the  underlying  purpose of  humanity,  Kant 
deduces that it is necessary (because it is our destiny), and therefore it must be possible 
(1793b, p.105) to discipline a child101 from animality to civilisation, and then to direct 
him  towards  humanity/morality.  These  three  original  elements,  self-preservation, 
propagation of the human species and community with other beings, serve as the most 
powerful, lowest, drives of human nature, which he groups collectively under the title of 
'mechanical  self-love'  (1793b,  p.76).  They exist  regardless  of  rationality,  and  when 
turned to vices, express as gluttony, lust, and wild lawlessness - in effect desire in the 
absence of pure reason.
Kant's  arguments  here  have  a  significant  degree  of  similarity  to  the  historical  and 
romantic  idea  of  the  'noble  savage'  (1775,  p.86)  which  he  takes  from Rousseau  – 
untouched by civilisation and reason, acting from instinct (i.e. the Voice of God) to 
survive and somehow 'pure' of nature because of this. As he puts it  “the human being in 
the state  of nature can only be subject to  a few follies and hardly any foolishness” 
(1764a, p.75). There is no evil within their actions – indeed, he also elsewhere ascribes 
the label of genius to them – as they are original creators of their own means of survival 
(1798a, p.331). Yet in his ongoing discussions with Georg Forster102 he also makes clear 
that such people are 'children' (1803, p.448), their happiness has no value, and their very 
existence serves no purpose for humanity (1785a, p.142).
101 Even if not an adult (1803, p.452).
102 Pauline Kleingeld goes into this in some detail in her article Kant's Second Thoughts on Race (2007).
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Part of the difficulty of this concept and his presentation in this way is that it has no 
relation to any period of the existence of humanity, as to exist in this state is to not be a 
part of humanity. It is essentially a theoretical concept that he creates to develop his 
arguments, which requires this initial construct, with each animal-human in isolation to 
each other,  so  that  he  can  parse  out  different  aspects  to  his  three  stages  of  human 
development. The problem with Kant's conception of this is the idea of the isolated 
human that he builds because it both disregards the impossibility of its occurrence, and 
situates his approach from a Rousseau-ian foundation that requires the base position to 
be that of the atomised individual, absent community. But to propagate the species and 
the social drive requires the pre-existence of a community of some kind, and interaction 
with others – all of which positions the human as a social creature and triggers the 
second predisposition – to humanity. As such, natural man as a social creature is always 
in the second stage because reasoning is always a part of his mental processes.103
3.3.2 Civilised Man
In his Lectures on the Philosophical Doctrine of Religion (1783) Kant argues that “the 
means to good is placed in  reason” (p.412, his emphasis) but more crucially that “he 
[man] first uses reason in the service of instinct, finally he develops it for its own sake... 
he finds evil  first  when his reason has developed far enough that he recognises his 
obligations” (ibid, his emphasis). Thus, “whilst the distinction between good and evil... 
can be known by the human heart, through sentiment” (1765, p. 297), the ability to see 
evil in himself can only be determined in conjunction with the recognition of one's duty. 
In this way Kant firmly separates the  determination of good and evil by pure reason, 
from the identification of good and evil by emotionality. This introduces a subjectivity 
to the determination of good and evil of a person's actions, as it requires the knowledge 
of one's duty and the deliberate choice not to do good, before evil can exist. The same 
action, from this approach, could be either good or evil, depending on the knowledge 
and awareness of the individual, and not on the act itself, which links to his distinction 
between  having  good  morals  and  being  morally  good,  yet  Kant  problematizes  this 
further  by listing  some vices  of  humanity (before  the  development  of  morality)  as 
diabolical vices - which implies that they are still, in some sense, evil. The only way to 
square these two arguments, it seems, is to assume that Kant perceived a route to the 
expression of evil (but not good), regardless of the type of reason used. Evil can be 
identified from the extreme expression of the vices of culture “where they are simply 
103 This links to section (3.4.1), where I connect the idea of the natural human animal to Kant's arguments 
on race.
Sahra Taylor Page 108 of 300 Feb 2019
the idea of a maximum of evil that surpasses humanity” (1793b, p.76) specifically as 
they relate to envy, ingratitude and joy at another's misfortune. Good, in contrast, can 
only occur, in the expression of one's duty through pure reason (with all other actions 
being in some sense evil) but it can be felt prior to the development of pure reason.
Evil comes about from the use of reason for one's own happiness, rather than for the 
happiness  of  others  and  the  perfection  of  one's  self  (1797,  p.190)  and  further  that 
humans are driven by the fear that one might not be worth enough, or worthy of respect 
(1793b, p.76). Kant uses the idea of 'comparison' to explain this – to gain worth in the 
opinion  of  others,  which  again  requires  reason,  from  judgement,  and  from  this, 
inevitably,  without  a  moral  personality  cultivated  from pure  reason,  emotionality  is 
involved which leads to the desire to gain superiority over others. Humans are cultured 
through social interaction, but without a pure moral position the main driving forces are 
most prominently from a fear of inadequacy through comparison to one's peers (the 
driving  force  for  civilised  man)  and desire  for  survival  and sexual  satisfaction  (the 
driving force of animal-man). Further, this use of reason is driven only by the empirical 
world - which should not be universalised, and cannot ever be pure. This combination of 
fear and desire moderated only by empirical reason, according to Kant, inevitably leads 
humans in the singular to vie with each other for greater status, wealth or pleasure, and 
in the collective to make war upon each other, which Nature then uses to drive humans 
to seek shelter under a civil constitution.
Yet to be driven to seek this shelter suggests that whether humans exist under a civil  
constitution or not does not require morality, only pragmatism. To be civil,  after all, 
does not require morality to exist, merely for the acceptable and expected  illusion of 
respect and civility. As Kant puts it “the more civilised human beings are, the more they 
are actors. They adopt the illusion of affection, of respect for others” yet he identifies 
this as in some sense 'good' because “when human beings play these roles... [they] will 
gradually be aroused and merge into the disposition [of virtue]”.  These illusions are 
assumed by him to be known as illusions by all,  and so it is not a lie,  but rather a 
“permissible moral illusion” (1798a, p.263) which contributes, in a small  way to an 
eventual movement from bad to better, even if it is not in itself good. Kant is basically 
(and somewhat crudely) arguing that our cultivation into civilisation relies on a 'fake it 
till you make it' approach through empirical reasoning, implying that we can be cultured 
towards good through allowing us “to deceive the deceiver in ourselves” (ibid). This 
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point is a critical one to make as Kant makes clear that the only route to morality is 
through culture and not beginning with morality (1798a, p.423). This suggests that the 
culturing of humanity must start before the development of morality for men, and since 
morality comes through our culturing104 it  cannot exist in its absence. Civilisation is 
therefore necessary, but only as a stepping stone to morality, through culturing105.
But it is also from this state of being that Kant decides that the destiny of humanity can 
be deduced in a universal sense; that “there is only one case in which experience leads 
our judgement to the concept of an objective and material purposiveness – the concept 
of an end of nature” (1790, p.194). In Section (3.2.1) I discussed how the existence of 
God  and  man's  destiny  are  circular  arguments  that  are  assumed  rather  than  being 
deduced from pure reason, as these initial routes to a belief in God and a final purpose 
of nature are determined from empirical groundings – from natural or practical reason - 
but the destiny of mankind cannot be  achieved using empirical knowledge. It is only 
from pure reason that our end can be achieved, just as an acceptance in the need for God 
must come from pure reason, and it is only from pure reason that a universal morality 
can be constructed which allows us to achieve our destiny. Of course, as was discussed 
earlier,  humans  possessing  a  final  destiny  requires  the  belief  in  the  existence  of  a 
Supreme Being, and so this position is required from empirical, sensate experiences. 
Essentially, humanity's initial belief in God comes from life experiences, not from pure 
reason,  which  in  turn  comes  from  the  culturing  we  receive  from  the  society  and 
communities (and family unit) we are a part of.
On the face of it then, a civilised person without morality would seem to be perceived as 
a negative, as a producer of only evil, but Kant here argues that in fact the opposite 
occurs through two different functions.  I  explore this  area in more detail  in section 
(3.4.2), but briefly, these are that firstly he suggests that people living together in a civil 
condition cancel out each other's evil. Secondly, that whilst those who act from self-
interest from one side contribute to creating evil, he also argues that they are necessary 
and indeed contribute to 'the common good'... in that “Those of self-interest are the most 
common...  those  are  the  most  industrious,  orderly,  and  prudent  people;  they  give 
demeanour  and  solidity  to  the  whole  for  even  without  aiming  at  it  they  serve  the 
common good” (1764a, p.39). Kant positions Nature as a system for the furthering of 
104 Which we initially receive from our parents (1786a, p.169).
105 Culture in this respect means “The production in a rational being of an aptitude for any ends whatever  
their choosing” (1790, p.260). Culture for Kant is a form of education, not a social existence.
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humanity, making use of their 'evil'  in this case by providing a foundation on which 
“finer souls can spread beauty and harmony” (ibid.).
3.3.3 Moral-Religious-Cosmopolitan Man
In  the  previous  sections  I  discussed  the  two  initial  concepts  of  human-animal  and 
civilised man. In the first, I highlighted how the natural animal category is a theoretical 
concept that Kant uses, but has no relation to reality, because human beings are always 
already  social  and  using  some  form  of  reason.  The  second  section  suggested  that 
culturing  and  civilising  are  essential  elements  to  humanity's  progression,  and  that 
Nature neutralises the evil of their uses of empirical reasoning, turning it to good. In this 
section,  I  examine  the  final  level  of  development  to  a  man's  personality,  or  moral 
character, “as a rational and at the same time a responsible being” (1793b, p.76) whilst 
also noting that for Kant, “Morality, not understanding, is what first makes us human 
beings” (1798c, p.291). Empirical reasoning is not and can never be a path to humanity.
This  stage of  development  moves beyond the natural  drives  of  animal-man and the 
culturing of civilised man that we experience as a part of a community or society, and 
involves  the  self-education  of  a  man  to  the  status  of  'human'  through  the 
revolutionizing106 of  his  approach to  the  world via  the  development  of  pure reason. 
Morality, as has been discussed previously, is determined through pure means and so is 
outside of the empirical  world.  It  requires  the cultivation of  pure reason to reach a 
position where it becomes a man's moral duty. In this way, morality and its maxims can 
only be determined through a cosmopolitan-religious-moral  education  because  “it  is 
only as a moral being that man can be the final end of creation” (1790, p.272). 
The development of morality requires an intense education, initially directed towards 
man as a part of his education to virtue, but then even more importantly practised by 
man in his self-education to wisdom until it becomes internalised. The first part of this 
final step is, it should be noted, addressed by Kant in his contemplations on education 
where he reaches  the conclusion that  it  is  better  for  education to  occur  in  a  public 
capacity, and for that education to include a moral education (1803, p.407). One of the 
problems he notes - but does not resolve - is the significant cost implication to this level 
of  teaching (he suggests the use of  the Socratic  Method).  This  would prevent  most 
people from accessing education and cultivation to a position where they have been 
106 Kant uses the word revolution in a positive way only rarely, reserving it for a man's self-recreation by  
pure reason, and when referring to a revolution in education.
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both  civilised,  and  taught  a  doctrine  of  virtue  (1797,  p.266)  which  serves  as  the 
beginning point for the development of a moral personality. Instead of exploring this 
issue further107, he accepts this problem is insurmountable and moves on, determining 
that schools in general should be used to cultivate children to an inclination to work 
(1803, p.461).  Through this  approach he also removes culturing to  civility from the 
schooling system itself, along with knowledge of the world “which should come after 
schooling”  (1798a,  p.231)  in  addition  to  a  knowledge  of  “higher  things” (1765, 
p.291)108.  Significantly,  those  educated  only  to  pragmatism  are  removed  from  the 
possibility of a (supported) development of a civil and moral personality, which, as was 
discussed  earlier,  also  requires  the  freedom to  practice  it.  In  conjunction  with  this 
aspect,  and  something  that  I  will  explore  in  section  (3.4.2),  are  the  roles  and 
opportunities  to  practice  virtue  that  he  recognised  as  impossible  for  those  of  lower 
societal ranks, where one who works for another is denied the right to express their own 
virtue - and thus to develop their own morality - in deference to their employer's desires. 
In addition to which, Kant states that those who work for others, and do not live on the 
fruits of their own labour are also denied a civil personality (1797, p.125 & 126)109.
Since one's cultivation to the determination of pure reason requires a level of education 
denied to most men (and all women), and the ability to develop one's virtue to wisdom 
is prevented through a lack of ability and opportunity to practice it - fundamental to his 
conception of the development of virtue to wisdom - it seems clear that moral men are 
far rarer creatures in Kant's understanding of civil society than is generally assumed. 
This  is  further  compounded  with  his  interpretation  of  the  role  and  importance  of 
philosophers in civil societies, not just as rational consciences to the state (1795, p.115) 
and the only ones incorruptible to outside influences (ibid.), but as the key individuals 
who dedicate themselves to developing their own reason for duty's sake (1786d, p.185). 
This privileges the position of the philosopher so far that he uses the 'teacher' of virtue110 
as the “good example” (1797b, p.267) to be adduced from (1793b, p.93) and as a proof 
of virtue itself (1797b, p.268).
A fundamental aspect of this moral person is that he is in an endless struggle against 
107 I explore this area further in sections (3.4) and (3.5).
108 The direct translation of his words here is 'higher insights',  suggesting that the teaching of virtue,  
morality and pure reason should also occur after this 'schooling for work', and indeed after knowledge 
of the world. This aspect comes from the design of his own Program of Lectures, highlighting not just 
that he theorised it, but that he practised it, as a part of his own teaching.
109 There is some ambiguity here though, as Kant also suggests that women and priest's “civil status is  
weak” indicating that they could, or do, possess some form of civil personality (1798a, p.281).
110 Which is, of course, the role of the philosopher.
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evil (1793b, p.92). Rather than a simplistic move towards an easily identified good (and 
a similarly easily identifiable evil) that can be easily maintained, Kant perceives it to be 
a battle that needs to be reinforced through external measures, as well as a never-ending 
internal checking process. To be good, in Kant's view, is  difficult  –  indeed virtually 
impossible - and can only occur after a revolution of thought that must be followed by 
“an ever consuming striving for the better” (ibid.). This battle, which Kant talks about in 
moral/religious  terms  requires  one  ongoing  internal  process;  establishing  the  good 
firmly  within  us,  and  then  three  key  empirical  actions;  propagating  it  externally, 
transmitting it to posterity, and maintaining a fellowship of the invisible kingdom of 
God through repeated public formalities (1794, p.228, paraphrased).
Good must  be  established within  these  men,  expressed publicly,  noted  as  such and 
recorded to posterity, and repeated, both as a part of an ethical community of others like 
himself, and for those outside of this ethical community (but within the same juridicio-
civil society). It is also only if this process is carried out and repeated that it allows the 
practising  of  virtue  which  leads  to  the  development  of  wisdom.  In  effect,  Kant 
acknowledges that a social system of positive reinforcement from those around us, both 
for his moral beings and those who are not but could be, is required to continue the path  
of humanity's progression towards his Kingdom of Ends. This is insufficient though, 
because of the far larger number of civil,  but not moral,  individuals,  as well  as the 
population at large who have neither a civil not moral personality. Education, from this 
perspective,  is  not sufficient  because there are  simply not enough people who have 
access  to  education of  the  level  needed,  or  the opportunity to  practice  their  virtues 
(through which to develop their own moral maxims) to achieve it without the hand of 
Providence forcing the issue. Kant clearly places the burden and responsibility of trying 
to move humanity forward on these elite individuals, both through this public action, 
and then relies on God through Providence to complete the task.
Kant's  moral men are,  as a result,  a select  group of highly educated men,  educated 
specifically in virtue,  with a socio-economic and political status that allows them to 
practice their virtue until it develops into a moral personality. Since he situated morality 
only  in  them,  they  are  also  effectively  the  moral  conscience  of  the  state  they  are 
members  of,  and their  duty requires  them to  contribute  to  the  ongoing progress  of 
humanity through the state.
3.3.4 Animal-Woman and Human-Man
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The previous section presents the essential difference between his ideas of the human 
animal, civilised human, and cosmopolitan man. This section examines the dynamic that 
Kant explores and establishes between men and women.
From his earliest works, Kant ascribes women with beautiful characteristics that inspire 
love and have their source within the sexual drive (1764a, p.46 & 50) whereas men are 
sublime and inspire esteem. Yet Kant's conclusions are underwritten by his arguments 
on God, nature, and reason. Man's duty is developed from pure reason, in competition 
with his lower powers whilst striving to become good rather than simply better, whereas 
women are assigned a different duty, and given different essential characteristics. Most 
stark amongst these is that women do not have the right to determine their own end. 
Whilst men have the obligation to develop their free will in connection with the moral 
law, for woman “one can only come to characterisation of this sex if one uses as one's 
own principles not what we make our end, but  what nature's end was in establishing 
womankind” (1798a, p.401, his emphasis). Women have an end which is determined 
solely by nature and their abilities are also driven by nature's sensate attributes, to such 
an extent that Kant believes firstly that “it is difficult... to believe that the fair sex is 
capable of principles" (1764a, p.43) and secondly, “true virtue can only be grafted on 
principles” (p.31). He makes clear that women are not destined for pure reason, and thus 
are unable to develop a moral personality or moral maxims. From this, for Kant, there is 
both the unlikelihood of the capacity, and the lack of necessity, for the development of 
their ability to reason.
He supports this argument further by deciding women possess “a stronger innate feeling 
for  everything”  (p.40)  which  positions  women closer  to  nature  before  the  fall,  and 
negatively impacts on their location in the category of humanity in the present. Whilst 
they have just as much 'understanding' as men, it is beautiful whereas man's is deeper 
(p.41). In section (3.3.1) I discussed how man is of two worlds, and this is also true for 
women, but in Kant's system they should only be allowed to be a part of the sensate 
world and so simultaneously a) probably cannot b) have no need of and c) should not be 
allowed to possess free will and reason in the pure sense because to educate them in 
virtue towards pure reason is a “malicious cunning” and a “perverted taste” (p.42). The 
use of the words malicious and perverted implies evil, deceit, unnaturalness and has an 
aesthetic  nature  to  it,  suggesting  that  Kant's  position  here  is  as  much an  emotional 
response  as  it  is  a  necessary step  for  his  system to  work.  He positions  women  as 
Sahra Taylor Page 114 of 300 Feb 2019
members of the human race (but not possessing humanity) only when acting from her 
sensate nature – essentially little different from that of an animal, and because of this, a 
woman's education must be to emphasise and reinforce these qualities rather than to 
work  against  nature's  will.  When  we then apply this  understanding to  the  previous 
section (3.3), it  becomes clear that of the three types of human that Kant identifies: 
natural, civilised, and cosmopolitan, women are perceived by him to exist and express 
as  a  mixture  of  only  the  first  two  aspects.  Women  can  become  civilised  through 
culturing, but cannot (should not, and must not) become moralised through education. 
Education's goal here, rather, must be to refine and further develop the capabilities of 
woman and man in line with Nature – for woman as a 'beautiful being', based on her 
greater natural inclinations to good from an innocence perspective111, and for man as a 
'noble being', sourced from his cultivation to good, from a just and reasoning approach.
Whilst  a  woman  could  be  both  good112,  and  evil113,  it  is  clear  that  from  Kant's 
perspective, a woman also cannot either be or do good because of her predisposition to 
reason. She can be and do better, but she must be denied the possibility to be or do good 
because  her  purpose  is  decided  by  nature,  not  her.  Women  have  simultaneously  a 
'higher', and baser purpose. She should therefore have little to no civil status within a 
society so that her capacity to do evil is contained. The only way in which a woman can 
therefore be the cause of evil  is through active attempts to allow her (or for her to 
attempt to) develop for herself pure reason whilst still of child bearing age (1764a, p.49) 
as to do so, given Kant's determination of the purpose that women must serve, is to 
pervert the dictates of Nature and subvert the course of humanity.
Between men and women, it is only in a marriage that they become a single whole, 
where the  woman acquires  (synthetically)  the moral  stature  of  her  husband (1764a, 
p.51)  yet  even within this  situation  Kant  perceives  men and woman as  a  binary of 
opposition,  both  in  their  capabilities  and  mentality.  Rather  than  perceiving  them as 
complementary to each other; as a holy union, or in some form of positive dynamic, he 
perceived  their  interaction  through  power  dynamics,  and the  idea  of  antagonism is 
embedded into both his interpretation and conclusions.  Men  force  women to  esteem 
them – to see and value their moral worth. Women force men to love them (p.51) – to 
111 It  is  questionable  whether  the  education  of  women,  in  a  Kantian  sense,  should  here  be  termed 
education at all.
112 In her absolute innocence and through her natural instinct, which it is of course not possible for her to  
achieve, although she is believed to be closer to this state than man.
113 From her culturing and as a result of her civil status, when expressed to an extreme level as diabolical.
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see and value their aesthetic worth, as well as attempting to force them to descend to the 
empirical and sensate realm where “woman shall dominate and man shall govern for 
inclination dominates, and understanding governs”. The justification that Kant gives for 
this dynamic is that the end of man requires him to have dominance over the woman, 
because of the end he is able achieve, and as a consequence duty requires him to work 
towards  (1797b,  p.98).  Once  again  Kant  presents  a  circular  argument,  this  time 
justifying the position he takes to exclude women from possessing a moral personality. 
His interpretation of courtship and the purpose of marriage an aspect of a civil society 
continues in the same vein, relying on the sensate nature of man, where “the woman 
does  not  give  herself  up  to  the  man's  desire without  marriage” (1798a,  p.401,  my 
emphasis). This dynamic can also be interpreted through the dispositions discussed in 
section (3.3) when he talks about the Character of the Sexes (1790, p.400). The aspects 
that  Kant  uses  to  identify  the  ways  in  which  men  and  women  attempt  to  achieve 
superiority over each other are that women make use of animal-man's mechanical self-
love  (to  propagate  the  species)  to  master  him,  and man  makes  use  of  his  physical 
superiority and  courage, which is a virtue (1798a, p.358), and so is an expression of 
cosmopolitan-religious-moral man. In this way, the man's superiority is inherent in that 
it  comes from his  mastery over  himself  (to  develop virtue),  whilst  hers  is  over  his 
harmful  animal  nature,  which as Kant puts it,  is  a “sickness... [which is]  incurable: 
except through marriage” (1798a, pp.290, my emphasis).
Kant  clearly  believes  women  exhibit  the  worst  characteristics  of  both  a  natural 
personality through fear - of her 'inherent' physical and mental weakness - and a weak 
civil  personality  through  desire  -  the  misdirection  of  empirical  reason  discussed  in 
section (3.3.2) in that “Inclination to dominate is woman's  real desire” (1798a, p.401, 
his emphasis).  She makes use of man's 'sick' desire for her to 'master' him, something 
that is apparently only curable by marriage (1798a, p.290), and hence the reason why he 
also remarks that the philosopher, with all the moral elitism, purpose and duty that he 
sees them as possessing (or requiring) should avoid if at all possible the trappings of 
marriage so that he can focus instead on his duty. 
This suggests that the more men who are educated to virtue, the more they will be able 
to  resist  the  ‘influence’  of  women,  and  ensure  the  moral  development  both  of 
themselves and humanity. The home environment where men and women interact as a 
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'natural hierarchy' also therefore serves as a place where a man can constantly practice 
his virtue, and where woman, as a consequence, serves his and humanity's end as her 
own end. 
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Part 2: Humanity
3.4 Human Groupings
In the first part of this chapter, on human nature, my analysis highlighted the essential 
role that education to pure reason takes in Kant's arguments on both religion and human 
nature. Humans start from a base of 'animality', which they are disciplined away from, 
then cultured to civility, cultivated to skilfulness, educated to prudence, and finally a 
select few are educated to virtue and self-educate to morality. It is only at this last stage 
that the need to believe in God, Providence, progress, and recording acts to posterity is 
produced. This part also made clear how Kant's scheme permanently excludes women 
from the possibility of a moral personality, instead situating their nature into the realms 
of  either  an  impossible  to  return  to  innocence  in  nature,  or  evil  through  empirical 
reasoning. This exploration then showed how he believed that the elements he examined 
combined in his own time, and how he felt they should  combine together in future to 
progress humanity to his Kingdom of Ends, but ultimately his assessment was that the 
production  of  men  with  moral  personalities  would  not  be  enough  to  achieve  his 
cosmopolitan world by themselves and so humanity must rely on Providence to carry 
them the rest of the way – but only if humanity does all that it can to progress itself.
The first section of Part 2 focusses on the communities that humans form. It sets out 
how  Kant  identified  three  distinct  types  of  human  groupings;  social  (natural) 
communities, civil (juridicio-civil) societies, and moral (ethico-civil) societies114. Social 
(natural) communities, are an expression of humanity's animal nature which “manifests 
itself earlier... more powerfully than pure humanity” (1798a, p.423) but because man is 
always already using reason, and man's animal nature features the social drive, this type 
of community features as a theoretical construct because what immediately arises is a 
movement from natural communities to social communities. 
This  occurs  from  two  main  directions.  Firstly  negatively;  from  war,  strife  and 
competition, that forces them to seek refuge under a civil constitution, which tellingly 
can be constructed, but cannot be  perfected  until either a global system, or a pacific 
federation, is established (1784b, pp.47-49). In combination with this is the impact that 
cultural progress itself has. It “hatches punsters and subtle reasoners” (1764b, p.65) as 
an aspect  of  humanity's  animal  nature in  combination with empirical  reasoning that 
114  As well as a theoretical singular ethico-civil community in the future Kingdom of Ends.
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civilisation represents. The prominence of empirical reasoning increases the frequency 
of wars (1793a, p.90) through the twin negative emotions of fear and desire115 that are 
the main drivers of human nature prior to the development of pure reason and morality. 
Secondly positively:  principally  from education.  This  initially  arises  from 'geniuses' 
who drive forward their understandings and spread their ideas and perspectives through 
formal education in the cultivation of elite men towards morality, as well as through a 
revolution of the art of education to the science of pedagogy. The actions of his moral-
religious-cosmopolitan men also contribute to the culturing of humanity, in the social 
and civil  setting,  as a part  of an ethico-civil  community,  through their  public moral 
actions (1784a, p.55). This public culturing towards virtue supports the actions of other 
moral  men,  those  who  are  un(der)-educated  and  therefore  not  moral,  and  an 
intermediary  group  -  those  who  emulate  the  actions  of  moral  men  and  “adopt  the 
illusion of affection, of respect for others, of modesty, and of unselfishness” (1798a, 
p.263). By adopting this role, his emulators can slowly be “roused and merge into the 
disposition” (ibid.) that they copy, and contribute to the level of virtue of the state, as a 
prelude to its moral progression. For both the cosmopolitans and the emulators, they 
contribute to the development of the constitution of the state under principles of right, 
into a commonwealth under law. It is the development of these laws that are, according 
to Kant, the true mark of humanity's moral progress to his kingdom of ends. Facing 
outwards, they also give support to the development of “a lawful federation under a 
commonly  accepted  international  right”  (1793a,  p.90)  and  support  this  through  the 
medium of global commerce.
The  third  type  of  human  groupings,  the  ethico-civil  community,  is  his  idea  of  an 
invisible  proto-community or  invisible  church,  within  all natural  and civil  societies 
(1793b, p.131). It consists of his religious-moral-cosmopolitan men, in self-construction 
through their individual moves to pure reason, and the need to believe. This singular 
community  is  initially  only an  idea,  expressed  at  the  beginning  as  separate  ethical 
societies, which can only become a single ethical community when the totality of “all 
finite  rational116 beings”  (ibid.  my  emphasis)  are  voluntary  members  of  it.  These 
cosmopolitans spread their  teachings – to culture both quasi-civil  and civil  societies 
through  the  public  expression  of  their  morality,  and  the  recording  of  their  acts  to 
posterity for future generations. Those who take the role of teachers experiment with 
115 See Sections (3.3.1) & (3.3.2).
116 i.e. specifically and only those who could, or should, develop pure practical reason.
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teaching techniques  and develop the  art  of  education  into  the  science  of  pedagogy, 
which serves as the means to create cosmopolitans in a systematic way, inculcated with 
a specific moral drive through their discipline, care and cultivation. Over time, as this 
'revolution  in  teaching'  spreads,  it  impacts  on  more  and  more  people,  eventually 
spreading  across  the  world  via  Cosmopolitan  Right  and the  medium of  commerce. 
These new pupils are turned from prizing cultural norms, their animal attributes and 
their own happiness, towards the happiness of others and the perfection of themselves.
3.4.1 Social (Natural) Communities
This  section examines  Kant's  perspective of the attributes of natural communities.  I 
firstly argue that there are two distinct types of social communities in evidence in Kant's 
arguments. The first applies to 'primitive' communities, and is distinguished by his racial 
arguments.  The second are natural  communities  where the potential  to  develop into 
some form of civil state is in evidence. The former are identified by Kant as those where 
the black and Native American races are situated. These communities in his view have 
no ability to develop a civil constitution, due to 'racial deformation' that has biologically 
fixed their nature, permanently denying them the ability to develop pure practical reason 
(1775, p.96). Social communities, which he applies to all the other races, can make use 
of empirical reasoning, even if they cannot develop it to a pure form. For Kant only the 
white race is able to develop pure reason, and from this, morality and the ability to do 
good become the exclusive capability of white people and their descendants.
Kant identifies three key attributes to “the animality of the human being, as a living 
being” which he locates under the label of “Mechanical self-love”; self-preservation, 
propagation of the species and community with other beings, and their associated vices 
of gluttony, lust, and wild lawlessness (1793b, pp.74-75). This leads into his argument 
that “The highest division of natural Right cannot be the division into natural and social 
right,  instead  it  must  be  the  division  into  natural and  civil  Right  (1797b,  p.67). 
Culturing  leads  to  the  development  of  civil  right,  which  is  expressed  through  the 
construction of a civil constitution,  not  society, because society is a natural aspect of 
humans, but men must taught civility  through culturing. Further, culturing is also the 
means by which  humanity progresses  to  moralization,  because  men must  be  taught 
virtue.
In section (3.3.1) I suggested that the idea of the 'Natural Human Animal' is a theoretical 
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construct that has no empirical basis, but which Kant uses to facilitate the construction 
of  his  system  of  human  development  to  morality.  This  argument  holds  if  Kant's 
approaches to equality and capability are taken on their own, but this conclusion can 
only be reached in the absence of a discussion of his views on race. The main issue here 
is that the same holds true for natural (social) communities because of the use of reason, 
which immediately moves a community to culturing towards civilisation. Natural social 
communities  act  as  a  theoretical  idea  to  allow  for  the  structuring  of  Kant's 
anthropological and sociological analysis of humanity, but when race is included into 
the mix, the situation changes radically. Kant's views on race, and his various works 
where he approaches the idea of race and humanity have seen considerable examination 
and critique as to whether, how much, or what type of racial arguments Kant held to. 
Some, such as Pauline Kleingeld (2007 & 2014) and Sakar Muthu (2003, 2012) suggest 
that his views on the different races changed and lessened in the latter part of his works, 
whereas others like Mendieta (2011), Harvey (2009) and Mills (2017), argue that Kant's 
position on racial hierarchies and essential racial nature never really changed117.  The 
view that I take here is that whilst Kant's views on race did not significantly change, the 
framing of them did. Whilst he initially held to a racial biological hierarchy with white 
people at the top, his long-running conversation principally with Georg Forster (Kant 
1788; Kleingeld 2007 & 2014), forced him to develop and present a social hierarchy, 
and it is into this hierarchy that he directs his un-recanted racial elitism through. 
In  effect,  his  view of  black  and  north  American  people,  whilst  in  theory a  part  of 
humanity but also 'utterly other'118, was developed from a racial (biological) hierarchy 
into a formalised structural racism of human group development, which situated black 
and Native American people at the bottom as ‘primitive’. The white race was placed at 
the top with the potential to achieve humanity, with the other non-white races spread 
between  these  two poles,  limited  to  the  civilised  level.  Black  and  North  American 
people, and people of colour more generally, are still below white people in his global 
social ordering, but whereas he previously presented this as a permanent location based 
only on their essential characteristics119, his last words on the subject (which Kleingeld 
builds  her  argument120 from)  suggests  that  it  is  their  cultures  and  communities,  in  
117 There is of course another group, that of the many cosmopolitan theorists who skirt around or entirely 
avoid the subject and focus on Kant's theoretical-political developments to the exclusion of his racial 
views, such as Thomas Pogge, Seyla Benhabib and Kwame Anthony Appiah.
118 This could be interpreted as possessing 'choiceless individualities' (See chapter two).
119 i.e. that the other races were inherently (biologically and cognitively) inferior and would always be so.
120 See  Kant's Second Thoughts on Race (Kleingeld 2007) and  Kant's second thoughts on colonialism 
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addition to his un-redacted position on their  essential  differences,  which now places 
them at the bottom of the global order.
This  shift  to  biological  nature  and social  existence,  positions  primitive  cultures  as 
natural communities, absent the capability for either civil development or the potential 
for moral geniuses to arise, but does still allows for the existence of 'natural geniuses'  
before reason, which links to the 'noble savage' idea that he took from Rousseau. Kant 
permanently excludes the lowest races from the ability to move from their animal nature 
state to the possession of skill (Mendiata 2011, p.312 & Mill 2017, p.32121), which is the 
first necessary step towards the development of a moral personality. As a result,  the 
education of non-white elites to cosmopolitanism is irrelevant to any discussions of race 
because for Kant these people could never be educated to morality anyway.
The dismissal of Kant’s racial texts under the argument that transposing contemporary 
views of race onto Enlightenment views, or suggestions that he was 'as racist as the 
general population at the time' is also not a convincing argument. As a cosmopolitan 
theorist,  with claims towards the ideal of global citizenship and human equality,  his 
position falls far below that of his academic peers. Georg Forster, as was mentioned 
earlier, strongly criticised Kant's position on race, as did Johann Herder, who lambasted 
Europe's  actions  towards  those  of  other  races  and  even  went  so  far  as  to  call  for 
reparations to be paid to the injured peoples122. Le Marquis de Condorcet and Thomas 
Paine also both argued publicly, vocally and repeatedly, as Abolitionists, against slavery 
and the lesser treatment of other races. Kant's reticence to publicly critique the slave 
trade from the perspective of those enslaved, in contrast to his peers, in conjunction with 
his oft-stated arguments on the inherent flaws that non-white (but most especially North 
(Kleingeld 2015).
121 Mill provides a number of quotes from Kant's works in his book. The most pertinent are: 
“Whites:  contain all  the impulses of nature in affects and passions,  all  talents,  all  dispositions to  
culture and civilization and can as readily obey as govern. They are the only ones who always advance 
to perfection.7 
Asians: [The Hindus] do have motivating forces but they have a strong degree of passivity and all 
look like philosophers. Nevertheless they incline greatly towards anger and love. They thus can be  
educated to the highest degree but only in the arts and not in the sciences. (p.96) They can never 
achieve the level of abstract concepts. A great Hindustani man is one who has gone far in the art of 
deception and has much money. The Hindus always stay the way they are, they can never advance,  
although they began their education much earlier.8 (2017, p.7)
Blacks:  They can  be  educated  but  only as  servants  (slaves),  that  is  they allow themselves  to  be 
trained.... The Negro can be disciplined and cultivated, but is never genuinely civilized. He falls of his 
own accord into savagery.11 
Native Americans:  The race of  the American cannot  be educated...  Americans and Blacks cannot 
govern themselves. They thus serve only for slaves.14
The Future of the Planet: All races will be extinguished… only not that of the Whites.17” (2017, p.8)
122 This is touched on again, more directly, in chapter four.
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American and African) people possessed,  makes clear that his  cosmopolitan scheme 
excludes  their  contributory involvement  in  his  cosmopolitan  world.  In  addition,  his 
continued teaching of anthropology and geography, where his more problematic ideas 
and arguments on race were propagated, continued relatively unabated until he stopped 
teaching in the mid-1790’s. As such, all of the non-white races are the third excluded 
group of people, after women and the less-well educated, from the possible acquisition 
of  the  title  'Cosmopolitan'  and  the  possession  of  a  moral  personality,  with  the 
consequential ability to do good.
Whilst Kant does criticise the actions of slavers, and he comments on the deaths that 
occur at their hands, his critique of slavery and of the slave trade are also less about the 
people enslaved, rather, they are principally directed at the impact of slavery  on the 
slavers, i.e. the Europeans and other western nations complicit in the slave trade. This 
focus on the white slavers is to do with  their moral development, and aimed at their 
decisions to commit acts of genocide because his aim is a pacific federation. This would 
be constituted,  at  least  initially,  and perhaps only ever, by western states, which the 
ongoing murders of peoples goes against – but from the standpoint of the people doing 
the killing because they are the only people he perceives to have the potential to act in 
moral ways. As Mendiata notes, “where Kant attacks the slave trade in Africans as an 
institution, he appeals to the cosmopolitan law of hospitality to condemn slavery and 
not to the categorical imperative.” (2011, p.304). Just as for Pogge's response to blind 
people123 where he positions their rights as a bolt-on to his overall system rather than 
adjusting it, and Rawls' doubling down when he refuses to deal with gendered justice 
inequalities124 by excluding justice in the family from justice as reasonableness, rather 
than reworking his system, so too does Kant refuse to modify his universal system that 
is built from the categorical imperative, but instead relies on a lesser, adjunct system to 
accommodate it125.
From this, the ability to moralise oneself is a capability that only white people possess 
(this  is  the  point  at  which  he  excludes  all  other  non-white  races).  Thus  natural 
communities only exist in far off places, on different continents. In contrast to this, those 
primitive  areas  in  Europe,  like  Greenland,  populated  by  white  people,  have  the 
capability, but not yet the opportunity, to develop morality. As such, and in line with my 
123 Section (2.2.2).
124 Section (2.2.3).
125 This  suggests  a  wider  issue  with  the  approaches  of  at  least  some universal  theorists,  but  further 
exploration of this falls outside the remit of this thesis.
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arguments as to the concept of the 'human animal' in section (3.3.1), the idea of the 
natural community is  one that his cosmopolitan scheme entirely excludes.  Since for 
Kant black people and Native Americans cannot develop at all,  and other non-white 
races cannot develop as far as morality, they cannot ever be a part of his  ethico-civil 
community – his Kingdom of Ends permanently excludes them.
This  of  course  introduces  a  fundamental  contradiction  between  his  philosophical 
universalism and his exclusionary politics, which Kant could have resolved by turning 
against his racial hierarchy. Instead, he reaffirms these exclusions both in the courses he 
taught and by republishing the works where he made these arguments in the latter part 
of his life126. The simplest and I believe most accurate explanation is to simply accept 
that Kant meant what he said, wrote, taught, and repeatedly published in his works after 
his critical turn. As a result, his works should be considered applicable specifically to 
western societies, and his universal arguments of equality viewed instead as arguments 
for a universal hierarchy of racial inequality. 
From  this,  the  points  where  he  mentions  ideas  like  social  discourse,  cultivation, 
culturing or education are not and were never meant to apply to non-white races. Whilst 
they can be subjects of a juridicio-civil society, they do not, according to Kant, have the 
capability to be a part of his ethico-civil community. Instead, they are directed solely at 
the different levels of European and Western social and political development. They (the 
non-white races) are permanently excluded from the possibility of being a part of the 
ethico-civil  community,  or  of  creating  their  own  ethico-civil  societies.  His  natural 
communities, and indeed his view on human animals, are arguments founded on his 
assessment of the lower races, which he supports with arguments such as the fixing of 
racial germs, the inability of races to develop if they are supplanted to different regions, 
and  his  multiples  of  comments  on  the  undesirability  of  mixed-race  people.  His 
conclusion  is  that  the  dominance  of  the  white  germ would  erase  their  mixed-ness 
through  successive  generations  (1775,  p.86;  1802,  pp.572-580).  Far  from  his 
cosmopolitan  principles  spreading  to  all  of  humanity,  his  arguments  are  in  instead 
concerned with the spreading of white, western, cosmopolitan men across the globe.
3.4.2 Civil Society and the State
The previous section argued that Kant's idea of natural social communities is where he 
126 Primarily in his response to Georg Forster; in  On the use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy  
(1788);  his lectures,  and students’,  notes on  Physical Geography (1802);  and the republication of 
Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798).
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firstly positions the black and Native American peoples into primitive communities but 
which  has  no  relation  to  the  experiences  of  the  white  race  because  of  their 
predisposition to use reason in a way that is not possible for the 'more primitive' races.  
Secondly, the social communities of the Asian race can be cultured and civilised, but 
through his racial hierarchy construction, are unable to moralise. As such, the 'lowest' 
non-white races are excluded at that point from Kant's cosmopolitan world because of 
his argument that they are unable to be taught or cultivated, rather they can only be 
disciplined, and the Asian race cannot follow a path to the eventual development of 
morality through pure means and so are permanently excluded from the ethico-civil 
community, although they can still be a part of a juridicio-civil state.
This section now examines his idea of a civil society, and the role that the state should 
play in ensuring a move towards a pacific federation and global cosmopolitan society. It 
considers how societies were expected to develop, from a (quasi-)natural position via 
empirical  reasoning,  to  a  society  with  a  civil  constitution,  driven  by  Nature  and 
influenced by pure reason. It then looks at the essential qualities of the state, the impact 
education has on the development of the state and of the state's role on education. It 
finally explores the importance of culture in directing this  development towards the 
ends of humanity,  and the perfecting of the civil  constitution. This section also sees 
another  group  of  people  excluded,  through  Kant's  distinction  between  citizens  and 
subjects, which corresponds closely to, but is not the same as, his exclusion through 
access to education, but aligns instead with the opportunity to develop one's morality 
through agency because of the increase of suffering through inequality that Kant sees as 
necessary for the human progression.
The movement from a 'natural society' to a civil constitution has multiple, contributory 
elements, the first  and most important being from the threat of war and strife.  This 
continual fear forces a natural community to develop into a judicial society127 through 
its negative interactions with groups of people that are considered 'not us'. This dialectic 
between  us  and  them,  based  on  Kant's  assessment  of  humanity's  nature  -  asocial 
sociability – forces both groups to reform themselves into military states (1795b, p.112). 
From this, the construction of the rule of law for the internal workings of the state, from 
empirical  reasoning,  is  founded  on  the  perception  of  external  threat,  i.e.  fear,  and 
develops further from both external threat and internal dissent. Due to its founding on 
empirical reasoning, wars and strife cannot end. Man is instead continually forced into 
127 i.e. a society founded on law.
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moving towards a civil constitution through the ever present external threat (or reality) 
of war and strife, and internally through a number of activities and processes, which by 
themselves are not enough to prevent war, but for which progress cannot occur without. 
The movement to a society though provides the essential framework for the move to a 
civil status, which cannot occur without a society of some kind already existing.
Secondly, the ongoing developments of culture, which produces the arts and sciences, 
helps to “make him [man] civilised and so prepare man for a sovereignty in which 
reason alone shall have sway (1790, p.262). This also contributes to the development of 
the arts of pedagogy, philosophy, and empirical psychology into sciences (1765, p.291-
295; 1797, p.267; 1798b, p.288; 1803, p.442), which are the main locations for man's 
development of pure reason (outside of the spontaneous appearance of 'geniuses'), and 
of  a  cosmopolitan  morality  through  the  need  to  believe  in  God  and  human  moral 
progress. The discoveries and the actions that these moral men make as a result of the 
route they take to morality128 are promoted publicly through the right to free speech that 
is  granted  to  'the  press'129 by  the  sovereign  for  the  purpose  of  “mak[ing]  his  [the 
citizen's]  opinion  publicly  known  regarding  what  appears  to  him  to  be  a  wrong 
committed against the commonwealth by the en-treatments and administration of the 
sovereign” (1791b, p.11; 1794, p.228). In addition to this is a drive to Enlightenment by 
philosophers through “the public instruction of the people in its duties and rights vis a 
vis the state to which they belong” (1798c, p.305), and through their public actions as a 
display of “their pure disposition... as an example to imitate” (1793b, p.182), which are 
also recorded for posterity (1794, p.228). 
Their words and arguments also serve as secret advice to the sovereign on war (1795b, 
p.115)130. As a consequence of their actions and words, they influence the veiling of 
practical reasoning man's civil personality with “the illusion of affection, of respect for 
others, of modesty, and of unselfishness” (1798a, pp.263). Of itself, these illusions mean 
little, but they contribute to the normalisation of a pseudo-moral civil character which 
128 There are only two routes to morality for Kant. The first is the self-manifestation of 'geniuses' (1784a), 
the second are those who are educated through a Socratic system of taught ethics,  which is then 
practised over a long period of time. This eventually leads to the self-development of morality.
129 In this case, the press refers not to the contemporary idea of 'the news', blogs or journalists, but rather 
to the publication of books and essays by philosophers and scholars.
130 Kant gives only two reasons for secrecy. First to preserve the dignity of a sovereign, the second is the 
shrouding of one's nature behind a public front of civility. In contrast, the comments on human beings  
as actors also notes that this occurs “without deceiving anyone at all, because it is understood by 
everyone that nothing is seriously meant by it” (1798a, p.263), and the injunction “To deceive the 
deceiver in ourselves... is a return to obedience under the law of virtue” (ibid.) which also emphasises  
that it serves to “save virtue” - itself 'small change', with potential to contribute to morality (p.264)
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makes it easier for them to, in theory, eventually move towards morality through pure 
reason. If we exclude subjects who are not citizens from the mix, as Kant does, this 
means the state is populated by two main types of citizens; empirically-reasoning men 
(for their own pleasure or as emulators of the virtue of moral men), and his moral men.
Secondly,  the  growing  importance  of  commerce  and  the  construction  of  a  legal 
constitution  to  protect  property  counteracts  and  redirects  man's  selfish  tendencies 
towards the state's prosperity (through their own emotional drives to prosperity) which 
makes the need for peace within a state more urgent, regardless of the existence of pure 
reason (p.113).  Wars  are  seen  as  a  greater  and  greater  threat  to  the  prosperity  and 
stability of the state. The power of the sovereign to declare war (which he does not 
personally suffer from but which the people of the state do) is eventually restricted. This 
surrendering,  of  course,  can  only  happen  in  some  kind  of  republican  state  which 
requires the existence of a civil constitution, based on the rights of all independent men 
such that they have the authority to make this decision.
Kant sees the establishment of a civil constitution as “one of the most important facts in  
human history” (1791b, p.3) which becomes almost a 'synthetic person' because it is “as 
an end in itself” (ibid.). He also places this above the needs of the individual people of 
the state, arguing that the end of humanity requires the existence of a civil constitution – 
and it is the primary duty of humanity to contribute to its construction. He therefore 
allows for humans to be both a means and an end for this specific purpose, in contrast to 
the commonly accepted view that his 'means and ends' relate to all humans at all times. 
But he goes further, repeatedly using religious language in relation to the construction 
of a  civil  constitution,  suggesting that  “The idea of a civil  constitution as such...  is 
sacred and irresistible” as well as “of an  exceptional nature” (1797, p.176 & 1793a, 
p.73, my emphases), and that even the “mere idea of a civil constitution among men 
carries with it the concept of punitive justice belonging to the supreme authority (1797, 
p.168), the preservation of which “is the highest law of a civil society (1798a, pp.425-
6), and that “A law is so holy that it is already a crime even to call it into doubt in a  
practical way... is thought as... from some distant flawless lawgiver... “all authority is 
from God”” (1797, p.130). Far from a secular system, Kant imbues the civil state with 
religious connotations, and uses religion to justify the reasons for its necessity.
With regards to the internal workings of the people of the state, there is a pre-existing 
level  of  inequality  which  contributes  to  the  further  development  of  'skill',  with  the 
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majority labouring for the benefit of the elite, who in turn contribute to the people's 
cultural development by exploring the “less necessary branches of culture in science and 
the arts” (1790, p.261). Their explorations contribute to the civilising of the state, and 
prepares them for “a sovereignty in which reason alone shall have sway” (p.262). Each 
of these paths educate the people in different ways,  with the elites developing their 
ability to use logic through science (towards pure reason), and the building up of virtue 
through the arts and the illusions that are assumed by his emulators. As a result, the 
culturing of the people of the state is slow, but one which still progresses quicker than 
the development of morality (1794, p.225). As a consequence, and in conjunction with 
the influence of Nature, they are both driven to conflict by empirical reasoning and the 
desire to dominate others131, educated further to skill and prudence (1798a, p.231), and 
driven away from war and strife because of its negative impact on commerce.
The people of the state are themselves divided into three main categories based on “the 
following rational principles”: 1) The liberty of every member of society as a Man, 2) 
The equality of every member of Society with each other as a subject,  3) The self-
dependency of every member of the Commonwealth as a citizen (1791b, p.3-4). As 
such, step one excludes women and children; the former permanently,  and the latter 
until they reach their majority (p.7). Step two defines the rest as subjects, and step three 
identifies a portion of them, determined by their economic 'self-dependency', as citizens, 
with this group alone bearing the right to “give or enact laws”, whilst those who carry 
only the title of 'subject' are viewed as “protected fellow subjects” (p.6, his emphasis). 
Their  exclusion  is  a  critical  part  of  the  state's  make-up for  Kant  firstly  because  he 
believed that the fewer active members of a society there are, the more likely agreement 
can  be  reached  (p.7)  but  also  secondly  because  he  sees  inequality  as  not  just 
unavoidable, but  unavoidably necessary. It contributes to increasing levels of internal 
and external  strife  (through Nature),  which  forces  the state,  and men in general,  to 
continue to move towards the perfection of their respective civil constitutions. Their 
suffering is not just necessarily, their right to be both means and ends is also denied to  
them because their lives are primarily for the civil state's development, not their own. 
Whilst  this  may seem a controversial  claim,  Kant  does argue in  The Metaphysic  of  
Morals  (1797) that the right to emigrate is something that should be possessed by a 
subject who is also a citizen. Underlying this argument is the belief that a person who is 
a  citizen  is  not property  and  so  their  movement  should  not  be  restricted,  but  his 
131 Desire is a key aspect of Kant's logic, which was discussed in Section (3.3.4), when I examined his  
views on women, and it provides the underlying emotional drive of 'natural human animals' in (3.3.1).
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distinction also makes the case that the subject who is not a citizen is in some way the 
property of the state (p.147).
For Kant, the cultivation of freedom occurs  under threat132, and is fundamental to the 
eventual development of morality and human progression. This occurs in a number of 
ways; humans and humanity can only develop from a childlike state either as natural 
beings or social creatures through external pressure (i.e. through practical experience) - 
either from a foreign military power (1795b, p.112), from the domination of adults over 
children (1803, p.448), from dissent within a state between the upper and lower classes 
(1790, p.261), through a struggle for dominance within a family between husband and 
wife  (1798a,  p.400),  in  the  discovery  of  good  (1783,  p.412),  a  people's  moral 
development (1784a, p.59), censorship of the press (1798c, p.305), from restrictions on 
civil freedom stimulating intellectual freedom (1784a, p.59) and more comprehensively 
against the state itself (1784b, p.49). It is from these threats and limitations that progress 
comes, from the “natural heralds... philosophers”. This progress can be measure by “an 
increase in products of legality” which are not disputed, alongside an increase in good 
deeds; “more charity, and less strife in lawsuits” (1798c, p.305 & p.307). 
With regards to education and the state, two key aspects are the state's involvement in 
educating its existing or potential citizens and subjects, and the means by which this 
education can be achieved. For the former, Kant is clear that public education is “more 
advantageous” than private (1803, p.447), and that this should in theory be determined 
'from above'133, but there are two main issues here. Whilst he sees this to be desirable, he 
also perceives that it is unlikely to have the effect that it should – that the people in the 
state  would act  from morality – rather,  they will  need to  be forced  from above by 
Providence through strife and conflict (1798a, p.423). What he does though allow for is 
that education from above134 will eventually lead to a reduction in wars (1798c, p.307). 
That  reduction  in  conflict  will  facilitate  additional  funds  being  directed  towards 
education (p.308). This then allows, in theory at least, for more men's education to be 
'complete',  incorporating both instruction to  skill  and prudence  and  moral education 
(1803, p.446)135, thus accelerating the development of morality within the state.
The other aspect to this is that if “the prince” (i.e. the sovereign of the state) pays for 
132 i.e. the dominant emotion drive towards civilisation is fear, through comparison.
133 In this case it refers to the sovereign (head of the state), not the Sovereign (God).
134 Again, the state, not God.
135 This education is, since it comes at the end, also “fortified by religious doctrine” (ibid.).
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education, then it will be developed in line with his desires “not so much the best for the 
world in mind but rather the well-being of their state, so that they may reach their own 
goals” (p.443). This issue leads Kant to determine that “enlightened experts” should 
instead  be  responsible  for  education,  hence  his  reason  for  deducing  that  education, 
whilst it should be for the masses, cannot be so because then their education would be 
for  the  purposes  of  the  princes,  and  not  for  humanity  (and  therefore  not  in  a 
“cosmopolitan  manner”)  (p.442).  Since  Kant  sees  war  as  the  greatest  drain  on  the 
sovereign's finances, the sovereign no longer having the authority to go to war and the 
consequential civil constitution being instituted would in theory allow these finances to 
be  directed  towards  education  and  peace  but  this  in  turn  depends  on  the  ongoing 
reduction of the occurrences of war. The conclusion he reaches here leads him to his 
arguments  on,  and support  for,  independently run  experimental  schools  such as  the 
Basedow Institute,  to  develop the art  of education to the science of pedagogy.  This 
avoids the state driven goal of an education for the purposes of the state, and instead 
leaves it in the hands of his “enlightened experts” who correspond once again to his 
moral/cosmopolitan/religious philosopher men.
3.4.3 The Ethico-Civil Society
The previous section examined three key aspects of a civil society; the construction of 
the  state  and  its  development  towards  a  civil  constitution,  the  role  of  the  state  on 
education,  and  the  actions  of  three  different  types  of  men  (practical  reasoners, 
emulators, and moralisers) within the state. This section now explores Kant's ethico-
civil society, and explains how religion moves from an ecclesiastic position to a pure 
state, and the meaning and purpose of his invisible church. I then argue that his views on 
religion  in  society,  from  section  (3.4.1),  run  parallel  to  his  arguments  on  the 
construction of a civil constitution, and are directed at the same moral people in section 
(3.4.2). The identity of the Cosmopolitan man, the man of faith, and a moral man are 
one and the same – and exactly the qualities expected of a philosopher.
Kant's ethico-civil community is “an association of human beings merely under the laws 
of virtue... can be called... an ethico-civil... society, or an ethical community. It can exist 
in the midst of a political community and even be made up by all the members of the 
latter.  It  has  a  special  unifying  principle  of  its  own (virtue)  and hence  a  form and 
constitution essentially distinct from those of the latter” (1793b, p.130). This makes it 
distinct both from that of a juridicio-civil society, which is concerned with justice, the 
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law,  the regulation of the state,  and the coercion of the individuals within it,  and a 
natural society where there is no justice, only power (rather than a state of injustice 
which can only exist in some form of juridicio state). A juridicio-civil society is “a state 
of  war  of  every human being against  each  other” in  an external  sense,  whereas  an 
ethico-civil  community  is  primarily  directed  at  an  internal  struggle  between  the 
principles  of  virtue  and  inner  morality  where  “the  good  principle...  is  essentially 
attacked by the evil which is found in him and in every other as well” (p.132). 
In section (3.3.3) I argued that Kant's moral man is the same as his cosmopolitan man 
and his religious man. These people form their own moral community both within the 
juridicio-civil society and in theory extending beyond and outside. It revolves around 
the moral law, which is an internal determination through the individual's move to pure 
reason, and its consequential external expression. In this it has a level of commonality 
with his idea of a natural community as “In both each individual is his own judge and 
there is no effective  public authority with power to determine... what... is the duty of 
each individual.”  (1793b, p.132).  Whilst  one's  duty can and often is  indicated by a 
juridicio-civil society, this is generally negative in nature - what should not be done. For 
the  ethico-civil  these  are  positive,  with some wide  and others  narrow in scope and 
expression. Whilst a natural community exists in a situation of “force without freedom 
and  law -  barbarism”,  the  ethico-civil  society  can  only  exist  within  a  republic  -  a 
juridicio-civil society that incorporates law with freedom and force (1798a, p.425).
Kant's ethico-civil community exists as a kind of invisible proto-community or invisible  
church within all natural and civil societies (1793b, p.131) that contains white people, 
and consists of his rational men, simultaneously religious, moral and cosmopolitan in 
construction, through their individual and internal moves to pure reason. This singular 
community exists initially only as an idea, expressed at the beginning as separate ethical 
societies. It becomes an ethical community when the totality of “all finite rational136 
beings” (ibid.) are voluntary members of it. These cosmopolitans spread their teachings 
–  to  culture  both  natural  and civil  societies  through educating  the  public  in  formal 
settings,  the  public  expression  of  their  morality,  and  the  recording  of  their  acts  to 
posterity for future generations to learn from. Those who take on the formal role of 
teachers experiment with teaching to develop the art  of teaching into the science of 
pedagogy,  which  serves  as  the  means  to  create  cosmopolitans  in  a  systematic  way, 
136 i.e., as I have argued previously, only white men; either 'geniuses', or those educated in virtue, and 
with the economic independence to express their agency and morality.
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inculcated  with  a  specific  set  of  moral  norms  through  their  discipline,  care  and 
formation. Over time this 'revolution in teaching' spreads, eventually reaching across the 
world via Cosmopolitan Right and the medium of commerce.  These new pupils  are 
turned from prizing cultural norms and their own happiness towards the happiness of 
others and the perfection of themselves.
The movement  from ecclesiastical  faith  to  pure religion  is  one  that  Kant  sees  as  a 
movement from childhood to adulthood (1793b, 151) in much the same manner as his 
earlier arguments in An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment (1784a, p.54). 
He criticises humanity for its “self-incurred immaturity” and levels this accusation at the 
feet of the clergy (1798a, p.315) and further argues that the ecclesiastical  system is 
designed in such as a way that the idea of morality is one that the church claims as their 
own (1803,  p.445).  In  contrast  to  this,  his  invisible  church  is  one  where  “the  pure 
religion of reason will have all the right thinking human beings as its servants (without 
being officials)” (1793b, p.176).  Kant's  rather more radical turn though is  where he 
argues  that  the  different  Judaeo-Christian  religions  should  instead  be  considered 
different faiths – branches in effect – of the “one (true) religion” (p.140). This involves 
a  second  shift  beyond  the  move  to  pure  religion,  extending  belief  in  God  across 
different belief systems and reasserting its universality in a different way as a “single 
church”  (ibid.).  His  arguments  on  this  move  are  essentially  an  argument  against 
sectarianism, which can only occur in the empirical realm and relies on partiality. By 
stripping religion of its physical trappings and combining them into a single 'need to 
believe' determined by pure reason, Kant's arguments reinforce the internal dimension 
of  belief  in  contrast  to  the  external  authority  over  the  way  to  express  belief,  and 
reinforces  the  need  for  a  single,  universal,  (religious)  moral  standard  which  is 
established in the discipline and cultivation stages of a boy's education.
Worship takes on a markedly different form now. Rather than attending church, praying, 
or following religious doctrine, Kant makes the case that “steadfast zeal in the conduct 
of a morally good life is  all that God requires of them” (1793b, p.137) because “only 
the pure moral disposition of the heart can make a human being well-pleasing to God” 
(1793b, p.181). To do one's duty for duty's sake, then, means not just following pure 
reason, but it means obeying “the precepts of holiness”. This involves not just the acts 
themselves, but their recording to posterity, and both the creation and reinforcement of 
the circular arguments that are needed to continue justifying them.
Sahra Taylor Page 132 of 300 Feb 2019
Part 3: Education
“The design for a plan of education must be made in a 
cosmopolitan manner” (Kant 1803, p.442)
3.5 Introduction
The  previous  sections  of  this  chapter  have  built  up  and  constructed,  from  the 
philosophical,  theological,  and  political  arguments  contained  in  Kant's  works,  the 
underlying elements of his cosmopolitan vision. Part 1 (3.1) examined its religious core 
and identified how a need to belief in God (3.2.1), and a particular form and meaning of 
good and evil, as well as the meaning and relationship between Providence and Nature 
(3.2.2) resides at the core of his works. These in turn tie in human nature as individuals, 
and humanity's nature as a species, into a progressive vision for humanity. As a result, 
religion137 determines the expected and necessary end goal for humanity and the role 
that religion and belief, and Providence and Nature play, and the meanings of good and 
evil, by which to get there.
The  next  section  of  Part  1  (3.3)  builds  on  this  from two  sides,  the  pure,  and  the 
empirical. Between the two they determine his understandings of human nature and its 
historical expressions, primarily concerning the interplay of emotions and reason - and 
their  corresponding  expressions  as  natural  animal,  civilised  man,  and  cosmopolitan 
man. This understanding requires men to be disciplined from animality to humanity as 
children, civilised to empirical reasoning for the purpose of commerce, the good of the 
state, and human society. Then, for a select few, to cosmopolitanize themselves to pure 
reason, to act as the conscience and moral centre of each society that they are a part of,  
in the service of humanity's moral progress, as a species. This section saw the first of a 
series of systemic exclusions - race - as Kant’s empirical works reject the possibility that 
black and Native American people possess the capability to develop any form of reason, 
and the inability of the non-white races in general to develop their  thinking to pure 
reason (3.3.1)138. For women (3.3.4), Kant's assessment of them139 is determined by his 
religious arguments,  and justified in his empirical works140. They are doubly excluded 
from both the right and the need to development pure reason (from which, crucially, the 
self-determined need to believe in God is developed). They are instead designated a 
permanent tool for the end of humanity – as broodmares, decorations and nurturers – 
137 Kant's Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1793b).
138 See also section (3.4) where I explore this in more detail.
139 Kant follows Rousseau's arguments on gender here.
140 Most prominently, but not exclusively, in his Observations of the Beautiful and the Sublime (1764a) 
and his Anthropology From a Pragmatic Point of View (1798).
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and placed in permanent opposition and antagonism to their husbands, and as a way for 
men to continually test and practice their virtue against141.
Part 2 of this chapter focussed on the communities that humans form. It set out the key 
features of the three distinct  types of human groupings that  Kant  identified.  Firstly, 
social  (natural)  communities  (3.4.1)  driven  by emotionality,  where  he  uses  it  as  a 
theoretical concept to explore white humanity's progress, as natural communities, but 
where he also situates black people in reality and permanently, which I refer to in the 
section  as  primitive  communities,  to  distinguish  between  them.  Secondly,  civil 
(juridicio-civil) societies (3.4.2) driven by a mixture of emotionality and reason where 
he locates both the white and Asian races,  but where he situates the Asian races in 
perpetuity due  to  their  supposed inability to  develop pure reason.  This  section  also 
examined  how  these  types  of  collectives  form  and  develop  –  to  the  eventual 
construction of a civil constitution driven by increasing inequality, war and strife, the 
actions  of  Providence,  human  nature,  and  education.  This  section  also  entailed  the 
reasons for the exclusion of another group of humans – those identified as subjects but 
not  citizens  –  from  political  agency142,  ostensibly  due  to  their  lack  of  financial 
independence. The final society is Kant's moral (ethico-civil) societies (3.4.3) that dwell 
within each white state, where pure reason is developed, expressed, and recorded into 
posterity. This section looked at the purpose, construction, and reason for the ethico-
civil community, and how his moral/religious/cosmopolitan men correspond to his ideal 
of the philosopher.
Part  three  of  this  chapter  now  directly  explores  Kant's  arguments  and  ideas  on 
education, and how they fit into the sections explored previously. There are two main 
sources  for  Kant's  arguments  on  education  (in  addition,  to  the  numerous  times  he 
explores  specific  aspects  throughout  much  of  his  texts).  The  better  known  is  his 
lecturers on Pedagogy143 and the lesser is a compilation of his writings on pedagogy and 
education which was edited in 1904 by Charles Brumbaugh144. The first main section of 
141 See section (3.3.4). This is somewhat speculative, but as Kant describes the antagonistic relationship 
between husband and wife, it appears to conform to the pattern he believes men need to continually 
'practice their virtue' - to develop their moral personalities under threat from the base lure of women.
142 This section provides yet another layer of exclusion for women, as they are already excluded for being 
women. They are excluded here, as are what would now roughly be considered the working classes, as 
they are not economically independent and therefore cannot be politically or morally independent.
143 Part of the problem with this text is that the last and most up to date version of them, which Kant gave 
to Friedrich Rink, has been lost to us (Louden 2007, p.435). Because of this, the version that I made  
use of is a compilation from a number of sources, gathered together, reorganised, and published by 
Cambridge University Press.
144 This book is, according to Brumbaugh, “an endeavour to bring together all of the material Kant has to 
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this  looks  at  the  role  and  system of  formal  education  that  he  develops  (or  sees  as 
necessary), specifically for boys, for mankind's progress (3.5), with the second main 
section exploring the elements of indirect and cultural education that he weaves into his 
arguments (3.6). For the first section, there is a three-fold process which starts with the 
disciplining of boys away from animality (3.5.1). The boys are then cultivated by their 
teachers to skilfulness so that they have the capability to serve the economic needs of 
humanity (3.5.2). The final stage is 'higher' education that is reserved for his elite white 
men. They are educated in the principles of virtue, and can then develop this through 
practice (3.5.3).
Section (3.6) examines Kant's ideas on informal education – starting with the influence 
and impact of the family on the development of the child (3.6.1) through the provision 
of “maintenance and support” (1803, p.437). The family environment is also where the 
education for girls is expected to occur, ideally from their mothers. The next section 
(3.6.2) explores the education of boys into civility to serve the social needs of the state,  
and is the main site for the roles and actions of the emulators and cosmopolitans that I  
discussed in sections (3.4.2) and (3.4.3), but this time focussed more explicitly on the 
learning and educational aspects of their dynamic and development. The final section 
(3.6.3)  takes  up the  thread  of  education  as  it  is  expected  to  extend across  borders, 
primarily as a function of the intellectual aspects of commerce, and explores how this 
makes use of, and provides, if not an alternate reason, at the very least an additional 
aspect to Kant's development of Cosmopolitan Right.
3.5.0 Formal Education (Schooling)
This introduction to Kant's scheme of formal education provides background to, and 
situates his main arguments on schooling. There are three key elements to this. Firstly, 
the importance Kant places on education and why. Secondly, on what kind of education 
is needed to produce his cosmopolitan system, and finally, the vehicle he identifies that 
should carry out this change – something that he suggests needs to expand as quickly as 
possible, as a revolution rather than an evolution, in education.
Kant's views on human nature and education are that “humans must be educated to the 
good” (1798a, p.420), and further, not only that “good education is exactly that from 
offer on the general theme of education” (1904, p.vi) and contains comments and notes from the  
multiple versions of the lectures on pedagogy, which have not been published elsewhere, as well as 
many of his other texts that have not yet been translated into English. In addition, a large number of  
the 'selections'  in  this  book are taken from the  Hartenstein's  Immanuel  Kant's  Sammtliche Werke 
(1867-1868) (not referenced) that Brumbaugh translated for his book.
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which all the good in the world arises” (1803, p.443), but also “the human being can 
only become human through education” (p.439). Kant sees education as seminal to his 
Kingdom of Ends and perpetual peace,  and he locates both the possibility of doing 
good, and of only becoming human through education. Without education, humanity as 
a collective - even though Kant does qualify its impact and importance significantly 
when he argues that it can only realistically prevent war - cannot progress to a position 
where they could be considered 'humanity', let alone bring about peace.
The education of a boy must progress through the four stages of discipline, cultivation, 
civilisation  and  moralization  –  with  the  latter,  as  with  religious  belief145,  already 
embedded  in  the  structure  and  design  of  the  educational  system,  even  if  it  is  not 
developed further through the formalised teaching of virtue. Kant envisioned that this 
would occur through a careful process by which the child is first disciplined away from 
animality,  cultivated  (and  civilised)  for  the  needs  of  the  state  and  humanity's 
progression,  and to  give the individual  the adaptability to choose from a variety of 
different (social) ends. These ends, it should be noted, still conform to the cosmopolitan 
moral principle, but they fall outside of their direct determination by these principles. 
They are wide, imperfect, empirically determined, and correspond to social and civil 
choices that Kant argues are illusions that all146 can see through. The latter  roles of 
formation and tutoring ensure that the child is made fit to be a functioning member of 
society, and finally, the Socratic Method is used to test out and develop, through the use 
of reason, his cosmopolitan approach. This final stage is in essence an education to be 
able to 'philosophise as an approach to life', built upon the foundations of discipline, 
cultivation, civilisation, and self-developed habituated virtue (1797b, p.268). But before 
this can occur, education must first be developed into the science of pedagogy (1797, 
p.267; 1803, pp.441-442). Only then can individuals be educated in such a way that 
they will achieve a level of moral similarity that will allow them to act “according to the 
same principles” which would become “second nature” to them (p.440). Kant's aim here 
is nothing less that the social re-engineering of the way in which humans understand 
themselves,  interact with each other,  and perceive the world.  This path of humanity 
must  proceed according to a singular principle under education -  in a  cosmopolitan 
manner (p.442) - which will ensure conformity and uniformity of moral principles.
Kant identifies the ideal vehicle for starting this process as Bernhard Basedow's school, 
145 See Section (3.2).
146 This would more accurately note that all rational, and thus Kantian moral beings, can see through it.
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which he lends his support to in a variety of ways over the course of a number of years - 
as a fund-raiser, a writer of letters, and through his essays about the institute. He refers 
to it variously as “the first to have come about according to a perfect plan of education” 
(1776, p.98), and a “genuine educational institute that is fitting to nature as well as civil 
purposes”. Even more surprisingly though is that he suggests that the Basedowan school 
is “the greatest phenomenon which has appeared in this century for the improvement of 
the perfection of humanity” (ibid.). For Kant, the example of the Basedow school is the 
route that “if spread quickly enough, must bring about such a great and such a fore-
sighted  reform  in  private  as  well  as  in  civil  affairs”  (pp.100-104,  my  emphasis). 
Education, and Basedow's approach at the Daseu Institute is, for Kant, the base from 
which not just society,  but the family itself will  be reshaped. Thus it has to happen 
quickly – as a “swift revolution” (ibid. p.102) everywhere for it to take effect.
Alongside this change within the family and the state147 is that he also sees this type of 
institute – and experimental schools in general – as 'a seed' which could spread across 
and beyond borders “to all countries and to the most remote descendants” (ibid.). As 
experimental schools, they develop the art of teaching through the education of both 
pupil and teacher into the science of pedagogy, and through their rapid expansion, they 
bring about social change and moral development. The comment concerning 'remote 
descendants'  also links  to  my previous  section  (3.4.3)  where I  discuss  'recording to 
posterity'.  Kant's  project  is  both  expansionist  and historical  in  nature,  even  if  the 
philosophical and political arguments are ahistorically presented, and he links both to its 
international propagation, through Cosmopolitan Right and commerce. Whilst Kant on 
the  whole  argues  against  undue  economic  influence  on  foreign  and  less  developed 
states, this does not apply to the exchange of ideas and knowledge – the other side of 
commerce  to  its  economic  factor  -  which  can  be  transmitted  through  “Universal 
Hospitality”. This provides the main route through which his cosmopolitan norms could 
expand beyond the borders of the nation-state.
3.5.1 Discipline
This section examines the first element of Kant's system of education; Discipline, and 
examines  its  negative  dynamic  that  is  designed  to  turn  a  boy  from  animality  to 
humanity, and the foundation that it provides to the development of a cosmopolitan-
religious-moral personality.
147 See also section (3.6.3).
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The primary purpose  for  discipline,  according to  Kant,  is  to  “prevent[s]  the  human 
being  from  deviating  by  means  of  his  natural  animal  impulse  from  his  destiny  – 
humanity” (1803, p.438), but this reference to his 'natural animal impulse' suggests two 
things that both tie in to earlier arguments that I have made, and which direct the course 
of  his  educational  arguments  and  their  formulation.  Firstly  that  a  human  has  an 
inclination to freedom 'at  any cost'  which hardens over time148,  and secondly,  that a 
human's base nature is “not moral at all”149 (p.479). Discipline's main task is to prevent 
this freedom being sought or expressed - at  any cost (p.438) - whilst at the same time 
maintaining this lack of morality by eliminating or restricting the “impulses” (ibid.). 
Discipline for Kant is as a result initially negative150 and designed to 'take away'  an 
individual's savagery (ibid p.437) and wildness. It must therefore occur early in a boy's 
life because if it occurs too late it can never be “made good” (ibid. p.439), even if severe 
attempts are made to break the person's 'will' at a later date (p.452). If it develops too 
far, there is no possibility of correction151. It is here that children are turned away from 
the path to evil in the first instance and the possibility of becoming individuals with a 
moral-religious-cosmopolitan personality is retained. If expressions from animality and 
the development of habits are prevented, then the expression and development of evil is 
curtailed, and so the individual can still potentially develop their thinking to pure reason 
without having to battle this 'natural' drive to freedom. This occurs initially through the 
reduction of a boy's experience of gratification from a very young age - through the 
avoidance of strong sensations – as a result of which 'nature is brought under rules' 
(ibid. p.443). Not only does this serve to prevent the child's inclination to freedom, but it 
also has the added benefit, according to Kant, of allowing the individual to enrich their 
later enjoyment of life (1798a, p.275) when controlled in such a way. This aspect steers 
the boy away from fulfilling sensate desires towards placing reason before emotions.
The first stage of the child's life is when he must display “obsequiousness and passive 
obedience” (Kant 1803, p.446). The child must follow passively, and discipline must as 
148 See also section (3.3.1).
149 See also section (3.2.3).
150 But this is  not  a function of his Negative Principle as that  occurs during the cultivation stage of 
education (Kant 1798a, pp.331-333).
151 There are also structural similarities here to Kant's justification for permanently excluding other races 
from the capability of pure reason when he argues that their attributes become 'hardened over time' 
and cannot be developed further, even if they originally had the possibility to develop pure reason. 
This hardening of the individual through his desire for 'freedom at all costs', and which results in a  
fundamental inability to be turned toward pure reason, is similar to that which he ascribes to non-
white races in general, but most specifically to the native American and African peoples.
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a  result  “leave  nature  undisturbed”  (p.451)152.  This  system is  designed to  avoid  the 
development  of  habits  –  not  necessarily  of  a  physical  kind,  but  primarily  to  avoid 
mental, internal, and moral, habits, which would, due to the lack of development of pure 
reason,  be  constructed  from  empirical  reasoning  -  and  so  would  manifest  already 
fundamentally  flawed  from its  inception. Kant  argued in  Anthropology (1798a)  that 
humanity's  nature  tries  to  move  humans  from  culture  to  morality,  but  that  reason 
requires it to  start with morality (1798a, p.423). Discipline here serves the purpose of 
starting  with  morality  because,  by  restricting  his  animality,  morality  deduced  from 
empirical reasoning is prevented and the boy is then, in theory at least, kept morally 
'innocent',  thus  allowing his  practical153 education  to  start  with the  precepts  of  pure 
morality rather than having to counteract pre-existing empirically directed culturing.
What should be noted at this point is that Kant makes clear that it would be better if a 
boy's discipline (and education) occurred in a public setting, designed by enlightened 
experts, and as a result provided by men (1803, p.443). A girl's discipline should occur 
in  private,  and be managed by her  own mother  (1798a.  p.227).  I  will  examine this 
aspect  of  education  for  women  in  section  (3.6.1),  but  as  it  pertains  to  men,  Kant 
reinforces  this  binary  of  opposition  by  emphasising  the  need  for  discipline  to  be 
conducted by each gender on its own gender (ibid.).  Kant is obviously reinforcing a 
gender  binary  through  education  principally  in  what  one  is  taught,  but  also  in  the 
educational environment and the social rules that are developed, enforced, rejected and 
encouraged in  single-gender  environments,  and so  affects  the  formation  of  identity, 
interest and experience.
But on top of this, and perhaps the most critical reason for Kant's approach to the idea 
of discipline, is that the process of education also requires the child to be disciplined in 
a way that serves the purpose of the future of humanity. The child is treated as a means 
to an end – the future of humanity - rather than (or in some cases as well as) possessing 
an end in themselves, through the normative implications underlying this avoidance of 
moral development and the forced denial of experience. This suggests that a specific 
type  of  moral  framework  is  being  created  for  the  child,  since  the  child  is  being 
conditioned through the embedding of a particular moral purpose that the child will in 
turn contribute to. This service to humanity involves both humanity in the present, and 
is aimed towards humanity's future (1803, p.442) and is the principle reason that Kant 
152 In this respect nature refers to moral innocence. 
153 i.e. “his education towards personality” (1803, p.448).
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favours a public education over a private one, even given the issues that would arise if 
the sovereign of the state develops public education for his own purpose. Discipline's 
purpose is not just, or even primarily, for the individual. It is a social process that instils 
in boys norms of behaviour that are designed to propagate specific ways of interacting 
and thinking – regardless of whether the individual is destined for or has the opportunity 
to receive education in virtue.  Discipline establishes not just  what can or cannot be 
done, it also enforces how and why something can or cannot be done – and directs the 
boy down specific paths of social, intellectual, and emotional development.
3.5.2 Cultivation
Cultivation and Moralization are in some respects more closely linked to each other 
than the previous section on discipline because they are both aspects of Kant's practical  
education (1803, p.448). The main distinguishing points between them is that, firstly, 
cultivation  to  skill  involves  instruction  and  teaching,  whereas  the  second  stage, 
moralization, requires tutoring in a Socratic manner154. Secondly, cultivation is directed 
towards  developing  in  all  boys  the  capability  to  choose  any  end  from  a  socially 
influenced  perspective,  whilst  moralization  is  directed  towards  the  development  of 
reason  and  judgement,  and  then  from  these,  the  ability  to  choose  consistently  a 
specifically cosmopolitan end. Alongside this runs a boy's civilisation which situates 
and determines the specific social context, and they are both involved in the preparation 
of a boy to the service of himself, whereas moralization is implicated more prominently 
with his service to his society, and to humanity.
Cultivation is also specifically a part of the moral development of a “rational being”155 
(1790, p.260) in their mental and physical capabilities, primarily in service to himself, 
and aimed towards the “technical disposition to manipulate things” (1798a, p.417). This 
cultivation  is  layered  on  top  of  discipline,  and  in  addition  to  the  structure  of  the 
instruction and teaching and the method by which the boys are taught,  it  is already 
directed  towards  a  specific  type  of  future  for  humanity,  since  moral-religious-
cosmopolitan norms are already implicit, even if not explicit, in design and direction of 
his education156. Thus the cultivation of the individual is for humanity, and as a result 
the  individual  is  developed  to  find  any  skilled  end  within  that  framework.  Kant's 
154 The second stage of moral education is self-developed through the active practice of morality.
155 Rationality is the final point of a man's moral development which leads to the education, preservation 
and  systemic  governance  of  humanity (1798a,  p.417).  Women are  excluded  from the  process  of 
cultivation because they are denied either the opportunity or capability to develop rationality.
156 See section (3.2.1).
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assertion that a boy cultivated in this way “determines no end at  all” (1803, p.444) 
whilst making sense  within  this framework, contradicts both the implicit and explicit 
aspects of his educational system that is structured and designed for a particular moral 
purpose.  Further,  that  “The moral concept of God reason gives  us is  so simple and 
obvious to the ordinary human understanding that not much cultivation is required for 
faith in a supreme governor of the world” (1783, p.448) only makes sense from within 
this framework because it is already normalised, and the system of education has been 
designed such that “at first everything must be attributed to nature, but later nature must 
be attributed to God” (1803, p.480).
The boy is further educated to perceive and interact with the idea of Kant's “principles 
of freedom” (1798a, p.417), who's expression has been denied up to this point, and is 
intrinsically linked to freedom for the self only in relation to the freedom of others. 
Every  boy's  education  is  as  a  consequence  specifically  designed  so  that  he  cannot 
achieve any of his goals if others cannot achieve theirs as well. Social dynamics are, 
reconstructed and naturalised within the schooling environment, and the individual is 
trained through the course of their schooling so that this dynamic is internalised. This 
allows Kant's educational system to produce the cultural and social uniformity he sees 
as  necessary  to  ensure  that  they  “act  according  to  the  same  principles,  and  these 
principles would... become their second nature” (1803, p.440)
One area that Kant discusses for the development of underlying cosmopolitan norms is 
lying and telling the truth. Telling the truth is made essential to a child's upbringing and 
way of life, and serves an explicitly moral purpose. Lying must be responded to with 
contempt (p.468) - and treated as “literally  vicious” (Kant, cited in Brumbaugh 1904, 
p.232,  his  emphasis).  The strength  of  the language that  Kant  uses,  and the type  of 
response needed by the one who is lied to, is clearly designed to provoke an internal 
process of a very particular kind - “the shamefulness of vice” (Kant 1797, p.271). This 
makes clear that lying must never be discouraged through positive encouragement – 
because the incentive should be moral and so  self-determined. Lying should never be 
punished because then he would be  trained to tell the truth - something which takes 
away his agency. What is needed is for the boy to understand it is a fundamental wrong 
in and of itself and then  chose to never lie because it is the right thing to do. This 
preference of understanding over training shifts education from discipline to cultivation, 
and is an aspect of Kant's Negative Principle (1798a, pp.331-333), expressed variously 
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as “to think for oneself” (p.333) or “What do I want? (asks understanding)” (p.332).
Whereas  training  is  to  have  the  thinking  carried  out  or  determined  by another  and 
impacts on the process that each boy is expected to follow on the path to determining 
for themselves their freedom and duty through pure reason. This leads to the need to 
“think for oneself” as the grounding for 'Enlightenment' (1786c, p.18). Whilst discipline 
is  wholly  negative,  and  relies  on  obedience,  this  control  is  reduced  through  the 
cultivation process as Kant argues for the normalisation of both interlinked freedoms 
where it can only be achieved if others also achieve theirs157, and the development of 
skilled independence – to be able to do without needing others.
Cultivation, whilst the first stage of positive education, is there to develop the skills and 
capabilities that are essential for a male person who is firstly a political subject – and is 
the  base  from which  the  characteristics  of  a  political  citizen with  the  right  to  vote 
develops (Kant, 1791b). No personality in the Kantian sense is developed through the 
development of skill,  or possessing the status of subject,  because it  is directed only 
towards his  “value in  relation to himself  as an individual” (p.448).  Pragmatism and 
moralization on the other hand are involved in the development of a civil and moral 
personality and so come later on in the individual's education (if at all).
With regards to the specifics of education that occur during the cultivation period, Kant 
makes clear that its  primary purpose is to prepare the individual to be a productive 
member  of  society.  This  development  of  skill  is  also  deemed  by Kant  to  be  fully 
developed by about the age of twenty (1798a, p.308) which not only covers the formal 
educational period for most boys, but extends further, flowing into the apprenticeship 
system. Essentially then, cultivation covers the whole of the schooling system before a 
university education, where knowledge of the world and virtue would be taught in his 
educational system. Moral education by contrast, is “one of life's adornments” (1765a, 
p.291) that is developed during a higher (university) education, and “knowledge of the 
world... must come after schooling” (1798a, p.231). This creates the curious situation 
where “All cultural progress... has the goal of applying this acquired knowledge and 
skill for the world's use” (ibid.) but knowing of the world for oneself is denied from the 
people who can contribute to humanity only through skill to this cultural progress. The 
creation  and  development  of  knowledge  is,  accordingly,  kept  in  the  hands  of  the 
educational elite. Those cultivated in its use are therefore beholden to the expertise of 
157 This idea of freedom is a moral, or practical, education in nature.
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others because their education, or lack thereof, and the moral system established during 
education, strengthens the authority that the educational elite have over the possession 
and development of knowledge.
3.5.3 Moralization
This section covers the second stage of practical education and is explicitly directed 
towards  the  explicit  creation  of  the  ethical  grounds  to  develop morality.  Whilst  the 
previous two sections have this as implicit aspects, it becomes the main feature of the 
next  stage of  education  in  the  discipline of  philosophy158 and  as  a  consequence  the 
teaching of a doctrine of ethics (1797, p.266). This system of education facilitates the 
pupil's creation of their own principles of virtue that can formulated and memorised, 
and which will serve him to develop his moral personality. At this point he reaches the 
conclusion that there is a need to believe in God. This provides a final, formal, linking 
of religion to pure reason at the end of a man's intellectual development, but crucially 
not of his moral development, which is continually tested and threatened. This occurs 
both internally with an ongoing struggle against “the inner enemy within men” (ibid.), 
and  externally  because  “Human  beings  morally  corrupt  one  another's  moral 
predisposition... as though they were instruments of evil” (1793b, p.132) through man's 
asocial sociability. The teaching of virtue is required because humans are by nature not 
virtuous beings – they are innocent (or potentially Hobbesian), although they have the 
disposition to good – and because Kant links cosmopolitanism to progressivism and 
human moral  capability in  his  religious  arguments159.  He assumes  that  “This  idea... 
resides in our morally legislative reason. We ought to conform to it, and therefore we 
must be able to” (p.105) becomes a moral imperative for those who have come before 
and established pure reason and a moral personality. It is this act of self-creation of a 
doctrine of virtue and its continual practice that defines the individual as a moral being 
worthy of humanity. Without it he would be considered a child or animal - no better 
than the inhabitants of Tahiti (1803, p.448) – and of no worth to humanity.
The principle of this education160 is based on Kant's three aspects of the power of the 
158 Kant establishes philosophy in his educational system as the pre-eminent discipline at University that 
all other knowledges must be subject to. Philosophy for him is the location of the exploration of truth 
and morality, which requires philosophy to control the developments of all other subjects, according 
to its rules. This ensures conformity to a singular moral standard and allows for his moral foundations  
to be a part of all aspects of a man's education (1798c, pp.255-256).
159 See section (3.2).
160 Kant goes into the underlying reasons in  The Metaphysic of  Morals (1797) but also lays  out the 
practical teaching of them decades before, in the  Program of His Lectures (1765). Whilst there are 
over  thirty  years  separating  these  publications,  they  are  also  supported  in  Religion  within  the  
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mind and the chaining of the 'lower powers'161 to the service of them162. Understanding 
refers to knowledge of the universal, judgement to the application of the universal to the 
particular, and reason being the connection of the universal with the particular (1803, 
p.461). They are developed in a Socratic dialogue with a tutor (1797b, p.267), starting 
with understanding, to develop “rules... to cultivate the understanding” (1803, p.464), 
using “moral catechisms” to facilitate the student's intellectual development. These rules 
are then arranged into “formula” so that they can be memorised, and because the student 
is their creator, he would 'love' these rules. The pupil is then “drawn without noticing it 
to an interest in morality” (1797b, p.267) and he learns how to think and philosophize 
(instead of just learning the right thoughts to think) (p.292). These examples are then 
used as proofs that the formula works, rather than as models to base the formula itself 
upon (since the examples are empirically based and the pupil is looking for the universal 
rule, not the particular expression). This allows the universality of the formula to remain 
'pure' as it is not influenced by the empirical.
The  interplay  of  learning  virtue  with  the  one  who  teaches  him  contributes  to  the 
prominence and importance of philosophers in Kant's schema, as it situates virtue solely 
within  the  study  of  philosophy,  and  he  quite  specifically  uses  scenarios  with 
philosophers as his only suitable examples of his “good people” (1793b, p.93 & 1797, 
p.268). The injunction of  sapere aude163 that Kant gives takes on a radically different 
meaning in this context as, according to his educational system and his formulation of 
the structure and nature of Understanding, it can only occur in an appropriate manner 
after the teaching of virtue has occurred – and then only within the context where a man 
is  continually  struggling  internally  with  his  animality,  and  constantly  challenged 
externally. Daring to think is a right and a duty that only philosophers are entitled to.
Kant's system also makes clear that reason must follow  after  understanding, and then 
judgement,  are  developed.  If  reason is  developed before  the  understanding of  these 
moral catechisms, the rules to guide them, and the testing and practice of them through 
experience, then “science is borrowed rather than grown within... it has been corrupted 
by  the  delusion  of  reason”  (1765,  pp.291-2).  The  consequence  of  this  is  that 
Boundaries of Mere Reason (1793b) where he uses the same structure.
161 These are the cognitive faculty, senses, imagination, memory, attention and wit (1803, p.464).
162 “The main rule here is that no power of mind is to be cultivated separately but each in relation to the  
other;  for  example,  the  power  of  imagination  is  to  be  cultivated  only for  the  advantage  of 
understanding” (1803, p.461, my emphasis).
163 Dare to Think, or “have courage to use your own understanding” in his  An Answer to the Question  
“What is Enlightenment” (1784a, p.1).
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understanding  would  be  linked  to  the  ongoing  development  of  empirical  reasoning 
which  has  grown through  cultural  interaction  and  empirical  knowledge,  rather  than 
being an internally developed through understanding and then judgement. Further, the 
development of judgement and reason do not feature in his formal educational system as 
they are techniques that cannot be taught, but which come in to play in social dynamics.
Strictly  speaking  then,  this  section  on  moralization  is  more  concerned  with  the 
establishment  of  the  doctrine  of  virtue  that  is  required  for  both  judgement  and 
moralization, which develops outside the schooling system, and later on in life. Other 
than Kant's geniuses who are able to cultivate and moralise themselves, and therefore 
fall outside the schooling system entirely. This educational system is the only path that 
Kant develops to provide the intellectual grounding for moralising to occur. It enables 
the pupil to establish rules to guide them, and the social settings where the underlying 
norms of his cosmopolitan morality acts within and influences. The consequences of 
this  system  not  only  exclude  the  vast  majority  of  men  and  all  women  from  the 
opportunity to develop their own systems of virtue, but it also privileges the already 
political  and  economic  elite  with  the  social  standing  of  the  philosopher.  These 
philosophers take on the role of the conscience of the state they are a part of, and are, 
Kant hopes but cannot rely upon, responsible for the broader social moral development 
of the rest of society. The result of this is that education provides one of the essential 
grounds to peace – and thus his pacific federation.
3.6 Informal Education (Bildung)
The previous section presented Kant's approach to, and the importance of, a particular 
type of formal schooling in the development of a cosmopolitan approach and moral 
stance to life. It examined the reasons for the structure of learning and the importance of 
discipline in curtailing a boy's inclination to animality and unrestricted freedom. It then 
explored  the  technique  of  cultivation  that  Kant  proposed,  which  would  engineer  a 
mutual-gains  dynamic  into  the  schooling  environment,  and  the  establishment  of 
underlying cosmopolitan-moral norms. The final section (3.5.3) examined in detail the 
final stage of schooling; the elite level restricted to a few privileged men, educated in 
the principles of virtue which would then be practised as self-culturing to morality.
 
This section (3.6), explores Kant's idea of bildung – focussing on education's social as 
opposed  to  formal  side  -  and  the  other  informal  measures  he  sees  as  necessary to 
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cultivate mankind to humanity. It shows firstly how the family plays a key role in the 
formation of a girl's social and 'philosophical' character (3.6.1). Secondly it examines 
the ways in which the university acts as the principle site for the moral development of 
men, educated in the principles of virtue, to practice and develop their judgement and 
morality, and how religion and the ethico-civil society are implicated in the cultural and 
moral development  of his  emulators,  who are educated,  but not in  the principles of 
virtue. These emulators copy the examples of moral action, rather than establishing the 
formula for themselves, but by faking a cosmopolitan morality over a “considerable 
length of  time” they are “gradually aroused and merge into the disposition” (1798a 
p.263). Because of their social standing they contribute to the moral and, more critically, 
the legal development of their society. The final section (3.6.3) examines the way in 
which  Kant's  Cosmopolitan Right  and global  commerce  facilitates  the  expansion of 
western political, legal, social, and moral norms across borders into other states.
3.6.1 Family life
The  family  plays  a  curious  role  in  Kant's  writings.  Section  (3.3.4)  identified  the 
dynamic between a husband and wife as both necessarily and intrinsically antagonistic – 
as asocial  sociability is  an empirical feature that runs through the entirety of Kant's 
works and is something that he argues comes from the fundamental conflict between 
our instincts from Nature, and the development of reason from Man. In the home there 
is already a clearly established and permanent hierarchy in place that privileges men 
over  women  and  places  them  into  a  binary  of  opposition  and  in  a  struggle  for 
dominance164.  It  is  also,  of  course,  the  place  where  children  are  raised.  If  they are 
educated  by  their  parents,  Kant  suggests  that  the  families  own faults  are  not  only 
continued, but deliberately fostered – something he clearly takes issue with – and this is 
one of the reason that he argues for a public education system. At the same time he sees 
the dangers of a sovereign-created and determined national education. As a result he 
supports  independent  schools  run  privately by educational  moral-elites.  This  allows 
education to be developed to a science that will be in the hands of, and for the progress 
of, humanity165.
164 See section (3.3.4).
165 Kant does also refer to the sovereign power creating a national educational system, according to a  
“well-weighed  plan...  steadily  maintained”  (1798b,  p.308).  An  educational  system  run  by  an 
educational elite is the second-choice scenario. This is similar to Kant's decision to pragmatise his 
idealism and settle for his second-choice of a pacific federation instead of a single global power - due 
to the danger of tyranny in the wrong hands, and its consequential formation and development for the 
wrong reasons. When Kant argues that “Behind education lies the great secret of the perfection of 
human nature” (1803, p.439), it is clear that the power he sees education possessing means that in the 
wrong hands it can not only deny the development of this perfection, but be deliberately directed in 
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The home and family is also the place where the responsibility for educating girls, in 
service to the needs of humanity's progress, occurs. Overall though, Kant gives little 
attention to the details and social dynamics expected of a family life, the education of 
girls, or indeed of the potential education of boys at home as well (Brumbaugh 1904, 
p.23). Whilst he mentions a few times that “care (maintenance and support)” (e.g. 1803, 
p.437) are essential  for the education of a child, and that this is the purview of the 
family, he rarely discusses this further. He is far more interested in the education boys 
receive, and what their education should be like, in a schooling environment. When he 
does discuss this environment, it is mostly implicit, and in relation to the characteristics 
expected of a girl.
There are a number of expectations  that Kant  believes are necessary to develop, or 
should  be  encouraged  in  girls.  Firstly,  “girls,  must  be  early  accustomed  to  frank, 
unforced smiling; for the cheerfulness of the features is gradually imprinted internally, 
and begets a disposition to joyousness, friendliness, and sociability which this approach 
to  the  virtue  of  good-will  early prepares."  (cited  in  Brumbaugh  1904,  p.196).  This 
expression of congeniality and the impact of its continual practice is similar to Kant's 
argument concerning the discipline of boys away from animality that I discussed in 
section (3.5.1), as well as for his moral emulators that I touched on in section (3.4.2) 
and which I explore further in section (3.6.2). Kant clearly sees that repeated actions, in 
general, serve to habituate actions into the disposition of the individual.
Secondly, girls are  expected to “know men rather than books” (p.226), and yet at the 
same time somehow possess virtue, which suggests that virtue for girls and women can 
only be  developed  from either  practical  reason,  or  that  the  principles  of  virtue  are 
‘given’ to her166 since practical reason is not sufficient for the self-determination of one's 
duty and a cosmopolitan morality. This also relates to the requirement that they have an 
understanding and appreciation of honour167 and the capability to develop “good modes 
of  thought”,  but  their  nature  needs  to  be  directed  down  a  different  route,  as  her 
education “is not instruction, but guidance... honor is her greatest virtue, domesticity her 
merit.” (ibid.). The 'science of man' which she is expected to learn is based on man's 
the opposite direction.
166  This means that her mother passes virtue to her daughter, as her father passes virtue to his wife. Her 
education is in the hands of her mother, and the closest example of virtue would be the father.
167 “Man's honor consists in his own estimation of himself; woman's honor in the judgment of others” 
(Brumbaugh 1904, p.230).
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animal nature, and her “philosophical reasoning is not reasoning but sentiment” (1764a, 
p.42). Because of this, her understanding of 'men'  cannot be an understanding of his 
moral personality – that which defines his humanity - which he develops through the 
practice of  virtue,  but  rather  must  be the base level  of man's  animal  nature,  as her 
“philosophical reasoning is not reasoning but sentiment” (ibid.). Her philosophising as a 
result cannot accommodate pure reason's development from the construction and testing 
of a formula of virtue. If she could do this, it would mean that sentiment can not only 
reach the same conclusions as pure reason, which Kant acknowledges is possible when 
recognising right and wrong168. 
More importantly, she would intuitively understand  why (because philosophy requires 
not just knowing a thing, but understanding why and using judgement - otherwise it 
would not be philosophical) - which is clearly not the point of Kant's marriage dynamic. 
A woman is not supposed to be able to grasp a man's reason because not only would she 
then have the capacity to engage him on that level, but she could do this  without any 
level of education to virtue at all - and she would still have influence over his animality 
because of his physical desire for her. Instead he sees women attacking and seeking to 
dominate only their animality. Further, Kant's view is that girls cannot (be allowed to) 
develop their reason to a pure level under any circumstance.  For whilst  women  can 
develop reason, it can be useful if they do, and they could even “go far in it” (ibid.), this 
can only be permitted to any significant level once their primary purpose as breeders 
and  nurturers  is  ended  (1764a,  p.49).  This  also  suggests  that  the  service  girls  and 
women  provide  for  humanity's  progression  never  really  changes,  and perhaps  more 
importantly  never  needs  to  change  -  because  for  Kant,  man's  animal  nature  never 
changes - even if his civil or moral personality can and must.
Given that a girl’s education is lacking any kind of formal education, that books are not 
considered all that important to their education, and that she is taught to emphasise a 
natural innocence and compliant nature, this strongly suggests that reasoning of some 
kind, whilst  useful,  is  not nearly as necessary for the girls'  development as a boy's.  
Whilst  a  boy must  be denied strong experiences  from an early ages  to  prevent  the 
development of animality at the same time that he is directed to reason as an underlying 
moral norm, for the girl, Kant's scheme suggests that her animality/sentimentality needs 
to be nurtured, at the same time that her (lesser) drive to freedom must be prevented. 
Her education would therefore,  if given to a boy, be dangerous, as it would nurture 
168 See section (3.2.3).
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emotionality and instinct. For a girl, Kant argues instead that “her bent”169 (ibid.) is of a 
more yielding and compliant nature than the boy and that she can use reason in support 
of  the  rightness  of  complying  with  this  tendency  to  compliance.  As  a  result,  this 
suggests that a girl would receive comfort and emotional experiences to a degree that a 
boy was not. This means that a woman is cultured into society from an earlier age, and 
this type of culturing takes a far more prominent place than for men.
3.6.2 Civilisation
For Kant, education has a limited, although still essential and influential, impact on the 
progress of humanity. They must also rely on providence (1793a, p.90) through asocial 
sociability, which drives humans to strife and war and forces them against their will to 
develop a civil constitution. Yet at the same time, Kant does also argue that, for all its 
inability to drive moral progress on its own, education  can bring about peace. Firstly, 
because “as culture grows and men gradually move toward greater agreement... they 
lead to mutual understanding and peace... this peace is created and guaranteed by an 
equilibrium of forces and a most vigorous rivalry” (1795b, p.114). Formal education, as 
the  main  driver  of  the  culturing  of  men -  and something which  must  of  course  be 
developed into a science that standardises their education - shifts all men's moral norms 
closer and closer together, making it easier to reach “mutual understanding” as people 
would no longer live and interact in (morally) different ways - because of their cultured 
similarities. Their education to skill,  which all men receive, further contributes to “a 
most vigorous rivalry” - essentially their asocial sociability - into economic commerce 
and as a result 'peaceful' conflict. The laws, rules and regulations developed both within 
the  state  and  between  states  across  borders  through  a  pacific  federation  channel, 
reinforces the importance of trade, and creates a legal framework that is a 'physical' 
representation of humanity's moral progress. Pragmatism and reason (even if not pure) 
in such a system still ensures that there will be military peace, and also serves to satisfy 
humanity's inherent asocial sociability that cannot be avoided and so must be directed to 
'economic war'  and commercial rivalry instead. Crucial to this is that it  relies on an 
economic system where Kant believes everyone will lose if the system - which relies on 
military peace  to  be  maintained  -  is  itself  broken.  As  a  consequence  the  economic 
system must be vulnerable to war170, and must be protected by all, regardless of whether 
it is driven or developed by pragmatism or pure reason.
169 I take “bent” to mean inclination and/or nature.
170 Essentially, to alter the economic system to avoid the danger of its destruction from war goes against 
the importance of its vulnerability to Kant's cosmopolitan scheme.
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The social environment is one where men who are subjects have been cultured to trade, 
and habituated into economic pragmatism. Just as boys were initially habituated into 
humanity through discipline, and the foundations for a later potential moralization into 
cosmopolitanism was established; and just as girls were habituated into passivity and a 
pleasant  disposition  to  serve  and  please  men.  From  this,  habitation  to  economic 
pragmatism appears far more day-to-day influential on these men than the habituation of 
their moral foundations laid during childhood, but this is where Kant's additional factors 
come in. Universities, public instruction, free speech, and his moral actors and their 
emulators, each of which contribute to the moral development of the inhabitants of the 
state, whether subjects or citizens.
The university is not just the location where virtue is taught, its teachings consists of 
two main branches. Firstly, the three 'higher' faculties of religion, law, and medicine. 
They “exist[s] among the incentives that the government can use to achieve its end (of 
influencing the people)”. This occurs through their “eternal well-being”; religion, their 
“civil sell-being as a member of a society”; the law, and their “physical well-being”; 
medicine, which are given to them through “public teachings” (1798c, p.250). These 
teachings  in  turn  come  from  “writings...  statutes...  symbolic  books”  (p.251,  his 
emphasis) that are a part of the empirical world, and can not only “be changed to suit 
the times” (ibid.), but which the government has the right to sanction should it disagree 
with them. The higher faculties exists in direct service to the state.
The 'lower' faculty of philosophy171, by contrast, which is the only location of the formal 
teaching and study of virtue that leads to the ability development of pure reason, must 
instead be “independent  of  the government's  command with regard to  his  teaching” 
(1798c, p.249). This is because it is supposed to exist in service to humanity and truth, 
whereas the higher faculties are in the service of utility and the government. As a result, 
the faculty of philosophy should, according to Kant, be in control of the higher faculties 
and  be  itself  subject  only  to  “the  laws  given  by  reason”  (p.255).  The  faculty  of 
philosophy, and therefore the philosophers who are a part of the faculty, have a duty to 
test  the higher faculty's  teachings172,  in service to the truth,  and “to deny the magic 
171 “This  faculty  consists  of  historical  cognition  (including  history,  geography,  philology  and  the 
humanities)... and a department of pure rational cognition (pure mathematics and pure philosophy, the 
metaphysics of nature and of morals)” (1798b, p.256). This faculty would also, according to Kant's  
arguments, be the location of the teaching of the social and political sciences, in the department of 
historical cognition.
172 The lower faculty has a duty to test the higher on anything that has a rational basis, and the higher to 
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power the public superstitiously attributes to these teachings and the rites connected to 
them” (p.258). Crucially, this testing is expected to occur 'in public', and is the principle 
reason for the need for principles of free speech and public instruction, but it is still  
heavily  restricted  as  it  is  intended  as  a  means  to  educate  the  “learned community 
devoted to the sciences” (p.248, his emphasis). By this Kant means that it is primarily 
the theorists who are to teach the empiricists within the lower faculty itself. It is the duty 
of these theorists to stay in conflict with the higher faculty, and to do this in according 
with the precepts of reason, but access to their public instruction extends to all those 
who are educated and a part of “the intelligentsia” (ibid.).
Another aspect of this public discourse is that firstly, far from an accommodation or 
compromise  being  the  resolution  to  their  disagreement,  Kant  stipulates  that  it  be 
determined by “the decision of a judge (reason) which has the force of law” (p.260). 
This 'law' is not law as would be created by a government – but rather a decision that 
the university and its teachers are expected to follows as if it were law, i.e. as if it were a 
moral duty (as truth is, for Kant). Secondly, that this process is an unending one and it is 
“the philosophy faculty that must always be prepared to keep it going” (ibid.). Between 
the two of these, the elevated moral position the philosopher possesses is enforced by 
the educational  system, as his  faculty serves the truth,  whereas the others serve the 
people (or the government) in their partiality. Contributing to this elevation, of course, is 
that men were educated at school whilst boys to always tell the truth and to see lies as 
“vicious things” that should be treated with contempt.
The interplay of the faculties in a university, and the implications it has for the “public 
use of reason” paints Kant's An Answer to the Question, what is Enlightenment (1784a) 
in a very different light to that which it is normally presented as. Far from an injunction 
for all member of a polity to “dare to think”, it is rather an expectation, firstly that the  
intelligentsia who serve the government as “businesspeople” will  dare to think  in a  
private capacity as citizens. That thinking is directed back towards the educated men of 
the state, but also beyond the state to other of a similar social standing. Secondly, the 
“natural heralds... are free173 professors of law, that is philosophers” (1798c, p.305, my 
emphasis) and it is their self-defined duty, under the requirements of pure reason, to be 
“objectionable to the state” (ibid.). In addition, as members of the lower faculty their 
test the lower on anything that has an empirical basis. (1798c, p.259).
173 Not free as in unemployed, but with authority over their own earnings – and thus citizens of the state, 
rather than subjects who are employed and/or dependent on others.
Sahra Taylor Page 151 of 300 Feb 2019
duty is to direct this towards the teaching of the lower faculty who are not theorists. The 
publicity that Kant refers to, not just here but elsewhere, is not members of the state as 
subjects, but citizens who are also typically the intelligentsia, and the most important of 
these are the philosophers who are members of the lower faculty, directly engaged with 
the  struggle  for  the  truth,  in  service  to  humanity.  The  university  system  provides 
education to the political, economic and religious elite of the state, a large number of 
whom then go on to serve the government, the church, or become business people. They 
are the target of the philosopher's arguments, not the public as a whole.
When it is recognised who the moral people are in Kant's system; the philosophers, and 
whom this public discourse involves and is directed towards; the state and more widely 
the  intelligentsia,  it  strongly  suggests  that  the  people  I  called  emulators  in  section 
(3.4.2) are the already educated people who are not philosophers. Further, this leads to 
and reinforces the exclusion of the less educated from Kant's cosmopolitan vision174. 
Whilst the intelligentsia might not have received education in virtue specifically, they 
have been disciplined away from animality, and they have the same moral grounds, as 
well  as having received an education to  skill.  In  addition,  each one will  have been 
educated to prudence and are “well suited for society, popular  and influential” (1803, 
p.444,  my  emphasis).  The  inclusion  of  influence  into  his  civilisation  suggests  still 
further, as I have indicated previously, that education to prudence is not one that all 
pupils at school would receive, but rather is a practice reserved for the elite. This is 
especially so, given that the men who receive this education receive it through Socratic 
instruction, which has a considerable financial cost. The opportunity to influence comes 
about primarily from the social status, or civil personality, that one possesses - which is 
a characteristic of the intelligentsia but far less for the less educated (or uneducated, or 
women, or other marginal groups). The ability to “use other people skilfully” (1803, 
p.448) only makes sense when coupled with social influence.
Both philosophers specifically, and the intelligentsia more generally that they are a part 
of, are educated to prudence and pragmatism via the second half of the positive aspect 
of education – guidance (p.446). This education consists of developing the ability to 
“think oneself into the place of every other” and comes from the exercise of the power 
of judgement (1798a, pp.332-3). These are a continuation and furthering of the initial 
culturing that all men receive at school, guided now by a tutor, as an aspect of their 
practical education (i.e. of the mind), and aimed at the skilful use of others. But whereas 
174 Women, non-white people, subjects who work for others, and the less (or un-) educated.
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the philosophers are expected to be men who “despises all the attractions and desires of 
the senses” (1786b, p.185), the intelligentsia are more connected to the physical world. 
They act within and influence it,  as members of their  respective societies.  It  is this 
which places them in the position of influencing not just the workers of their state, but 
also the workings of the universities, and the government itself. They are as a result 
important to the creation of, the writing of, the application of, the enforcement of, and 
the teaching of, the law; which serves for Kant as the physical representation of their 
society's, and humanity in general's, moral development175.
It is for this group of people that public instruction, and the moral development that 
Kant refers to, is aimed at. They have the opportunity, if they develop their sense of 
judgement,  to  contribute  to  the  future  progression  of  humanity,  once  some form of 
international peace is established, and not just for themselves or their state. But this 
internal development of theirs, and its expression, does not occur quickly. Kant suggests 
that it is an ongoing progression that is established by about the age of forty. It is the 
forerunner to the development of  wisdom where a person's moral personality starts to 
develop176 and which will be established at about sixty years of age. It is here that Kant 
establishes a further layer of exclusion, as his cosmopolitan moral system is also an 
oligarchical  one  –  reserved  to  old(er)  men  who  have  had  the  necessary  education, 
possess the requisite social status to develop their judgement, and then wisdom, as elite 
citizens of their society – but these moral men are, as I have argued earlier, most often 
situated in the university setting, as teachers of philosophy.
3.6.3 International Propagation
This section explores a somewhat neglected aspect of Kant's cosmopolitan vision – how 
his concept of morality through pure reason is spread beyond borders. In essence, how 
cosmopolitanism as a moral duty is able to propagate across the world and in so doing, 
contribute to the development of humanity.
So far, sections (3.6.1) and (3.6.2) have emphasised the importance of education in the 
moral development of a state, and highlighted that the physical manifestation of this 
175 Whilst Kant does not have any great hope or expectation that either his moral cosmopolitans or their  
emulators will have any great  impact on the development of these laws (1795b, p.113), they will  
nevertheless allow for the prioritisation of “the  spirit of commerce” to take hold, and promote the 
cause of peace (p.115), that allows resources to be directed to the education of the citizens of the state. 
As a consequence, their education contributes to the ongoing development of moral norms that rely on 
the spirit of commerce.
176 If he has the opportunity, has already had the requisite level of education, and has enjoyed a long 
period to practice his judgement to do so.
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development is  the creation of a civil  constitution,  the increase in laws, and acts of 
charity  or  philanthropy.  It  has  also  established that  the  concept  of  humanity is  one 
charged with moral connotation in Kant's system and is located in his moral-religious-
cosmopolitan men, not simply a catch-all for 'all human beings', just as the idea of the 
citizen is different to and an extension from the base level of the subject of the state 
rather than them being considered interchangeable. In addition to which, the exchange 
of ideas between the intelligentsia is the primary purpose for the 'freedom of the press'  
that allows for the propagation of his cosmopolitan morality and the establishment of 
'truth'.  Finally,  that  the  ideal  vehicle  for  the  spreading  and  establishment  of 
cosmopolitan moral norms are the experimental schools that Kant argues need to spread 
and be established as  quickly as  possible  to  trigger  a  revolution  in  the  methods  of 
teaching the elite boys of a state. This would then allow for the embedding of a common 
moral grounding in them (even if they do not acquire an education in the principles of 
virtue) that would facilitate the spread of his preferred moral norms into the heart of the 
educational, political, theological, and economic systems of the states where they are 
established. As a result, the development of laws suited for a civil constitution would 
increase, whether for pragmatic or pure reasons, and the reasons for disagreement would 
decrease because they would no longer live such (morally) different lives. This would 
trigger a (slow) systemic change in the desire for war, and the increasing establishment 
of  its  replacement,  'a  vigorous  rivalry'  through  trade.  This  in  turn  embeds  and 
normalises the spread of his cosmopolitan moral foundations still  further, eventually 
allowing for additional funding to be channelled to the education of its citizens.
It  is for these reasons Kant argues that “The problem of establishing a perfect civil 
constitution is subordinate to the problem of a law-governed external relationship with 
other states, and cannot be solved until the latter is also solved” (1784b, p.47). This is 
why he devotes the final part of the seventh proposition of his  Ideas for a universal  
History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose to the problem of the cultivation of the citizens’ 
minds of each commonwealth (p.49) – this is the essential point of establishing peace, 
and diverting funds to education instead of war. It is to facilitate and widen the moral 
education of the elite members of the state – because this type of education is something 
which occurs after the base level of education to skilfulness that all of the subjects of 
the  state  are  provided  with.  The  ongoing  intellectual  interactions  within  the 
intelligentsia  of  a  state,  and  crucially,  between  different  states,  alongside  the 
establishment of experimental schools - as 'a seed' - could spread across and beyond 
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borders “to all countries and to the most remote descendants” (ibid.). This allows for the 
development of elite level education that contributes to the slow expansion and refining 
of their education to cosmopolitan norms.
This in turn contributes to the growth of Kant's ethico-civil societies that facilitate the 
moral development of the state through acts of charity, the refining of the state’s civil 
laws,  public  discourse  that  allows  for  the  propagation  of  truth,  and  the  ongoing 
development of the education of its citizens. The limits  to this that he sees existing 
between states  –  principally religious  and linguistic  differences,  are  barriers  that  he 
clearly believes will weaken over time because of the promotion and propagation of 
pure reason and education by his moral-religious-cosmopolitan men. His “federation of 
free  states”  (1795,  p.102),  whilst  a  second  best  choice  to  a  “cosmopolitan 
commonwealth” (1793a, p.90) is one that the actions of the members of his ethico-civil 
societies  are  clearly  expected  to  respond  to,  as  they  work  towards  the  eventual 
establishment  of  a  single ethico-civil  community of  all  -  “a  single church”  (1793b, 
p.136 my emphasis).
With  regards  to  Kant's  idea  of  Cosmopolitan  Right  and  “Conditions  of  universal 
Hospitality”177 (1795b,  p.105),  whilst  much  discourse  has  been  produced  since  its 
publication,  typically around the idea of  immigration and refugees,  what  stands out 
most in the text itself is the absence of words like immigration, emigration, asylum and 
so on. Rather, the focus of Kant's test is always focused on visitation to non-European 
states. He mentions the Barbary Coast, Arab Bedouins, America, African countries, the 
Spice  Islands,  the  Cape,  China,  Japan  and  so  on,  as  places  where  this  type  of 
engagement  could  occur,  but  nowhere  in  the  article  is  there  mention  of  a  right  of 
visitation  to a  European  state.  Alongside  this  outward-looking  view of  the  right  of 
hospitality,  from a  European perspective,  is  his  argument  that  “this  natural  right  of 
hospitality... make it possible for them to attempt to enter into relation with the native 
inhabitants”. Again, the direction implicit in this is  from  Europe to elsewhere, as he 
never refers to the population of developed European states as 'natives'. This language is 
only ever reserved for those outside of the developed world and because of this set up, it 
is  also  not  a  mutual  dynamic  or  exchange.  Finally,  Kant  continues  that  “continents 
distant from us can enter into mutual relations which may eventually be regulated by 
public  laws,  thus  bringing  the  human  race  nearer  and  nearer  to  a  cosmopolitan 
constitution.” (p.106). From this, and given the arguments I have made so far in this 
177 Also see section (2.3.4)
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chapter, what seems clear is that Kant is not, and never was, referring to the right to 
emigrate as such, although this could be considered an aspect of it. Rather, the principle 
reason for Cosmopolitan Right is that it may lead to the development of public laws – 
which  would emanate  from  European states  that  have  developed some form a civil 
constitution. These public laws produced would incorporate the underlying moral norms 
that are a part of the reason for, and which would in turn contribute to, shifts closer to 
his cosmopolitan moral vision.
The result of this final feature is that, even though Kant is clear that some races cannot 
ever develop pure reason – can never be moral - his argument that empirical reasoning 
is enough to ensure the development of a civil constitution allows for the transmission 
of cosmopolitan norms to be established in these non-European states, and as a result, 
the distraction of the masses into the 'Spirit of Commerce' (p.114). By implication then, 
this  allows  for  the  'Asian  race'  to  be  incorporated  into  Kant's  cosmopolitan  world 
because even though he believes that they cannot develop pure reason, their ability to 
develop practical reason could emulate the pure reason developed in the western states. 
Asia  would  follow  Europe's  pure  reason  because  European  moral  examples,  which 
travel through commerce and lead the way on the establishment of trade agreements and 
laws,  would  contribute  to  the  establishment  of  the  Asian  race  as  a  race  of  moral 
emulators, similar to the educated, but never moral individuals themselves.
3.7 Conclusion
In conclusion, this chapter has shown the carefully interwoven nature of Kant's many 
works, which all come together to respond to the issues that he believed prevented the 
progress of humanity.  Far from the normal interpretation of a cosmopolitan state or 
world filled with cosmopolitan individuals, Kant's cosmopolitanism was designed to be 
populated by a majority who are not cosmopolitan, have no access to the educational 
techniques, and opportunities, that are required to cultivate cosmopolitan attitudes, and 
are  for  the  most  part  deliberately  and  permanently  excluded  from  it.  Further,  this 
cosmopolitan  world,  situated  as  it  is  from a  deliberately western perspective  would 
inevitably become a western dominated cosmopolitan world.  Slowly,  over time, this 
would erase the other races from existence, and promote the superiority of the white 
male moral philosopher. It requires the complete and eternal subjugation of women, as 
well as the removal of the less educated from any political or indeed moral agency. His 
cosmopolitan right, as a vehicle where immigration can occur, also becomes a means by 
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which the white, western developed nations could ensure their continual domination of 
the rest of the world, and global commerce was the vehicle to achieve it.
Whilst  the  arguments  made  in  the  chapter  make  the  case  that  education  is  a  vital 
component of his cosmopolitan world, his works also highlight the prime role of Nature 
in driving progress, rather than education alone. From the context of the Enlightenment 
period itself this is unsurprising. If the idea of a solely secular version of Cosmopolitan 
is approached, as is the case in the contemporary era - if we strip the role of God from 
his works, then education becomes the sole driver of Kant's cosmopolitanism.
The process of Kant's system of education therefore goes as follows:
1. A boy is disciplined to avoid animality and the development of evil,  with an 
implicit universalised moral foundation established from the earliest moments
2. He is cultivated as a subject, to be skilled for the needs of the state, alongside the 
continuation and expansion of the implicit foundations of the moral system.
3. A select  few  elite  youths  are  then  educated  in  virtue  so  that,  through  their 
practice, he is able to develop his own formula and rules that he can be habituate 
himself into, which he will prize as he has developed them himself, and is the 
master of his own 'science'.
4. Judgement  allows  him  to  use  others  in  a  pragmatic  way,  according  to  the 
society's norms (underwritten with a cosmopolitan moral structure of interlinked 
freedom, truth and duty).
5. He practices virtue through the use of reason towards – through the principle of 
consistency – in the establishment of a moral personality (doing good things and 
recording them to posterity for future generations to learn from).
6. He reaches in the establishment of his moral personality of the need to believe in 
a God – who is already implicit in the norms already established in stages 1-3
7. The  ongoing  development  of  an  educational  system is  designed  to  find  and 
establish and refine the rules for this educational system.
Those cultivated in its use are, surprisingly, beholden to the expertise of others because 
their education, or lack thereof, strengthens the hold that the educational elite have over 
the possession and development of knowledge. Whilst the common understanding of 
Kant's position, taking only a selective understanding of his arguments, is that sapere 
aude is a principle for all, my reading of Kant, and building on the systemic exclusions 
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that have been identified so far in this chapter, indicates that the guardians of the truth 
have merely changed from religious people to the philosophical elite. They have not 
been removed at all. Overt empirical religious doctrine is replaced with philosophical 
doctrine that  is also  pure religious doctrine and the ownership of truth and right are 
possessed by a specifically disciplined, cultivated, civilised and moralised cosmopolitan 
group of mature men. Kant's political project was designed, quite simply, to promote a 
single moral code which would be cultivated in a select few thorough a Socratic-style 
cosmopolitan education system.
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Chapter 4: Johann Gottfried Herder
“If  Herder  is  the  leader  of  the  Counter-Enlightenment...  then  his 
inconvenient cosmopolitanism cannot be ignored; indeed, Herder is often 
a better cosmopolitan than Kant, especially in the issue of sympathetically 
understanding non-European cultures” (Scrivener, 2007, p.30)
Contents
4.1. Introduction
Part 1: Situating Herder
4.1.1. Why Herder?
4.1.2. Interacting with Herder's Works
4.1.3. Herder's Themes
4.1.4. Humanity
4.1.5. Bildung and Tradition
Part 2: Humanity as Process
4.2.1.  Language
4.2.2.  Family
4.2.3.  Culture
4.2.4.  The Volk
4.2.5.  History
4.2.6.  Progress and Change
4.2.7.  Unity and Diversity
Part 3: Humanity as Project
4.3.  Education
4.3.1.  Schools
4.3.2.  The Belles Lettres
4.3.3.  Philosophy, and the University
4.3.4.  Government and the State
4.3.5.  Commerce and International Interaction
4.4.  Conclusions
4.1 Introduction
Due to a relative lack of knowledge of the main arguments and developments of Johann 
Herder, in contrast to the far better known Immanuel Kant, this chapter firstly notes the 
influence that Herder's works have had over a range of different theorists and academic 
disciplines (4.1.1), most predominantly in the cultural, philosophical, anthropological 
and critical theoretical areas. I then move on to explore in more detail the process of 
interacting  with  Herder's  works  (4.1.2).  Because  of  the  importance  he  places  on 
language,  culture,  and emotions,  this  section  identifies  Besonnheit178 -  the  reflective 
178 This is often translated as simply reflectivity, or reflection, but it has a more precise meaning.
Barnard notes that Herder means “reflective mind”, and then goes on to indicate that it is a “state of 
development... in which he can mirror himself within himself' and thus discover the nature and scope  
of his self-realisation” (1969, p.19). As he also later notes,  Besonnheit is distinct from both “ “The 
Moral Sense School”... and with Locke's dualism.” 2003, p.115).
Spencer also notes that “Besonnheit refers to the general disposition and character of the human being, 
that is the totality of human powers” (Spencer 2012, pp.35-37, my emphasis).
Sonia Sikka, by contrast, suggests that it indicates “both self- reflection, and self- restraint” (2011, 
p.58) and clarifies this further by referencing a section from The Origin of Language: “Man reveals 
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capacity – as a process that it is necessary to engage with in, and is a crucial part of, his 
works. Reflectivity,  as a process,  is for Herder the single most significant aspect of 
human existence, and the ability to carry out this process establishes one as human. It is 
through  reflectivity  that  firstly  internal  communication,  and  then  external  language 
arises, and it processes our engagement of the physical, sensate word, through reason. 
Using reflection, and in the case of Herder, the process of examining his writings, is the 
most significant way we learn both about ourselves and the other. When besonnheit is 
enacted for the purpose of humanität179, this is education in the deepest sense.
Section  (4.1.3)  examines  two main  issues  with  Herder's  works.  I  firstly bring  up a 
common complaint that Herder's works have no overall system, where I suggest instead 
that the reason for this is because of ongoing attempts to force Herder's works into an 
antagonistic binary system. Essentially,  he is considered confusing and contradictory 
from an Enlightenment-Kantian perspective which is then directed at the fragmentary 
and expansive nature of Herder's  writings to provide additional  justification for this 
stance. Herder's express purpose in producing works like this was because he viewed 
his arguments as merely a single set of works that needed to be built on, developed, and 
then finally discarded as understandings of human nature and humanity grew, changed, 
and moved on from his own perspective. I finally briefly elaborate on his frequent use 
of imagery.  Although he most often uses an 'arboreal'  metaphor system, relating his 
arguments to seeds, flowers, leaves, trees, groves, gardens and forests, his metaphorical 
approach deliberately changes, often in the same texts, with him using multiple types in 
his dialectical arguments. There were three main reasons for this. Firstly, as he noted in 
the  preface  to  his  Ideas the  metaphor  of  stages  of  human  life  to  that  of  a  nation 
development was not supposed to suggest a direct equivalence180. Secondly, Herder's 
perspective was that it  makes sense to use metaphor,  because it  allows for a closer 
situated understanding of the author and their arguments. Finally, for Herder metaphor 
is  a  fundamental  source,  component,  and  function  of  language  itself.  All  language 
originated as a type of metaphor,  as it was first developed in relation to the natural 
reflection when the power of his mind acts so spontaneously that, in the vast ocean of sensations  
rushing in on it by way of the senses, it can isolate and retain one single wave, so to speak, fix its  
attention on it, and be wholly conscious of doing so. H reveals reflection when... he can rouse himself  
to a moment of alertness, concentrate deliberately on one image, observe it quietly and clearly, isolate 
some characteristics of it, and identify it as this object and no other... This first act of apperception 
renders a clear concept: it is the first judgement of the mind... … the first indication of the conscious 
mind was a word” (Herder 1772a, p.135)
179 See Section (4.1.4) for Herder's interpretation of humanität.
180 “It  had never entered into my mind, by employing the few figurative expressions,  the  childhood, 
infancy, manhood, and old age of our species... to a few nations, to point out a highway, on which the  
history of  cultivation,  to  say nothing of  the  philosophy of  history at  large,  could  be  traced  with 
certainty” (Herder 1784-91d, p.vi).
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world.  Using  organic  imagery  allows  for  a  more  'natural'  engagement  between  the 
reader and writer that helps to facilitate and direct understanding.
The final section of part one (4.1.4) examines the meanings he provides to humanity 
from his introduction of a new word humanität, which allows him to impart it with an 
old/new meaning that he draws from Roman history. This old/new meaning is further 
differentiated by approaching humanität as both bildung: self-formation as a process of 
being and living, and education: a project to establish the means by which bildung can 
be cultivated. I conclude part one by exploring in more detail Herder's use of the ideas 
of  Bildung  and tradition  (4.1.5)  noting his  historical  repurposing of  both,  which  he 
develops as two linked processes of becoming and change, rather than states of being. 
This corresponds to  humanität as process at both the individual and group levels.
Part two explores Herder's  humanität  as process through two main themes: language 
and history. Section (4.2.1) starts with language as a route to explore his arguments on 
the topic. This reveals firstly that Herder sees two types of language existing, the first of 
which is  base,  emotional and instinct based expression of feeling,  and the second a 
production  of  the  process  of  reflection  (Besonnheit).  The  capacity  to  reflect  is,  for 
Herder,  the  essence  of  human nature,  which  produces  language through our  unique 
ability to construct images of ourselves (and others) in our minds, which we engage in 
communication with. This communication is the origin of language through reflection, 
as it requires language to function, and this process is driven by emotions and sensation 
that are an intrinsic  part  of the constitution of language,  and which our capacity to 
reason orders for us through reflection. Humans then develop spoken language through 
interaction with others. Language for Herder is thought, and acts as both the medium of 
our  thought,  and  the  border  beyond  which  we  cannot  think.  Our  responsibility  to 
ourselves  and others is  to  develop and expand our capacity for communication and 
language,  and  to  cultivate  our  ability  to  reflection  through  its  practice.  As  a  result 
reflection is, for Herder, the process of endlessly becoming oneself through being. 
The next section (4.2.2) examines Herder's argument on the family, and its importance 
as  our  first  place  of  learning.  The  process  of  language  through  reflection,  our 
relationship to others, and our involvement in our first community of the family, makes 
us co-creators of language, and culture is the process of passing back and forth our 
knowledge and understanding to those around us,  and those who follow us. Section 
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(4.2.3) extends these linkages further into the idea of culture, noting the multiple nature 
of culture through communities linked by degrees of commonality and difference but 
ultimately from a common source of humanity as a single race. Culture and language 
are  also  pre-requisites  for  each  other  because  humanity  cannot  live  outside  of 
community, and community requires communication, which requires spoken language – 
which is created through reflection. Our perception of the world, and our interaction 
with it, as well as our understanding of ourselves and the world, are as a result heavily 
influenced by language, culture, community, and the geographical area we reside in. 
Although  we  are  all  still  unique  in  Herder's  view,  we  all  also  have  a  tendency to 
similarity because of these common aspects of our histories and experiences.
Section (4.2.4) expands this dynamic still further, emphasising not just that we are born 
into families and communities, and are involved in creating and shaping culture, but that 
we are a part of a volk because we identify ourselves as such, and we are defined by our 
self-identification  and  our  active  involvement  in  culture  through  tradition  that 
continually redefines the volk.
This projection through time leads to the second theme (4.2.5); the 'idea' of history181. 
Rather  than  the  typical  Enlightenment  progressivism  to  a  utopian  future,  Herder's 
historical argument is more akin to the tacking of a boat against  the wind. There is 
forwards,  backs  and sideways  movement,  and the  direction  is  crucially  never fixed 
because there is no final destination to progress to, no utopian perpetual peace; only 
progress,  movement  and  change through  time.  Not  only is  progress  not  guaranteed 
without  the  active  involvement  of  all human  beings182,  but  Herder  argues  that  it  is 
impossible for humanity to progress smoothly forward because each evolution of human 
experience  in  its  'always  already  existing'  collectivities  (families,  communities, 
societies, volk etc.), is an essential function of the expression of its own version of the 
good life and of morality. Each expression incorporates both progression and regression 
because of the unique, flawed nature of humans, and of one's situated perspective. As a 
result  each  expression  can  only  contain  certain  formulations  of  the  good  life  and 
morality within them, which Herder explains as a path which crosses a series of valley 
and mountains rather than a path leading only or primarily upwards – and the valleys 
and dips are just as important as the mountains (Morton 1989, p.60). 
181 Primarily in: Yet Another History for the Education of Mankind (Herder 1774a & b) and  Ideas on the  
Philosophy of History of Mankind (Herder 1784 & 1784-91a, b, c & d)
182 Herder make clear in a number of places that  all humans are included in this. Men  and  women, 
humans of all the different communities, volker, and cultures
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Part 1: Situating Herder
4.1.1 Why Johann Herder?
Johann Herder, such as he is generally presented within the field of politics, is that of a 
straw-man figure; “a dreamer, an irrationalist,  a person permanently in the past, and 
finally a pathological case” (Adler 1994, p.56). He is most often mentioned only in 
passing to facilitate a greater understanding of Immanuel Kant's political works, where 
Kant  dismisses  and  derides  –  savagely  so183 –  Herders  writings  on  the  history  of 
mankind, and his works more generally, in the frequently republished  Kant: Political  
Writings  (1784/2010,  pp.193-220).  Herder  here  is  presented  as  little  more  than  a 
teaching point on the path of Kant's intellectual greatness184 yet Herder's works have had 
a profound impact on the arts, humanities, and social sciences (Zammito et al. 2010, 
p.662; Bahr et al. 2008, p.504). Whilst his name is often not recalled, or assigned to 
only a few of his  developments such as the idea of the  volk,  nationalism, empathy, 
populism, or his aesthetic philosophy, poetry, folk tales and anthropology, his arguments 
and developments can be seen, in many cases virtually as they were when he first wrote 
on them, across these disciplines. 
Hegel draws from and develops Herder's writing on “God, the mind, and history185” 
(Forster  2002,  p.vii),  as  well  as  his  dialectical  approach,  just  as  Theodor  Adorno, 
perhaps unknowingly, makes use of Herder's “negative dialectics” (Morton 1989, p.39). 
Karl Marx builds on his critical approach to cultural identity and social development, in 
addition to re-presenting Herder's “dregs of society” - those who have no sense of civil 
consciousness  or  affiliation  -  as  his  lumpenproletariat186 (Barnard  2003,  pp.30-33). 
Friedrich  Nietzsche  also  pays  tribute  to  Herder  arguments,  and  incorporates  his 
developments  on  language  and  morality  (although  he  sharply  disagrees  with  his 
conclusions), and they both share a critique of rationalism that is “at times strikingly 
similar” (Zusi 2006, p.509). In addition, Church (2015, pp.13-29) suggests that Herder 
183 Kant goes so far as to state that “intentional deception [was] Herder's trademark” (Kant 1800, cited in  
Anders 1994, p.56). Lying, for Kant, is an evil act.
This interaction in some ways resembles the attack that Martha Nussbaum launched at Judith Butler 
(and her works), where she states, among a number of other extreme criticisms, that “Judith Butler's  
hip quietism is a comprehensible response to the difficulty of realizing justice in America. But it is a 
bad response. It collaborates with evil.” (Nussbaum 1999, p.13, my emphasis). See also Ingram (2013, 
p.158).
184 Ironically, Herder is used only as a means to an end, and not also an end in its own right.
185 Gjesdal  also  notes  Herder's  impact  on  Hegel  through  his  development  of  a  “genetic  method  of  
comprehending history by tracing the cultural genesis of its events” (2006, p.114)
186 It should be noted that Herder does not reduce this 'rabble' to a single social class, whereas Marx does.  
Rather, he allows for it to be a feature of people from any social class, and he considers their existence 
a failure of their society's culture and education, not something intrinsic to the rabble themselves.
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heavily  influenced  Nietzsche's  theory  of  Kultur  (culture),  and  Sikka  notes  that  he 
anticipates Nietzsche's account of 'concept construction' (2007a, p.41). Herder is also 
recognised  as  a  principle  figure  in  the  development  of  the  philosophy of  language 
(Forster 2002), which can be seen reproduced, and developed further, in the works of 
Wittgenstein, as well as in Heidegger's comments on language (2007, p.40). He is also 
located at the foundations of social theory and sociology more generally (Sikka 2011), 
in addition to the birth of Anthropology alongside Immanuel Kant and Ernst Platner 
(Zammito  1992).  Finally,  Herder  is  identified  as  the  progenitor  of  the  words  and 
concepts; Einfuhlungsvermogen – most commonly translated as empathy, Kultur as well 
as populism, expressionism, and pluralism (Berlin 1976, p.153)187.
Herder's  works,  as  a  result  of  his  mostly  under-appreciated  influence  on  these 
disciplines and theorists, have a relevance to contemporary politics as well as social and 
cultural theorising. In relation to the works of the contemporary cosmopolitan theorists 
that I explored in chapter two, Herder's works engage directly with the struggle of how 
difference and diversity can or  could be incorporated,  embraced,  acknowledged and 
responded to, in their cosmopolitan framings. Scrivener's quote at the beginning of this 
chapter,  whilst  in some way a contested argument188,  points to two central  issues of 
cosmopolitanism identified  in  chapter  two.  Firstly,  the  encounter  with  the  different, 
which Herder handles far more adroitly than Kant (whose approach to difference is 
simply  that  difference  is  the  problem  that  needs  to  be  'solved')  and  secondly,  the 
importance  of  asymmetrical  power  dynamics,  which  inevitably  manifest  from 
universalising systems and approaches.
4.1.2 Interacting with Herder's Works
When approaching Herder's  works,  there are  a number of key elements that feature 
prominently.  Firstly,  Herder's  critical  arguments and the stances he takes were often 
produced and developed in critique of  the works of other theorists, primarily (but not 
solely)  Immanuel  Kant189.  As  a  former  student  of,  and one-time  friend of  Kant,  he 
experienced a series of very public critiques and vilifications, which started with Kant's 
reviews of a number of his works (Reiss 2010, pp.192-200; Kant 1784, pp.201-220). 
187 See also Andress (1916, p.1); Barnard (1969, p.4); Berlin (1976, p.145); Gillies (1945); Schick (1971, 
p.11); Morton (1989, p.1); Forster (2002, p.vii); Seigel (2005, p.334); Sikka (2011).
188 The idea of a counter-Enlightenment is a contested concept, as is his supposed leadership, as well as  
the binary that is created by conceiving of the Enlightenment in such a way (or indeed in thinking  
about the Enlightenment as a singular Enlightenment).
189 Morton refers to this as “a kind of variation of the medieval scholastic via negativa” where errors of 
another are used to develop one's own arguments (1989, p.66).
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The impact of Kant's ongoing and negative critique influenced much of Herder's process 
and  writings,  which  are  bound  into  his  frustration  with  this  situation  -  from  his 
perspective the betrayal by, and fundamental misunderstandings  - of his writings and 
arguments by one of his intellectual 'fathers'190, compounded by the triumph of Kant's 
perspective alongside his own fading into obscurity. His texts are frequently attempts to 
correct misunderstandings of his own works, and responses to what he perceived to be 
both  fundamental  mistakes  of  Kant's  philosophical  framework191 as  well  as  the 
dangerous consequences of his political developments (particularly Kant's version of 
cosmopolitanism192), as much as they are presentations of his own arguments.
Secondly, grasping Herder's arguments requires coming to terms with his writing style 
that  involves both discursive  and  his gestural  characteristics.  Kant's  writings,  whilst 
admittedly quite dense and in many cases awkward,  obfuscatory and cumbersomely 
constructed, rely on the discursive style to transmit his argument – on the precision of 
the meaning of the text, as it is written, in a linear manner with a start and end point.  
Herder's works in contrast are characterised by an almost unrelenting use of a number of 
different dialectical movements, emotive language, a lack of texts that focus on specific 
themes, and the multiple-layered structuring of the texts themselves. His careful use of 
specific words, which are linguistically particular to the German language during that 
period,  but  are  not  always  connected  to,  or  relatable  to  each  other  in  the  English 
language  (either  grammatically  or  conceptually)  in  the  same  way,  as  well  textual 
linkages through the  spelling and compounding of particular words that he plays off 
against  each  other,  are  used  to  propel  the  reader  of  his  works  both  forward  and 
backwards across his texts.
This can be seen most clearly in his use of sarcasm to critique the arguments of his 
contemporaries. Without grasping the complexity of his approach in his native German 
language, this could be read as an argument in support of the stance he is mocking, 
rather  than  a  feature  of  his  gestural  style  which  tries  to  move  the  reader  to  his 
perspective after moving the reader back and forth between different and often opposing 
positions. A careful re-presentation of Herder's argument requires the use of a number of 
translations and critiques of his writings in their original language to avoid missing, 
misinterpreting, or misrepresenting his arguments and the interwoven nature of both his 
190 The two fathers being Immanuel Kant and Johann Georg Hamann.
191 See especially A Metacritique on the Critique of Pure Reason (1799) and Calligone (1800).
192 See especially his Letters for the Advancement of Humanity (1792 & 1793-7a, b & c). 
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writings  and  the  concepts  he  develops.  His  purpose  in  writing  this  way,  using  the 
discursive  contents  of  the  texts,  the  gestural  context  of  the  texts,  and the  interplay 
between them that arises from a repeated engagement with his writings over time is to 
reveal  new links  that  change the  nature  of  earlier  dynamics  and meanings  (i.e.  not 
specifically  just  the  dialectics  he  produces,  but  how  each  is  changed  through  the 
process). The difficulty of engagement with his texts is further compounded because of 
the practical reason that a number of his texts have either not been translated, or the 
translations are of questionable accuracy193 194.
Thirdly,  in the previous chapter I for the most part relied on the arguments of Kant 
himself,  which  was  presented  in  an  ahistorical  sense  with  little  secondary  theorist 
critique195. My attempt was to take his works and developments as he presented them; 
fitting them together and trying to grasp the cohesive system that he had in mind, but 
excluding any sense of personal history or experiences that might have influenced his 
theorising196.  This  was  partly  to  allow  the  texts  and  his  arguments  to  speak  for 
themselves, but also because  this was Kant's own desire for how his texts should be 
interacted  with,  and they form a  part  of  his  own arguments  that  cosmopolitan  acts 
should be recorded for posterity. This was one of the reasons that he spent so much 
time, prior to his mental decline in the late 1790's, arranging to have all of the texts that 
he approved of, and that he felt best represented his arguments, updated for publication 
193 Herder's Opus Magnus, Ideen zu einer Philosophied er Geschichted er Menschheit (1784-91) has only 
been translated in full once, in 1800, by T. Churchill (1784-91c), where he names it  Outlines of a  
Philosophy of the History of Man. Parts of it appear in a number of other books; Barnard's Herder on 
Social and Political Culture (1969) has a selection from five different books and calls it Ideas for a  
philosophy of the History of Mankind,  and is my first choice of translation; Adler & Menze's  On 
World  History:  Herder,  an  Anthology  (1996) takes  the title  from Churchill,  and  appears  to  more 
faithfully present the emotional angle of Herder's works than Manuel's Reflections on the Philosophy  
of the History of Mankind which consists of most but not all, of nine of the twenty five books (1968).
A similar translation concern can be seen in the title of  Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte zur  
Bildung* der Menschheit (1774). Barnard interprets this as Yet Another Philosophy of History for the  
Enlightenment of Mankind: (A Further Contribution to the many contributions of the Century) (1969) 
whereas Forster interprets the title as This too a Philosophy of History for the Formation of Humanity  
(2002).  Evrigenis  &  Pellerin  (2004),  in  contrast,  title  it  Another  Philosophy  of  History  for  the  
Education of Mankind. Barnard's translations are the preferred as they carry a more emotional angle to 
the title and in the body of the text that I believe more closely mirrors Herder's personality.
*Whilst Bildung is often interpreted to mean formation (or culturing, education or socialisation), it is 
both wider and contains multiple aspects to it. Further, its meaning has changed since Herder's time,  
and his use varies from both the majority at his time, and now. For these (and other) reasons the 
preferred translation texts start with Barnard. See also Section (4.1.6).
194 Churchill,  for  example,  translates  Herder's  Kultur  into  civilisation  rather  than  culture,  which 
dramatically changes the nature of his arguments.
195 These were resorted to when direct access to translated texts was not possible.
196 There is a wealth of texts that does just this, partly as a means to dismiss his works out of hand 
(mostly from a feminist and racial perspective), or on the other side to excuse or discount his writings 
on gender and race. Kant's relevance or importance often revolves around whether his position on race 
(racism)  and  gender  (sexism)  can  be  abstracted  from,  or  are  emblematic  of  his  'white,  western 
universal imperialism'.
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during the 1790's and into the 1800's197.
My engagement with Herder's texts here in this way is because, for Herder, the only way 
to grasp the writings of a person, and the world they perceived and moved through, is to 
start at the beginning and to bury oneself into their works and life – to rely on “feeling 
oneself into” the person through their writings – starting with their first work, which he 
suggests is often the truest of the writer's productions198. This involves not just a) an 
enlarged  mentality199 of  one's  own  thought  processes  to  attempt  to  accommodate 
different  perspectives,  or  b)  the  ability  to  step  outside  and  to  view  the  writings 
(semi-)objectively, but in addition c) to attempt to  adopt the particularity, peculiarities 
and contradictions of that person's experiences and uniqueness within one's own mind; 
to step outside, and to feel oneself into the position and perspective200 of another so that 
the other's notions of justice and the good life can be felt inside as if they were one's 
own. Further, that all three of these points need to be grasped simultaneously. 
To engage with Herder, on Herder's terms, is to grasp not just the words that he writes,  
but the context and historical aspects of his world, and his unique location in them all. 
To connect with Kant on the other hand, on the terms that he desired, is to encounter 
him in an ahistorical sense, with his life and experiences abstracted from the words he 
wrote (or the arguments of his critics201) that he left to posterity. Essentially, Kant should 
be  understood  from  a  textually  discursive  perspective  that  ignores  his  life,  but 
understanding Herder's requires the addition of a gestural engagement of his writings 
and life to situate him, and the trinary of gesture, discourse, and their dialectic to all be 
grasped simultaneously.
4.1.3 Herder's Themes
Unlike Kant or other more systematic theorists, it has been noted frequently that it is 
difficult to know where to start when attempting to engage with Herder's works. Morton 
197 This is covered in Manfred Kuehn's Kant a Biography (2001). See especially Chapters 8-9.
198 I touch on this process again in a number of different sections: (4.2.1) where I explore Herder on 
Language as well as (4.2.2) on culture. It also appears in section (4.4.2) where I expand on his idea of  
reflection (or besonnheit) as well as in section (4.6.2) on literature. 
199 e.g. Hannah Arendt's (1971) or Benhabib's (1992, p.122-3).
200 Herder also uses the word 'transplant' and see this as an act of personal self-creation (Morton 1989,  
p.83). Barnard (2003) notes that Herder uses the word  Einfuhlungsvermogen which he translates as 
“the capacity to feel oneself into” (p.5). He suggests that it is “a process of understanding that could at  
times prove superior to established methods of enquiry, to the deductive form of  a priori reasoning 
and the  a posteriori  form of empirical induction. It consists of grasping connections  creatively  by 
bringing a combination of different modalities of the mind into play” (p.7, my emphasis).
201 See also; Sikka (2011, p.12-13 & pp.126-159); Spenser (2015, p.370); Shoenmakers (2012, pp.29-30) 
and Robinette (2012, p.193)
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suggests that “one reason – perhaps the major reason – that Herder has tended not to be 
read... is... the deceptively simple one that with him it has historically not been at all 
obvious  where  one  is  to  begin”  (1989,  p.3)  and  he  is  not  alone  in  reaching  this 
conclusion202. Each of Herder's works extends far beyond their simple beginnings and 
their stated themes.  On Diligence in Several Learned Languages (1764), for example, 
whilst  ostensibly  a  simple  essay  considering  whether  one  should  learn  additional 
languages  or  use  translations,  incorporates  arguments  on  history,  communal  and 
individual identity, the foundations of human nature, the impact of and problems with 
capitalism and commerce, reinterpretations of the bible, a rejection of the belief that 
God gave humanity language, the purpose of the sharing of scientific discoveries, the 
history and philosophy of language, a critical examination of the idea and meaning of 
human progress, the cultural function of literature and poetry, the bordered nature of the 
state system and its porosity, the interplay between the unity and diversity of humanity, 
arguments  on  an  essential  link  between  language  and  thought,  the  structuring  of  a 
school's curriculum, and the ultimate purpose of education. All this, from a relatively 
short essay he wrote in 1764 whilst a student of Kant's in Konigsberg (ibid. pp.16-17).
Almost all of his texts possess at least this level of depth and complexity, ranging far 
and wide not just across different disciplines or schools of thoughts, but backwards and 
forwards throughout history and the text itself, using allegory, metaphor and simile, and 
employing dialectic after  dialectic  as Herder  weaves between supposed opposites to 
shift the reader's mind into a mental state that facilitates a grasping of Herder's own 
intellectual  processes  and  conclusions.  Everything  is  interlinked  in  Herder's 
understanding of the world, and multiples of factors impact in fundamental ways on 
each individual topic such that for Herder, they cannot be ignored, and he explores this 
in literary and poetical ways, as well as in philosophical and political texts.
A perhaps unfortunate consequence of this complexity, as well as the deeply involved 
linguistic and dialectic elements of his writing and some problematic translations of his 
works, have led a number of theorists to conclude that Herder's works have no overall 
“system”203. Instead, they assert that Herder is a contradictory and confusing writer with 
flashes of brilliance, and suggest he is instead better engaged with second-hand rather 
than directly. This might be the case for a simple play-off against something like Kant's 
202 See also Sikka (2011, p.9); Barnard (1969, p.380)
203 See Andress (1916); Barnard (1969); Morton (1989); Norton 1991; Sikka 2011 amongst others.
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Perpetual  Peace  or  his  Universal  History204.  Whilst  his  works  were  presented  as 
fragments - as leaves and forestlets - and range far and wide, the overall direction of 
them shows a remarkable cohesion and consistency to a number of conceptual themes, 
based on his understanding of humanity, even if he rarely staid 'on topic'.
Herder's  purpose – deliberately – was that  his  production of these 'leaves',  'groves', 
'forestlets', ' forests', and 'fragments' was intended to be built on and surpassed205. In the 
preface to his  Ideas, for example, he emphasises the unfinished and situated nature of 
his works, not just as he produced them, but also more widely such that:
“He, who wrote it, was a man; and thou, who readest it, art a man also. He was 
liable to error, and has probably erred: thou hast acquired knowledge, which he 
did not and could not possess; use, therefore, what thou canst, accept his good 
will, and throw it not aside with reproach, but improve it, and carry it higher. 
With feeble hand he has laid a few foundation stones of a building, which will 
require ages to finish: happy, if, when these stones may be covered with earth, 
and he who laid them forgotten, the more beautiful edifice be but erected over 
them, or on some other spot!” (1784-91d, p.xvii)206 
The words that he used to title his works also emphasise that they would be forever 
unfinished, not just by him, but because of his fervent belief that humanity was not, and 
could never be, explained by a single writer, nor could it be narrowed down to a single 
universal system or indeed perfected; since “what is best”, he argues throughout his 
writings, “differs over time” and is always relational (Herder 1784-91a, p.307). 
Another theme that extends throughout his works207 was his 'Anti-dualism', in that he 
“attempt[s] to mediate between apparently mutually exclusive opposites such as unity 
and diversity,  the universal  and the particular,  individual  freedom and determinism” 
(Spenser 2007, p.81)208. He believed that humanity had no defined end point, and that it 
is, by nature, neither perfect nor perfectible, and so cannot be tied down to a single 
204 Although I would disagree here as well, as he clarifies and compiles a number of his more political  
arguments in his Letters to Humanity (1793-7).
205 Strikingly, this is entirely the opposite perspective of Kant, where his recording to posterity seeks to 
reinforce their importance throughout time, due to the 'objectively true' nature he ascribes to pure  
reason and his own deductions. Kant uses history to ahistoricise his works.
206 This translation comes from the Churchill (1800) version, hence the somewhat old-fashioned language 
style. The use of 'man', given that Herder's wife was his principle editor, and his much more inclusive, 
although still problematic approach to women's social position, suggests that using human, human 
being, or perhaps person, would convey his meaning more accurately.
207 See sections (4.2.2.3) but also especially (5.5.1) where I develop this theory further  and apply it  
directly to contemporary cosmopolitanism.
208 This is distinct from a Derridian deconstructive approach.
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universalising principle or theory, whether as a product of singular monist system, or 
from  a  binary  of  opposing  aspects  and  their  synthesis.  His  'overall  system'  is 
contradictory only if approached from the assumption of binary oppositionalism, and 
crucially,  only if  the approach relies on a Hobbesian assumption of inherent human 
selfishness.  Whilst  Herder  recognised  the  value  of  both  universal  approaches  and 
particular experiences, these do not sit in direct opposition to each other because they 
are interwoven into each other, and are an intrinsic part of human existence, through 
history, which maintains the tension and distinction between diversity and unity that 
stems from his idea of reflection. His 'system' is one that exhibits and expresses his key 
themes and concepts throughout his works, but cannot be reduced further, other than 
that  his  understanding  of  humanity  was  “to  be  what  one  should  be...  exactly  the 
enlightened,  informed,  fine,  rational,  educated,  virtuous,  joyous human being which 
God demands” (Herder 1769 pp.364-5209, cited in Norton 1991, p.70). What that means 
is, or should be, determined and re-determined by each individual, as expressed by their 
own particularity, not by a universal system representative of a single dominant group or 
cultural norm, just as it cannot be understood only from a singular particular experience.
Later Romantics such as Fichte and Novalis took on Herder's concept of the nation as an 
organic  (animal)  being,  in  the  singular,  with  certain  groups  in  society  representing 
biological  equivalents210.  Herder  by  contrast  made  use  of  a  number  of  different 
metaphorical concepts and styles when discussing humanity. His purpose was to use 
metaphor to help the reader grasp the meanings in his  texts, which he considered a 
natural function211 of language that helped to situate the reader into the position of the 
writer. For this reason he make frequent use of the idea of flora in both the singular and 
plural,  rather  than  'a  fauna'  in  the  singular.  This  allowed  him to  indicate  that,  for 
example,  his  'forest'  (humanity)  could  imply  that  each  leaf  (person),  each  tree 
(community), each grove (nation), are all a part of a multi-dimensional whole, and yet at 
the same time unique elements in their own right. Whilst individual trees grow, develop, 
change and then die, so too do groves grow, develop, change (or 'die'), and whilst a 
forest also grows, develops and changes, it always remains a forest, yet the forest is 
constantly  in  a  process  of  change.  His  use  of  such  imagery,  especially  the  use  of 
209 See Herder's Sämmtliche Werke Vol.4 (1878).
210 The brain for scholars, the military as the limbs etc. But many romantics essentialise the metaphor 
from like an organism to “in fact an organism” (Barnard 2003, p.54).
211 Boes  disagrees  with  position,  suggesting  that  “For  Herder,  metaphor  is  an  attribute  of  divine 
language” (2012, p.52), but Herder makes clear in his Essay on the Origin of Language (1772) that 
language is entirely human in origin – although the capacity to reflect  is  of divine origin. Boes is 
incorrectly referring to Herder's constructed language through reflection rather than natural language,  
with divinity. I discuss this in section (4.2.1).
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plurality in relation to his imagery, was indicative of an idea that for a forest (humanity) 
to exist, it  requires  all of these smaller constituent elements, all the way down to the 
individual, unique leaf – and that as a whole, all the trees are dependent on each other 
for their naming as a forest. But whilst there is a hierarchy in this conceptual naming, 
with smaller elements making up a larger element, it is of a markedly different nature to 
the use of a body or a mechanical system, and allows for uniqueness to be expressed at 
all levels, as it is exists not as in an ahistorical timeless always, but as always becoming.
4.1.5 Humanity
This section establishes Herder's understanding of humanity,  because it relies on his 
developments  and  arguments  on  language,  culture,  and  history.  Essentially,  his 
determination of humanity is developed from these themes rather than the themes being 
determined  by  the  definition.  These  developments  establish  part  one,  humanity  as 
process, and part two, humanity as project, as distinct, but co-dependent. At the same 
time, to order and explore them in this way requires understanding what Herder means 
by humanity as humanität.
Herder weaves his vision of humanity from the moment of conception, emphasising an 
inherent  uniqueness  of  each  and  every  individual,  firstly  in  rejection  of  Locke's 
epistemological assumption of a  tabula rasa” (Barnard 2003, p.122). Yet at the same 
time he incorporated (Locke's) environmental factors as Klima, which starts in the first 
moments  after  birth  in  the  earliest  teachings  by  the  child's  nurse  into  a  particular 
framing  of  life-perception.  The  goal  of  his  works  was  not  the  abrogation  of  one's 
individuality through the adoption of a moral code identical to all others, but of the 
fulfilment  of  life  through living,  experiencing  and being,  as  a  process  of  endlessly 
becoming oneself, as humanität.
As a function of this framing of humanity, Herder decided, given his awareness of the 
co-constitutive nature of language through culture, to introduce a new word - humanität 
to  the  German  lexicon  -  rather  than  attempting  to  repurpose  the  already  existing 
Menschheit,  which during his time implied a  passive sense of sympathy and caring. 
This  allowed  him  to  “distance[s]  himself  from  anything  that  might  weaken  or 
sentimentalize the quality he captures with the word "humanity." (Adler & Menze 1996, 
p.105). With his creation of the word Einfuhlungsvermogen (empathy), he was able to 
connect  humanität  to  the  ideas  of  “humankind,  humaneness,  human  rights,  human  
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duties,  human dignity,  love of humankind” (Herder 1793b, p.105, his  emphasis).  He 
achieved  this  by  linking  it  to  what  he  believed  was  one  of  the  earliest  recorded 
expressions  of  humanity,  during  Roman times,  where  obeying the  laws  of  the  land 
would make one “just, but not thereby humane... the man of nobility, who on his own 
did not make use of these rights where they were not fair...  as a human being, was 
humanus,  humanissimus, not only in...  conversation and social discourse, but also in 
matters of business, in domestic customs, in the entire sphere of conduct” (ibid. p.109). 
This idea of fair, for Herder, was not simply a deduction sourced from reason abstracted 
from emotionality, but as a greater part of the expression of humanity as an art which 
comes from love of humankind, in its historically and culturally situated setting. It was 
the combination of, essentially, justice as fairness cultivated from justice as caring212
Sonia  Sikka  (2011,  p.20)  notes  that  Irmscher  (1994,  p.205)  provides  a  “helpful 
statement” of Herder's multiple elements of humanität, at the same time suggesting that 
his  third  point  moves  too  far  towards  the  idea  of  the  sublimation  of  individuality, 
something  which  I  agree  is  not  entirely  accurate  for  Herder.  As  a  result,  my  own 
definition of Herder's Humanität varies slightly from his:
1)  The  general  nature  of  humanity  as  unique,  individual  beings  who  each 
determine themselves through besonnheit (reflection)213.
2) The expressions of the possibilities of this general nature, in their historical214 
and culturally215 unique, situated settings.
3)  The  historical  task  of  the  co-evolution  and  co-constitution  of  volker216, 
involving  the  diversity  and unity217 of  individuality  in  a  world  community 
characterised by solidarity218.
The development of humanity then, for Herder is, as Adler puts it, “a goal in itself” and 
as a consequence, “the process of human history has no end” (Adler 1994, p.63).  
This  human  process  does  not  happen  of  its  own  accord  simply  by  respecting  and 
following  these  three  definitions  though.  Rather,  there  is  an  essential  educational 
212 This obviously connects to my critique in Chapter two of both Thomas Pogge and Seyla Benhabib.
213 See Sections (4.2.1) and (4.2.2).
214 See Section (4.2.5).
215 See Section (4.2.3).
216 See Section (4.2.4).
217 See Sections (4.2.6) and (4.2.7).
218 Irmscher's (translated (Sikka 2011, p.20)) points are:
(1) The general nature of man as a being that determines itself
(2) The particular realization of the possibilities of this general nature in a specific historical situation
(3) The historical task of the co-evolution of nations, involving the sublimation of individuality in a 
world community characterised by solidarity (Irmscher 1994, p.205).
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component, because the human being must firstly be understood as a holistic being, and 
educated as such (Andress 1916, p.126)219. Only if that is established can the direction 
of human progress and change (whatever that may be at that point in time and space) 
proceed in accordance with humanität. These determinations are the expression of our 
holistic  natures,  and these expressions  of  humanität are  established from “self-  and 
other-  feeling”  that  arise  from  reflection  as  it  is  undergoes  processes  of  internal 
“expansion and contraction” (Herder 1778, p.214). These feelings through expansion 
and contraction in turn come from reflection, based on the “noblest cognition”,  love: 
“To love the great Creator in oneself, to love one’s way into others, and then to follow 
this sure pull – that is moral feeling, that is conscience”. (ibid. my emphasis). Humanity 
then, for Herder, is not a passive expression of love or sympathy towards the other. It is 
active  because  it  requires  movement  -  action –  that  pulls  us,  in  a  historically  and 
culturally  situated  way,  based  on an  understanding  of  the  holistic  nature  of  human 
beings, and it requires the development of reflection, which in turn requires language 
and thus community to function.
Humanity as Humanität is thus both a process and a project. It is a process of situated 
being as becoming,  as well  as a project to cultivate the opportunities for  being in a 
holistic way, in the process of situated becoming. But neither “cold speculating reason” 
nor responding to “every insistent knocking and welling of your heart” (Herder 1778, 
p.215)  allows  for  the  expression  of  this  humanität.  Only both  aspects  of  cognition 
understood as one wider sensation-cognition suffice, but this is not to say that the ideas 
of cognition and sensation themselves do not help in their holistic cultivation. The same 
process of reflection allows us to think of a multitude of 'internal mirror-created aspects 
of  cognition-sensation'  that  can  be  considered  and  explored  as  distinct  cognitive 
concepts such as emotion and reason. These multiples of concepts, though, are still a 
single holistic capacity  of the totality of the human mind, and thus of human nature. 
Humanität as a process is then self-formation,  or  bildung.  It  is the process of being 
oneself  in an unending process of becoming oneself, exercising one's power as, and 
through,  Besonnheit.  To do so  is,  for  Herder,  'human  perfection'  -  not  as  a  perfect 
expression of one's being, or a perfect end point of being - but in the human (and thus 
flawed and particular) process of becoming. Just as this is human perfection, so too is 
the perfection of all humanity therefore possible. Not as a state of being, but a 'place' 
where “humankind is engaged in eternal progress and striving” (Herder 1793a, p.104).
219 See Section (4.3.1).
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Humanität as a project is essentially then, in the Herderian sense, the manifold practical 
ways in which humans contribute to and assist themselves and the other in their endless 
becoming through situated living. Herder explains this most clearly in “The Character 
of Humankind” where he states: 
“7. To provide for and to facilitate in each individual case the  mutually most  
beneficial impact of one human being upon the other, that, and that alone can be 
the purpose of all human community. Whatever interferes with, hinders, or voids 
this purpose is inhuman. Whether the human being lives briefly or for a long 
time, in this estate or that, he is meant to enjoy his existence and to convey the 
best of that existence to others;  to that end, the society that he has joined is 
meant to assist him.” (1793, p.100, his emphasis220)
Both process and project are involved in, and therefore fundamental parts of, a human's 
education in the singular, and the multiple pluralities that humans experience in their 
becoming.
4.1.6 Bildung and Tradition
These two aspects of humanity can also be understood as the twinned ideas of Herder's 
understanding of Bildung and tradition. Herder, as has already been noted, repurposed 
words,  created  new  ones,  and  introduced  foreign  words  into  his  arguments  when 
needed, and this also holds here. The idea of Bildung that Herder encountered was itself 
a  repurposing of  its  early Enlightenment  meaning,  where  it  was  used “primarily in 
theological  contexts”  (Boes  2012,  p.47)  and   was  closely  associated  with  the 
development of the soul to a more divine state. The shift was generally understood to 
have come from Anthony Ashley Cooper, the third Earl of Shaftesbury – specifically 
from  the  translation  of  his  book  Soliloquy.  It  was  from  Shaftesbury,  through 
Winkelmann (Horlacker 2004, p.416), whom Herder had great admiration for, that he 
received the meaning of Bildung. It had at this point altered from a mostly passive and 
primarily mystical sense, and “moved into the realm of active striving, as the process 
through which the soul grappled for its proper form. The importance of this process of 
secularization... allowed the term Bildung to gain a previously unprecedented level of 
conceptual depth” (Boes 2012, p.48). Boes also goes on to point out that Bildung gained 
it's “foremost expression... in the work of Johann Gottfried Herder” (p.49), but it also 
influenced  Christof  Weiland,  who  in  turn  “introduce[d]  the  philosophical  idea  of 
cosmopolitanism into the German discussion” (ibid.) between 1774 – 1780, long before 
220 Herder lists 36 points detailing the character of humankind (1793, pp.100-104).
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Kant's own engagement with and repurposing of the term.
What Herder did was firstly to link Bildung to history, and the idea of bildung for him 
was the main purpose for writing his Ideas as “the universal history of the Bildung of 
the world” (Herder, cited in Boes 2012, p.51). Bildung from there became intrinsically 
linked to culture, expressed through the collective identity of a volk. Humans for Herder 
are  always  already  bound  into  communities  and  cultures,  and  he  placed  great 
importance on the role of both cultural education and tradition in the development of the 
individual.  Bildung is  from  this  the  process  of  cultural  education  and  cultivation 
involving the active exercise of specifically human, reflective faculties (Sikka 2011, 
p.7) in a situated setting. This process for him is one determined and presented not as an 
absolute concept from an authority in a top-down manner, as is usually the case, but 
rather as an interactive dynamic where the process of learning and development occurs 
in both directions, and across society, extending in all directions.
Bildung is  most  often  now  perceived  to  mean  a  particular  state of  a  person's 
accomplishments. Essentially, in the modern sense, the state determines the parameters 
of what defines  bildung because the state is  involved in the practical project of the 
education  of  its  citizens  and  subjects.  For  Herder,  though,  beliefs  and  customs  are 
ongoing  processes  of  change  and  development,  with  each  term  involving  its  own 
immanent dialectic. A volk or community's culture is both the product of bildung, and 
the producer, in an ongoing, organic state of change, as it exists as a part of its own 
continual recreation. Barnard refers to this process as “building up” (1969, p.388; 2003, 
p.145),  and Bohlin uses both cultivation and formation (2008, p.1).  Whilst  in some 
respects these are  reasonably accurate,  Herder's  frequent  use of  organic,  flora-based 
metaphors, and his rejection of mechanistic approaches to human living suggest instead 
that Sikka's use of “cultivation” (2011, p.7) more closely aligns with his arguments.
Tradition is also used in a different way by Herder, not as a set of beliefs and customs, 
often institutionalised through the apparatus of a state, but rather as the idea of “passing 
on” through bildung. It is also a process - “an ongoing intergenerational transmission” 
which from Herder's perspective should happen absent the authoritative determination 
of and by a state, but rather be continually recreated by the volk themselves. Tradition is 
determined by the people as a community or  volk221, through the ongoing process of 
221 Volk  for  Herder refers  to a  community,  or communities,  of  any size,  that  has the collective self-
identification of themselves as a specific  volk, and acts according to that relationship. See sections 
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bildung,  which is  culturally situated,  geographically unique,  and historically moving 
through time. From this, tradition is the practical indicator of change not stability, and 
because it proceeds through history, it is a process of change. If the volk are both willing 
and able to express their humanität, then this change is progress – and also always and 
inevitably its own “immanent dialectic” (Barnard 2003, p.147) that both moves towards 
and away from humanität along its path of history222. Tradition is, from this respect, a 
cultural indicator and expression because it is produced by the activities of a volk as it 
grows and changes from the activities within, via bildung, as well as from its inter-volk 
interactions as individuals and peoples interact with each other. The whole world then, 
in Herder's view, is “a school in which each must learn and cultivate that  humanität 
which is inherent, in embryo, within him... The vehicle of education is tradition – the 
accumulated and transmitted experience of the race223 – which is brought into contact 
with the innate powers of the learner” (Herder, cited in Morton 1989, p.9)
Since  Herder  places  the source  of  culture  in  the  human capacity of  besonnheit,  his 
concept of the process and meaning of culturally and historically situated reflection is 
essentially  bildung in itself, which incorporates the first two points of the definition I 
gave  for  humanität.  Tradition  involves  the  second  and  third  points.  From  this, 
humanität as process is the combination of Herder's bildung, and tradition.
Part 2: Humanity as Process 
4.2.1 Language
“Without language man can have no reason, without reason no language” 
(Herder 1772a, p.137)
This section examines Herder's approach to language, and how he links language to 
thought, culture, and identity. Whilst Herder's writings explore a number of themes in 
some detail, both language and history represent two core aspects of his overall work. 
Human nature gives rise to a capacity to reflect, and from this language arises.
The first, or natural, language of humans consists of those expressions that arise from 
surprise, pain, and other intense emotional experiences and are a 'universal' language of 
emotions which all humans share with each other and with animals224. It comes from 
(4.2.4) and (4.3.4).
222 See also section (4.2.5).
223 The use of the word 'race' here indicates the human race  as a whole, and not a subset of humanity 
culturally constructed as different 'races'.
224 More specifically,  this  is  a  language  that  we also  have  in  common with  animals,  which  Herder  
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those expressions which are forced from us “at the first moment of surprise, without  
deliberation or intention... these utterances  are  a form of language,  the language of 
emotions,  expressive  of  the  original  force  of  nature”  (Herder  1772a,  p.118,  his 
emphasis).  This  language  is  in  many  respects  a  universal  possession.  We  can  be 
emotionally affected by the vocal expression of emotions regardless of where we might 
encounter  them,  whether  it  be  the  “primitive  wailings  of  the  aborigines”  or  the 
“discordant yell expressive of the love and kindness of the Indians” (p.123), we are 
affected  by the  emotions  that  these  vocalisations  represent  and can  recognise  them 
because we all share this common language.
The second language225, which Herder devotes considerably more time to, contains his 
reasons for determining that the creation of language is a human act, which comes about 
as  a  result  of  our  lack  of  clear  and  prominent  instincts  directing  humans  in  any 
particular  ways.  Because  of  this  lack  of  pre-supplied  direction,  in  contrast  to  other 
animals who possess prominent instincts to direct them in specific ways, humans must 
instead chose a direction. From this, humanity is defined by choice and thus freedom - 
to  choose  -  is  an  essential  and original  aspect  of  human existence.  To choose  also 
requires the capacity of Besonnheit226 (1772a, p.154) - a fundamental and according to 
Herder unique aspect of human nature - which allows us to 'step outside ourselves' and 
consider a circumstance in detail, whilst we reduce external input and our own personal 
desires from the data that is being considered227. This reflection requires language in 
which to frame and clarify our thoughts, and is driven by a need – an emotional drive 
produced from Empfindung (sensation) (Sikka 2007a, p.33) that makes us want to use 
reason, expressed in our need to reflect on the situation. The choice being made matters 
in some way, and so it is driven by our emotions, at the same time it requires direction, 
suggests is understandable depending on how close to 'human' the animal is. Apes and monkeys, for  
example, share this language most with humans, with other hot-blooded animals like cats and dogs 
less so, extending outwards and fading over 'genetic distance'. (1772a, p.118).
This also suggests that humans possess a truly universal comprehension of language - the expression  
of emotions from sensation, now called Ideophones (See Haiman's Ideophones and the Evolution of  
Language (2017), but also Armoskaite & Koskinen (2017)).
225 It is helpful to think of these languages as 1) Naturally expressed language and 2) Naturally reflected 
language. Each of them is  natural because each of them relies on natural human capabilities. Their 
differences are that one is sourced from emotions that are 'forced' from us, in the absence of reflection, 
but which reflection then builds upon. The other does not have this forced aspect,  and is sourced 
through reflection. Both languages rely on sensation and thus an emotional core element to trigger  
either the emoting, or the reflection.
226 See especially Sikka (2011, pp.162-165), but also Spencer (2007, p.90) and Speck (2014, pp.49-50)
227 This process also forms a part of the action to 'feel into the mind of another'.
Whilst Herder does believe that other animals can consider options and weight up choices, the human 
ability to reflect allows for something fundamentally different to occur – firstly, to create a mirror of  
ourselves in our own mind which we enter into dialogue with it, and secondly to create the image of 
another that we can insert our mirrored self into. 
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which reason provides, just as this process cannot occur without the mental capability to 
pause, reflect, and mirror, in our minds. From this scenario, Herder links language to 
thought and emotion to such an extent that he argues we cannot think beyond the basest 
of emotional experiences without language, and all thought incorporates emotion.
Crucial to this process was not just that it allows us to feel our way into the other, but  
that it is the process by which we are human because:
“As long as the human being, this marvelous riddle of creation, reflected upon 
himself in his visible state, and in so doing measured himself against that which 
dwelt within him... he was oppressed by a feeling of  frailty, of  weakness and 
disease...  this  perception  by itself  led  to  humaneness... to  the  compassionate 
feeling for the suffering of others, to the taking part in the imperfections of their 
nature,  with the accompanying effort  to cope with those imperfections,  or to 
assist in overcoming them” (1793b, p.107, his emphasis)
Reflection, considering, thinking on, awareness of, ideas about, self-awareness and self-
restraint  etc.  -  all  translations  of  Herder's  Besonnheit, is  the  fundamental  factor  of 
Herder's arguments and it is from this capacity that all of human learning comes from. It 
produces not just compassion for others, but also a desire to better oneself and to help 
others; to not just be human, but to be humane, and act humanely. 
This  capacity,  and  its  moral  injunctions,  for  Herder,  define  human  nature  and  any 
creature,  if  it  possesses  it,  is human,  regardless  of  external  form  or  ability  to 
communicate externally. The existence of the structure (language) that thought requires 
for  it  to  occur  provides  us  with  the  tools  we  need  to  reflect,  and  the  deeper  our 
understanding  of  language's  complexity  and  expression,  the  more  tools  we  have  to 
reflect with. Each reflection on a topic, subject or situation gives us empirical examples 
that allow us to understand a thing more fully, but also, crucially,  contributes to the 
ongoing capacity to reflect in general, and our ability to define ourselves in relation to 
what we are considering or encountering.  An education that focusses on developing 
only specific parts of our mind's capabilities like reason, emotion, or wit etc., rather than 
a holistic education which trains the mind as a whole, unbalances this ability to reflect 
and skews it in a particular, and for Herder unwanted, direction. This influences not 
only later reflections, but, throughout communication with others, impacts on how our 
volk and  others  in  turn  reflect.  As  a  result  it  distorts  or  'deforms'  the  processes  of 
bildung, culture and tradition.
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The ability to frame that choice, and the possible paths that are erased or emphasised 
because of one particular framing over another, is influenced by the elements that have 
gone into the creation of  the language that  is  being used to  reflect,  and the unique 
attributes  and  experiences  of  the  person  reflecting.  It  also,  if  it  is  going  to  be 
communicated to an other, needs to be understood by that other, and developed further, 
and so language requires a community of people by which it is co-created and shaped. 
This  original  language was neither  created with a  structured grammar,  nor was it  a 
construct of philosophers.  It  was rather a primitive construct,  haphazard,  filled with 
synonyms  and  metaphors  from  nature,  and  based  on  the  social  and  geographical 
environment.  It  was more 'natural'  in  that  need determined the time and place of a 
word's creation, just as it determined its changing and repurposing. It was also more 
closely connected to our emotions228 and the first language we all share in a way that 
more  developed  languages,  with  more  precision,  structure  and  complexity,  are  not 
(1772a,  p.119).  This  organic  language  could  not  be  developed  without  reason,  and 
because of this language is the “external characteristic of our species just as mind is the 
internal mark” to such an extent that should another being develop language as a way to 
communicate with itself, “he would have inwardly been a speaking man who was bound 
sooner or later to invent also an external language” (1772a, p.140). Language is created 
to communicate with ourselves in our own minds, and vocalised to communicate with 
others.
From this Herderian perspective, language acts as a border beyond which we cannot 
think or understand. It limits our ability to express ourselves, just as it gives us the tools 
by which to express ourselves beyond base emotional  outbursts  of sound. It  further 
shapes our understanding of our own expressions and experiences because without the 
construct we cannot think the thoughts that we think. Because language is created from 
the  particular  environment  and  experiences  and  chain  of  development  that  it  has 
received from previous users of the language, it is nuanced and directed in particular 
ways, as a somewhat chaotic melange rather than a carefully constructed logical system. 
It is culturally determined before our entry into life, which in turn is influenced by the 
environment that humans are a part of. It is then constantly recreated and redirected as 
its use and its meaning changes over time (1769b, p.253). From a complex mixture of 
228 These first words were linked closely to our sensate selves, often as “singing speech” (1769b, p.254) 
but because language is a human construct that is essential to but can only approximate thought, it is 
filled with synonyms, similes and metaphors that rely on the particularity of the person's reasoning 
and reflecting that created it in its original context.
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physiological reasons, changing environmental condition, changing needs and interests, 
and  a  need  for  greater  precision,  words  change  meaning,  are  created,  reorganised, 
introduced from different languages, and fade from use over time (1772a, p.166).
Through Herder's connection of language to thought - that we think in language - our 
facility  with  language  determines  our  ability  to  create  the  constructed  image  of 
ourselves and others inside our minds, and it determines the boundaries beyond which 
we have no ability to enunciate or articulate our thoughts and experiences; “If it is true 
that we cannot think without thoughts, and learn to think through words, then language 
sets  limits  and outline  for  the whole  of  human cognition” (1767-8,  p.49).  Our first 
constructed language229, which we are exposed to from the earliest moments of our lives, 
embeds deepest into our cognitive processes. How extensive the language we then have 
access to and have experience with,  limits  that  which we can articulate,  to such an 
extent that "a people has no idea for which it has no word." (Herder 1784-91 p.437, 
paraphrased in Sikka 2007a, pp.293-4). 
Two important parts of his analysis of language is that, firstly, different expressions of 
language complexity is  not  a function of  'race' and as a result families, cultures and 
volk  are  not  racial  in  nature.  Herder  makes  clear  that  the  concept  of  race  is  not  a 
biological category, but was rather formed by western Europe's move to categorise those 
of  different  cultural,  geographical,  and  ethnic  backgrounds  as  lesser. Primitive  is 
primitive for Herder, wherever it occurs, regardless of skin colour, social or geographic 
environment, and this understanding of primitive is based around the level of emotive to 
reflected  language  (1772a,  p.121).  Because  of  this  primitive  'status'230 of  language, 
primitive  cultures  have  more  in  common  with  each  other,  regardless  of  physical 
features,  social  similarities,  or  even  geographical  location.  The  second  part  of  this 
analysis is that the more primitive the language, the harder it is to translate into writing 
because  language  in  these  early  stages  is  based  more  closely  on  our  passions  and 
speech,  which,  whilst  'generally'  understandable  from  an  emotional  perspective,  is 
harder to transmit through written form because the emotional-instinctive content is so 
high in relation to the reflected-constructed side. As a result we can usually grasp the 
base emotional aspect instinctively, but there is simply not enough on the constructed 
side to allow a comparison through reflection between constructed languages to occur. 
229 Herder calls this our mother tongue because the first person we learn language from is the one who 
nurses us – traditionally the mother (or another woman taking on caring duties) (1772a, p.164).
230 I am using these ideas of primitive, status etc. as somewhat loose and nebulous terms here.
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The further we are from communication that incorporates these natural sounds into our 
own lexicon, the harder it is to reach back and grasp them.
Whereas Kant excludes language from his analysis of reason, Herder argues that reason 
can only ever be expressed through language. Reason is intrinsically to language, and 
reason is therefore already always biased - it can never be 'pure'. Neither the products of 
language  nor  the  theoretical  constructs  we  create  in  our  minds  are  immune  to  the 
influence of language. In Herder's view, there is no such thing as  a priori other than 
'being' and the human capability of reflection (Sikka 2007a, p.37). It is never possible to 
have pure reason of any kind231 and it therefore made no sense to prioritise the idea of 
it232 (Herder  1784-91;  Sikka  2007a).  The  development  of  language  through  unique 
geographic, cultural and familial environments inevitably contribute to the development 
of individuals shaped and influenced by these environments. Language is an inherent 
predisposition of humanity, and was spontaneously created by the action of reflection 
“on sense  experience  (and not  a priori)”  (Herder  1772a,  pp.149&154),  through the 
creation  of  symbols  to  represent  concepts  and  define  difference,  but  the  spoken 
language could only develop through communication with others, through the interplay 
of  unity  and  diversity  between  people  either  individually  or  culturally.  As  a 
consequence,  Herder  rephrases  the  Cartesian  understanding of  identity,  individuality 
and consciousness (“I think, therefore I am”) and dramatically asserts  “I feel my own 
self! I am!” (Herder 1769, cited in Norton 1991, p.42).
4.2.2 Family
Our first  encounter with language,  outside of its  mythical beginning at  the dawn of 
humanity, is when we are born into the family environment, where language already 
exists. Those who raise us are the first to educate us in the ways of its “logic” (Herder 
1767-8, p.48) and we “enter the world, and in doing so, I enter a world of instruction; so 
did my father; so did the first son of the first ancestor. And as develop my thoughts and 
transmit them to my descendants, so did my father... we are all his sons: with him began 
race; he originated language and instruction. He began to invent; we invented after him” 
(1772a,  p.171).  Communication,  for Herder,  is  an act of continual  co-creation – we 
become, in communication, which is itself a process, and we recreate language through 
our use of it both internally and externally. This dynamic of being taught and teaching 
231 Whilst Herder acknowledged that Kant's Critique of Pure Reason significantly reduced the number of 
elements that could be attributed to pure reason, Herder believed that nothing could be attributed to it.
232 Herder did though spend considerable time and effort engaging with it, in his attempt to counteract the 
influences of Kant's critiques when he published his Metacritique.
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is, in Herder's view, a debt to nature that we pass on to our children, and as a result, it  
takes on a positive emotional aspect to it. Rather than a simple medium through which 
we communicate, Herder presents language as a fundamental part of our life and an act 
of creation that is produced through our encounter with ourselves and the world. He 
gives it emotional significance because we are taught it by our parents, whom we love; 
he gives it add purpose because of what we gain from it,  and this  purpose expands 
because it allows us to become an active part of the family where our emotions are first 
expressed. Language is something precious because it also represents a chain of creation 
extending back to the origins of the species. It is therefore bound up in the “spiritual 
heritage of the family, since it is through the language of the parents that a given mode 
of thinking is perpetuated” (1772a, p.163).
A child's first interactions with language is a powerful and ongoing experience. The 
importance of these earliest moments to the child, who is learning for the first time has a 
strong emotional engagement with language, and the cognitive processes it is involved 
with allows us to enter into living and being. Thus “every word we learn during this 
early phase carries with it secondary associations which we rekindle in our minds every 
time we use the word. Frequently it is these secondary ideas which sway the mind more 
powerfully than the main concept... and essentially determine the character of which we 
earlier termed the family or kinship mode of thought” (1778, p.229). As a result, “the 
infant  imperceptibly absorbs  the  emotional  flavor  given to  them by his  parents.  He 
repeats  therefore  with  every newly acquired  word  not  only certain  sounds  but  also 
certain feelings” (1772a, p.163). Not only are emotions an intrinsic part of the creation 
of language, they are also a feature of learning it, of our process of reflection when we 
use words to think, and when we communicate with others. This emotional flavour will, 
in Herder's views, influence the rest of a child's life, and we will always be influenced 
by the emotional tenor of communication because of this link.
The family system in which this education occurs is one that is supposed to be filled 
with “learning in the easiest and most natural way” where one gains “the ideas of the 
father [and] the precepts of the mother”. Underlying this is the idea that in that home 
there is no greater wisdom than the parents',  no kindness more kind, and no system 
more perfect  that  this  “government  in  miniature” (1772a, p.163).  It  is  here that  the 
cultural,  spiritual and religious heritage of the family is passed down from parent to 
child. This dynamic is replicated in all families, and “the rank of the fathers, the region, 
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the way of life, the activity and experience; all these determined the germ of learning 
and the manner  in  which it  was passed on” (1780, p.230).  Language represents the 
unique ways in which the family interacts both with the world around them and each 
other,  so there is  a common style of linguistic  use,  but each individual still  speaks, 
strictly  speaking,  their  own  language  (1772a,  p.165).  Each  individual  is  a  unique 
individual, such that “no two words in one language [are] ever spoken in quite the same 
way by two different people” (ibid.). 
Because of this  process,  language represents  for Herder an expression of a person's 
connection to something that both precedes them and will continue long after they are 
gone. Any writings by that person, if it is genuine representation of that person's views, 
thoughts  and  feelings  “presents  to  the  public...  a  part  of  his  soul”.  It  provides,  in 
Herder's view, a window into the past and a snapshot of the heritage that that person 
shared in and contributed to. and as a result it is “the singular and the greatest benefit of  
printing, which otherwise would have brought as much harm as usefulness to literary 
nations”  (1784,  p.111)233.  Family,  the  culture  that  the  family is  involved  in  the  co-
constitution of, as well as the volk they are a part of, are intimately tied together through 
language.  Culture  is  expressed  and  constantly  re-expressed  through  language,  and 
language  is  in  a  constant  process  of  growth,  development  and  change  through  its 
cultural  use.  This  dynamic  between  language  and  culture  means  that  any literature 
produced in its mother tongue would bear the imprint of that culture's way of thinking at 
the time of its writing (1767-8, p.50), and provide access for the reader to the 'spirit' of 
the age that it was produced from.
The family is also a part of a larger cultural system primarily because humans require 
communities  for  their  historical  and ongoing practical  survival,  due to  our  physical 
weaknesses and needs (1772a, p.161). As Herder puts it, “Man is not the Hobbesian 
wolf, not a lone creature in the forest, as Rousseau would have it; for he has communal 
language in which to communicate” (1772a, p.167) and in so doing emphasises both the 
essentiality of community to human existence and that language acts not only as the link 
between people in a community, but is in some important respects, the community. 
4.2.3 Culture
“In what does true culture consist? 
... in cultivating morals and customs” (1769c, p.92)
233 This links to Herder's critique of commerce, which I explore in section (4.3.5).
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As has been suggested previously, Herder saw the family, and as a result culture, bound 
to language. This influences the working of the mind since it was only through culture 
that language could grow; from the interaction with the near other (one's family), and 
then expanding out to the more distant other (one's tribe/community/volk/other volker). 
Herder was firm in his belief that all of humanity, no matter their geographical location, 
skin colour,  or capabilities, are a part  of the human race and have the capability to 
express their own unique  humanität. All humans as a result always share a common 
base emotional language and a common system (reflection) for constructing language. 
No matter  the  'distance'  (1772a,  p.170),  there  are  always  elements  of  commonality 
between different groups of humans. Their movement over time, the springing up of 
different  communities  and  volker, are  to  Herder's  way  of  thinking,  necessary  and 
unavoidable manifestations of humanity expressing itself. Because of this shared origin, 
and because all humans share in the capacity of  besonnheit, cultures that developed, 
extending all the way back to the earliest point in humanity, shared a common heritage 
which has grown, split, separated, and reformed. Since language is the common link 
that all cultures share, which is produced in the reflective process, besonnheit is a path 
not just to consider our present circumstance, or to hypothesise the future with, but to 
grasp the history and nature of humanity itself.
It is not just the structure of the medium234 itself that determines this though. What is 
passed along the medium is essential  as well.  Shared stories,  religion,  mythologies, 
beliefs, histories, customs and practices that are a part of the structures of history also 
serve to cultivate their senses of group affiliation, as well as through the variations and 
shifts in the telling of the tales adding their own influence on the content and context of 
their communication. Radically for his time, especially given his status as a Christian 
preacher, Herder held that religions, myths and beliefs are produced through reflection 
on the unknown – and “whether we laugh at Greek mythology... yet each of us, perhaps, 
makes up his own. The people235 have mythology of a thousand things”236 (1769c, p.75, 
234 Morton refers to Herder's use of language as a 'veil of language' but also argues that nothing is behind  
the veil. My use of the word medium is used in a similar way. There is nothing that contains the  
medium. The medium is language as it is used, and does not exist in its absence, just as removing the 
veil, or medium, removes language and thus ends the possibility of meaning (1989, p.70). The veil 
metaphor is also a feature of Wittgenstein's works.
235 Barnard (1969) interprets this as “common people”, which at the time of Herder's writing was the 
direct translation of  volk,  but Eggel (2007) notes that Herder's  deliberate repurposing of the word 
shifted its  meaning.  Barnard himself  later  changes his view on this,  locating the term not  in the  
'common people', but in the 'not-property-determined middle classes' (2003, p.29).
236 This links to Kant's argument on the 'need to believe' (see section (3.2), but whereas for Kant it must 
be  deduced  through  pure  reason,  for  Herder  it  is  an  essential  function  of  our  human  need  to 
understand. We create meaning through reflection. Whether it is true or not is almost beside the point  
that it has meaning to us. It reflects us and as such, if we communicate our beliefs, gives others insight 
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my re-translation). He even went so far as to argue that the bible itself should be taken 
not as proof of god, but rather as proof of the human tendency to mythologise (1769d, 
p.95), and a demonstration of our need to find meaning in life. As a result, the bible, as 
well  as all  other  religious  literature,  represent  the quest of different  peoples  to  find 
meaning “in matters of their creation” (1769d, p.83). This then suggested to Herder that 
early religious books should be considered “mythological national songs of the origins 
of their most ancient memories of note” (p.85). These religious texts, and indeed the 
Bible itself are “thoroughly human. The thought and the word, the sequence and the 
manner of representation, all are human. A human soul produced each thought written 
down”. These texts as a result provide an insight into the experiences of humans in the 
'dawn' of humanity237 - and if the words written down are true to them and deeply felt by 
the  person  writing  them –  if  the  words  are  an  expression  of  their  humanität,  they 
provide a means for us to grasp the historically distant other through reflection, and to 
better understand and express our own humanität.
Crucially  though,  culture  is  not  simply  a  single  thing  that  can  be  pointed  to  and 
identified as being a part of a single culture. For Herder, culture is always multiple. He 
identifies sailors and herdsmen, families, tribes and even philosophers possessing their 
own cultures,  as  well  as  nations  like  Russia  possessing  “various  levels  of  culture” 
(1769c,  p.93)238.  Because  of  this  sense  of  plurality  from  a  common  source,  every 
community was and is both a part of something larger than itself, and yet at the same 
time also unique in its own experiences of existence. All humans share multiple cultural 
artefacts and concepts in common with each other (because of their common source), as 
well as unique elements intrinsic to only a single person, family, community or nation 
(because of their particular development over time, and how/when they were linked to 
other cultures and people's environments). Because of these similarities humans are not 
bound to a specific unchanging culture, nor does Herder suggest that humans should be 
tied into a single culture that is directly equivalent to a  volk -  because a  volk can and 
usually does contain multiples of cultures -  but rather than these natural and ongoing 
links to multiple cultures and levels of cultural experience problematizes attempts to 
essentialise  the  idea  of  culture  into  a  fixed  shared-experience  identity.  Yet  because 
language is the common thread and medium for a group of people, it embeds in them 
tendencies to rationalise, emote, and express, in similar ways, even if not in the same 
into us.
237 Herder uses the phrase “the Morn” here, which I am re-interpreting as 'the dawn'.
238 Herder also notes here that Russia is constituted by multiple nations, as well as different provinces and 
capitals possessing spirits.
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directions. As a result, this produces not just collective recognition of them from outside 
the group that they share a commonality with, but within the group because their form 
of communication is one that they are co-creators of, and they recognise each other's 
relationship with their community.
This cultural  affiliation and perception process inevitably influences us in ways that 
deny the possibility of total and unrestrained freedom, individuality, and atomisation for 
an individual, but at the same time the individual could not come to be or to act with 
'freedom' without these processes. For Herder, freedom can only come from cultural, 
family,  and  volk relationships  and  circumstances,  and  the  expression  of  freedom is 
slanted  along  familial,  cultural,  linguistic  and  volk lines  as  a  result.  Even  if  that 
expression is a rejection of those links and ties, it is still influenced by what is rejected. 
Just as for Herder's utter rejection of the concept of pure reason, and the illogic of it in 
his framing of human existence, so too did it make no sense for him to conceive of 
human individuality and agency outside of language, culture and community. These are 
all an intrinsic part of every individual's life story and of humanity as a whole.
This is not to suggest that human development within such boundaries was limited. In 
his aesthetic philosophy he insists that each human soul and body239 is unique in and of 
itself (1769b, pp.192-197), just as every Klima240 was unique, and every experience of 
humanity historically situated. From these base elements, the infinite variety of humans 
and humanity come from the interplay of all of these characteristics: cultures, family, 
language, body-mind, soul, and the physical environment. Between them they nudge, 
shift, influence, direct etc. human cultivation, as well being influenced by interactions 
between other  volk, without determining precisely how influential they will be, what 
aspects of the individual are being nudged, or even what direction it will progress in 
(regardless of intent), or of what aspects influence more or less. Whilst there will always 
be  influences  drawn  from  specific  cognitive  tendencies,  comprehensions  and 
inclinations,  their  expression and understanding nevertheless  remain infinite  in  their 
possibilities.  These  occurrences,  repeated  throughout  humanity,  create  a  fabric  of 
multiples of quasi-distinct cultures with blurred 'boundaries' producing identifiable but 
not totally distinct forms of communication in dialect, language, and through complex 
cultural identities. They blur into each other in a complex interweaving as individuals, 
cultures and human groupings interact both internally through reflection and externally 
239 By body he refers to both physical and mental characteristics.
240 Climate, in a wide sense.
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through communication, influenced by  bildung and through a process of tradition as 
change and growth.
A number of contemporary theorists have engaged with Herder, attempting to define 
whether he was a cultural relativist, essentialist, pluralist or multiculturalist, or indeed 
an anti-dualist (Spenser 2007) or cultural communitarian (Whitton 1988). All of these 
angles for interpreting Herder's perspective on culture contain some connection to his 
arguments. He was a relativist because he believed that cultures should be recognised as 
their  own distinct form of human living searching for their  own happiness.  Judging 
other cultures should occur based on how they hold to their own cultural ideals, rather 
than  simply  from  an  outside  perspective  that  uses  the  judging  to  pass  moral 
pronouncements on their fitness to the category of human. He was a cultural pluralist 
because, although distinct cultures are a rare thing in his view, there is a constant and 
ongoing dialogue between these different cultures within a  volk,  just  as this extends 
beyond culture to different volk. In addition to this, Herder becomes more relativist the 
further removed cultures are from each other in their respective 'ages'. Primitive cultures 
are  more  closely relatable  to  each other,  whereas  Herder  veers  to  relativism in  the 
exploration of primitive cultures in relation to his own developed nation perspective, 
just as he becomes more relativist the more historically distant a culture is.
There are also, of course, strong communitarian aspects to his arguments although there 
are  still  significant  differences  between his  position  and that  of  Charles  Taylor  and 
Alasdair Maclntyre (Spenser 1996, p.246). Herder's main direction is better understood 
by framing his arguments using the idea of “inter-” to community, culture,  volk  and 
state,  facilitated  by  a  (mostly)  passive  liberal government  lens  (see  Section  4.3.4). 
Herder focusses much of his writings on inter- dialogue, exchange, and action, rather 
than  simply reifying and fixing culture as  timeless  features  living  side  by side and 
relying on tolerance to ensure a peaceful co-existence.
The point of his idea of, and focus on, reflection was to emphasise first that humans are 
always already a part of communities and cultures, but the point of  being was in the 
development of their  reflection,  which served to cultivate a unique individual in the 
process of constantly becoming themself.  Only through an acknowledgement of and 
critical engagement with one's own situated experience could this occur, because only 
then could one engage with it in relation to the situated experience of the other, whether 
that be through a physical encounter with another, or through the literature that the other 
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has produced. The process of mirroring oneself in one's own mind requires a deep level 
of  understanding  of  oneself  as a  situated  emotional-rational-reflecting  being.  The 
purpose of living and humanität was to engage across cultures and through time to learn 
more about the other and oneself, and through that encounter to become more what one 
is in an active process of being, in relation to the other. 'Being' as a process requires its  
enactment, both as an though process and its physical expression in the world.
But  at  the  same  time  Herder  also  maintained  a  universalist  aspect  alongside  his 
relativism241. Throughout his works he constantly responds to inequality, and frequently 
passes biting ethical judgements on the practices of all cultures and societies. This is not 
just  as  a  necessary part  of  his  dialectical  analysis  where  he  both complements  and 
critiques the cultures he examines, but also more widely because there are moral norms 
that Herder does believe are needs, or requirements, common to all humanity. Whether 
it  be  his  analysis  that  “Rome  began  its  career  in  heroism...  and  what  were  the 
consequences  of  their  exertions?  Ravage and destruction” (1784-91d,  p.410)  or  that 
alongside  Greek  philosophy  and  nobility,  and  “quiet  industry,  simplicity  and  true 
friendship,  steadfastness”  it  presided  over  the  ill-treatment  of   “helots,  pelasgians, 
colonies,  foreigners,  and  enemies”  (p.375),  Herder's  arguments  were  cross-cultural 
moral critiques, focused on “practices that lead to or result from a severe inequality of 
power  between  individuals  and  groups,  where  the  well-being  of  those  who  are 
oppressed by this inequality are harmed” (Sikka 2011, p.18). 
Freedom,  equity,  agency and  capability  are  core  critical  angles  that  he  uses  in  his 
cultural  arguments.  Whilst  he  does  without  question  display  what  would  now  be 
considered sexist attitude towards women (and indeed racism towards other ethnicities), 
he also points out their unequal or unfair treatment, based on these same principles, and 
he uses the example of the treatment of women as a weather-vale to highlight inequality 
in different cultures. He also, more importantly, and in contrast to Kant, maintains that 
women  are human, they are co-creators of culture and traditions, they are a part of a 
volk,  they  are a  part  of  humanity,  and  they  are  able  to  contribute  in  and  to  the 
progression of humanität. They can do good, possess morality, and indeed should have 
access  to  books  and education.  Their  learning  environment  should  also  not  be  one 
isolated from men and whilst he does say that women should not be taught philosophy, 
he  makes  this  same point  for  men –  because  he  makes  a  firm distinction  between 
241 Both Michael Morton (1989) and Sonia Sikka engage with this aspect directly and in some detail, but  
I restrict myself to Sikka here, as I return to Morton in section (4.3.3) to develop his arguments on  
unity and diversity.
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philosophy and “healthy reason”. The latter is something which all men and women can 
and should possess and express. 
Herder does also conform to the widely held view that women should have their own 
focus  of  attention – the  home and the hearth  essentially -  as  well  as  implying that 
women are more connected to, and should be educated more, in the aesthetic areas. But 
what is most important is that Herder opposed and criticised anything that he perceived 
prevented or hindered this process of  bildung as  humanität, and thus the principles of 
freedom and agency and the opportunity to develop one's capabilities to reflect. Whilst 
he had clear blind spots (not just towards women, but also in comments he makes about 
Africans  and  other  ethnicities),  his  overall  principle  was  entirely  inclusive  of  all 
humanity. All humans, no patter their culture, location, ethnicity or gender, have the 
capacity to cultivate and express their  humanität  and he was also, as Scrivener points 
out,  far  more  inclusive  than  most  of  his  contemporary  scholars  towards  different 
ethnicities, genders, and ways of living.
4.2.4 The Volk
The  existence  of  the  idea  of,  and  one's  relationship  with,  a  volk is  in  Herder's 
understanding a result of all of these linguistic, familial, and cultural interactions that 
connect together  to form a common framing of themselves as a  people-nation.  It  is 
formed by a sense of, and expressions by, those within the nation that they  are a co-
constitutive  part  of  that  nation  and is  as  a  result  ongoing cultural  processes  of  co-
creation. Their common languages, multiple levels of cultural connections, as well as 
shared stories, mythologies, and (religious242) beliefs and practices all serve to connect 
the members of the nation to each other. The nation is co-constituted and its passage 
through time is conditional on those people who inherit in some way their membership 
in the nation desiring to be a part of that nation, and choosing to continue forwards 
together as a volk243. The nation in the Herderian sense is the volk - the people – not an 
aspect  of  or  construction  of  a  state,  or  defined by a  bureaucracy.  Nor  should  it  be 
determined or given credence by those outside the state, although their impact on this 
self-belief has, given the interwoven nature of human existence he sets out, an impact.
Although it was possible for a nation to also be a state, the creation of a government 
242 Whilst religious beliefs are a large part of this, and of crucial importance from Herder's perspective, 
they are not the entirety of belief.
243 Herder uses the example of the Jewish nation to explain this (Barnard 2003, pp.17-37).
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from the cultural experiences of the people of the nation, rather in a bureaucratic and 
mechanical state defined way would, according to Herder, produce a stronger sense of 
mutual inclusion and equality, as well as allowing a greater degree of cultural change 
through  tradition,  in  addition  to  which,  this  informal  expression  of  a  collective 
relationship allows for a higher degree of individual individuality. This notion of the 
nation as a people, through culture and language as a process, does have related types of 
restrictions  that  a  state  or  system  would  place  on  it  though.  This  is  because  the 
government typically locates membership of the people through a state-determined (or 
influenced) shared cultural heritage which has historically been directly related to blood 
ties – we inherit membership through family and a biological connection. But there is 
no  direct  equivalence  between blood and culture  in  the  Herderian  sense,  because  a 
shared  cultural  history  does  not  require  blood  relations.  What  it  requires  is  time, 
location, and desire – to essentially be formed, or at least to spend a good proportion of 
one's formative years244, in the culture(s), to become a part of the culture(s). As a result 
any outsider, regardless of blood or relation, would not be a member of this volk, just as 
any person raised within the cultural area with a desire to be a part of that culture would 
be a member of the volk. This link to childhood245 is crucial to Herder's concept because 
of the way in which language, family and cultures interact with and shape each other.
By this point though – because of the ongoing historical development of volker - Herder 
concludes  that  language is  now less  influenced by the  geography or  climate  that  a 
person  is  situated  within  than  it  is  from “internal  factors  such  as  dispositions  and 
attitudes  arising  from  relations  between  families  and  nations.  Conflict  and  mutual 
aversion, in particular” (1772a, p.167). Whilst language originally came from a 'natural' 
process, each child born into the family, their cultural experiences, and the volk all affect 
the remembrance of its past, the direction it travelled, and its future direction. Alongside 
this,  attempts to codify,  clarify,  and produce greater precision in language led to an 
ongoing movement from a primarily organically cultivated language with a large degree 
of emotional expression, to a language more logically structured, but historically less 
nuanced. 
Whereas before, in our historical past, volk were (in theory at least) often separated, and 
defined  themselves  in  geographically  distinct  ways  with  only  limited  interaction 
244 Given that Herder sees cultures arising through work-life practices like fishing, shepherding, or even 
professions like academia, as well as living experiences more broadly, this idea of formation might  
well be considered something one could 'work oneself into' should this also align with one's wider 
living experiences connecting to these professions (moving to a fishing village, becoming a sailor etc). 
245 i.e. one's formative years, spend as a co-constitutive member of the volk.
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between them, their reconnection was driven primarily by trade, where the interplay was 
reversed.  Here,  different  approaches  to  life  interacted  through,  at  least  initially,  the 
medium  of  “greed,  and  its  consequence,  economic  imperialism”  (Herder  1764,  p. 
157)246. Herder at this point raises issues of structural and economic inequality between 
different nations247 that must be guarded against. The purpose of coming together was 
not to amalgamate into one culture or to assimilate, but instead for cultures to stand out 
in stronger relief to each other as they slowly developed along their own paths whilst 
sharing knowledge. Mutually influenced and connected, yet still distinct and 'unique'.
His concern here is not that change can or could occur – Herder “largely sees cultural 
interaction as a good thing” (Sikka 2011, p.7), but what he does have concerns with is 
the  nature of  that  encounter,  when  enacted  through  asymmetric  power  dynamics. 
Economic imperialism is clearly one his main concerns248,  but he extends this more 
broadly to any unequal power relationship that allows one side to influence the other in 
an unbalanced way. One of the primary uses of his process of reflection was, according 
to Barnard, to induce a “concerted effort of nurturing a reciprocal sensitivity that would 
enable people to extend their capacity for experiencing the pain and humiliation of the 
deprived and marginalised in this world as if it were their own” (2003, p.12). This focus 
on  their  suffering  and  experiences  of  inequality  and  marginalisation  is  an  essential 
aspect of Herder's works. It is the primary way by which his universalising aspects are 
expressed and engaged with: their relative lack of equality, freedom, and agency. It is 
also, from this sense of vulnerability, a way in which humans should come to terms with 
our imperfect nature, our ability to choose, and our common heritage as humans.
As well as this, through reflecting in such a way, it allows a mirror to be held up against  
one's understanding of the volk that they are a part of, against that of the volk they are 
reflecting on. This allows each volk to “gradually rub off their sides against each other, 
and at last there come into being some common endeavours of several peoples” (Herder 
1793a,  p.102).  This  process,  crucially,  comes  from recognising  marginalisation  and 
inequality – pain, suffering, and humiliation – of the experiences of people, effectively, 
at  the  bottom.  Only  by  recognising  the  negative  dialectics  that  come  about  from 
expressing humanität can a volk progress and change in accordance with the process of 
humanität.  Herder is not so much suggesting that nations will become like each other, 
but rather that the coarser elements which produce conflict and discord – the jagged 
246 See also Morton (1989, p.54).
247 Nations as a plural concept, not just multiple different nations.
248 I explore this again in section (4.5.1).
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edges - will be worn away through their interactions, both in our own minds, and the 
practices of our families, cultures and peoples in the living world through living. The 
volker learn from each other, and reach common understandings and crucially recognise 
desires that can be achieved together. There are essentially now multiple levels of co-
constitution occurring at the same time, not just at the point of a 'physical' interaction, as 
one  mirrors,  oneself,  and the  interaction  with  the  other  are  affected,  but  also  from 
communities and volker interacting with each other. This suggests an image of pebbles 
on  the  beach  slowly  wearing  each  other  smooth  but  still  remaining  distinct.  Their 
distinctness  is  refined,  clarified  through  the  interaction,  rather  than  the  boulder  of 
“economic  imperialism”  simply  grinding  down  all  the  pebbles  in  its  path  to 
individualised motes of dust.
The interaction between different cultures and volk is, generally speaking both a good 
and necessary thing for Herder - and it inevitably comes with negative consequences. It 
is a dialectical relationship in which each grouping of people experience both gains and 
losses. So long as the losses and gains are relatively evenly balanced on both sides, and 
they come about from reflection in the process of humanität, then this, for Herder, is a 
part of a natural human dynamic. Unequal interactions though, such as was the case of 
Germany's  sense  of  national  inferiority  and  its  fragmented  political  and  cultural 
existence that led it to try to assume the 'nature' of France through the importation and 
attempted replacement of its cultural norms, created instead an artificial environment 
that was inauthentic for the people who experienced it. This also applied to his critique 
of European's interactions with the rest of the world, where these power dynamics were 
even more pronounced. The point of the  volk was not to copy or impose its will on 
another, but to  learn from an other, as the other learned from them about their own 
flawed expressions of humanity – with both volk altering in the process through shared 
cultural and intellectual experiences, knowledge and trade, and internal reflection. This 
counted not just  for encounters  with  volker in the present,  but  also with encounters 
which continue through, and occur throughout, history. The point of this encounter was 
not to attempt to emulate a historical nation like the ancient Greeks, but rather to learn 
about what made them 'as themselves', and through this, to learn what makes us our 
selves, for one's self, one's cultural and familial experiences, and one's own volker.
The consequences of Herder’s analysis of language, the family, cultures,  volk, and the 
purpose of humanity,  is that he concludes “we are born to create human happiness” 
(1775a, pp.330). But happiness was not a permanent state for him, to be reached in a 
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Kingdom of Ends as 'eternal contentment' from doing one’s pure reason deduced duty, 
such  as  Kant  suggested,  rather  it  was  the  “simple,  deep,  irreplaceable  feeling  of 
existence” (Herder 1784-91 p.331, cited in Sikka 2011, p.57). Being is the experience of 
humanity – that irreducible and unique a priori that tells us we are alive - and becoming 
is the process of humanity. It is through this, as well as through the exercise of one's 
powers (Sikka 2011, p.76) that our happiness comes about. Again, reflection is the key 
to happiness because being is not an isolated internal self-awareness. It is a process that 
requires an engagement with ourselves and something else, whether that be in our own 
minds or in a physical way. He addresses this point in Yet Another History (1774a, b & 
c), in response to the question “Which Was the Happiest People in History?” where he 
concludes that “each people meet with such a moment, or there never was one” (1774a, 
p.185). Each culture must have its own intrinsic value and as a result “Each nation has 
its centre of happiness in itself” (1774b, p.297). Because humans are shaped by their 
familial, cultural, environmental and linguistic processes it is not possible to suggest 
that happiness can be a singular universally definable constant (1774b, p.296) and also, 
through  this  dialectical  lens,  he  rejects  the  idea  that  the  progress  of  history  “must 
[invariably]  lead  towards  greater  virtue  and  individual  happiness”  (1774a,  p.187). 
Happiness for Herder is a unique experience that occurs in the course of human life in 
perpetual motion  rather than an end goal  to exist  within,  in  perpetual peace (Sikka 
2011, pp. 44-83). Happiness, for Herder, is a unique experience. Just as language and 
culture slants the development of groups of humans in particular directions, so too is 
happiness coloured by them “for if human nature... is a flexible clay for... needs, and 
pressures...  even the  image of  happiness  changes  with  each  condition  and region249 
which,  though,  all  shape  themselves  according  to  land,  time,  and  place?” (1774b, 
p.296). 
Herder's approach extended much further than simply acknowledging that happiness is 
relative to the individual and their cultures. He also asserted that “Each man has his own 
perspective, and consequently so has each assembly of even the most enlightened men. 
The perspective determines both the questions posed and the solutions proffered. Hence 
they cannot but be biased, and the public, society and posterity, as the umpires” (1780, 
p.240, my emphasis). Bias, for Herder, is the natural state of experience, not just for the 
individual250 but at every level of human experience and interaction, whether that be in 
249 This section is in brackets in the quote: “for what is this image ever but the sum of “satisfactions of 
wishes, achievements of purposes, and gentle overcoming of needs”.
250 Herder goes so far as to state outright that his own dedication to the priesthood was a direct result of  
these childhood prejudices; “From this also resulted my early dedication to holy orders. Beyond a 
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the living, or in their recording to posterity. It is this that provides his justification for 
asserting that we are all culturally situated and, even if our lives are not determined by, 
they are indelibly stamped by our relationship to our language, family, culture, and volk.
Since biases, and indeed prejudices, are natural to the human condition, they are as a 
result neither good nor bad in their own right251. Although he most often refers to them 
in a negative way, Herder does see times when they can be of benefit. Firstly, when 
there is conflict or disagreement, prejudices provide a cohering effect on a volk allowing 
them to “converge upon their centre, attach[ing] more firmly to their roots”252. Secondly, 
because prejudice, in relation to the negative dialectical aspect of western universalism 
stands  against the  “thousand  evils  [that  occur]  in  their  name”  which  promotes 
bloodthirstiness and avarice alongside its stance in favour of “liberty sociability and 
equality” that also atomises humanity into individuality absent culture (1774b, pp.219-
20). Interestingly, this also suggests an innate and natural dialectical fracture point of 
any universalising tendencies or their expressions253. 
Once again, this is where the function of reflection comes in – to reveal those biases and 
prejudices for what they are, both in ourselves and our volk - particular ways of seeing 
and experiencing the world that are a (dialectical) function of living in the world. To 
attempt to resolve them, or at the very least when examining other cultures and peoples, 
it requires us to “lay aside our proud prejudices and consider the nature of this region 
with as much impartiality as if there were no other in the world”254 Herder's approach is 
pluralistic here, but he also frames his analysis around inequality and unfreedom. When 
we connect this to the metaphorical closing of borders around a volk, and receding into 
the background the oppressions that results from asymmetrical power relations between 
different volk, this allows, at an intra-volk level, a community driven reflective practice 
that  mirrors  the  idea  of  our  unoppressed  selves  against  the  image  of  the  volk  that 
oppresses it. Just as it works for the individual, so too can it work for a volk community.
doubt, local prejudices of my boyhood played a large part in this; but so, with equal certainty, did my 
impressions of church and altar” (1769c, p.69).
251 Herder refers  to  prejudices  in negative (1793a,  p.103),  positive (1774a,  p.186),  and neutral  ways 
(1769c, p.71) in his works. 
252 I develop this aspect  of Herders work in more detail in chapter five,  where I connect Benhabib's 
concern with cultural identity fixing with Herder's own arguments.
253 See also section (2.4) on James Ingram.
254 Herder makes this  statement  in  his  Ideas  (1787-91c,  p.178) in  the chapter  on  The Nature of  the  
African People and continues “The [African], whom we consider a cursed son of Ham and the image 
of the fiend, has equal right to call his cruel despoilers albinos and white satans who so degenerated 
only because of a flaw of nature, just as several animal species living near the North Pole degenerated 
to whiteness”. See also (1784-91d, p.148).
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This section explored the inter-woven nature of Herder's analysis of language, family, 
culture and  volk.  It  established that,  for  Herder,  everything is  incorporated into our 
cultural  experiences,  whether  it  be  the  language  we  speak,  the  cultural  norms  we 
incorporate into our way of living, or even how we perceive and experience happiness. 
Most crucially,  is that this  same claim allows him to establish what we would now 
consider structural bias as an inevitable dialectic of our situated living experiences. 
4.2.5 History
Herder deviates sharply from his contemporaries when it comes to the idea of a linear 
progression  of  history  to  a  utopian  future,  and  this  idea  is  one  that  he  chides  his 
contemporaries with, in the titling of his essay “Yet Another Philosophy of History, For 
the Enlightenment of Mankind: A Further Contribution to the Many Contributions of the 
Century” (1774a, my emphases). His view on history was an expansion of his view on 
language  and  culture  –  of  the  development,  growth,  and  changing  of  humanity,  of 
cultures and nations, in a multitude of forms and styles. Each formulation of humanity 
experiencing  itself  as  it  bursts  into  life,  grows  and  decays,  splits  into  parts.  It 
incorporates new ideas, concepts and cultures before new variations in turn develop and 
decay, springing from and connecting to each other in a myriad of ways.
Herder  entirely  rejects  the  idea  that  scientific  and  intellectual  progress,  or  legal 
developments,  justify an assumption of  moral  progress,  not  least  because the moral 
centre  of  a  volk is  a  dialectic  of  both  the  good and the  bad that  produces  its  own 
particular  prejudices.  He  also  splits  off  scientific  and  moral  progress  from humans 
progressing through time in a historical sense, emphasising instead deliberate positive 
activity  towards human  progress,  rather  than  assuming  humanity  is  moving  in  an 
inevitably forward motion regardless of aim or purpose in the manner that Kant and 
others suggested. Human moral progress, in the individual, can only come about from 
experiences in the particular through reflection – and this is not reliant on any form of 
scientific or intellectual production. In the collective, this comes about from reflection 
on the interaction with other cultures and  volk which might be  instigated by imperial 
greed (Morton 1989, p.54),  but need not occur only from this.  Any encounter,  with 
another volk, either directly with, or through a historical engagement, can trigger this.
He uses a number of different metaphorical constructs when discussing history255, but 
255 For example, “We live in a world of appearances, where one phenomenon follows upon another and 
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the overall imagery suggests deliberate human progression is reminiscent of travel on a 
boat256, tacking back and forth against the wind – with each tack producing dialectical 
aspects of both progress and regression. The wind, in this metaphor, could be composed 
of  multiple  actions  and  attitudes  that  work  to  stupefy  or  hinder  humanity's 
predisposition to reflection, whether that be through unfair economic practices, racist 
attitudes, arrogant and aggressive nationalism, religious persecution, through a focus on 
teaching  philosophy to  children  before  they  are  'ready'  or  by prioritising  reason or 
universal  norms  over  reflection  and  empathy.  The  metaphor  of  the  boat  struggling 
against the wind to advance also implies that we are all within the boat and we are all, 
whatever the gender or relative position in a community, actively involved in working 
towards  its  progression.  External  changes  in  the  wind  and  currents,  and  internal 
struggles within the boat between different occupants, can and do cause the boat to 
change direction. This struggle, both within the boat and without, is an inevitability of 
humanity's movement through time and if considered from a moral perspective, requires 
the active involvement of all humanity to progress. But crucially, there is no fixed end 
point  that  can  be  known  because  progression  always  comes  with  regression.  It  is 
ultimately, in Herder's view, in the hands of God. Thus there is no pure direction or 
route  that  can  avoid  regression  because  it  is  outside  the  possibility  of  human 
knowledge257.
As  flawed,  fallible  beings,  humans  cannot  know  with  absolute  certainty  which 
combination of which biases, perspectives and prejudices258 will constitute a movement 
in a certain direction, because we cannot know how these ideas will spin off and be used 
by others to create new perceptions of the truth or the right, or be incorporated into 
political and cultural elements and artefacts. Herder's dialectical approach to cultures 
and history were designed to show that in each moral progression there is regression, 
whether  it  be  in  his  assessment  of  the  Romans,  Greeks,  Phoenicians  or  Egyptians 
historically  or  contemporaneously  when  he  considers  the  Chinese,  Indians,  Arabs, 
Americans, Africans or Europeans, as a whole, or as individual nations. Each of these 
expressions of humanity in the particular produces their own 'goods' and 'bads'. This 
one moment is annihilated by the next; everything in the world is bound to the wings of time, and 
movement, change, activity, are the very soul of Nature” (1769a, p.97).
He also often makes use of the idea of a seed and tree, but also of the life-cycle of a human, and of 
fauna based metaphor and similes.
256 This  metaphor  also  functions  analogously  to  critical  approaches  to  cosmopolitan  education.  See 
Oakshot (1989, p.23, cited in Hansen 2011, p.93). 
257 “there [is] a great, divine plan for the whole human race which not a single creature can survey” 
(1774a, p.215).
258 In their good, bad, and neutral expressions.
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was also the case for his own era, where he argued that the European call for a universal 
understanding of humanity and brotherhood, justice and morality, had resulted in the 
oppression, enslavement and murder of entire peoples and the production of an arrogant 
cultural  and  racial  elitism  that  was  used  to  justice  these  actions  and  their  own 
superiority. Rather than simply progression, there is, instead, “line[s] of... progress not 
as straight, nor as uniform, but as stretching in all directions, with all manner of turns 
and twists. Neither the asymptote, nor the ellipse, nor the cycloid can portray the course 
of nature” (1793a, p.101, his emphasis).  For Herder,  firstly,  the purpose of life was 
being in the process of becoming. There could be no final conclusion to this journey, 
nor should there be,  because then there would be no further change and becoming. 
Secondly, because everyone is unique not just in their individuality but in their multiple 
collectivities, no one location of being, created by humans, could ever accommodate all 
particularities.  As  a  result,  there  can  be  no  one  true  direction  because  experience, 
happiness, being, and thus progress, are always in the particular.
Just  as  there  is  no  'true'  direction  for  the  progress  of  moral  humanity  that  we  can 
determine in advance (because we cannot know what prejudices and inclination will 
contribute in what way to produce what dialectics) so is there no 'true' history which we 
can  reflect  on  because  these  same  prejudices  and  biases  are  a  feature  of  our  own 
analyses of history itself. Our own experiences and perspective, whether they be Hume's 
writings on (British) history or Plato's on statecraft and philosophy, each reflects their 
own prejudices in their approach to and understanding of history (1767b, p.29-30). Any 
attempt at a systematic understanding of history produced from a single perspective, 
whether  that  be an  individual  or  volk,  is  inevitably a  system  from that  perspective, 
reflecting that interpretation on history. This production of a system of history involves 
a second layer of judgment beyond what is 'fact' such that it is, according to Herder, the 
works of a “creator, genius, painter, and artist of history” (p.26, his emphasis) because 
the links between cause and effect have to be inferred “and the art of inference utilised 
is no longer history, but philosophy” (p.31). We discover philosophy by expressing our 
humanity  through  our  reflection.  When  this  is  directed  at  history,  it  produces 
anthropology-that-is-philosophy.
Whilst  Herder  sees  this  production  as  essential,  it  carries  with  it  its  own dialectic 
because the more the system is extended, the more “an extensive string of events be tied 
together  with  reference  to  one  purpose,  within  one  scheme,  including  the 
correspondence of the parts, the danger is so much the greater that this system, shaped 
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according to the measure of one mind, will not be in every respect simple and clear 
history” (ibid.) What Herder is trying to suggest here, although somewhat cloudily259, is 
firstly that data and inference, if they are not made distinct in the production of texts on 
history,  lead the reader along that person's belief.  Secondly,  given Herder's previous 
arguments,  this  is  ultimately  unavoidable,  given  both  the  writer  and  reader's  own 
particularities. Any products of 'history' “ought to be accepted as a self-examination to 
determine to what degree a reader, even in a history of art, has the twofold obligation to 
believe and to examine” (1767b, p.32). With the level of examination determined by the 
level of bias/inference which the writer  makes clear is  their bias/inference,  and that 
which is unconsciously so.
But given all this, the point I raised previously concerning an underlying universalism 
of freedom, agency, and cultivation holds true here as well. Herder's own analysis of 
history is ultimately the beginning of an attempt to identify and indeed create a tentative 
and flawed system260 by which to reflect on human nature, firstly through the collection 
of  “data  from the history of the ages;  each will  yield to  me the picture of its  own 
customs, usages, virtues and vices, and its own conception of happiness” (1769c, p.89). 
His focus here is on “the human soul and its manifestations on this earth; its strains and 
stresses,  its  hopes  and  satisfactions,  its  influence  on  a  man's  character”  (ibid.)  that 
contribute  not  just  to  the  unique  experiences  of  humanity  through  the  ages,  or  the 
instances of genius expressing, or of power wielded by individual beings, but in the 
expressions of human collectivities as they live out their lives in their own quests for 
happiness.
The  exploration  of  history  is,  as  a  result,  a  means  to  an  end,  which  is  the  moral 
development of the individual and all groupings which they are connected to, through 
reflection as the expression of our humanity,  just  as  all  historical exploration,  at  all 
times  are  means  to  ends.  Through  the  chain  of  humanity,  we  are  therefore  in  this 
exploration both means and ends for ourselves, just as they were for all those who came 
259 This may be a product of the translation. 
260 This comes out in his critique of Hume and other historians (1767b, pp.24-32). The flawed aspect is  
similar to Ingram's use of 'false universals' that he takes from Judith Butler (2.4). See Section (5.2.1).
Herder continues this angle when he states that a number of questions need to be considered when 
approaching this: “What is human happiness? How far does it exist in this world? Considering the  
great difference of all the beings upon earth, and especially of man, how far is it to be found in every 
form of government, in every climate, in every change of circumstances, of age, and of the times? Is  
there any standard of these various states? And has Providence reckoned on the well-being of her 
creatures, in all these situations, as upon her ultimate and grand object? All these questions must be 
investigated,  they must  be unravelled through the wild whirl  of  ages  and governments,  before a 
general result for mankind at large can be produced. (1784-91d, p.xvi, my emphasis).
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before, and will be for those who follow after us. But more than this, Herder’s approach 
“aligns the history of the human race with the development of nature while subsuming 
both under the higher concepts of bildung and humanität” (Adler & Kopfe 2009, p.33). 
Exploring history is to become involved in this process through reflection, and thus has 
a moral component for Herder. In common with Kant, Herder held to the same idea of 
means and ends, but whereas Kant, because of his progressivism, sees people from the 
past as merely a means to an end, Herder's moral understanding of it identifies the past 
experiences and lives of people as both means and ends in their own rights.
4.2.6 Progress and Change
This exploration of the past allows for an understanding of the origins of volk, as well as 
the myths and religions of their times, but it also “brings to light about the most ancient 
history of the world, its migrations, languages, customs, inventions, and traditions, the 
more likely becomes, with every new discovery, the single origin of the whole species” 
(1774c,  p.3).  This  revelation  came  about  for  Herder  through  identifying  that  every 
culture  and  volk had  “received  seeds  of  culture,  language,  arts,  and sciences  from  
elsewhere” (p.21, his emphasis)261. All of humanity's expressions, no matter how distant, 
are linked to each other because “the whole chain of culture, derives from one common  
source”  (1772a, p.170, his emphasis). All human experiences, throughout history, are 
therefore  something  we  can  relate  to,  and  thus  we  can  learn  from them.  Through 
reflection,  we can not only grasp ourselves and the other more clearly,  we can also 
incorporate into ourselves those aspects which can contribute to our own process of 
being. This applies not just in the individual, or their family, but also to the  volk, and 
ultimately, all of humanity.
But Herder also cautions that attempts to recreate that culture in one's own time, or to 
“dwell... in wistful dreams of foreign lands from whence they seek hope and salvation” 
was not the purpose of history, but would instead “reveal the first symptoms of disease, 
of flatulence of unhealthy opulence, of approaching death” (1774a, p.187). We can learn 
from the past, but we cannot recreate the past in the present and should not attempt to do 
so. Just as dwelling in the past or attempting to recreate it was problematic, so too was 
the universalisation of a particular experience, or attempting to project that across space 
261 In this particular case his analysis also revealed that “the Greeks received all this as if they never had 
[received it], that they endowed it with an entirely new nature, that in every way the “beautiful” in the  
truest sense of the word was most certainly their work”. This claiming into oneself of past cultural  
creations was for Herder a crucial part of the organic development of a people. 
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and time. This was something Herder felt his own age was particularly responsible for 
when he suggests that “the general, philosophical, philanthropical tone of our century 
wishes to extend 'our own ideal' of virtue and happiness to each distant nation, to even 
the  remotest  age  in  history”  (1774a,  p.187).  This  was  true  not  just  for  morality  or 
'virtue', but also on the aesthetic level, which was equally problematic because “Nothing 
is more dangerous than transforming a delicacy of our taste into a universal principle 
and making it  into  a  law;  one good aspect  thereby results  in  ten  precarious  ones.” 
(1769a, p.98). No matter the norm, whether it be morality, progress, reason262, taste, or 
beauty, attempting to universalise them is always problematic. Even if something good 
could come from it, much more would be “precarious”. At the same time the process of 
developing understanding, through reflection, was for Herder universal, even if all of 
the empirical elements (including the body-mind), would always be unique.
His  view  of  human  progress  was  one  in  which  he  rejected  the  idea  of  previous 
generations and cultures existing merely to serve as platforms for latter generations to 
build upon. He instead placed intrinsic value on all cultures and communities that had 
existed in past and present ages as unique expressions of humanity. Herder argued in 
sharp contrast to Kant that, when we consider the universal, and the people within it, “Is 
not  everything  a  means  to  a  million  ends?  Is  not  everything  an  end  for  a  million 
means?” (1774a, p.214). Each and every culture is both a means and an end in its own 
right (p.194), and so cannot exist merely for its own purpose or for another wave that 
follows  afterwards.  Rather,  humanity  is  connected  in  their  individuality,  and  their 
collectivities, as expressions in a chain “twisted and tangled a thousand times... each 
link in the chain has its own place... but it [is] unaware of the end to which the chain 
finally attaches... everyone is under the illusion that he himself is the centre, is sensitive 
to everything around him only so far as... it directs its rays or its waves towards this 
centre (1774a, pp.215-6). Every person, and every people, are the centre of their own 
universe, just as each people find their own centre of happiness and so their own ends. 
But they are also at the same time a part of everyone else's universe, at different points 
on a chain that extends throughout history into the past, and into an unknowable future.
For Herder, human existence at all levels is a part of the process of progress and change, 
whether  that  be  in  language,  family,  culture  or  volk,  or  in  history.  The  point  of 
reflection,  or  of  the  “reflexive  mind” is  that  it  “governs  the  succession  of  ideas,  it 
262 He argues instead that “Universal human reason, as we would like to understand the term, is a cover 
for our favourite whims, idolatry, blindness, and laziness” (1778, p.223).
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operates even in his most sensual states... it is an essential trait of the human mind, to 
learn nothing for one moment only, but to connect everything with what it already knew, 
or to store it up for future associations” (1772a, p.156). We are in a constant state of 
trying to fit what we learn to what we already think we know, as a cumulative process of 
growth and change, rather than by instigating abrupt and radical changes (either through 
the external revolution of a state, or the internal revolution of our sense of self) in what 
and how we know the world. Essentially, our current being as becoming is a growth 
from  our  previous  being  as  becoming  which  (should)  have  come  about  through 
reflection.  As a  result,  we are  “always in  the state  of  development,  of  progress,  of 
becoming” (ibid.). This becoming is one that needs, in Herder's view, to occur based on 
his underlying universal moral goods of freedom, agency, cultivation, through situated 
experience. Ultimately, change is the primary state of human existence at all levels, but 
change as a consequence of reflection was the purpose of humanität.
As a result, change should always come from below, because only from below would it 
be an expression of an individual's agency and freedom, but change was also always 
dependent on their cultivation, and thus their experiences and perspective as members 
of multiple groupings.  It  has to come from the individuals contributing,  developing, 
growing and changing their volk in an organic way through their own reflection, just as 
an individual's perception of an experience of a volk is changed by their membership of 
a volk that each individual impacts on it through the progress of tradition. At the same 
time  that  individual,  and  all  individuals  involved  in  these  processes,  continued  a 
feedback mechanism by which their culture(s) organically changed over time.
Part of the issue that Herder had with the idea of European progress, and especially the 
writings by many of the philosophers of his time like Kant or Fichte on the idea of 
progress more generally, was not just that they assumed progress, or promoted their own 
version of virtue universally,  but  that  their  own versions were overwhelming in the 
promotion of a scientific, rational, mechanical system that relied on a Westphalian state 
system. This for Herder would inevitably lead to the  deformation of the cultures and 
volker they encountered,  and indeed of  the  European nations,  not  only because  the 
encounter  was  inevitably  negative  for  the  non-European  culture,  but  because  their 
emphasis of only one aspect of the mind – reason and rational thinking – unbalanced the 
progress of human existence and experiences for all involved (Gjestal 2017, p.177). I 
made the  point  in  section  (4.2.1)  concerning  language,  and how it  developed from 
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common emotional expressions that, if reason was used to re-organise it would lead to 
an emotional distancing of the people who use it from the expression of their emotions 
through language,  and this  applies here too. The overemphasis of reason, instead of 
emotion-reason as one, as well as the ongoing mechanistic reconstruction of western 
societies, which justified at least in part the idea of a linear progression, also produced 
the same problems. The hindering of organic growth and change that for Herder is an 
essential part of our humanity.
This is not to say that Herder believed reason was not an essential part of progress and 
change, nor is this to say that Herder saw all cultures in an absolutely equal way. He 
gave the development of reason a place of importance in the development of language 
and history, just as he placed Europe at the top of this development - just as he placed 
Indians at the top of their development of the  feeling of humanity. Herder's issue was 
the  primacy  that  Europe  gave  to  reason,  not  that  it  wasn't  important  or  indeed 
fundamental  to  any attempt at  progress and change.  Reflection,  after  all,  is  the key 
process that he relies on.  Bildung, needs reason to work. His critique of Europe was 
driven  by  his  identification  and  rejection  of  the  arrogance  and  superiority of  the 
European based on their privileging of the development of reason and not his rejection 
in toto of the European. In Yet Another Philosophy of History, as elsewhere in his works, 
he levels attack after attack on a Janus-faced European attitude:
“Ideas of universal love for humanity,  for all  nations,  and even enemies,  are 
exulted,  whilst  warm feelings of family and friendship are  allowed to decay. 
Principles  of  liberty,  honour  and  virtue  are  commonplace;  they  are  loudly 
acknowledged... whilst at the same time lying in chains of cowardice, shame, 
servility and miserable desultoriness.... Is this then the ideal state into which we 
are being fashioned, to which all Europe... increasingly aspires?” (Herder 1792, 
p.200)
This  critique,  perhaps  more  than any other,  presents  most  clearly his  rejection of  a 
'Kantian  Cosmopolitanism'  based  on  an  ongoing  universalisation  according  to 
overarching concepts, and aligned him much more closely to the kind of cosmopolitan 
ideals represented by Christof Wieland and Georg Forster (even though he disagreed 
with them in a number of other areas). He describes the actions and attitudes of Europe 
towards the rest of the world and themselves as one where reason was deliberately split 
off and placed in opposition to the sensate self, which was itself best represented for 
him by the works of Kant.
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This oppositional nature, rather than a move to a more active striving for their balanced 
harmony,  prevented  a  more  educated  and  technologically  advanced  Europe  from 
experiencing  humanität  as a process of  bildung. It prevented them from acting with 
emotional kindness and respect; essentially, of expressing their  humanität. Instead, it 
relied on a Kantian post-rationalised duty, stripped of emotional character or, as was far 
more often the case, it moved straight to forcing the rest of the world to endure blatant 
condescension,  imperialism,  colonisation,  exploitation,  slavery  and  repeated  acts  of 
cultural and ethnic genocide. Herder deduced that Europe's philosophical prioritising of 
reason, which led to their determination of what it meant to be human, and from there to 
the development  of a  racial  hierarchy and the subsequent  exclusion or  only limited 
acceptance of non-white people, was the underlying source of such atrocities.
The existence of each human being is woven together with his whole species. If 
our concepts concerning our destiny are not pure, what is the point of this or that 
small improvement? Do you not see that this sick person lies in infected air? – 
save him from out of it and he will get better automatically. In the case of radical 
evil, attack the roots; they bear the tree with its top and twigs. (1793-7c, pp.422) 
Whilst Europe might appear to some that it was ahead of all others, this meant nothing 
more or less than it was just one of a multitude of waves. Whether it was at the peak, 
ascending, descending, or in the trough, peaks and valleys which occurred in other times 
and places, humanity's moral progress was by no means assured “a quiet progress of the 
human  spirit  towards  the  improvement  of  the  world”.  The  assumption  of  this  was 
“hardly anything more than a phantom of our minds” (Herder 1774a, pp.187&195). 
This rejection of the primacy of reason was driven by his belief that humans and his 
vision of  humanität was of humans in touch and balanced by their sensate-reasoning 
selves.  Europe's  actions  and  the  path  they  were  following  was,  by  Herder's  own 
measure,  inhuman because it actively did harm to the rest of humanity, and hindered 
their own opportunities to progress and change as holistic beings (1793a, p.100). Kant, 
Fichte,  Condorcet  and others,  in  their  presentation  of  history as  moral  progression, 
suggested that the history of humanity could be characterised as having passed through 
specific  ages,  or  stages  of  human  development,  something  which  Herder  explicitly 
repudiated. Their reason for doing so was to unquestionably situate the peak of that 
progress in Europe (Kant 1784; Condorcet 1795; Fichte 1804-5 (1847) etc.263) and their 
263 Kant and Fichte, as well as Voltaire and Weiland, all located the peak of this moral progress in their 
own professions, and by extension in themselves. Herder's response to this was that “the philosopher  
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focus on human progress was directly equivalent to what Herder refers to as a “dry and 
cold reason” (1774a, p.276).
Herder also had sharp words to say concerning Kant's incorporation of selfishness by 
Providence for moral progress (Kant 1795, pp.108 & 124). Selfishness was not, nor 
should it ever be, a positive element. Scientific progress, trade and commerce  did not 
equate to moral progress and his response to this was characteristically biting: 
“Who is there who would not shudder at this misanthropic impudence? To be 
sure, we are, even in our stupidities and deeds of vice, tools in the hands of 
Providence – however,  not  to  our credit,  but  perhaps precisely in  order that; 
through a restless and hellish activity; poor amidst the greatest wealth; tortured 
by desires; enervated by luxurious sloth - we might die in a nauseating and slow 
way  from  this  stolen  poison....  if  no  other  path  than  this  can  the  nations 
experience salvation and solace, should one not here feel most painfully sorry 
for our whole species? (1793-7c, pp.382-3, my re-translation, his emphasis).
Herder and Kant's respective approaches to progress and change can be summed up 
quite  simply  here.  Kant  asks,  in  his  essay  An  Answer  to  the  Question,  what  is  
Enlightenment  (1784a) “If it now asked whether we at present live in an  enlightened 
age, the answer is: No, but we do live in an age of enlightenment” (p.58, his emphasis). 
For  Kant,  an  Enlightened  Age  is  the  end  goal  of  his  system264.  The  Age  of 
Enlightenment  is  the  period  of  movement  towards  that  goal.  Hence  the  question 
assumes the point is the final Age state, not a process, and represents his final era of 
Perpetual Peace within his Kingdom of Ends. For Herder, by contrast, there could be no 
end goal due to the dialectical nature of humans and cultures, where both advancement 
and regression are bound in to each other. There could never be such an age, but there 
could  be  an  ongoing  Age of  Enlightenment,  where  all  humans  are  able  to  actively 
engage in a process of becoming through being. 
4.2.7 Unity and Diversity
is never more of an ass than when he most confidently wishes to play god; when with remarkable 
assurance, he pronounces on the perfection of the world, wholly convinced that everything moves just 
so... that each generation reaches perfection in a completely linear progression, according to his ideals 
of virtue and happiness. It so happens that he is always the ration ultima, the last, the highest, link in 
the chain of being” (1774a, p.214).
264 Although Kant also acknowledges that humanity may well never get there, the end goal is known and 
the purpose is to strive for this end state. The age of enlightenment is the refining of the process by 
which to reach his Kingdom of Ends.
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Leading  on  from my exploration  of  Herder's  position  on  history,  and  progress  and 
change,  is  his  idea  of  unity  as  diversity  and  more  generally  in  response  to  the 
philosophical problem of 'The One and the Many'265. So far the focus of this chapter has 
been on emphasising change, under the understanding that difference is  the primary 
point of experiencing being, and through the process of being, happiness is experienced. 
In this, I have identified Herder's emphasis on this reflection process producing greater 
relief  between the self  and the other,  not just  in  an individual sense,  but  also more 
widely in terms of culture, volk and language. 
Reflection's purpose for Herder was to “extend... one's capacity for experience, beyond 
the structures given in one's native situation – not merely quantitative but qualitative266” 
(Morton 1989, p.18), but as Morton goes on to point out, Herder has a concern that it is 
possible to get lost in this process, losing one's sense of self in the constant, ongoing 
encounters with the other. Morton suggests thinking of it through the metaphor of the 
wave/particle duality of light, which incorporates both elements, but expresses only one 
at a time, as a particle, as ourself, as a wave as a part of a unity, which maps onto the  
idea of the One and the Many. Essentially, light is/are wavicle; always both singular and 
many  at the same time,  although the perspective we examine light  from determines 
whether we see it as one or many. To be subsumed through reflection means to become 
one  of the many, but only from the loss of the dual positionality as the One  and  the 
Many. Diversity is lost as a result and this is Herder's main concern that he engages with 
in his dual use of discursive and gestural writing in his leaves, fragments and groves, as 
well  as  being  the  main  method  by which  he  considered  language  in  his  essay  On 
Diligence in Several Learned Languages (1764)267.
Herder's emphasis on the necessary uniqueness of each and every individual is at the 
heart of the issue of what is traditionally thought of as the opposing forces of diversity 
and unity. To incorporate them as he did required a conceptual shift so that instead of 
265 Unity and Diversity in Herder's  works is the topic of Michael Morton's book (1989),  and I draw 
heavily from him in this section.
266 It is this qualitative aspect that require more than simply an enlargement of thought.
267 This dynamic also occurs not just in the consideration of the origin of language, but also from an 
engagement  with  literature  as  the  belle  lettres.  Through  reflection,  we  can  “cultivate  and  mould 
[ourselves, and] ...walk among statues as in a world of original ideas of beauty rendered sensuous: that  
shall be your first academy.” from this, we can therefore: 
“Behold: multiplicity on a single ground, in a single continuum, in a single patch of light and shadow.  
So  here  you  shall  study  the  concept  of  unity  and  diversity  as  ordinance,  as  juxtaposition  and  
composition. Here you will find these concepts smooth and perfect, in the whole and in its effect, in 
its groups and figures, arrangements and contrasts, light and colors; everywhere there is one fable and  
one world of visible diversity and unity” (1769b, p.288).
“How beautiful the human soul thereby becomes! Unity in its foundation, thousandfold diversity in its  
development, perfection in the totality!”(1769b, p.198).
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thinking of them as an “antinomy between the ideas of cultural and individual autonomy 
on the one hand and development and realisation of universal humanity on the other”, 
we  should  conceive  and  resolve  them “through  their  reinterpretation...  in  terms  of 
history268” (Morton 1989, p.11). This reinterpretation, for Herder, requires us to proceed 
through language which is to say that reflection is the process, language is the medium 
through  which  thought  passes,  and  the  history  of  language  and  thus  culture  and 
humanity is the setting that is used to resolve this seeming contradiction. Through this 
method,  which  he  re-presents  in  his  style  of  writing  not  just  in  On Diligence but 
elsewhere269, his interpretation of humanity and nations, and his analysis of thought and 
language are, as Morton puts it “The genuine equilibrium between the One and Many 
[which]  can  be  sustained  only  if  the  uniquely  individual  character  of  each  of  the 
elements of the Many is developed in a way that appears to render impossible their 
ultimate assimilation into a single all-embracing One” (p.43). This 'uniquely individual' 
person is the ultimate purpose of Herder's approach to education. The balance between 
the Many and the One can  only be maintained if  education is  directed towards the 
cultivation of individuality over conformity, through reflection in a situated existence.
This starts at the very beginning of his understanding of a child's life because “The 
human  being's  soul,  is  by nature,  unique,  and from the  youngest  age  a  person has 
already developed  a  sense  of  self,  a  concept  of  the  other,  can  distinguish  between 
sameness and difference, has an understanding of figure, form, magnitude and distance, 
grasps the concept of past  and present time, of the  one and the  more-than-one, and 
judgement” (1769b, pp.195); all before a single word has been spoken. Indeed Herder 
presents the accomplishment of the child as far in excess of all the abstractions that the 
philosopher  could  create.  This  process  of  sensation  and  experience,  reflection, 
interpretation and judgement relies on both the sensate and rational working together, 
such that:
“With repeated,  identical sensations the infant forms his first  judgement:  that 
they are the same sensation. This judgement is obscure and must be so, for it 
shall endure for a lifetime and remain a permanent basis in the soul. It must 
therefore have the strength and consistency, as it were, of an inner feeling; and 
so  it  is  preserved as  sensation.  In  the  manner  of  its  origin  it  was  already a 
268 Morton notes that Hegel, following Herder, achieves this shift “at the expense of history” rather than 
through history (p.11). Herder's system is open ended (from a human perspective), whereas Hegel's is 
closed (p.143). Marx's works, by contrast, are a project that attempts to close the circle.
269 For example Fragments (1767c) and Yet Another (1774a, b & c). The dialectical aspects are generally 
speaking more pronounced in his earlier works, but evident throughout.
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judgement, a result of combining several concepts; but because the judgement 
emerged through habit, and the habit of immediately applying that judgement 
preserved it, the form of its origin grew obscure and only the content remained; 
it became sensation” (p.194)  
The first part of this interpretation of the development of a child is that experiences – 
sensations - are necessary to trigger this cycle and Herder's development on education 
that I examine in more detail in section (4.3.1) follow this principle. The most important 
task is to harness the child's innate curiosity and enthusiasm, to help to induce deep 
emotional experiences of a positive nature that connected to the child through  all of 
their senses and which stay with the person all their life, acting as a well-spring from 
which they could reconnect to earlier memories of happiness. The secondary aspect to 
this was that this process would help to train, through experiencing and then reflecting, 
the child's understanding of their own emotions and sensations. It was only as the child 
grew, only after the child had that developed somewhat, that a more formalised ability 
to reason was to be gradually developed.
To hold on to one's own perspective, with all its partiality, whilst enlarging one's own 
mind to grasp the differences and similarities between the two experiences, to attempt to 
construct in one's mind the thought processes of the individual writing the texts,  all 
whilst  in addition stepping away from both perspectives to attempt a neutral stance. 
Only then, in Herder's view, is it possible to make the imaginative leap necessary to 
encounter a writer in a 'true' way that grasps the spirit of their essence and particularity, 
as  the  mind  makes  leaps  that  connect  both  the  rational  and  the  emotional,  whilst 
embedded in the writings of the author. This “living reading” is, for Herder, “the only 
reading, and the deepest means of education” (1778, p.218) and is the main path by 
which empathy can be developed. This  process has three aspects: mental enlargement 
of one's own perspective to try to fit the other's view and ideas into it; stepping outside 
in an attempt to take an objective view of both the other and one's self; and trying to 
intuitively 'feel through to the other' to grasp the author's 'essence of being'.
Herder's  response  to  The  One  and  The  Many predated  Kant's  own  solution  in  his 
Critique of Pure Reason. Tellingly though, because Herder's conclusion is linked to the 
cultural and historical specificity of language and the uniqueness of each individual's 
thoughts and experiences, the answer in this framing is always different (Morton 1989, 
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pp.171-2), and thus requires a never-ending multiplicity of experiences to give life to 
each individual person's response to their own dialectical becoming. It is this necessary 
multiplicity of difference that gives rise to the importance of change, creation, growth 
and  decay,  whether  it  be  the  development  of  the  mind  or  the  body,  cultures, 
communities and societies, or of humanity. His theory of humans was as sensing beings 
(Herder 1778, pp.187-243) inculcated into a culture through rearing and language, and 
so  both  given  agency  and  opportunity,  and  inevitably  constrained.  At  once  of 
individuality as One-of-Many, and yet also of humanity as One: encapsulated in the 
“twin themes of particularism and cosmopolitanism” (Morton 1989, p.18). But crucially 
reinterpreting this idea of cosmopolitanism not as “an empty formula” (Barnard 2003, 
p.40) of rationality, but instead “mediated by a cultural framework” that rejects the idea 
of the entirely self-made and atomised individual (Gjestal 2017, p.184).
Part 3: Humanity as Project
“Education must lead the individual to express himself, for in this expression of 
himself he was to realize his nature and destiny” (Andress 1916, p.137-8)
Part two of this chapter explored humanität as process, and established the interwoven 
nature  of  Herder's  view  of  humanity,  where  change  is  the  primary  'state'  of  this 
existence, and our natures are unique, yet indelibly influenced by our familial, cultural, 
historically situated perspective, and our self-determined volk identity through language. 
Each human is unique, and in possession of the capacity for Besonnheit – reflexivity – 
which when engaged with through humanität as process, is bildung. 
From  this,  the  passive  feeling  of  sympathy  that  we  might  have  for  another  is 
transformed through bildung into Einfuhlungsvermogen – empathy – which allows us to 
feel our way into the being of another, as well as grasp ourself more closely and clearly. 
The result of this ongoing process of  humanität  is the original meaning of empathy, 
which carries with it  a moral drive to both  express our humanity,  and  act upon the 
knowledge we gain from this multi-factored, multi-layered process. How we act, if it is 
in accordance with  humanität, is on one hand to cultivate ourselves. Yet at the same 
time to make use of, and contribute to tradition as the vehicle of our situated heritage by 
expressing our humanität – as a process of becoming. To facilitate the opportunities to 
develop, and express this capacity for others, so that they too can act in accordance with 
humanität in  process.  These  cultural  and  volk processes  require,  for  Herder,  an 
educational-political  project  –  humanität  as  project -  to  develop  volker-driven 
Sahra Taylor Page 208 of 300 Feb 2019
governments that would best facilitate an individual's capability to, and opportunities 
for, the situated activity of bildung.
Part three firstly considers the practical aspects of Herder's writings on education before 
elaborating on the three stages of human development during the schooling period (as 
child, boy/girl,  and youth).  In (4.3.1) I go on to examine some of the elements that 
constitute Herder's development of education in the schools he managed. I touch on his 
ideas  on  teaching  language,  religion  and  history.  Because  of  the  importance  that 
language and literature has in Herder's process of Besonnheit, I discuss his belle lettres 
(4.3.2); what constitutes them, as well as some of the implications that arise from their 
use.  This  then  leads  to  discussing  particular  aspects  of  his  critique  of  philosophy, 
philosophers, and the university (4.3.3).
Section  (4.3.4)  explores  the  purpose  and  reasons  behind  some  of  the  practical 
implications of government and the sciences that are explored at universities, as well as 
his views on commerce's influence on the expression of our humanität. Free speech is 
also a feature of this section before I move to an inter-volk and inter-state level (4.3.5). I 
finally play off Herder's dispositions against Kant's propositions, and examine his idea 
of patriotism before touching on his critique of colonialism.
4.3 Education
As with much of Herder's works, his educational-political project is diffusely spread 
across a number of the texts (both published by him, or made available some time after 
his  death),  in  contrast  to  other  political  and  philosophical  theorists  from  the 
Enlightenment period who produced and published works that specifically addressed 
this issue. Rousseau, for example, provided us with Emile (1762), Pestallozi wrote How 
Gertrude Teaches Her Children (1801) and even though somewhat flawed270, we have 
Kant's  Lectures on Pedagogy  (1803).  All  of these texts are widely known and have 
experienced a wealth of critical examination in a variety of languages, across a number 
of different disciplines (Although Pestallozi's has been for the most part restricted to the 
history of  education).  Herder's  writings  on education were eventually compiled and 
published as volume thirty of Suphan's Sammtliche Werke in the late 18th century. They 
feature written addresses  to  his  pupils  and staff,  details  of  his  ongoing struggles  to 
increase his teacher's pay, to provide them with bursaries to purchase additional books, 
270 (Louden 2007/2013, pp.434-436)
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as well as his attempts to develop vocational schools for the poor and the orphaned, as 
well  as  expanding  the  resources  available  to  the  schools  in  Weimar  that  he  was 
responsible for, in addition to writing children's text books. The most recently publish 
book  that  directly  engaged  with  Herder's  texts  on  education  was  J.  Mace  Andress' 
Johann Gottfried Herder as an Educator (1916). Andress notes that Herder “concerned 
himself personally with courses of study, methods of teaching, the training of teachers, 
better school equipment, better libraries, the specific aim of various studies, etc. The 
reform  of  the  Weimar  gymnasium  was  probably  his  greatest  piece  of  school 
reorganization” (p.4). Andress' book also contains his expositions on, and translations 
of, a significant number of passages and texts from this Suphan book, and as a result, I 
draw on this book to a significant degree in sections (4.3.1) and (4.3.2). Yet at the same 
time, the translation issues that I discussed in section (4.1.2) also applies here, so they 
are supplemented by, or in some cases rejected271, in favour of his other, more recently 
and more accurately translated texts that touch on education.
Given the profound level of importance that Herder placed on change, cultivation, the 
process  of  living,  and  the  interwoven  nature  of  existence,  it  should  come  as  little 
surprise  that  this  determined  not  just  the  need  for  a  mostly  passive  and  flexible 
institutional system for the  volk, to allow for the growth and change of a people over 
time,  but  that  this  system should  serve  the  people  and not  rule  or  order  them.  His 
educational  project  was  also  both  designed  to  be  active  in  the  cultivation  of  the 
reflective capabilities of the pupils, in service to humanität as process, whilst resistant to 
specific cultural moral norms. In Herder's view, we receive from and co-create with our 
families, communities and volk the basics of language, morality, culture and tradition. 
The school serves to actively encourage and balance the development of reflection, and 
contributes knowledge which helps both understanding, and practical skills for the pupil 
throughout their life.
Herder's approach to education relied on his understanding of humans as physical and 
situated beings, who gradually develop over time, as well as basing his understanding of 
the way to proceed in education on a physiological and psychological understanding of 
the human body and mind.  From this understanding,  Herder suggested that  humans 
experience a layering effect of identity and knowledge as the mind and body grows and 
develops from childhood to maturity. This led him to conclude that the human body also 
271 Andress makes a number of translation assumptions similar to Church (1800) in Ideas. For example 
Kultur is translated as civilisation, rather than culture (e.g. Andress 1916, pp.196 & 214).
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develops in stages, and its capabilities, both physical and mental, followed this pattern 
(1769c, p.77). The opportunity to easily learn, and the best time to establish a strong, 
moral,  situated  and  individual  identity  was  at  the  beginning  of  a  life  where  love, 
curiosity, activity and discovery would drive this process. As a result, the Kantian idea 
of a personal revolution of the self during late adulthood, where a person can suddenly, 
through  an  internal  revolution,  become  a  morally  acting  being  was  for  Herder  to 
fundamentally misunderstand both the psychology and physiology of humans, as well 
as  the  profound impact  that  situated  living  exerts  on humans  both  individually and 
collectively. The kind of approach that Kant exemplified272 was considered by him both 
unrealistic and unlikely to be successful.  Herder's approach was instead designed to 
promote for as long as possible an environment that would delay the inevitable “ageing 
of the human soul” (p.70, his emphasis)  but this approach was to be determined by 
empirical observations, not a universal norm produced from abstract philosophy.
This first stage of human existence is  characterised by curiosity and “active unrest” 
(Andress  1916,  p.142)  which  requires  the  use  and  cultivation  of  all of  the  senses 
(Herder 1769c, pp.80 & 83). The purpose of this is to allow each child to “act of himself 
and according to his own motive, which is curiosity”, and experience “diverse, tangible 
and vivid sensations perceived in the most uniquely individual manner” which would 
help to “produce original men” (p.83). This must be led and guided, but in a relatively 
passive way, without imparting one's own prejudices or biases on the child, but also 
serving to avoid “foreign motives” like vanity (p.82). This process makes the individual 
the creator of their own understandings, and because these experiences engage all the 
senses, it occurs in a holistic manner. To permanently, or for a long period, deny a child 
the  opportunity to  “exercise  one's  faculties”  (ibid.)  –  something that  is  evident  and 
necessary in Kant's perception of the need for the disciplining of a child (See section 
3.5.1) - would lead to a fundamental and irrevocable loss of the ability to use those 
senses to their fullest extent (p.80), something that can momentarily occur if a child is 
forced into “long periods of abstract thought” (ibid.)273. 
But Herder also acknowledged that there were both positive and negative effects to his 
approach.  On  the  one  hand,  the  more  potent  these  experiences  are  stored  in  one's 
272 See sections (3.5) and (3.6).
273 Given Herder's  frequent  comments  throughout  his  writings  about  “grammarians”  who force  their 
pupils to endure long hours of learning on abstract thoughts – and of how he believed that having to 
endure this himself had permanently harmed his ability to express and experience in a holistic manner, 
it is unsurprising that he would take this stance.
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memory and 'soul' the longer they will endure, but on the other hand the more we recall  
specific experiences the more their recollection becomes a habit, which slowly hardens 
over time (p.86). This process could be slowed down though if the child had more, and 
more varied, opportunities for the ongoing stimulation of their senses, driven by their 
natural  curiosity.  The  overall  purpose  of  this  relatively  free  period  of  exploration, 
discovery  and  sensate  experiences  is  to  establish  in  the  child  the  understanding  of 
themselves as creators of their own knowledge and even more importantly of their own 
understanding.  Learning for  the  child  would  then,  in  Herder's  belief274,  spring  from 
curiosity and “become a pleasurable activity, a joy, a delight” (p.81). Herder even goes 
so far as to suggest that “everyone should really invent their own language, understand 
the idea underlying each word as if he had discovered it himself” (ibid), replicating his 
own arguments in On Diligence on the origin of language and the process of choice and 
freedom through reflection.
Herder’s second stage is adulthood, where “the strong sallies of his  imagination are 
stifled;  he  learns  to  adapt  himself  to  the  ways  of  others,  and  at  the  same  time  to 
distinguish  himself  from themselves”  (1769c,  p.78).  The  mind  gradually  “becomes 
closed” (p.85) and at this point, according to Herder, the person finds it easier to apply 
the ideas, techniques and experiences that had formed whilst young rather than their 
creation. Encounters with the different become more and more difficult to process and 
incorporate into oneself and there is a marked tendency to revert to what we already 
know and believe. This stage is, according to Herder, the time when a person “can be a 
true philosopher of action, of wisdom and experienced” (p.78). 
The third and final stage was old age, where “The old man is a prater and a philosopher 
of words... this is the age of rest... the mind is scarcely open to new impressions any 
more and little disposed to new experiences” (p.78-79). One thing that can be clearly 
seen from this is a direct contrast between Kant's perspective and his own. Whereas 
Kant imbues this third stage with gravitas and moral right, Herder sees this as the least 
active part of one's ongoing cultivation. Since humanität in the individual is a process 
and activity of cultivation, old age is when humanity for the most part reverts back to 
earlier expressions. Part of the purpose for the wide range of experiences he encouraged 
for the child was to delay the onset of this phase because of its tendency to delay the 
progress of tradition. At its worst it would be a hindrance to, or even rejection of, the 
274 Herder had not yet, at the time of writing, had more than a few years of teaching experience, and the 
teaching he had given was at a lower social level, with less ability to influence teaching practices.
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need to perceive tradition as a process of change through time.
This understanding of human nature,  and the purpose of education within a situated 
setting, also carries with it the reality for Herder that “tendencies or talents slumbering 
in the heart therefore, may never become actual accomplishments” (1774a, p.184). With 
every step along the path of a human's life, choice and the freedom to choose collapse 
alternate paths of opportunity, and shift and change the ways we develop as humans. 
Each choice is both agency and denial but by basing it to a large extent on the pupils 
themselves, as they grow up, Herder establishes a sense of freedom, choice, agency, 
individuality  and  personal  responsibility  for  one's  own choices  in  this  approach  to 
education. The attempt by the teacher in the school to avoid overt bias, and to try to 
prevent attitudes like vanity from appearing, minimise overt cultural influences and the 
number of paths collapsed. Yet at the same time the first teaching occurs in the home by 
the parents who establish “the formation of a kinship mode of thought by virtue of the 
manner in which education is first transmitted...  the development of language which 
constitutes the medium of this  transmission...  is [also] intimately bound up with the 
spiritual heritage of the family, since it is through the language of the parents that a 
given mode of thinking is perpetuated” (1772a, p.163). 
The way we think and the paths we follow are as a result not something we have total  
control over, because our individuality is constrained; “although admittedly... it  is the 
deepest self in us, [we are] not as autonomous, voluntarily choosing, and unbound as is 
believed.” (1778, p.212). Our reasoning is always already partial because it develops in 
a particular setting. Reflection guided by humanität provides a way for an individual to 
recognise this partiality at the same time affirming one's individuality by acknowledging 
that “[t]he more deeply someone has climbed down into himself, into the structure and 
origin of his noblest thoughts, then the more he will cover his eyes and feet and say: 
“What I am, I have become. I have grown like a tree; the seed was there, but air, earth, 
and all the elements, which I did not deposit about myself, had to contribute in order to 
form  the  seed,  the  fruit,  the  tree.””  (pp.213-4).  Extending  this  metaphor  further, 
incorporating bildung, the tree also affects the air, earth and elements, shaping in turn 
that which shaped it, affecting the plants around it because no tree grows in isolation.
The difference between a tree and a person, though, is that a tree has a ‘natural’ instinct, 
but a person, in Herder's view, is characterised by the freedom to choose – to affect their 
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own cultivation. Even if they have no choice over the seed’s constitution, and they do 
not have complete authority over the air, earth and elements, they still have influence. 
Herder's holism – of the total development of all aspects of the tree - and his arguments 
that each person, each culture,  each community and each  volk has its  own inherent 
worth, as well as his arguments against asymmetric power dynamics, lead him to the 
conclusion that cultivating the capability of reflection is the best way that the person can 
express the “worth and beauty of free human nature” (Herder, cited in Andress 1916, 
p.122). This allows the individual to see both the necessity of partiality and situated 
living and to make choices from that  awareness -  and to become, if  they chose,  “a 
nobler, freer soul by his own exertions” (ibid, p.124).
But Herder was also responding to a wider belief that education should be primarily 
concerned  with  “good  knowledge  of  the  exact  sciences,  instruction,  enlightenment, 
clarification and the polishing of manners” (1774a, p.204) – reminiscent of the kind of 
approach to education that Kant favoured. From Herder's perspective, this approach did 
not have the capacity to “change or develop dispositions”, nor was the current direction 
of Germany, or the Enlightenment more generally, interested in “restoring or creating 
afresh the attitudes... whereby alone it is possible to build a 'better world'” (ibid.). To 
achieve this better  world required,  in Herder's view, an emotional-rational education 
because humans are more likely to be swayed and moved by emotional appeals to our 
sensibilities than by logic or reason. Without an education in sensation and 'taste', we 
are less able to experience our lives in a holistic way that incorporates both aspects as 
one,  and vulnerable to emotional influence.  Pupils, as a consequence,  needs to have 
instilled  in  them “the gentle  feeling  of  the  beautiful  and the  good accompanied  by 
reason and choice” (1775a, p.331). From this, if “reason... joins with inclination and 
habit to form a universal taste of life... that is... education” (p.332) a harmony of all the 
pupil’s  “powers”  allows  us  to  be  active  in  our  education  so  that  we  can  cultivate 
ourselves rather than simply being formed by others.
4.3.1 Schooling
Herder's writings on schooling were in response to three main aspects of education. 
Firstly, the existing schooling of his time, where he recognised problems and positive 
developments  in  the  formal  teaching  dynamic  between  teacher  and  pupil,  the 
systematisation of the knowledges that were being taught, and the contents of the topics 
themselves. Secondly, he addressed what he felt needed to change, and in what ways, to 
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promote the capacity of, and opportunities for, bildung on a practical level. Finally, he 
explored  what  would  be  the  ideal  way of  continuing  this  transitional  period  into  a 
process of ongoing development and change.
The existing schooling situation was a mostly static  and one-sided determination of 
particular types of knowledge deemed appropriate by special interests (mostly clerical 
and aristocratic) that funded the schools, and the teachers taught at the passive student. 
They  focussed  on  learning  Latin  (religion  and  history)  and  French  (literature  and 
science), neglected the German language, and this education came with a yearning for 
'never existing, better pasts'. It also involved, in Herder's view, high levels of abstraction 
and  advanced  levels  of  knowledge  that  were  for  the  most  part  useless  or 
incomprehensible  to  the  pupil.  These  schools  were  “a  dusty  prison  into  which  the 
children are driven as young cattle into a dark cave only to break joyfully away from it  
as soon as escape is possible” (Herder, cited in Andress 1916, p.121). This involved 
among other things an overworked teaching staff, limited resources, a large amount of 
rote learning, abstract and complex topics that had little relevance to the majority of the 
pupils,  very  large  classes  where  the  students  were  treated  as  a  mass  rather  than 
individuals, and a high drop-out rate between the stages of schooling. 
These schools were designed primarily for those who aspired to be scholars themselves, 
which made them for the most part  useless to the working people – and effectively 
removed all the working people from further or advanced levels of education due to 
their lack of relevance. The working classes, from Herder's perspective, needed not just 
better  education  in  the  subjects  they  were  taught,  but  also  additional  education  in 
practical subjects through the establishment of 'industrial schools' for those who made 
their living in the “manual arts”. What was also required though, to facilitate this, was 
an establishment where teachers could be taught to more effectively teach.  Through 
Herder's  ongoing efforts,  he  managed to  establish  both  an  industrial  school  for  the 
workers  and a  seminary where  the  top  students,  older  people  (ex-soldiers  etc.)  and 
teachers could develop their teaching abilities.
The role of these teachers was not just for the existing political/social system. Herder 
very specifically insisted that they should:
“[w]ork not for the present alone but also and mostly for the future; not for the 
world as it is but also as it is to be; not for our city or country alone, but for the  
welfare of youth in all lands that have been given into your keeping. Comfort, 
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strengthen, and encourage yourself with the thought that your arduous profession 
is no private work but a universal, public, eternal work, a work which concerns 
the  city,  country,  posterity,  where  seed  continues  to  sprout  with  developing 
reason, continues to grow with increasing knowledge and humanity, yes, which 
wins new strength in every new field, and bears new blossoms and fruits. Keep 
yourself removed in all your work from private opinions and from all private 
anxieties. You are destined to pass away but the school will remain" (Herder, 
cited in Andress 1916, pp.212-3).
Thus, Herder's vision of education was, as Gjesdal suggests, “an education to a pluralist 
– cosmopolitan, as Kant would put it – commitment” (2017, p.177) that allowed for the 
development of his own version of moral cosmopolitanism (Spencer 2015, p.370) as 
bildung. 
Given the importance that Herder gave to language in much of his writings, it should 
come as no surprise that this was a focus for him in schooling as well. There were two 
main issues he felt he had to respond to, with the first being more practical, yet still 
political and cultural – the general perception of the German language at that time. It 
had “little or no standing among scholars and men of letters. It was thought to be almost 
impossible as an exact and refined instrument of thought. The Latin tongue alone was 
the language par excellence; and German was relegated to the common people as a kind 
of vulgarism” (Andress 1916, p.185). Language in Herder's view was a crucial part of 
the  cultural  heritage  of  a  people,  and  the  medium  through  which  tradition  was 
transferred.  His  work  on  this,  not  just  in  the  schools  he  managed,  but  also  in  his 
involvement  with  the  Sturm  und  Drang movement,  the  poetry  he  translated  and 
produced, the folk tales he gathered, and his linking of language to thought, helped to 
shift this perception of the German language during his lifetime.
But  more  than  this,  and  a  topic  that  he  considered  carefully  and  detailed  in  On 
Diligence (1764) was the question of learning languages, and/or the use of translations. 
The conclusion he reached in the essay was that both can and usually are of use, but the 
deeper  reading  requires  the  ability  to  read  the  original  tongue  because  it  is  in  that 
original language that the fullest encounter with the writer is possible. Since besonnheit 
requires the multiple movement and mental creation of the self and the other, the other 
cannot be created authentically if the language is not there as well. Language, after all, 
in his view, carries with it the imprint of the culture and history of the  volk that each 
person was a part of. This led Herder to conclude that a more expansive engagement 
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with different languages is essential for humanität, and thus must be an important part 
of a pupil's education. 
Secondly, as has already been discussed in section (4.2.1), the progression of language 
through time from the origin of humanity had slowly shifted from a predominately 
emotional  character  to  a  much  more  formalised  and  structured  system  of 
communication. The production of the written word reduced this emotional aspect still 
further because whilst it allowed for the transmission of information across the world 
and through time, it also created a barrier between the person writing and the person 
reading, which would not be there in direct discourse. Herder's approach to the teaching 
of language was in part an attempt to counteract this impact, and re-imbue language 
with at least a part of its original emotional nature. This required the active development 
of the capacity for speech, since this was the route by which our thoughts flowed. It 
should “possess not merely tone, but character. As music has a scale on which the voice 
must be practised so that it will ascend and descend, so speech has extensive riches in 
sentiments,  sorrows,  beliefs,  convictions,  and emotions  of  the  soul  which  are  to  be 
expressed most vividly, naturally, and pleasantly.” (Andress 1916, p.186)275. In addition, 
whilst reading silently offered a way to develop our capacities to understand language, 
reading out  loud allowed for  this  capacity to  be  extended into  speech as  well,  and 
brought the reader closer to the writer. This reading, Herder suggested, should occur 
“with understanding and feeling”, making use of “stories, fables, history, conversation, 
soliloquies,  poetry,  odes,  hymns,  comedy,  and tragedy” that  would be sourced from 
local works, as well as classical and religious texts - ideally those that were considered 
belle lettres (see section 4.3.2).
When it came to religion, Herder also took a somewhat radical view of its teaching, 
because “Religion to him was not a mental state of mere belief, knowledge or emotion, 
but one of action” (p.170). Just as for the teaching of language, the texts explored also 
needed to be understood and for them to matter to the practical circumstances of the 
pupils being taught (p.168). Religion was also multiple, in that, linking back to section 
(4.2.3), religion was a manifestation of each  volk's quest for understanding. God had 
revealed himself to different people, at different times, in different ways, and was as a 
275 State-provided speech therapy courses make explicit the differences in speech styles between men and 
women. Higher levels of intonation and inflection that those assigned female and are expected to  
express, and that those assigned and raised male on the whole speak in a far more monotonous way. 
Cultural  norms  affect  overall  pitch,  range  and  frequency which  men  and  women  from different 
cultural groups, as well as different languages and nations, speak at. The way we speak is culturally 
determined, and the median frequency we speak at is influenced, but not determined by, our biology.
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result represented in different religious texts, as well as being worshipped in different 
ways. Given his standing as a preacher, Herder took a radical stance on religion because 
he “refused to believe that God had revealed himself but once, and that his words, as 
inflexible as cast iron, were necessary for salvation. God was revealed to him not only 
in the scriptures but in the various manifestations of history and nature.” (p.171). 
Herder was after all a Christian – and he believed that the teaching of Jesus, as well as 
the writings in the bible were the best expressions of religion that humanity possessed. 
But his focus on the teachings of Jesus was not simply to replicate them in the present, 
but rather that they should be adapted for the present era (Herder 1769c, p.90). He even 
went so far as to argue that “[t]he religion of Christ, which was represented by Himself, 
taught by Him and practiced by Him, was this humanity. It was nothing but this; but it 
was  this  also  in  the  widest  sense,  in  the  purest  source,  and  in  the  most  effective 
application. Christ knew for himself no nobler name than when he called himself the 
son of man, that is to say, a human being” (Herder 1793a, p.103, his emphasis). By 
emphasising both the human aspects of Jesus, and noting his use of “practised” and 
“application”, Herder presents religion as a human centred activity.
When  it  came  to  studying  history  and  geography,  Herder's  approach  was  to  firstly 
introduce the pupil to individual stories from a number of different cultures, times and 
locations, and then to slowly expand this to incorporate cultures, volk and the process of 
history as a “state of becoming” (Andress 1916, p.172). To study history was to study 
humanity,  and  with  the  right  texts,  produced  as  belle  lettres276 –  as  authentic,  true 
produces of a  writer’s  beliefs  – they could contribute to the cultivation of our own 
humanität. What he wanted to show and for the pupils to learn, was firstly not just the  
famous figures and their achievements, but also their failures. Alexander the Great, for 
example, should be shown as “Alexander the conqueror of the world, the drunkard, the 
cruel, the conceited, and Alexander the protector of art, the patron of science, the builder 
of cities and empire” (p.174). Through and in history, we can and must “learn to admire, 
learn what to admire, to love what should he loved, but also to hate, despise, and abhor 
what  is  hateful,  despicable  and  abhorrent[?]—otherwise  we  should  be  deceitful 
murderers of human history” (Herder cited in Andress 1916, p.175). Secondly, it should 
explore “the life and the achievements of the common people” (p.173) as well as how 
the arts and sciences developed over time. Geography came hand in hand with history, 
as the “home of man” and should extend beyond simply the recitation of “facts” to 
276 See section (4.3.2).
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“their explanation” which the pupil was expected to be involved in. Initially exploring 
those things which “grow out of the child's interests” (p.182) before developing them 
further and then linking them to history more directly.
On a practical,  structural level,  Herder's  response to the existing situation of formal 
education277 was to reformulate it so that it  established three basic groups of pupils; 
infants, boys278, and youths. The first stage harnessed their natural curiosity and desire 
to be active, focusing on the development of an infant's perception and feeling – their 
sense experiences from the immediate environment they start to develop their active 
reflection from – as well as teaching in natural history, stories from history, catechism, 
proverbs and German poetry. The prominence of history is notable here. The second 
stage harnesses the boy's imagination and the subjects taught become more inter-related. 
Science was introduced, natural history became natural philosophy, maths was linked to 
physics  and  the  historical  stories  expanded  to  the  histories  of  peoples,  related  to 
geography. Religion was also connected to humanity,  and movements were made to 
cultivate ideas of universal humanity. The third stage moved the youth to the use of their 
reason and their study becomes more scientific in nature, incorporating natural history 
and natural philosophy. Maths becomes more scientific and systematic, and history and 
geography led to politics, industry and culture. Religion and the study of humanity was 
finally 'elevated to philosophy' as a combination of all the studies that the pupil has 
engaged with (Andress 1916, pp.199-200).
This system also reflects Herder's understanding of the human capacity of Besonnheit -  
reflection  –  where  he  presents  the  process  of  reflection  as  the  tripartite  product  of 
imagination and sensation through language (1765, p.11). Imagination is particularly 
relevant  here  because  it  is  the  key  ingredient  that  allows  for  the  mental  leap  he 
perceived necessary to truly grasp the unique personality of an individual that we “feel 
our way into” when we read their works or encounter them in person. Using simply 
sensation (i.e. the empirical) and reason (i.e. logic) is not enough. Besonnheit for Herder 
is the ordering of imagination and sensation not as philosophy or logic, but as “healthy 
understanding”279,  which  requires  reason  as/in/through  language  and  as  a  result  is 
imperfect  'logic'.  Herder's  Besonnheit requires,  essentially,  an  engagement  that 
277  He was a superintendent, and director, of the Weimar schools from 1783 to his death in 1804.
278 Girls were not taught at the schools he managed, although the teachers trained in his seminary were 
also expected to teach girls.
279 This  is  also translated  to  “true understanding”,  and  a  similar  pattern  follows his  use of  “healthy 
reason” and “true reason”. True and healthy reason are not 'pure', they are linked to Besonnheit, just as 
true and healthy understanding are its product. 
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recognises the fragmentary, and often illogical and contradictory ideas that imagination 
'resolves' beyond what reason and empirical analysis can deduce. In this, Andress is 
incorrect to link to philosophy here without also making explicit that Herder rejected the 
general  direction  of  abstract  philosophising  that  was  occurring  during  his  time.  By 
contrast,  Herder  makes  clear  that  his philosophy is  both  conceptually  different  and 
practical in nature - it serves the purpose of humanity, which is why he both refers to it 
as “healthy understanding”, and repeatedly asserts that  all humans, at all times, in all 
places, no matter the culture or volk, can use healthy reason. This is what he believed 
philosophers should be focusing on helping to develop, instead of excluding themselves 
from the people and producing illusory mental constructs and transcendental a priori’s.
Our imagination is cultivated by “sensuous cognition, the wit... the sensuous appetites,  
enjoyment, the passions and inclinations” (1781, p.338) something that Herder sees as 
being ordered by “the belle lettres”. Along with “our inclinations and desires; they are 
the lens reflecting truth, which is revealed to us mortals only as appearance; they are the 
artisans  who  order  the  ground  of  our  souls,  so  that  truth  and  virtue  may be  made 
manifest to us. There is scarcely more that can be said in their favor; there is no higher 
endorsement.” (p.339). It is for this reason that Herder focuses so much on “Languages 
and poetry, rhetoric and history” in the previous two stages of teaching because “they 
are humaniora, sciences and exercises that develop the feeling of humanity within us” 
(p.345, his emphasis). 
4.3.2 The Belles Lettres
The  Belle Lettres, for Herder, occupy a unique position of importance. They cultivate 
the “so-called lower faculties of the soul” (1781, p.338) as well as “exert[ing] the finest 
and best influence on the higher sciences280” (ibid.). Because of Herder's belief that “all 
the powers of the soul are only one power”, and that all the powers of the mind are only 
one power as a holistic whole, this means that the  belle lettres contribute to, and are 
necessary for, all aspects of human existence and the development of humanität. They 
“order the ground of our souls, so that truth and virtue may be made manifest to us. 
There is scarcely more that can be said in their favor; there is no higher endorsement.” 
(p.339).  Belle Lettres should contribute to  all aspects of a pupil's education, and they 
should also  be introduced  before our  encounter  with  the “higher  sciences”.  Further, 
Herder also asserts that the highest science of all is the “art of living” (p.337). This 
280 The 'Higher Sciences' during his time typically referred to philosophy and theology.
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suggests that for him, the higher sciences are in this respect the humanities – broadly 
speaking - which the pupil is introduced to in the first stage of their education.
Given the importance and impact that Herder sees the belle lettres exerting, or needing 
to exert, on humanity, he is quite specific that not all texts, whether they be on history, 
writing of poetry, novels, or whether they are considered a part of 'the classics' etc., are 
belle lettres. A belle lettre is a text that a writer produces “in which he dwelt for years as 
in the property of his spirit and heart, an author such as this, I say, for better or for 
worse, in a way presents to the public with his book a part of his soul” (1784a, p.111). It 
must  have  been created  as  a  true  expression of  the  writer,  in  their  own process  of 
humanität,  and  whilst  the  pupil's  encounter  with  them  must  “precede  the  higher 
sciences” this must happen in such a way that “truth underpins the former also” (1781, 
p.342, his emphasis). The belle lettres are simply, and precisely, only those texts which 
“develop the feeling of humanity within us” (p.345). 
Translated  texts  are,  given  what  has  been  discussed  so  far281,  not  the  best  way to 
experience this, according to Herder, because they do not provide the same impact as 
engaging  with  the  text  in  their  original  language.  The  language,  after  all,  carries 
familial, cultural and volk 'signatures' that situate the writer in a unique way, but their 
relationships  are  altered  through  translation,  just  as  their  situation  cannot  be  fully 
grasped without a wider understanding of the culture, environment, and the 'spirit' that 
most drives their volk. The pupil's encounter with the belle lettres is from this limited to 
the languages that they can read and write. In the earlier stages, this would most likely 
be in German, but given that Greek and Latin were also widely taught, and French was 
privileged so much at that time, texts from these languages were often a part of a pupil's 
education. To read the stories of the Romans in Latin, or of the Greeks in their own 
tongue, allowed the student to “gain an entrance into the ideal world of the Greek [or 
Roman]  thought  and  civilization”  (Herder,  paraphrased  in  Andress  1916,  p.196). 
Reading aloud helps because the words are externalised and encountered again in our 
minds through hearing. The cadence and flow all contribute to an active (as well as 
physical) encounter with the words of the author in a way that reading in one's mind 
cannot  provide  because spoken language carries  an emotional  aspect  that  was itself 
embedded in ourselves as children.  The focus  that  Herder  gave to  developing one's 
capacity for speaking in a more melodic and emotional way expands the interaction and 
impact of the belle lettres
281 See sections (4.2.1) & (4.3.1).
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For Herder, engaging with belle lettres through Besonnheit should allow us to “walk in 
the  spirit  of  our  ancestors”,  but  how and in  what  way they make our  own “ideals, 
feelings, and aspirations...  purer, better,  higher” (p.197) is indeterminate. It does not 
mean that  we will  learn  the  same things,  nor  does  it  tell  us  how our  humanität is 
cultivated. These are both necessarily vague and ambiguous, because their purpose is in 
Herder's  view  ultimately  not  scientifically  justifiable.  Firstly  and  most  importantly 
because  Besonnheit relies  on  imagination to  work  –  but  unlike  the  Kantian  use  of 
imagination  in  judgement,  which  functions  by  universalising  the  particular  through 
reflection (Kant 1790). Herder's is a step 'beyond' logic applied to the empirical. It relies 
on  the  leap  outside  logic  and  sensation  to  connect  fragmentary,  illogical  and 
contradictory elements  at  multiple  levels,  not  just  of  the author  of  the  text  or  their 
situated reality, but also of the mirror-image of the reader. The 'image' of the other is not 
a  cohesive  or  singular  holistic  whole.  It  is  not  a  single  spiderweb  explaining  the 
complex interconnected individual or culture encountered, it is multiple spiderwebs that 
may connect, yet do not do so in a logical, coherent or consistent fashion, and which 
changes over time. Imagination allows us to somehow bring all of this together in the 
process of Besonnheit. The multitude of threads that make up our nature, experiences, 
and understandings start  and stop,  reverse,  and act in  illogical  ways in  the multiple 
patterns of our humanity that form a singular person. As a result, the product of this is a  
human, or a culture, or a people, that cannot -  and should not ever - be universalised. 
This contradictory, confounding, and unique individual, not just as a seed but also as a 
result of their cultivation into a tree ensures that every encounter with a belle lettre will 
be unique to the individual. 
The ultimate point for Herder in all of this, as has been mentioned previously, is that the 
individual  cannot  be  subsumed  or  lured  into  wanting  to  become  that  which  they 
encounter. The pupil must “not... lose his own individuality through this study nor was 
he to imitate the Greeks; he was to learn how to live in the spirit of the ancients. He was  
to find the secret as to how he might develop his own humanity” (Herder paraphrased, 
Andress 1916, p.190, my emphasis). 
4.3.3 Philosophy, and the University
So far, this chapter has noted in a number of places the problematic relationship that 
Herder's had with philosophy. “Logic” philosophy that attempts to establish, or which 
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contained, “comfortless, far-too-universal rules” were not just a problem for him but, 
following on from Rousseau, something he considered a danger to the people282. But 
unlike Rousseau, who simply rejected this type of philosophy, Herder cuttingly noted 
that Rousseau himself needed the training of a philosopher to develop his own critique 
and justification of the dangers of this type of philosophy. From this, Herder argues that, 
firstly, philosophy as “healthy understanding” is the only thing that can counteract the 
damage that analytic philosophy has caused on both education and the people at large. 
Secondly, he shows that this type of philosophy not only counteracts the harm that logic 
philosophy has caused to the people, but is also good in its own right for the people.
Whilst Herder accepted that “philosophical thinking is a perfection” (1765, p.10), he 
was also responding to a situation where philosophers were for the most part socially 
isolated from the people – what we would now think of as the ivory tower. Herder 
referred to them as “a troglodyte-people living in caves” (p.7), which hindered their 
ability  to  bildung.  The  result  of  this  increasing  social  distancing  and  philosophical 
abstraction was that their  thinking was of no benefit  to the people because they no 
longer saw themselves as an integral part of the people (p.29). But this lack of bildung 
also  influenced  the  cultures  and  traditions  of  scholasticism  itself  –  reducing  or 
preventing their own cultural norms from progressing and changing. They were instead, 
more and more, taking the position that they were a people above the rest due to only a 
single aspect of their  capabilities – their  intellectual/reasoning capabilities. This was 
ably demonstrated, Herder believed, by the continual arguments by philosophers that 
they  were  the  highest  source  of  morality,  good,  virtue,  and  then  projecting  that 
standpoint as the ultimate universal norm: “As a rule, the philosopher is never more of 
an  ass  than  when  he  most  confidently  wishes  to  play  god;  when  with  remarkable 
assurance,  he  pronounces  on  the  perfection  of  the  world,  wholly  convinced  that 
everything moves  just  so...  that  each  generation  reaches  perfection  in  a  completely 
linear progression, according to his ideals of virtue and happiness. It so happens that he 
is always the  ration ultima, the last, the highest, link in the chain of being” (1774a, 
p.214). This was Herder sniping not just at Immanuel Kant, but also more widely at 
those who followed the Wolffsian tradition of philosophising.
Herder argued that they should make their philosophising  useful to the people, rather 
than simply producing generalised “[m]oral theory [which] does not teach new rules, 
nor  old  rules  better”  (1765,  pp.13-14).  Universalising  formulas  from transcendental 
282 i.e. all “those who are not philosophers” (1765, p.7)
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nothingness,  or  universalising  their  own  particularities  were  used  to  justify  the 
exclusion of different peoples from the category or capacities of humanity. To become 
useful  to  the  people  they  would  have  to  actively  develop  their  humanität,  which 
required in turn their interaction and involvement  with the world and  with the people 
within it (p.10). This would entail accepting the situated nature of their own existences 
and contribute to the processes of culture and tradition through which  humanität in 
general would spread; to essentially “be a human being” (p.15). Practical philosophy 
was essentially the point of philosophising – as “healthy living” which would help to 
cultivate their humanity – so it also needed to recognise our holistic nature, something 
which Herder believed the  belle lettres  were perfectly suited to contribute to. Indeed 
Herder made the argument that philosophising as “healthy living” and the belle lettres 
had an almost symbiotic relationship with each other, such that if the importance of one 
faded, this would inevitably negatively impact the other. 
With regards to the university more generally, Herder had already in part promoted a 
closer series of links between schooling and universities,  as well  as with the public 
(1780,  p.242).  On  a  practical  level,  he  expressed  this  through  his  promotion  and 
establishment  of  both  technical  colleges  and  a  teacher-training  school  but  he  also 
developed  this  angle  further  by  arguing  for  a  more  inclusive  and  interconnected 
educational system, where the schools fed into what we would now consider further and 
higher  education  that  served  local  community  interests,  as  well  as  their  respective 
province and the volk more generally. This would lead to the creation of “one Academy 
of Education” where “[e]ach faculty would also serve as a practical academy to meet the 
specific needs of the locality”,  and a “university course would then not last for two 
years, but for as long as it takes to become ready for the business of life” (p.243). 
4.3.4 Government and the State
There is a certain irony in Herder's criticism of the works of other philosophers who 
situated  the  best  and  the  true  and  the  good  in  their  own profession,  as  the  moral 
'saviours'  of humanity, since this is something that Herder was, at least in part,  also 
guilty of. From as early as 1765 he hinted in his journal that he would have to become 
political and act on his beliefs, and then later, he constructed the idea of the “aristo-
democrat” - those who would “spread the gospel of  bildung” (Barnard 2003, p.33) to 
“improve the state from below” (Herder 1765, p.25) – something which Herder clearly 
tried to achieve in his own life. Just as with Kant's moral-cosmopolitan men, Herder's 
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aristo-democrats would take on the responsibility of educating the people, just as both 
Herder  and  Kant  enacted  in  their  own lives.  Kant's  approach  was  to  argue  for  the 
independence and freedom of each citizen, within a loose moral community of other 
elite ethico-civil individuals, under the absolute rule of a civil constitution designed to 
direct the asocial sociability  (i.e. the fear and desire) of its male subjects and non-moral 
citizens  towards  commerce283.  Herder's  was  instead  of  all  beings  expressing  their 
freedom and humanity, as a part of an active, situated, social life for the collective good.
Herder's approach at the national level was also similar to his approach to the family, 
just  as  it  was  similar  to  his  approach  to  the  inter-volk and  inter-state  realm.  The 
community was an expansion of the family, just as the  volk  was an expansion of the 
family - different in magnitude, but not of kind. As a result of this framing, a social 
contract is not required because the cultural dynamics come from, essentially, the ideal 
family type284, which is based on love, mutual care, and acting together as and when 
there is a need. The government of the volker serves in this respect to supplement rather 
than replace this weakening emotional connection and closeness with “rules of conduct” 
(Sikka 2007b, p.536) but whilst Sikka goes on in her article to suggest that these rules 
“...mimic sympathy” I believe it would be more accurate to suggest instead that they are 
designed to mimic  empathy.  In relation to  Herder's  view on the distinction between 
them, sympathy is passive285, whereas empathy in his framing carries with it a moral 
imperative. It is a product of besonnheit that requires both expression and action, whilst 
sympathy does not.
Given Herder's views of the importance of holism at all levels, the rules of conduct in 
the family and community, whilst perhaps unwritten or formalised, would be known, 
just as they would be different for each person in a family and each person in a small 
community. In their uncodified state, these rules also have more freedom to shift and 
change  over  time,  thus  allowing  progress  and  change  in  a  'natural'  way.  As  the 
relationship  gets  more  distant  though  -  at  the  governmental  level  of  a  volk,  with 
multiples of cultures and communities - the awareness of the rules of different cultures 
are less likely to be known in their specificity by all of the people. We have less of an 
283 See Section (3.4).
284 This links to section (2.2) where I considered the ideal family from Rawl's Theory of Justice. 
285 Kant makes a similar point concerning sympathy (See section (3.2.3)), but Kant's emotional-moral 
aspect is only in the sharing of the feelings of the other. The duty to act can only be good and moral if  
it is a pure moral deduced action (sympathy supplements the need to act, but must not replace the duty, 
or the determination of how, to act). Herder's emotional-rational  besonnheit requires expression and 
action (Sikka 2007b, p.537).
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emotional  connection,  and  less  ongoing  involvement,  and  so  rules  are  created  to 
emulate the emotions and rules that we already know for those closest to us. It is vital  
that this balanced emotional-rational level be maintained, because Herder's inter-volk 
interaction requires “a common feeling [to] gradually awaken, so that each can feel itself 
to  be in the place of the others” (Herder 1793-97, cited in  Sikka 2007b, p.536, his 
emphasis). The language he uses is the same as for the process of besonnheit.
Herder also, preceding Karl Marx's arguments, perceived the volk to be a “single class”, 
no  matter  the  social  standing  of  any  individual.  Yet  the  “Pöbel”  (Herder,  cited  in 
Barnard 2003, p.30), who are roughly the same as Marx's  lumpenproletariat that are 
spread across all of society, and have no sense of collective identity or will to contribute 
to the common good. Whilst Marx later essentialised them as the “scum on the streets” 
and “parasites”,  treating them as failures in and of themselves,  Herder viewed their 
alienation  to  be  a  failure  of the  political  and  the  cultural.  Their  state,  nation, 
communities, cultures and families had failed to cultivate them, as well as failing to 
provide them with the agency and opportunity to express their “divine and noble gifts, 
allowing [them instead] to turn to rust, thereby giving rise to bitterness and frustration” 
(Herder,  cited  in  Barnard  2003,  p.34).  Their  alienation  from  the  wider  culture, 
community,  or  the  volk was  instead  “that  they lived,  from their  childhood on,  in  a 
society beset by misfortune” (Herder 1793a, p.100). This was a failure of the state's 
government and the people themselves to accommodate, facilitate and cultivate their 
inclusion.
The purpose of Herder's aristo-democrats (as  reluctant politicians and statesmen who 
cannot wait to give up their power) was to serve a cultivational-educational purpose and 
the role they would take is in some ways similar to Kant's cosmopolitan men. This was 
obviously, at least in part, a response to the existence of the rabble, but also more widely 
to  facilitate  the  possibilities  of  bildung  –  their humanität as  process.  Kant's  moral-
religious-cosmopolitan  man  by  contrast  is  a  much  more  restricted,  and  restrictive, 
category, focusing its actions on the intelligentsia, and carrying with it both a specific 
moral  imperative  and a  morally  superior  stature,  political  influence  and  capability 
reliant on the necessity of the paternalistic state system that it promoted. All this whilst  
distracting the masses with economic commerce and basing the true measure of their 
deeds and progress in the laws that were created to regulate their societal existence. 
Herder's aristo-democrats by contrast worked on a cultural, educational and volk level, 
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ideally absent a fixed and mechanistic state system. Part of their purpose was to help in 
the  education  of  the  working  classes,  “to  a  point  where  their  leadership  would  be 
unnecessary” (Spencer 2012, p.171). Whilst Kant believed that humans would always 
need a master because of their asocial sociability, Herder believed that humans do not 
need, but will always have, a master if they are in a state system. The point of humanität  
was to grow up – to become an adult and act with responsibility, care, and decency - and 
this  was  the  ultimate  purpose of  his  aristo-democrats,  as  political  actors  as  well  as 
cultivator-educators (p.172).
Humans, though, whilst ideally not having a master, have in Herder's view always had a 
government, whether it be the “mild government of father and mother” (1780, p.229) or 
that  of  a  despot  (pp.232-235).  Government  was  a  natural  feature  of  human  social 
existence, just as family, culture, tradition, community and language are, and given the 
interwoven  nature  of  human  existence,  Herder  posited  that  all  of  these  elements 
influence how, why, and in what direction the exploration of the sciences follows. When 
he examined this, he started with an exploration of paternal and despotic governments, 
and, in his usual way, points out both their benefits and flaws. He links paternalism to 
the development of “the most necessary kinds of human knowledge, and of religion” 
which closely follows the pattern and dynamics of the family itself – and is “the most 
perfect that can be found”. The paternal government for Herder is essentially the family 
enlarged, charged with religious and mythological features. It is founded on love and 
emotional content, which culminates in  the volk. Despotic regimes by contrast come 
about from ambitious leaders who “drive[s] the defenceless shepherds themselves like 
sheep before him and gradually begin to treat children like slaves” (p.231). In time, “the 
people become accustomed to bearing his yoke... in time the man becomes a god... a 
father a sultan” (ibid.). 
Three aspects to his presentation of the construction of government, and its interactions 
with the people and education, are of significance here. Firstly, whilst he claims that the 
paternal government is “the most perfect”, he also refers to the people in a paternal 
government as children when he moves on to discuss despotism. The shift between the 
two governments changes the nature of the existence of the people from childhood to 
servility/property, but this is also dialectical. He initially uses the example of Islam and 
argues that their dominion and rule was despotic, but he also asserts that “I know of no 
finer book than the Persian Valley of Rises by Schich-Sadi... Its moral is true, simple, 
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noble, elegantly dressed and, if I may say so, human with a spark of the divine” (p.232),  
and Herder then goes on to suggest similar for Moses and the Jewish nation. Secondly, 
the cultural  production of  religion,  mythology and superstition are,  as  was noted in 
section (4.2.3), products from the dawn of humanity in their desire to find meaning, so 
Herder also situates paternalism and intellectual education in the historic past, both of 
which are intrinsic to religion and spiritualism, just as the belle lettres can arise within 
despotism. All of the despotic regimes he mentions are religious in nature, and whilst 
they may initially promote learning and education in theology, this is over time stifled 
because the existence of the people is based on ownership and dominance, not freedom 
(1780, p.235). Third, he argues that the ongoing development of government from its 
simplest  paternal and caring expression to despotism occurs because there is  a shift 
from a parental figure to a sovereign ruler.
In a family structure, children 'gain' their freedom (whilst still expressing this freedom 
in  situated ways)  by becoming adults.  The sovereign,  though,  is  an  institution  of  a 
different type. Because of the religious connotations of his position, it moves him to a 
conceptual realm beyond, above and outside humanity and the people, and this shifts the 
relationship between them from children, who grow up under the guidance of parents 
and in the love of a family into their freedom, to the worship and/or servitude of the  
people who can never become the equal of their god or sultan and who are never free 
from his sovereignty. Free constitutions, in contrast to despotic governments, were “the 
only government under which nature, true proportion and balance is maintained” (ibid.), 
and this time Herder uses the example of Greece to elaborate his arguments. The ending 
of Greece as a free domain, and thus its natural proportion and balance (and as a result 
its own version of 'perfection'), commenced when “a law was... promulgated that no one 
should publicly teach philosophy without the permission of the senate” (p.239).
The  next  iteration  of  governments  were,  for  Herder,  republics,  with  each  variation 
exhibiting  their  own  educational  tendencies.  Republican  democracies,  for  example, 
promoted the “popular sciences” of “poetry, oratory, popular philosophy, and those area 
which appealed to the eye or ear” (p.249). A republican aristocracy, but contrast, would 
focus on more abstract sciences like politics, philosophy and history – and a hybrid of 
the two would produce a mixture of them. Essentially that the “spirit of the people” 
influenced the direction of the exploration of the arts and sciences. Whether that be the 
commercial spirit of the Dutch moving them towards focussing on the sciences most 
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related to trading and commerce, or that “a republic based on warfare” would be most 
interested  in  the  martial  arts  and  sciences,  and  the  'art  of  war'.  Both  republican 
democracies and aristocracies feature the types  of sciences  that  Herder  himself  was 
most interest in, and his belle lettres are also heavily situated in the sciences produced in 
them. Between them they provide the best grounds for the cultivation of bildung. 
There is one quite curious element that does require additional discussion her – because 
Herder  calls  his  archetypal  bildung cultivators  aristo-democrats. This  is  clearly  a 
melding  of  these  two  types  of  republics,  yet  Herder  was  vehemently  opposed  to 
monarchies  (he  was  censored  repeatedly  for  expressing  this  view),  just  as  he  was 
opposed to any form of hereditary system that allowed either influence due to birth, or 
assumptions  of  a  superior  character.  There  was,  as  Barnard  notes,  a  shifting  in  his 
position from 1765 onwards, where he initially believed it was possible for monarchy 
and aristocracy to co-exist with the Enlightenment of the people (2003, p.34). Herder's 
use of the name aristo-democrat is not to imply that they are a part of the aristocracy, 
even  though  he  does  see  a  need  for  them  to  take  on  the  roles  of  statesmen  and 
politicians, but rather that they are a product of a hybrid aristocratic-democratic state, 
where the sciences most related to the cultivation of humanität were encouraged.
This  was  the  practical  situation  for  Germany  during  Herder's  time  and  the  main 
concerns that he expressed in his  Dissertation286 concerned the biasing that arises if 
sovereigns and princes have authority over the hiring of teachers and academics, as well 
as exerting influence over education and particular sciences at university level. His fears 
were of a similar nature to Kant's (see section 3.5) but whereas Kant argued for his 
second  choice  of  independently  run  schools,  Herder  proposed  that  his  interwoven 
educational system should for the most part be determined by each province and city, 
who he felt would be best able to determine what practical education was needed by 
them for their inhabitants. His concern was not just that education was too abstract and 
did not serve the needs of the people, but also that “Governments in recent times have 
especially  affected  the  sciences  by  encouraging  their  practical,  mechanical  side... 
substantial  developments  in  the  sciences  have  received  their  impetus  from military 
leaders and the art  of war...  Less equivocal has been the contribution of the arts  of 
peace, especially to the development of the practical sciences”. This had expanded in 
combination with the growth of “Academies of economics [who] compete with each 
286 Herder  write  effectively an  extended footnote  addressed  directly  to  the  members  of  the  German 
Academy. (1780, pp.240-244)
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other” that “one could almost call our century the economic century” (1780, p.243).
The direction of education had been towards competition, between different faculties or 
universities, as well as their use by various princes and rules, rather than cooperation. 
Scientific developments were also harnessed and promoted by economic and political 
elites, for their own interests and glory. Alongside these, the political sciences strived 
for “more clarity, order and security of the affairs of state”, and the legislation they 
produced had as a result has been forced to “strike a note of humanity and conviction” 
(p.244).  This  had  produced,  in  the  international  arena,  what  Herder  believed  was 
something unique to his era: “Gross infringements of international law now are so much 
more publicly apparent and have to be camouflaged by governments in terms of truth, 
justice and humanity – a think which previously was both unheard of and uncalled for” 
(ibid).  The  'economic  century'  had  both  produced  in  greater  numbers  these  gross 
infringements  as  well  as  influencing their  responses  – governments  and states  were 
forced to use the language of truth, justice and humanity to mask their lies, injustice and 
inhumanity.  From this 'mischievous' use of moral language, Herder suggested that the 
actual increase of “wisdom, kindness and real love of humanity” (ibid. my emphasis) 
would make “whole sciences and professions” more useful, more united, and would be 
able  to  “root  out  old  prejudices  and  use  enlightenment  to  increase  kindness  and 
happiness” (ibid.).
Beyond an educational  system that  facilitated the use of  besonnheit  was a need for 
“Nihil Obstat, the licence to pursue a good thing, above all, freedom of thought.” (1780, 
p.245). Only a space where free dialogue and communication could occur, absent the 
censor, would lead to the “free investigation of the truth from all sides [which] is the 
sole antidote against delusion and error” (1793-7a, p.370). But this was not meant to 
assume that a single truth was the ultimate goal of this process. Truth is always situated 
and particular in Herder's view, and whilst one culture, age, volk or time may have their 
own views on what is true, human existence as a historical process meant that there is 
never  one ahistorical  truth.  Only in  an environment  with the freedom to  speak and 
publish  one's  thoughts  would  these  multiple  truths  be  available  to  be  learnt  from. 
Contrasting truths  allowed for the purification of “human cognition” (ibid.)  through 
reflection, and so we can learn from them, just as publications by “deluded persons” 
allowed for the arising of “a new view of the truth”. Censorship has no  legitimation, 
when it is carried out, because it is the will and the view of censor, not of the  volk. 
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(p.372)  but  more  than  this,  censorship  denies  the  future  the  opportunity  to  know, 
explore, accept, or reject, the truths from the past. But Herder also imposes a crucial 
corollary  to  this  freedom of  expression:  –  should  there  be  unrestricted  freedom of 
speech, it must also as a consequence deny the author anonymity (p.373).
This  “Freedom of  thought  is  the  fresh  air  of  heaven  in  which  all  the  plants  of  a 
government,  especially  the  sciences,  thrive  best”  (1780,  p.247)  and  to  both 
accommodate  and  facilitate  this,  the  government  “should  be  almost  neutral  in  his 
preferences in order to encompass, tolerate and clarify the opinions of everyone in his 
state and direct them to the common good” (ibid.). Herder was essentially arguing here 
for a type of liberal-democratic government, based on the principles of tolerance, as 
well as, through the provision of its educational system, a responsibility to “arouse and 
encourage the activity of humans in keeping with their diverse tendencies, sensibilities, 
weaknesses and needs” (1793a, p.104). This “almost” though, still imposes a limit on 
freedom of thought, “where it publicly stops the wheels of the state, licence defeats its 
own principle” (1780, p.245). This justifies the government taking action to restrict or 
prohibit activities, professions and sciences that it believes would have this impact. But 
whilst it has this right, it also has the responsibility to not make these decisions merely 
because they would change the nature of the government, and their decisions must be 
made  with  an  awareness  that  it  does  not  know  'the  truth'.  Whilst  they  might  be 
interpreted  as  'harmful',  this  could  simply  be  because  the  government  was  not  as 
accommodating as it believed, or because the people's negative biases and prejudices, 
rather  than their  humanity,  drove the argument  that  these activities,  professions and 
sciences should be prevented. What should then occur is the enactment and process of 
besonnheit, carrying  with  it  the  awareness  that  this  will  change  –  that  the  people's 
understanding of  humanität  changes over time - and this future  humanität cannot be 
deduced in advance.
Whilst the idea of the nation is often equivalenced with the state, or folded into one as 
the nation-state, for Herder these are fundamentally different concepts and he was, on 
the whole, antagonistic to the idea of a state (Barnard 2003, p.10). Firstly, because the 
state’s  artificial  construction  cleaved  through  cultural  connections  and  reformulated 
them into a system that served the dominant individuals of the state and their continuing 
dominance. Secondly, he took this position because the Westphalian state system was 
one that reified a particular conception of sovereignty and the state. The purpose of the 
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nation-state became its continuing existence and as a consequence, particular ideas of 
the nation,  specific  purposes  for  the inhabitants,  and particular  ways  of  living were 
promoted  or  prevented.  This  led  the  people  in  a  direction  that,  from  Herder's 
perspective,  'warped'  their  'natural'  growth  and  change,  instead  reifying  particular 
aspects,  and  the  promotion  of  specific  types  of  formulations  of  myths,  mysteries, 
morality  and  religions  as  well  as  specific  educational  practices.  Third,  this  was  a 
problem when linked to the idea of property rights, western imperialism and the liberal 
ideas of philosophers like Adam Smith, John Locke and Immanuel Kant, because they 
restricted the rights and opportunities of communities, peoples, and nations to seek out 
and create their own system of government that they felt would work best for them, and 
for that system to be respected by external institutions. Instead, the western European 
concept of the state served only, in Herder's view, the needs and desires of the powerful 
within the western European states, and only when formulated in a specific way.
4.3.5 Commerce and International Interaction
Commerce was, for Herder, as with much else, its own dialectic. As I mentioned in 
section (4.2.4), economic imperialism had brought different volk into contact with each 
other,  but  this  also allowed for  the  exchange of  knowledge and  belle  lettres in  the 
service of humanity.  But this occurred in an unrestrained way and asymmetric way, 
which resulted in the 'deformation' of the people's cultivation, for both peoples. This 
was most  visible  in  Holland,  which  in  his  view had “only one driving  force  –  the 
commercial spirit... the spirit of a new European economy” (1769c, p.97), where even 
morality was for sale. This spirit was one he believed, if unrestrained, would “kill[s] or 
restrict[s]  the spirit  of valour,  of great  undertakings,  of true statesmanship,  wisdom, 
learning” (p.99). 
In contrast to other theorists' views on human history and established ideas of property 
and human nature, whether it be Locke's idea of humans as traders, Hobbes' views on 
our supposedly selfish nature, Kant's deduction that we should act on the assumption 
that humans might be selfish, or Rousseau's position that we were originally atomised 
individuals  in a state of nature,  and contaminated by society,  Herder  believed these 
earlies stages of humanity were “characterised by creativeness and action rather than by 
acquisitiveness  and  the  desire  for  private  possessions.  Hence  pride  in  the  former 
constitutes a far greater point of honour than the distressing pride in property of later 
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and more spineless periods” (1772a, p.168). Their views287 had collectively contributed 
to the dispossession of “religion... spiritual freedom and human happiness” and replaced 
it with “fear and money” and the worship of “Mammon as our sole god” (1774a, p.207). 
This  problem,  he  believed,  was  the  responsibility  of  governments,  in  this  case 
specifically the post-Westphalian state governments that promoted “international trade 
and the rivalry of interests between nations” (1780, p.244). The dialectic of Europe's 
“philosophical, philanthropical tone [which] wishes to extend 'our own ideal' of virtue 
and happiness to each distant nation, to even the remotest age in history” (1774a, p.187) 
under the banner of “mutually brotherly assistance,  and the common interests  of all 
countries”  (p.209)  had  resulted,  as  he  sarcastically  noted,  in  “three  continents... 
devastated, yet policed by us; we in turn are depopulated, emasculated, and debauched 
as a result. Such is the happy nature of the exchange” (ibid.).  What was most needed 
from a government was to give the  volk  the opportunity to counteract the desire for 
competition over cooperation, and imperialism over brotherhood.
Economic  imperialism,  and  the  European  determination  to  universalise  their 
particularities were, in Herder's view, responsible for death and destruction on a global 
scale, as well as deforming all of the cultures and traditions involved in the encounter. 
Whilst good could come of it – his dialectics work in both positive and negative ways – 
their actions were inhumane and neither could nor should be condoned or relied upon. 
To rely on them, as Kant did, to justify both his own system and the permanent need for 
a sovereign, was for Herder not only to view the people who suffered as merely a means 
to an end, but would also negatively impact on the cultures, traditions, and peoples of 
the  world.  It  denied  the  people  their  right  to  determine  their  own  freedoms  and 
happinesses. The establishment of international law, international trade agreements and 
institutions to regulate them, were in consequence little more than the enforcement of 
European ideals and ways of life on the world – something that was inhuman – and 
demanded reparation from the European states to the peoples they had harmed.
Herder proposed instead a gentle and fluctuating development of alliances that arose 
and subsided as each need arose and was dealt with, but a strictly formal 'cosmopolitan' 
approach would only come together in times of significant threat when, for example, 
one state was acting aggressively towards another. His international relations proposal, 
set out a series of “dispositions of peace” (1793-7c, p.404), appears to have been written 
at  least  indirectly  in  response  to  his  Kant's  Ideas  for  a  Universal  History  with  a  
287 i.e. Locke, Hobbes, Rousseau and Kant, amongst others.
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Cosmopolitan  Purpose  (1784b),  and  is  detailed  in  one  of  his  Letters  on  the  
Advancement of Humanity (1973-7c)288:
Herder's Dispositions (pp.404-409)
1. Horror of War
2. Reduced respect for heroic glory
3. Horror of false statecraft
4. Purified ‘patriotism’
5. Feelings of Justice towards other nations
6. Concerning presumptions in trade
7. Activity
Herder's use of the word  disposition  here is telling, because they are directed for the 
most part inwards, at the people themselves, that would influence an ongoing and intra-
volk attitude, rather than an end point that can be clearly defined. The first three concern 
attitudes  towards  war,  heroism,  and  the  excuses  and  lies  that  leader  use  to  justify 
conflict,  territorial  expansion,  and  economic  gains.  The  fourth  disposition,  purified 
patriotism,  concerns instead the perception of the people themselves,  based only on 
themselves  and  not  in  relation  to  others.  Essentially,  the  same principle  guides  the 
closing  of  borders  and  recentering  in  the  face  of  threat  –  to  'centre  around  our 
prejudices' and re-establish a people's sense of itself as a people. It called not just for a 
clarification of this sense of self, but for it to occur as  besonnheit. It also asserts that 
“with this feeling there is necessarily bound up horror and contempt for every invasion 
of [our] people into foreign lands... for every empty aping and participation that disturbs 
our business, our duty, our peace and welfare” (p.406). The point of this was not merely 
for a people to think and reflect on the appearance of the nature of a community, but to 
reflect  on  the  good,  the  bad,  and  the  ugly  that  the  people  represent  and  enact  to 
themselves and others. Only then does this allow for the same kind of consideration to 
be given to other states. This again follows the idea of expansion and contraction that is 
a feature of Herder's reflectivity. We contract into ourselves to reconsider ourselves, to 
then expand to carry that to our consideration of others. This then leads us to contract 
once again, with each expansion and contraction bringing new ways to understand and 
see ourselves and humanity in the eyes of another's humanity - not simply to compare 
and decide that “we are more humane”.
Whilst  disposition  four  is  focussed  more  on  the  contraction  aspect  of  reflection, 
disposition five is directed towards the international arena, but once again in a limited 
288 Letter 119.
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sense.  The expansion aspect  of  besonnheit  carries  with it  the  recognition  of  others’ 
humanity – from our own “feeling of frailty, of weakness and disease... this perception 
by itself led to humaneness... to the compassionate feeling for the suffering of others, to 
the taking part in the imperfections of their nature, with the accompanying effort to cope 
with  those  imperfections,  or  to  assist  in  overcoming  them”  (1794a,  p.107,  his 
emphasis)289. When we see another people “disparaged and abused” this should – must - 
“gradually awaken a common feeling so that every nation feels itself into the position of 
the other one” (1793-97c, p.406-7, his emphasis). This comes about in recognition not 
of the best attributes of a nation – their bravery, strength or honour – but from common 
feeling of weakness, vulnerability and suffering.
The sixth disposition is at least in part a rejoinder to the British Empire’s assertion that  
it ruled the oceans, as well as a suggestion that our humanity should drive our trade for 
“reciprocal prosperity” (p.408), not our greed, and as with the fifth disposition, we have 
a responsibility to act, based from the abuse and suffering that other people experience. 
The seventh disposition returns to considering war – this time as a critique of a 'warrior 
caste' but Herder also makes use of the example of the Indian peace accord which he 
discussed in a previous letter (118) that was developed by the Native Americans, and 
which he calls “On Eternal Peace290 (an Iriquois arrangement)” (1793-7, p.400-403). 
His purpose here is not to suggest that their treaty was a model to be guided by, where 
one of the three tribes would 'become the woman' and stand between the two other 
tribes  to  ensure  peace,  but  rather  that  the  purpose  of  this  treaty  was  to  teach  and 
cultivate people in the other two tribes. Not only is Herder situating peace as a primary 
purpose of inter-volk interaction, but he is also elevating the actions of  non-western 
people to a teaching position in relation to Europeans.
4.4 Conclusions
This chapter has, through an exploration and critical engagement with Johann Herder’s 
works,  identified  the importance of  his  idea  of  Besonnheit  -  the  reflective capacity, 
which  establishes  one  as  human.  It  is  through  reflectivity  that  firstly  internal 
communication,  and  then  external  language  arises,  and  it  proceeds  out  of  our 
engagement with the physical, sensate world, through reason. Using reflection, and in 
the case of Herder, the process of examining his writings, is according to him the most 
important way in which we learn both about ourselves and the other. When besonnheit  
289 See also section (4.2.1).
290 Once can see, again, the aping of Kant's Perpetual Peace language here.
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is engaged with for the purpose of  humanität though, this is education in the deepest 
sense. Within his re-framing of the idea of humanität, as a process of becoming, reside 
bildung as self-formation as a process of being and living, and tradition as a constantly 
changing  intergenerational passing on one's particularity. His educational project is the 
means by which bildung can be cultivated and tradition can continue.
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Chapter  5:  Anti-Dualist Cosmopolitanism
Contents
5.1. Introduction
5.2. Reviewing Contemporary Cosmopolitanism
5.3. Cosmopolitan Education
5.3.1. David Hansen
5.3.2. Mark Bracher
5.3.3. Hannah Spector
5.4. Returning to Kant
5.5. Nonbinary Cosmopolitanisms
5.5.1. Turning to Herder
5.5.2. L.L.H Ling and Daoist trialectics
5.6. Conclusions
5.1 Introduction
This chapter firstly brings together and clarifies the arguments that I engaged with in 
chapters  one  and  two  (5.2).  I  then  incorporate  the  arguments  of  a  selection  of 
educational theorists  who have explored the idea of a cosmopolitan education (5.3). 
This analysis reveals the surprising closeness of their approaches to Herder's own, the 
importance of compassion and the imagination, and the problems of economism and 
bureaucracies. I then turn one final time to Kant (5.4), clarifying the problems immanent 
in Kant's hierarchical and binaried cosmopolitan scheme in relation to the findings from 
the previous section and contemporary cosmopolitanism more broadly.
In the final section (5.5) I argue for a 'nonbinary' approach to cosmopolitanism. I turn to 
Herder (5.5.1), examining in more detail the problematic nature of the chained opposing 
binaries  in  Kantian,  and  contemporary,  cosmopolitanism.  I  argue  that  Herder's 
particularity,  and his anti-dualist approach, allows for multiples of moral,  social and 
cultural framings to exist in a way that Kant's is deliberately designed to prevent. I then 
consider, in relation to university education,  his arguments, and the importance of his 
approach to history,, as well as the roles that reflection and the imagination could play 
in such a setting. In the final section I set out L.H.M. Ling's Daoist trialect, and suggest  
that such an approach, as one of a multitude of approaches in a Herderian Nonbinary 
Cosmopolitanism setting, is not just possible, but necessary.
In the introduction I touched on the current situation with regards to cosmopolitanism. 
Firstly, the triple 'streamlining' of political cosmopolitanism that has occurred through 
the selectivity of contemporary theorist's approaches to the concept. I then considered 
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the dominant historical narrative of cosmopolitanism before discussing the multiplicity 
of often contradictory meanings, perspectives and attitudes given to Cosmopolitanism 
outside  of  the  political  angle.  In  response  I  suggested  that  cosmopolitanism  could 
perhaps better be understood, or accommodated, in a 'particularity framing' (1.2). As a 
result  of  the  political  aspect  of  cosmopolitanism,  interpreted  as  primarily  a  global 
concept, two distinct types of cosmopolitanism are produced. Firstly a top-down project 
relying  on  universalisms,  institutions  and  bureaucracies,  and  secondly  a  bottom-up 
individualism  process  designed  to  project  a  variety  of  national universalisms, 
emphasising the importance of similarity over difference (1.3).
In chapter two I explored the writings of Thomas Pogge (2.1), Seyla Benhabib (2.2), 
and  James  Ingram (2.3)  which  resulted  in  four  main  discoveries.  Firstly,  that  their 
arguments position contemporary cosmopolitanism as a struggle between the particular 
and the universal that relies on a Kantian framing not only of cosmopolitanism, but of 
universality and particularity, and human nature as well. Secondly, this establishes the 
essentiality  of  conflict  at  the  core  of  contemporary  cosmopolitanism,  between  two 
chained series of concepts that work as an antagonistic binaried structure at multiple 
levels of human experience and existence. On the one side, dominant,  is a chain of 
related  terms  that  reinforce  and  support  each  other.  This  links  the  universal  to  the 
generalised other, (justice as) fairness, equality, objective, reason, public and male, to 
which can be added white, cisgender, heterosexual etc. – the core chained concepts of 
(Kantian)  cosmopolitanism291.  Placed  in  opposition  and  always  submissive  to  the 
universal is the particular, which is linked to the concrete other, (justice as) care, bias, 
subjective,  emotion,  private  and  female,  which  also  implicitly  includes  non-white, 
intersex,  transgender,  homosexual  etc.  Third,  my  analysis  revealed  that  underlying 
contemporary political cosmopolitanism is not just the core belief in selfishness, but the 
necessity of this assumption. This comes from Hobbes, but is reframed through Kant’s 
belief in ‘asocial sociability’, which underlies both the norms of cosmopolitanism and, 
due to the dominance of western universal narratives, its responses as well. And fourth, 
the premises of Kantian Cosmopolitanism affects the possibility of resolving (historical) 
injustices in the theorising of cosmopolitanism.
In  section  (5.3)  I  incorporate  the  works  of  a  selection  of  educational  theorists  and 
philosophers who have specialised in, or explored, the idea of a cosmopolitan education. 
291 Essentially,  any  dominant-prized  attribute  or  characteristic,  for  example  cisgender,  able-bodied, 
neurotypical, heterosexual, allistic etc. might in theory be added to this chained series.
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With David Hansen's works, I  highlight both the surprising closeness his  arguments 
have to to Herder's, and his interpretation of a cosmopolitanism that explicitly rejects 
Kant's universal morality and hierarchical principles (5.3.1). Mark Bracher's arguments 
on a cosmopolitan eduction sets out the problem of relying on sympathy and empathy, 
from a rationalist approach absent emotions. These issues require a shift both to the 
concept of compassion, and the necessity of the breaking down chained and reinforcing 
binary  logics  (5.3.2).  In  (5.3.3)  with  Hannah  Spector  I  explore  the  importance  of 
imagination, and the problems of  a universal economistic narrative that both constrains 
the  productive  imagination,  and  distances  morality  from  education  through  the 
increasing importance of institutional approaches and bureaucracies.
 I  then  turn  once  more  to  Kant  (5.4),  clarifying  the  problems  immanent  in  Kant's 
hierarchical  and  binaried  cosmopolitanism,  and  as  a  result  of  contemporary 
cosmopolitanism more broadly. 
In the final section (5.5) I argue for a 'nonbinary', or multi-structuralist, approach to 
cosmopolitanism, presenting Ling's Daoist  approach international relations (5.5.1) as 
one way to avoid a dominating system that plays off the universal against the particular. 
I then return to Herder (5.5.2), drawing on his approach to language and translation to 
further justify my 'turn to Herder'.
5.2 Reviewing Contemporary Cosmopolitanism
Chapter  one  (the  introduction)  set  out  three  main  issues  with  the  contemporary 
understandings of cosmopolitanism. Firstly (1.1), I considered the contemporary history 
of  cosmopolitan  theorising,  and  how  the  increasing  selectivity  of  historical  texts 
considered  relevant  had  narrowed  down  over  time  to  Immanuel  Kant  as  the  best 
exemplar of Enlightenment cosmopolitanism. From a diverse exploration of the idea by 
a number of his contemporaries, to the overwhelming dominance of Immanuel Kant's 
texts, this reduced still further to a small selection of his 'most pertinent' international 
political texts before being filtered still further, through Nussbaum’s contemporary 're-
incarnation' of cosmopolitanism in 1994. Secondly (1.2), I considered the multiples of 
meanings attributed to cosmopolitanism, which I suggested can be mapped onto two 
broad  approaches  to  cosmopolitan  theorising  –  the  universalising,  and  the 
particularising,  which  align  with  two  different  histories.  The  universalist  history  is 
narrow, dominant, and accords with, roughly speaking, the Greek inception, the Roman 
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development, the Kantian revolution, and the contemporary era through Nussbaum to 
Held and Archibughi. This sketch widens, and strains beyond the principles of Kantian 
cosmopolitanism  the  further  one  moves  from  a  strict  universalist  position  most 
exemplified  in  the  political  and  philosophical  theorising  of  cosmopolitanism.  As  it 
moves towards a particularist approach, it is eventually forced to avoid entirely, or give 
only lip-service to Kant, his works, and his overall concept of cosmopolitanism.
Finally, I considered the politics of a cosmopolitan education in relation to the needs of 
the Westphalian state in a nationalist environment of unceasing competition for political 
power (1.3). Those within the state are bound into competition for power to represent 
the state and so cosmopolitanism as an educational ideal – most typically represented as 
an idea that downgrades or dismisses entirely the importance of the state, state identity, 
or local affiliation in favour of a borderless universalism – is less than desirable.  It 
places cosmopolitanism in permanent opposition to national particularity. I then briefly 
explored the question of how we consider the idea of cosmopolitan in the framing of it  
as a top-down project, or a bottom-up process.
In chapter two, I focused my exploration of cosmopolitanism on the writings of Thomas 
Pogge, Seyla Benhabib and James Ingram, as contemporary exemplars of three different 
approaches to the political theorising of cosmopolitanism. I identified that they each 
establishes in their system, at some point of group interaction, the pre-eminence of the 
universal over the particular. 
For  Thomas Pogge (2.1),  this  occurs  with  any  group, with his  splitting of  essential 
(universal)  and additional  (particular)  rights,  although he relies  on the grounding of 
particularity  and  the  primacy of  emotions  (following  on  from Rawls'  philosophical 
developments) - of justice as care - within the family, before layering universality on 
top. Pogge's approach to the universal nature of cosmopolitanism extends much further 
though, establishing an interchangeability of individuality, and positioning both group 
affiliation  (of  any kind)  and choice-less  individualities  as  little  different  to  lifestyle 
choices that can be taken up, put aside, or swapped in and out at will. His position,  
through the adoption of Rawls'  philosophical premises,  establishes a  gendered 'male 
archetype figure' in the home as the head of the household, and the ideal characteristics 
of this figure as; justice as reason; rationalism and individualism. 
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Putting oneself 'into the place of', a common feature of cosmopolitan discourse is, in 
this  framing,  based  on  emotional  association  and  closeness  -  love  and  feelings  of 
affection - that are extended outwards as we find echoes and variants of these original 
(familial) connections in those we encounter as we take on more roles throughout life. 
But  at  the  same  time  it  rejects  emotionality  at  all  other  levels  of  association  and 
interaction. Pogge's assumptions and arguments concerning (cosmopolitan) education 
are as a result public, generalised, justice as reason(able) and universable in nature at all 
levels. Justice as care (and its chained concepts such as particularity), whilst emphasised 
and essential in the home environment, and in the connections formed between others, 
is still  subordinated, depoliticised, and essentialised, in part because of the Rawlsian 
establishment of the male head of the household in a nuclear family environment and 
his decision to remove the private from the political when it comes to gender dynamics. 
In addition, because of the privileging of the universal over the particular, there is an 
ahistorical element that, through Rawls, is unable to process historical inequalities that 
require redress. Whether it be through race, gender, or (dis)ability, there is a clear and 
prominent desire by Pogge and Rawls (as was also the case with Kant) to shift these  
claims to secondary, adjunct concepts, or to dismiss their relevance altogether.
The next section (2.2) examined the arguments of Seyla Benhabib and the struggle she 
engages  with  between  the  particular  and  the  universal,  through  her  framing  of  the 
concrete  and  generalised  other,  seeking  a  way  to  find  some  way  to  balance  and 
incorporate them both into her understanding of cosmopolitanism. There is as a result a 
greater  accommodation  for  particular  experiences,  incorporating  both  the  immediate 
family and a wider community, through webs of interlocution, but the further out this 
extends, the more particularity and concrete dynamics are expected to move towards (or 
be rejected in favour of) the general and universal. This occurs primarily through her 
use of reversibility as the means to balance the concrete and generalised other concepts, 
but  there  are  problems  to  this  approach  in  two  main  ways.  Firstly,  because  of  her 
approach  through  reversibility,  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  they  can  be  considered 
conceptually different (i.e. both concrete, and particular), and thus either in need of, or 
able to be balanced. Secondly, because it positions the one reversing into a position of 
power  and  so  reinforces  existing  power  dynamics.  I  then  argued  that  Benhabib’s 
approach widens the boundaries of the generalised other, but does not do so for the 
concrete other. Perversely, as a result, this strengthens and widens the generalised other 
category rather than supporting her desire for parity with the generalised other.
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Unlike Pogge, where the switch between the particular and the universal is at the border 
of  the  parents-children  (but  primarily  mother-child)  bond  in  the  nuclear  family, 
Benhabib's is at the limit of the webs of interlocution – the point at which the concrete is 
unable (for whatever reason) to interact in concrete ways with the other, and for that 
engagement  to  occur  repeatedly,  over  time.  Education's  purpose,  for  Benhabib,  by 
contrast, is an explicit rejection of the Kantian principles of education and universalism, 
emphasising  the  formation  of  a  person  in  and  as a  part  of  an  emotional  human 
community characterised by a mixing of formal and informal education and culturing. 
For all other group dynamics though - cultural, societally, at the state level, or globally - 
whether in relation to the inter-dynamics between groups, or in appeals to hospitality 
through cosmopolitan right, the universal is favoured by Benhabib over the particular.
Benhabib’s arguments in relation to culture, because of the underlying issues with the 
reversibility argument, thus emphasises generalisability over particularity at all levels. 
Cultures are forced to move towards the dominant's norms, not least because claims for 
recognition have to be framed in the language of the dominant group(s) of a state. There 
is  the  possibility  of  successfully  resolving,  within immigrant  and  marginalised 
indigenous communities, particularity inequalities relating to issues such as the lesser 
status of, and treatment of, women, but this process also, as a consequence, reinforces 
the  chained  elements  connected  to  universality  in  the  dominant  group(s)  that  hold 
political power. This approach emphasises the lesser importance of the concrete other in 
relation to the generalised norm, within the wider (nation-state) polity. In addition, when 
considering choice-less individualities such as variant sexualities, disabilities, or neuro-
variances, the increased dominance of the generalised position acts as a limiter, rather 
than  a  facilitator,  of  the  institutional  and  social  acceptance  of  the  ‘utterly  other’. 
Benhabib reinforces still further the emphasis of the generalised over the concrete when 
she considers the issue of Kant’s cosmopolitan right, since she sides firmly with justice 
as reason over justice as care. As a result, her arguments on the importance of ongoing 
democratic re-iterations express as the different, and other, conforming to the similar, 
and self, and ultimately rejects the equal validity of the concrete other.
In James Ingram's case, he takes the universal as 'always already there' and thus must 
always be responded to, introducing as a result the inevitability of an ahistorical binary 
between the dominant universal and the submissive particular.  From his perspective, 
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cosmopolitanism  has  always  carried  with  it  the  scent  of,  and  tendency  towards, 
imperialism because of the desires of dominant and powerful groups to universalise 
their  own  particularity,  and  to  enforce  that  particularity-as-universality  on  others. 
Cosmopolitanism as  a  project  has  as  a  result  always  had this  issue,  and from this, 
cosmopolitanism has in one way or another always been both complicit and active in the 
historical oppression of others. Because of this, Ingram re-frames it as 'cosmo-politics', 
and recasts the idea of it as a group challenge from below against a false universal - to 
then be re-conceptualised as a new false universal upon its successful challenge. The 
importance of perceiving it as a new false universal, rather than through Benhabib’s idea 
of democratic iterations is at least in part because of Ingram’s incorporation of the issue 
of  “sustained  difference”  from  Badiou,  something  which  universalising  norms  are 
unable to subsume and thus ‘horrifies’ those who promote it. As a new false universal, 
the universal both must change, and must be perceived as always already false. 
Cosmo-politics  then,  for  Ingram,  is  the  process  of  resistance  enacted  by oppressed 
groups, rather than a normative or institutional project, but it becomes a part of the 
normative and institutional project through its challenge, and upon its success, when it's 
needs are incorporated into the new false universal. There are though some significant 
unresolved issues with Ingram's approach to groups – not least because he suprisingly 
hesitant in making clear whom/what are able to make appropriate claims. In addition, 
the determination of an appropriate claim against the universal must be either defined, 
or  accepted,  by  the  representatives  of  the  universal  because  of  pre-existing  power 
hierarchies. In addition, Ingram's arguments, unlike Benhabib’s, fails to consider intra-
group interactions that emulate external power dynamics. This gap in his arguments 
allows for the construction of a new false universal that is most palatable to the already 
dominant – i.e. the least different, the least cosmopolitical and least able to process the 
existence of the utterly other. From this, the likelihood of a lesser ‘universal iteration’ in 
a 'Benhabbian' sense – the influence of the dominant ensuring accommodation  within 
the existing principles of the universal - rather than a conceptually new false universal 
which breaches, fractures or shatters the previous, seems considerably more likely.
Extrapolating  from  Ingram's  arguments,  a  cosmopolitan  education  that  would  best 
facilitate  the ideal  of  Ingram's  approach in  the stronger  sense (i.e.  if  internal  social 
dynamics are incorporated) firstly require a particular focus on the education of the 
dominated group that appeals to the language of the universal against the imperialism 
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and inconsistency of the expression and application of that universal.  Secondly,  and 
even  more  importantly  given  the  asymmetric  power  dynamics,  education  of  the 
dominant group so that it is able to recognise, accept, and incorporate the falseness of its 
own universality -  and its  consequences  -  so that  it  might  be more  easily 'claimed' 
against292. Finally, that the encouragement of dominated group, group identification, and 
crucially  both  the  right,  and  ability,  to  temporarily  'close  its  borders'  is  not  only 
important, but an essential part of this process.
 
Between the three theorists explored there was a commonality of the framing of the 
dynamic between universalism and particularism as; contestatory, a fight, competition, 
conflict, or struggle, which occurs in the social sphere at one ‘level’ or another. Claims 
against  inequality manifest  as an adversarial  process  of some kind,  whether  that  be 
through discourse, consensus, or more explicit (and perhaps, at its most drastic, physical 
and violent) resistance. For Pogge, following on from Rawls, the contest is expected to 
occur through existing legal and formal institutions, systems and processes, and as a 
result, the bureaucratic systems established by the dominant political order. This is a 
descendent  of  Kant's  own  belief  that  moral  progress  is  tracked  through  legal 
development – which also emphasises the importance of the already dominant's system 
of discourse to justify the particular  within the universal. The universal is reinforced 
through the claims of the particular, and its articulation is refined through pre-existing 
bureaucratic  norms.  For  Benhabib  this  is  framed  for  the  most  part  in  cultural  and 
discourse  terms,  following  a  similar  universal-particular  dynamic  to  Pogge's,  which 
again reinforces the universal through the claims of the particular. Because of the state’s 
role in moderating the discourse, it experiences this same bureaucratic  and structural 
articulation  in  its  new  iterations.  With  Ingram  this  provides  the  label  he  uses  of 
contestatory cosmopolitics and his attempts to relabel the universal as a false universal. 
Struggle, for both Benhabib and Ingram, is essential to their arguments; so much so that 
their arguments do not work without the concepts of structural inequality and suffering 
to  respond  to,  whether  that  be  through  democratic  iterations  or  Cosmo-political 
moments and processes. For Pogge, by contrast, direct struggle for the accommodation 
of  difference  is  avoided  though  the  more  prominent  legal  claim to  the  universal  - 
because the legal is already a number of steps removed from the site of struggle in the 
social and cultural realms.
292 Herder's  Belle Lettres  (4.3.2), as a way to cultivate compassion and a collective sense of humanity 
through shared experiences of vulnerability and suffering play a similar role to Nussbaum's liberal arts  
education approach (2.4.3). See also section (5.3.2).
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What  also  became  evident  in  my  analysis  of  their  respective  arguments  was  the 
prominence of Kantian arguments. For Pogge, (partly) through Rawls, this was perhaps 
most clear, and can also be seen in the normative assumptions of human selfishness, as 
well as the gendered and privatised nature of the nuclear home. In Benhabib's case, her 
favouring of Kantian logic and structure in the case of cosmopolitan right, where she 
turns away from the concrete other, and for Ingram, in his perceived need of a cycling 
between top-down and bottom-up approaches that re-affirms the pre-eminence of the 
universal over the particular.
5.3. Cosmopolitanism Education 
In  this  section  I  examine  a  selection  of  theorists  who  have  been  involved,  from a 
specifically educational perspective,  in the theorising of a cosmopolitan education.  I 
explore the works of David Hansen (5.3.1), Mark Bracher (5.3.2) and Vicki Spencer 
(5.3.3) where I collectively highlight how their own arguments mostly cohere around 
the same struggles between particularism and universalism that are emblematic of the 
theorists I examined in chapter two. What also quickly becomes apparent is how far 
removed they are from Kant's own scheme – at almost every level – although there is 
still  a  tacit  acceptance  of  Kant's  specifically  international  arguments.  By  contrast, 
Herder's position and arguments, which I set out in chapter four, are eerily close to their 
own. Emotions are an essential part of their approaches, establishing that approaches to 
a cosmopolitan education in the contemporary era reject Kant's own approach, in favour 
of Herder's.
For David Hansen (5.3.1) this closeness is most marked, to such an extent that ideas like 
Herder's interpretation of tradition is effectively reproduced by Hansen in modern form, 
just  as  is  the  case  for  his  use  of,  and  the  importance  of,  metaphor  and  language. 
Hansen's use of literature mirrors Herder's use of belle lettres, and his idea of reflection 
appears  as  virtually  a  modern  day  version  of  Herder's  own  works.  Hansen  also, 
interestingly, suggests a re-framing of cosmopolitan to mean 'inhabitant of the world', 
rather than citizen, which firstly provides a gateway from which to slip away from the 
historical  presentation of cosmopolitanism as a  binary/dualistic  system for humanity 
alone, as well as a rejection of statist language which the concept of citizenship implies.
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In  section  (5.3.2)  we  encounter  Mark  Bracher,  whose  approach  features  a  need  to 
distinguish  between  passive  sympathy  and  empathy,  arguing  that  cultivation  of 
compassion  –  a  higher  order  concept  for  him  than  empathy,  is  the  only  cognitive 
structure  that  triggers  the  kinds  of  response  that  cosmopolitan  theorists  believe  is 
fundamental to a cosmopolitan orientation. Bracher notes the failure of contemporary 
cosmopolitan  theorists  to  move  beyond  merely asserting  that  sympathy or  empathy 
evolves into action through an engagement with literature, which he approaches from a 
cognitive science perspective. He still uses literature, but also makes use of concepts 
like 'cognitive schemas' and 'faulty prototypes' - sourced from psychology and cognitive 
theory - to set out his arguments. His approach suggests that specific aspects of our 
thought processes produce biases against the other, which links to the way in which we 
see the humanity in the other. Bracher presents the same dynamic of internal reflection 
between the self and other as Herder does, using different terminology, and argues that 
an  emphasising  on  a  shared  human  experience  of  unjustified  suffering  over  and/or 
before particularity is approached is the critical aspect from from which to distinguish 
and clarify the different ways humanity expresses.
When I turn to Spencer, I focus on her exploration of the productive and reproductive 
imagination. This aspect touches to the heart of Herder's use of besonnheit, (just as it is 
a key aspect of Kant's arguments on judgement). The critical difference between their 
approaches  is  that  for  Kant  it  is  an  empirical  exercise  of  reason that  taps  into  the 
'mystery'  of imagination,  whereas for Herder it  is  both empirical,  and the holism of 
reason and emotion, that produces imagination. I then examine Spector's response to 
educational  economism and  bureaucratisation,  which,  through  Arendt,  identifies  the 
growth  of  moral  irresponsibility  through  increasing  bureaucratisation,  which  her 
cosmopolitan  education  is  designed  to  confront,  as  well  as  her  use  of  Kantian 
arguments, which I critique.
I previously noted that Herder, far more than Kant, is seen to better express a moral and 
cultural  cosmopolitanism  that  cherishes  difference  in  his  arguments293.  These  three 
educational theorists establish, between them, that Herder's approach to education also 
aligns  with,  and better  exemplifies,  contemporary understandings  of  a  cosmopolitan 
education. 
5.3.1 David Hansen
293 See section (4.1.2)
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Hansen's  work  is  quite  explicit  in  its  purpose  in  that  it  is  a  response  to  increasing 
globalisation in an ever-increasingly interconnected world. He argues that we need to be 
“openly  reflective  to  the  larger  world,  while  remaining  loyal  reflectively  to  local 
concerns,  commitments  and value”  (2011,  p.xiiv).  Hansen moves to  incorporate  the 
complexities that many of Herder's works also focused on, in this case as a guide to 
teachers,  (which is  also,  it  should be noted,  the case for  Kant's  approach).  What  is 
perhaps  most  telling  about  this  book  though  is  the  way  in  which  Hansen  almost 
deliberately  avoids  making  use  of  Kant's  own  works.  There  is  no  mention  of  his 
writings on pedagogy, and on many occasions he makes entirely the opposite argument 
to Kant's. When, for example, he states that “A cosmopolitan compass does not provide 
a  fixed  moral  latitude  and  longitude”  (p.49)294 he  positions  his  understanding  of 
cosmopolitanism in direct opposition to Kant's own rigid universal morality, and, likely 
unknowingly, taps into the same kind of language that Herder uses when discussing the 
idea of human progress.
Instead, possibly because of the shrouded nature of other Enlightenment cosmopolitans 
beneath  Kant's  shadow,  Hansen  draws  on  other  writers  and  philosophers  such  as 
Michael de Montaigne (pp.26-27)295, Maire le Jars de Gournay (pp.29-31), Rabindranath 
Tagore  (pp.39-40)  and  Confucius  (pp.22-24)  –  as  examples  of  a  pluralist  and 
particularist  approach  to  cosmopolitanism.  These  people  would  likely  never  have 
considered themselves cosmopolitan in a Kantian way (p.69), rather, their approaches 
are far more reminiscent of Herder's own attempt to delicately balance universalism and 
particularism through his approach to unity and diversity and The One and the Many. 
Further, he uses not just their written works, but their lived experiences as well, again in 
sharp contrast to Kant's own determination to exclude his own personal life from the 
history  books  so  that  his  works  could  be  presented  as  universal  ahistorical  texts 
applicable to all ages.
Hansen frames  his  own version  of  Herder's  approach to  the  One  and the  Many in 
somewhat different terms but it serves as the central thesis to his book - the idea of 
“moving closer and closer apart and further and further together” (p.3, his emphasis). 
Closer  and  closer  apart  occurs  through  the  recognition  and  respect  for  distinctive 
294 There  are  numerous  instance  where  Hansen  asserts  an  understanding  of  cosmopolitanism that  is 
diametrically opposed to Kant.
295 Herder also engages repeatedly with Montaigne's works in a similar way (1766a, p.33; 1767a, p.43; 
1769, p.184; 1768, p.169; 1775a, p.327; 1778, p.219; 1781, p.346 etc.)
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differences, but the framing suggests a double gesture. Closer and closer implies a move 
to  similarity,  yet  in  combination  with  further  apart  to  emphasises  distinctiveness. 
Because of this, it gestures to a shared closeness that clarifies our difference, just as 
Herder  suggested  with  his  example  of  pebbles  rubbing  together.  As  understanding 
increases these differences are both clarified and brought closer to oneself but difference 
is not removed, rather these differences are enunciated more clearly at the same time 
that the humanities of different people are expressed and connected to. This process 
closely  resembles  Herder's  besonnheit,  because  Herder  also  focussed  on  a  shared 
humanity first,  from which our own biases are brought into sharp contrast  with the 
other. It is only from seeing the other as human that this can occur, and this dynamic in 
Herder's framing occurs not just in the singular, but for entire peoples as they reflection 
upon the other. 
At the same time, through this process, shared experiences create a shared history as 
they  travel  further  and  further  together.  This  shared  history  is  the  primary  means 
through which Herder talked about tradition, as a process by which the individual learnt 
and was cultivated into a society (1764, p.10). At the same time that the individual, and 
all individuals involved in these processes, continue a feedback mechanism by which 
the cultures they are a part of themselves change over time, organically. In combination 
with Herder's understanding of humanität as the combination of tradition and individual 
creativity, his approach again appears remarkably similar to Hansen's own.
Hansen  makes  the  decision  to  re-interpret  kosmopolites as  'inhabitant  of  the  world' 
rather than the more traditional 'citizen of the world' (2011, p.45) and in so doing he 
moves in two ways from a hard interpretation of cosmopolitanism. First, is the explicit  
move from an understanding of it as a from a predominantly political and international 
scheme presented by writers such as Held and Archibughi, to the subjective  questioning 
of “how are you inhabiting your world”? (pp.45-46). Secondly, his retranslation moves 
it  from an implicit  statist  norm granted  by a  sovereign that  has  the power to  deny 
citizenship.  This second move also carries with it  the recognition of habitation over 
legal  recognition  of  citizenship.  In  addition,  whilst  citizenship  is  and  can  only  be 
granted to humans, habitation does not impose a species limit, nor does it require either 
sovereignty or legal recognition.
In tying this to questions of culture, Hansen again emulates the arguments of Herder in 
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his  understanding  of  culture  on  three  levels:  sociolinguistic  communities,  social 
practices, and individuals (p.65), seeing their interplay through a respect for tradition, 
but  not  as  'traditional'.  Hansen  uses  the  writings  of  Montesquieu  here,  and  his 
interpretation of the interaction between the local and global to support his position. 
Somewhat  problematically  though,  is  his  uncritically  use  of  Montesquieu,  which 
ignores  both  his  desire  to  codify and  quantify (from an objectivist  and universalist 
perspective)  different  political  governments  and  human  expressions,  and  his 
determination of variance due to simple environmental (climate) factors. Herder, who 
also draws on Montesquieu in this responded by arguing “[that] I simply cannot accept 
that  some  such  general  concept  as,  for  example,  fear,  honour,  or  patriotism,  is 
inseparably  linked  to  given  degrees  of  longitude  and  latitude”  (Herder  1784-91,  p. 
325n). His argument is one, I suspect, that Hansen would also follow. 
The alignment between Hansen and Herder also extends to their views on literature. 
Hansen's  engagement  with  what  Herder  termed  the  Belle  lettres  raises  “educational 
questions”  (2011,  p.73)  of  a  similar  style  that  Herder  sought  to  answer,  just  as  the 
process of engagement with a person through their text “do[es] not imply a person must 
abandon  original  orientations  even  though  they  do  necessitate  a  degree  of 
metamorphosis” (p.72). Engaging with literature as a way to change our perspectives of 
our own situated existence through the exploration of another's is a theme that both 
share.
I do not wish to belabour the point further with regards to the remarkable similarity 
between Hansen and Herder's views on education, so I will end this section with a quote 
from Hansen that I believe both clearly represents Herder's perspective and definitively 
rejects Kant's own purpose for education: 
“to me, the educational priority in places of learning is coming into the world: 
becoming  an  inhabitant,  becoming  at  home,  cultivating  roots  in,  and 
consciousness of, the stream of human meaning-making across time and space. 
This  orientation  fuels  the  core  value  of  reflective  openness  to  the  new and 
reflective  loyalty  to  the  known.  Without  the  orientation...  they  may, 
paradoxically, render education into a mere means to an end, which is the very 
antithesis of learning to inhabit the world” (p.113).
5.3.2 Mark Bracher
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This section examines Bracher's approach to cosmopolitan education. I firstly set out his 
basic understanding of the underlying issues that impact on the perception of the other 
as equally and fully human. Drawing on Lazarus and Lazarus' works, Bracher argues 
that a disposition towards openness is not sufficient in and of itself to motivate action 
for the benefit of others. Compassion understood as “being moved to distress by another 
person's  suffering,  and  wanting  to  help296”  (Lazarus  &  Lazarus  1994,  p.125,  my 
emphasis) is required, which itself relies on three specific judgements that he draws 
from Nussbaum's Upheavals of Thought (2001). Bracher then continues, arguing that it 
is the information that goes into the construction of each person's cognitive schemas that 
determines whether these three judgements can collectively be confirmed – and only 
then will compassion be experienced. Essentially, a) how the image of 'The Human' is 
constructed,  developed and cultivated in  our  minds,  b)  how closely and rigidly this 
conforms to our image of ourselves as 'The Human', and c) how broad the knowledge 
structure is. All three affect how, and whether, we see the other possessing a common 
humanity to us. The degree of overlap - when we can see the humanity in ourselves and 
the other - influences the degree of compassion, or whether it can be triggered at all. 
Resolving, changing or 'fixing' faulty schemas involves repeated work to break down 
the habituated binaries that are constructed in the logic of self/other as a method of 
comparison and the implicit hierarchies carried within it.
Bracher takes a pragmatic approach to cosmopolitanism and education, attempting to set 
out in practical terms “1 the specific behaviours that constitute cosmopolitanism... 2 the 
capabilities and habits of mind and heart that enable and motivate these behaviours... 
and 3 the types of educational practices that foster these cosmopolitan capabilities and 
habits  of  mind  and  heart”  (2013,  p.3).  He  concludes  that  cosmopolitanism  entails 
helping others who are in need, no matter who or where they are, which in turn involves 
assisting others in danger or distress, intervening against active and passive distress, and 
acting to diminish the suffering of others, regardless of colour, class etc. From there, he 
turns to a consideration of what prevents these sentiments from expressing,  because 
simply having a disposition of openness to others does not automatically provoke the 
action of trying to help others when they are suffering. 
This then leads to a distinction between sympathy, empathy, and compassion. Bracher 
296 This echoes my discussion of Herder's argument in sections (4.1.4) where he defines the wanting to 
help as 'conscience' rather than conflating both aspects into compassion.
See also (4.2.1) where he links it to shared experiences of suffering.
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concludes that compassion, produced from three specific judgements, which he draws 
from Nussbaum, is the most crucial of these, and they in turn rely on three key pre-
requisites that are require before the sentiments can lead to  action.  “1 that another 
person has a serious need or is experiencing significant suffering; 2 that the other is not 
responsible for this suffering or need; 3 that the other's well-being overlaps significantly 
with  one's  own (Nussbaum 2001,  pp.306-321297,  paraphrased in  Bracher  2013,  p.7). 
Whilst empathy can facilitate or contribute to this process it is not, according to Bracher 
necessary, nor is it enough by itself – compassion can be expressed without empathy, 
and  only compassion triggers a positive, moral response. These three points can also, 
interestingly, be shortened to 1) it is unreasonable 2) it is unfair and 3) it could have 
been me. In this respect, Bracher is arriving at justice as fairness, and Pogge/Rawls' 
position, through Nussbaum298.
From there,  Bracher turns to an examination of how the judgements themselves are 
formed, which requires the use of the idea of 'cognitive schemas'; “general knowledges 
structures that comprise multiple types and forms of knowledge concerning a particular 
category”  (2013,  p.11).  It  is  these  knowledge  structures  which  determine  what  we 
perceive, how we perceive it, what we are able to infer, suppositions we draw, what we 
look  for,  what  we  remember,  what  emotions  we  have  in  response  to  them  etc. 
Essentially, how these knowledge structures are created determines whether, how, and 
how much, we see ourselves “linked to others through a shared humanity” (Monroe 
1995, p.105). These knowledge structures are also constructed, tellingly, from multiple 
binaries.  Bracher  perceives  in  this  that  the  more  a  person  approaches  from  a 
'universalist' perspective, which Phillips and Ziller suggest focusses on “similarity rather 
than difference” (1997, p.420)299, the more likely a positive response will occur. It is 
from this that Phillips and Ziller then go on to argue that “universal orientation avoids 
the first treacherous act in interpersonal relations, that is, the separation of the self and 
other, which tends to be followed by an invidious comparison of self and other, to justify  
the separation...  the foundation is  set  for  conflict  rather  than accord” (Phillips and 
Ziller, 1997, p.430, my emphases). 
Whilst Bracher emphasises the universal aspect in his arguments, from the phrasing that 
297 Nussbaum in turn draws on Philoctetes and the Aristotelian tradition (2001, pp.304-306).
298 See also section (2.2.3)
299 Their use of  'universal' is somewhat different to how it has been used elsewhere in this thesis, as it  
implies for them an orientation towards the descriptive category of 'Human' that all (or at least more)  
humans fall into, rather than a prescriptive system that all must conform to.
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Phillips and Ziller use, this suggests that the crucial issue here is the comparative aspect 
that  tends to be followed, which comes from the separation of self and other (because 
distinguishing the self from the other is both necessary and inevitable). There are two 
key aspects to this that I want to focus on here. Firstly, that it is from this tendency to 
envy that  conflict  rather  than accord arises.  In chapter  three,  when I  set  out  Kant's 
construction of the 'civilised man' and 'the state', it was clear that for him comparison is 
produced by a fear of inadequacy in a hierarchical sense – thus it is already in some 
sense  antagonistic  and  unavoidable  by  all  bar  his  cosmopolitans.  This  conflict  is 
unavoidable  for  Kant  and  so  must  be  harnessed  and  repurposed  towards  economic 
rivalry. Herder, by contrast, is almost pluralistic in his wariness of comparison between 
either peoples, and their moralities (or indeed in relation to individuals), other than in 
the  express  service  of  humanität.  Herder  is  seeking  commonality and  connection 
through other-self-perceived suffering and the development of compassion – essentially 
the accord that Phillips and Ziller refer to. Emotions for him are both necessary and 
intrinsic  to  the  process,  and  whilst  conflict  might  drive  forward  progress,  this  is 
something we should be ashamed of and try to avoid, rather than relying on and taking 
advantage of. In addition, this idea of humanity is a category that is only awarded to a 
select group of people in the Kantian system based on education, privilege, race, gender, 
class, and opportunity, whereas in Herder's it is an innate capacity and capability that all  
humans  possess,  and  can  express  in  their  actions.  Secondly,  the  use  of  the  word 
“invidious” contributes to an underlying selfishness that establishes, in this 'tendency', a 
narrative of selfishness that again ties to a Hobbesian approach.
What is of particular interest here is not so much that Herder's approach once again 
aligns with Bracher's cosmopolitan approach much more closely than Kant's, but that 
Herder's approach is aimed directly at subverting this tendency, that Bracher passes by 
without  comment.  Herder  rejects  a  moral  comparison  in  a  negative,  selfish  sense, 
instead emphasising how we express our same humanity in  different ways – which he 
then turns inward to a self-critique of our own normative assumptions on what defines 
our own humanity and ourselves. Effectively, using Bracher's language - how we hold 
to  unconsidered  knowledge  structures  that  are  revealed  in  different  ways  by  our 
interactions with differently othered others who we interact with, and then reflect upon. 
Herder's approach is to see the humanity of the other in ourselves, and the humanity of 
ourselves  in  the  other,  thus  providing  multiple  links  of  commonality  or  'unity  in 
diversity', at the same time insisting that every expression of humanity is dialectical and 
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so carries with it its own flaws in  both the self  and the other. This, for Herder, is his 
attempt to prevent the suggestion of a (false) pure idea of humanity that could be reified, 
and to mitigate these tendencies and invidiousness justifications.
What  also stands  out  when Bracher  uses  the  example  of  western vs  African  in  the 
sequence of “civilised/uncivilised, cultured/barbaric, rational/irrational, adult/childlike, 
humane/savage” (Bracher 2013, p.16) is the similarity to the two chained concepts that 
form  the  Kantian,  and  contemporary,  cosmopolitan  binary  system  of 
universal/particular,  justice/care  reason/emotion  etc.  that  I  discussed in  section  (5.2) 
One side is good, and 'us', the other side is bad and 'them', but because a binary meta-
system already exists, the only response possible is to alter the individual binaries rather 
that the series of chained concepts collectively. This binary dynamic also plays a part in 
the  construction  of  stereotypes  and  prototypes,  which  humans  use  unreflectively  as 
short-hand interpretations for different types of humans.
Bracher groups these concepts into two categories, which he argues define either how 
one is  animalised,  or dehumanised.  The first  functions around a distinction between 
uniquely human qualities vs animality as “cognitive sophistication, culture, refinement, 
socialisation,  internal  moral  sensibility,  industriousness,  inhibition,  self-control”.  The 
second  establishes  whether  or  not  someone  displays  human  nature  “interpersonal 
warmth, drive, vivacity” (Haslam 2006, pp.256-257; Bracher 201, p.14-15). Searching 
for  and  perceiving  industriousness  or  self-control  in  the  other,  we can  see  them as 
‘human  like  ourselves’,  but  what  this  also  does  is  reinforce  industriousness  as  the 
idealised norm. This carries its own problems when we consider, for example, disabled 
and neuro-diverse people whose sense and expression of control might differ widely 
from  'the  norm’.  Just  as  disability  might  hinder  or  deny  the  possibility  of  being 
‘industrious’ in a traditional western sense - and industriousness itself is a concept that 
carries with it economic expectations. How we understand industriousness is its own 
cognitive schema that might carry with it ideas of factories, productivity and business in 
a western industrial setting. 
What is also exceptionally curious, although not explicitly discussed by either Haslam 
or Bracher, is the gendered nature of these two categories. The first are qualities more 
related to reason and the restriction of emotion, whereas the second are indicative of 
emotional expression and social interaction. By implication then, the first defines the 
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human quality as a male vs animal, and the second defines human nature as female vs 
emotionless (i.e. the absence of emotion, not its restriction). From this can be seen an 
echoing of Kant's own arguments on the distinction between the beautiful (women) and 
the sublime (men) that are respectively of nature and reason300.
The final aspect I want to explore from Bracher is his use of the words disposition and 
proposition. In the previous chapter, in the section on international interaction (4.3.5), I 
went into some detail with Herder's dispositions, and also in chapter three (3.6.3) on 
international propagation for Kant. Kant's Propositions are of course well known, but 
their choices in the use of these words is telling. Disposition for Herder is focused on an 
internal attitude or orientation that is the holism of reason and emotion, and proposition 
for Kant is a statement, that also expresses a moral judgement. At the beginning of this 
section I noted that Bracher's point about disposition was that a disposition to openness 
was not sufficient to promote action. When he uses proposition later on in his book, in 
relation to  the arguments I  have set  out of  his  thus  far,  this  time in relation to  the 
category of  human vs animal,  he suggests that  “even if  westerners  subscribe to  the 
proposition that Africans are fully human, their perceptions, judgements, emotions, and 
actions  (including  public  policies)  regarding  African  will  still  be  distorted  by  the 
implicit  conviction,  based on these  various  prototypes,  that  Africans301 are  not fully  
human.  The  various  forms  and elements  of  the  prototypic  African  will  continue  to 
operate implicitly, beneath the threshold of consciousness, and will override Westerner's 
conscious, propositional knowledge and produce distorted, dehumanising perceptions, 
judgements, emotions and actions regarding Africans” (Bracher 2013, p.20). Essentially, 
disposition  without  a  moral  angle  does  not  achieve  compassion,  just  as  proposition 
without a dispositional approach that incorporates a moral angle emphasising our shared 
humanity through suffering cannot resolve these underlying biases.
What clearly comes across in Bracher's deduction of the way to initiate a response to the 
suffering of the Other is that Kant's approach is the opposite to his. Bracher, from his 
exploration of empirical studies on how to achieve his goal of action establishes that 
Kant's desire to develop the art of education to the science of pedagogy would have 
required the opposite approach to Kant's binary reason vs emotion system. Imposing a 
duty in the absence of emotions does not facilitate the perception of others, either across 
300 See section (3.3.4)
301 There is also an unspoken gendering when Bracher refers to Africans here – it is African men that he 
is implicitly referring to. There is a lack of awareness of the intersections of race and gender here. 
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race or gender, as our equals because it does not incorporate an emotional strand that is 
required to engage with the human nature of the other, nor can it trigger a shift from 
sympathy to compassion. From my exploration in chapter three of Kant's arguments, 
and especially in relation to his comments on the Tahitians this is, perhaps, Kant's point 
– to him they are not morally equal and so should not be seen as equal.
In this section, my exploration of Bracher and his approach to activating a response to 
the  suffering  of  others  requires  a  focus  on  a  common humanity,  and  an  emotional 
connection, as well as judgement of the veracity of their suffering. From his cognitive 
schemas, the knowledges and 'facts' which prevent seeing the other as human and inter-
connected  with  the  self  can  be  responded  to  through  a  careful  engagement  with 
literature that switches around the binaries that go into the various levels of Bracher's 
arguments.  Repeatedly  approaching  these  problem  areas  allows  over  time  for  the 
breaking down and reconstitution of the schemas which unconsciously positions the 
Other into categories of inhumanity and/or animality.
5.3.3 Hannah Spector
I now turn to Hannah Spencer and her approach to cosmopolitanism and education. 
There are two main areas that I examine here. Firstly, her writings on imagination, and 
secondly, on bureaucracy. From the first, which she progresses from Hannah Arendt's 
partial writings on the topic, as well as Justine Greening's arguments, Spector links the 
restriction of the productive powers of the imagination during the contemporary era to 
the rise and domination of educational economism, which she argues has altered and 
redirected the path by which people imagine, into an economistic framework. For the 
second, her critique of bureaucracies, following on from Arendt's own works, suggest 
that bureaucracies and institutions distance the individuals who work in them from that 
which is  institutionalised and bureaucratised.  As a result,  they are distanced from a 
sense of personal responsibility, which also both influences and limits the expression of 
their  morality  outside  the  institutional  environment.  To  her  own  critique  of  global 
economistic dominance influencing the future direction of imagination in the schooling 
environment in economistic and the contributory effect bureaucratisation, I respond by 
arguing that  this  is  also  a  feature  of  both the  theorising,  and attempts  to  introduce 
institutional systems – as they impact on the ability to imagine cosmopolitanism in ways 
outside of universal, binary, and institutional ways.
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Spector argues that, to date, there has been little exploration of imagination within the 
theorising of education. Whilst imagination is often used and considered in everyday 
language, it means very different things, to different people, at different times (2017, 
p.39). It is considered obscure, and the most mysterious of the cognitive faculties –it 
cannot  be  accurately defined -  although it  can  be  explored  and  elaborated  upon in 
numerous ways. For Kant, the imagination serves as the bedrock from which genius 
develops, but it must also be “tamed” because it is also linked by him to excess and the 
extreme  (1798a,  p.290).  It  must  therefore  be  “cultivated  only for  the  advantage  of 
understanding” - it has no value in and of itself (1803, p.461, my emphasis). For Herder, 
by contrast, imagination cannot be cultivated only from understanding because it plays a 
constitutive role in the creation and use of language itself, which we all experience at 
the beginnings of our lives. Because of its link to his view of language, and thus its 
shaping thought and expression, as well as providing a link to a shared cultural heritage, 
this  nudges the direction of imagination according to a person's cultural,  social,  and 
environmental experiences. Imagination lies at the base of all that humans can achieve 
because without it we cannot think. It is through its use – through imagining and the 
carrying of this imagining outwards - that we become co-creators of our cultures and 
traditions. Reason manifests because of the imagination, and so expresses ‘afterwards’.
Egan (1992), one of the few educational theorists to have engaged directly with the 
topic of imagination, suggests that imagination is linked to freedom, because, as Spector 
goes on to paraphrase; “it is through the capacity to imagine other worlds, or to imagine 
something not present, that one can “become an autonomous thinker”” (cited in Spector 
2017, p.39). The imagination allows us, in the case of Bracher earlier, to imagine a 
shared  humanity with  the  other  through  literature,  allowing  for  the  development  of 
compassion, and because of this, imagination is often linked to the moral and ethical. In 
addition it has an aspect of spontaneity and uncontrollability which “blossoms under 
conditions of freedom”, but also withers away for the weak and vulnerable in highly 
controlled societies (p.42). There are clear parallels to Kant's approach which directs the 
majority  towards  economism  and  positions  the  imagination  inside  his  framing  of 
cosmopolitanism, through discipline during childhood. Imagination, as Spector notes, 
can also be directed, channelled, and used for dark purposes. It can show and enhance 
our humanity as well as displaying and furthering one's inhumanity. Czobor-Lupp also 
notes that Herder, presaging Arendt's arguments, made a similar critique of what he calls 
“despotism” when he warned of “the political danger that could arise when deceit or 
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despotism abuses imagination by ‘rendering the limitless ocean of the human fantasies 
and dreams subservient to its purposes’” (Herder 1800302 p. 201, in 2012, pp.57-8).
This, for Spector, is one of the main problems with the current situation in education 
because  “the  curriculum  and  pedagogy  are  being  systematically  controlled  and 
financially  exploited  by  the  developing  educational-industrial  complex”  (p.43). 
Education has become a means not so much of enlightening, cultivating, or developing 
(and whether the imagination can or should be 'priced' and thus have 'value'), but for 
financial  security,  passing  the  next  test,  ticking  a  box,  and  employment.  The 
globalisation  of  education,  alongside  the  globalisation  of  the  economy,  has  filtered 
outwards  and  downwards  in  a  variety  of  ways  and  established  the  primacy  of  the 
instrumental ideology of “economism” (Talavera, 2014) and the ongoing re-creation of 
the  individual's  identity.  From this,  Spector  notes  that  the  increasing  regulation  of 
teaching has led to a decrease in the freedom of teaching, other than when it follows an 
economistic requirement. This results in the downgrading of the perceived value of, and 
the opportunity for, spontaneity. The longer this continues for - the more economistic 
education becomes socialised and historically normalised at the educational and societal 
level  -  the  stronger  the  influence  and  directing  capabilities  of  economism  on  the 
imagination itself. From this, the weaker a person is within the system, the more that 
person's spontaneous imagination to think outside the system is affected303. 
Spector then turns to Kant's classification of the two types of imagination: productive 
and reproductive, which he develops in his Critique of Judgement (1790). Within such 
an environment as Spector considers, the productive imagination is hindered, but the 
reproductive imagination,  which  is  derived  from and  remains  closely  linked  to  the 
existing social  setting,  still  has  an outlet.  This  reinforces  the  existing  framework in 
which  thinking  is  condoned,  and  restricts  production  from  outside  the  framework. 
Spector in this is directing her understanding at both the dominance of economism in 
education, as well as in consideration of Arendt's own writings on Nazi Germany, but it 
also has wider implications. 
When I reconstructed Kant's political  scheme through the lens of education, I noted 
firstly in section (3.2.1) that the potential  of a  child's  imagination is  closed off and 
302 This translated text is in the bibliography under the original (German) publication date of (1784-91d).
303 In a post-colonial context, see Franz Fannon's arguments on the impact of colonialism reshaping the 
boundaries of self-perception of the black man (1961). His response was that only through violence 
and the destruction of the colonial framework could new realities of imagining be realised.
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directed towards Kant's own hierarchical and exclusionary perspective of the meaning 
of humanity.  The discipline they endure turns them away from their  own animality, 
towards the service of humanity's progress. Secondly, in section (3.5.2), I highlighted 
that  Kant's  desire  for  his  cosmopolitans  to  be  able  to  find  any skilled  end is  only 
applicable  within his  cosmopolitan  framework.  In  my  analysis  of  Kant's  political 
scheme, his educational system can only facilitate the reproductive imagination. It must 
function within the constraints of an ahistorical cosmopolitan morality and thus is not 
productive because it is, necessarily and perversely, the contradiction of “both free and 
of itself conformable to the law” (Kant 1790, p.71, his emphasis). 
In addition, the mostly forgotten side of Kant's political system is that the education of 
the  masses  is  deliberately  different  -  purposefully  functionalist  and  economistic  by 
design to encourage cooperative competition and economic interdependence - and it 
falls within the same universals that Kant's cosmopolitans are disciplined and cultivated 
into.  Geniuses, in the Kantian world, occurs  outside the boundaries of cosmopolitan 
education,  in,  as he puts  it  a  'mysterious'  way,  something his educational  system is 
deliberately  designed  to  prevent  due  to  its  closed-system nature  which  saddles  the 
imagination in the service of cosmopolitan either through universal economism for the 
majority, or universal morality for his elite. From this perspective, the development of 
the art of education to the science of pedagogy tries to close off the possibility of a 
productive imagination. Encountering the other, from a different social sphere, society 
or state is translated through the belief that these social differences are merely illusions 
that 'all' understand as such.
Herder, by contrast, argued that genius always carries with it social implications because 
it  is  developed within,  and expresses aspects of, the  volker that it  arises from. This 
means multiple moral avenues, and further, it  requires a historical approach through 
tradition that relies on change and multiplicity. Herder believed that genius has cultural, 
family and community dynamics, but 'his systems' - his volk - his cultures - his 'monads' 
- have windows. Whilst imagination is inevitably constrained (i.e. all is re-productive), 
the windows, and his approach to history, provides ever-changing routes by which it 
will always be limitlessly variable. There is not one sphere of universal morality, but 
rather multiples of endlessly varying spheres of morality, and thus endlessly varying re-
productive imagination expressions. Imagination on the one hand serves as a source of 
inspiration and a way in which to understand the expression of humanity for a  volk 
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because the imagination is not outside the social life. On the other, in his view, it also 
reveals  a  volk's  inhumanity  if  produced  within  an  environment  of  unfreedom. 
Inhumanity is the prevention of change, or the constriction of change along narrow or 
dominant-group determined paths  whereas  for  Kant  this  prevention  is  necessary for 
humanity's progress.
Returning to Spector, the result of these changes to the educational environment is that 
it  “undermines  teachers'  and  students'  capacities  to  develop  meaningful  learning 
experiences  that  value  history,  culture,  community,  and  individuality”  (2017,  p.46). 
Whilst  this  is  in  some ways  a  reasonable  critique,  economism in  its  latest  guise  - 
neoliberalism –  more  and  more  requires  the  commodification  of  a  person's  history, 
culture, community. They are not so much lost as economised and individualised. This 
historical normalisation can also be seen from a (post/neo) colonial perspective, because 
the commodification, or what is often called 'cultural appropriation' of an other's history, 
culture, community, and individuality starts at the margins of society (whether that be 
globally or with a nation state). What for a marginalised group of people is a 'fetish', 
symbol, or cultural artefact that contributes to a group's identity, strength and cohesion, 
under  economism  becomes  a  financial  opportunity,  individualised  as  a  culturally 
meaningless affectation for those who are outside or less marginalised. The problem that 
Spector sees as a relatively recent shift in the US should instead be considered a part of 
a much older and longer shift that has built  up and slowly increased firstly through 
colonialism and the 'civilising mission', and later via global schooling, starting at the 
margins  'out  there',  through  ideas  like  western-driven  development  studies,  'world 
education' and the imposition of western capitalism that, from Ingram's perspective in 
his critique of Nussbaum304, serves to embed western values and ways of thinking in 
their search for a 'better' life.
Turning now to Spector's analysis of bureaucracies and institutions, the same logic of 
economism's impact on the imagination also has an influence on bureaucracies more 
generally,  and  equally  profoundly.  One  critique  that  Herder  made  concerning 
bureaucracies was their development into mechanisms of state power, combined with 
the ideal of sovereignty. This was in part due to the distancing of the people from the 
activity of, and responsibility for, that which was bureaucratised (1774a, p.197), as well 
as  creating  a  culture  of  bureaucratisation.  This  is  also  an  area  that  Spector  shows 
concern for when she argues, following on from Weber, that “Bureaucratisation is a 
304 See Section (2.3).
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multilayered socialisation process that has a variety of implications beyond utility or 
desire  for  efficiency”  (Spector  2019,  p.504).  It  also  affects  how  responsibility  is 
understood and interacted with. Biesta (2006) suggests that responsibility is essentially 
ethical in nature, and drawing from Arendt’s own arguments, this is especially so when 
it comes to education because it is “the point at which we decide whether we love the 
world enough to assume responsibility for it” (Arendt, cited in Biesta 2006, p.147). But 
more-so,  this  kind  of  responsibility  is  more  than  just  not  economical  in  nature,  it 
“excludes and opposes calculation” (Biesta 2015, p.70, my emphasis).
The ongoing bureaucratisation of education at state level upwards, under economistic 
terms is then, according this, not just an abrogation of responsibility, but unethical, and 
at its most extreme leads to 'I was simply following orders' and the banality of evil. It is, 
tellingly, also the murder of the moral person  in the bureaucracy itself (Arendt 1973, 
cited in Spector 2019, p.4). Bureaucratic socialisation leads, according to Spector (as 
well  as Arendt, Weber and Biesta),  to the bureaucratisation of  irresponsibility (p.13) 
through the instrumentalisation of responsibility. Counter-intuitively, the more efficient 
the bureaucratisation of responsibility becomes under an economic rationale, the more 
morally irresponsible it becomes (p.14). Hierarchies, institutions, and bureaucracies are 
by nature discriminatory. The more efficient they are, the more discriminatory they must 
become. These two points link together in a cumulative way; economistic norms restrict 
the productive imagination, and redirect the reproductive imagination in economistic 
ways, and increasing bureaucratisation leads to the abrogation of responsibility, and thus 
morality,  within the structure of education through greater 'efficiency'  and economic 
pragmatism.  Between  them,  they  impact  on  every  aspect  not  just  of  the  sphere  of 
education, or the link between morality and education, but the entire social sphere of 
human existence and experience.
This  section  (5.3)  has  examined  three  prominent  theorists  in  the  (sub)  field  of  the 
theorising  of  cosmopolitan  education.  From  David  Hansen  I  take  on  the  re-
interpretation  of  cosmopolitan  to  mean  inhabitant  of  the  world,  which  allows  a 
distancing from not just the political and institutional aspects of much of cosmopolitan 
theorising,  but  also  for  a  potential  broadening  of  its  theorising  beyond 
anthropocentrism. From Mark Bracher, his distinction, and development of a practical 
means  of  cultivation  compassion,  from  which  cosmopolitan  actions  can  occur, 
establishes  the  essentiality  of  emotions  in  cosmopolitanism,  the  first  step  of  which 
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requires a  focus on a  shared experience of  human suffering that  each possesses.  In 
addition, the two binary ways in which others are Othered – from man to animal, and 
man to woman, the distinction between disposition and proposition, and the different 
ways  in  which  their  injunctions  of  orientation  and  judgement  fail  to  establish 
cosmopolitan foundation and actions, all reinforce the necessity of a correction to the 
faulty  biases  and  assumptions  that  prevent  triggering  the  emotional  response  of 
compassion. When I turned to Hannah Spector, it revealed her cosmopolitan analysis of 
the  impact  of  economism on  the  imagination,  and  of  bureaucracy on  morality  and 
responsibility. Between her two points, they highlight the existence of an ongoing and 
profound social reconstruction of the imagination and morality, which establishes an 
institutional framework that is difficult to break through. From all three theorists, they 
also  establish  the  binary  nature  of  cosmopolitan  theorising  from  an  educational 
perspective, which I respond to in the next section.
5.4 Returning to Kant
In this  section I return to my arguments from Chapter three, firstly touching on my 
reconstruction of Immanuel Kant's interwoven political, religious, philosophical, social 
and educational system. Secondly, I explore some of the complexities and issues that 
arose  from  my  approach  to  Kant's  overall  political,  cosmopolitan  system,  and  the 
underlying norms, logics, and arguments that went into establishing them, in relation to 
my arguments and findings in chapters one and two. Thirdly, I more explicitly connect 
my argument concerning Kant to the arguments of Hansen, Bracher, and Spector, to 
elaborate  upon  the  inherent  problems  with  a  Kantian  approach  to  contemporary 
understandings of the importance of compassion, the imagination, and bureaucracies, to 
cosmopolitanism and education.
Chapter three explored in detail the educational thread that extended throughout Kant’s 
works, as well as the universalised particularity of his cosmopolitan project. The results 
of my analysis was the identification of the importance of an educational system for his 
elites, designed to pre-empt, in part at least, the influence of human selfishness (asocial 
sociability),  projecting  from  the  base  emotions  of  fear  and  desire.  Secondly,  the 
deliberate redirection of selfishness towards economistic concerns, facilitated by global 
commerce that positions the non-western world at  the bottom of a moral,  economic 
hierarchy. Thirdly, I noted the essentiality of hierarchies of power and exclusions that 
flowed  most  prominently  along  gender,  race,  social  capital,  age,  and  class  lines  to 
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establish  his  political  system.  Finally,  that  the  consequence  of  these  exclusions  and 
hierarchies, linked to the ahistorical nature of his universalism through the international 
system, reifies, joins, and locks into place these existing hierarchies and binaries.
The  two  emotions  of  fear  and  desire,  expressed  in  Kant's  arguments  on  asocial 
sociability, are rooted in the possibility of a Hobbesian premise of innate selfishness and 
his own conclusions on human nature. This fear justified Kant arguing that 'man needs a 
political  master',  establishing an eternal  need for a sovereign.  His arguments on the 
importance of recording to  posterity allow for the projection of  his  assumed norms 
forwards through time, influencing future social  dynamics towards his  cosmopolitan 
ideals, and embedding the belief in innate selfishness into the need for an international 
system to regulate  and redirect  its  effect  through commerce.  These linked ideas,  in 
consequence, reside within the arguments of Pogge, Benhabib and Ingram, not least 
because in Pogge's case he outright accepts the same normative assumptions on human 
nature, but also because the need for the universal is premised in Kant's arguments on 
the selfishness  of humanity,  in  addition to  the absolute  danger  of emotions  and the 
illusory nature of particularity. His hierarchical system excludes those he perceived to 
be the least rational and human – women, and people of colour - and the politics of his 
cosmopolitan system is essentially the struggle between two elite groups of educated 
people who are cultured, civilised, educated, and in possession of socio-econo-political 
power.  The first  (and larger)  elite  group lacks a  moral  education of  a  universalised 
nature and the second are his underdog heroes – philosopher educators –  uniquely able 
to countermand and resist, even if only in part, the lures of temporal life. They alone 
recognise their duty to fight to steer higher education and other elite educated people in 
the direction of 'truth'.
Kant's  pacific  federation,  republication  system,  and  cosmopolitan  right,  were  all 
designed both to respond to selfishness, and to emphasise the universal, at the same time 
they  require selfishness  to  justify  their  need,  and  to  drive  through  progress.  Thus 
selfishness is an essential, ahistoricised principle of Kantian Cosmopolitanism305 that is 
firmly established in  his  religious  works,  and projects  outwards  through the  rest  of 
writings.  This  religious  core  justifies  itself  through  a  series  of  circular  arguments 
concerning progress, a state and civil society perceived in quasi-religious ways, as well 
as the acceptance of a specific type of human as ‘natural’ and from these, the eternal 
305 This is not to say that Kant's arguments and texts are solely 'responsible' for the universalisation of 
selfishness, not does this imply that only selfishness is at the core of his works.
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danger of emotions and particularity. Kant's awareness of the socially constructed nature 
of human existence (which influenced his decision to teach geography and anthropology 
throughout  his  career),  was set  out  in  his  various  empirically  focussed texts306,  and 
established the necessity of his own developments on (pure) reason, judgement,  and 
morality.  This  determined  the  measures  needed  to  produce  his  vision  of 
cosmopolitanism, starting with the use of discipline in education to enclose moral and 
social norms within the cosmopolitan sphere of universality. 
Alongside this was the importance of developing the art of education into the science of 
pedagogy. This would produce three distinctly different educational systems that, firstly, 
provided a home environment where women were educated to perceive themselves as 
inferior.  Women would  serve  solely  as  means  to  the  end  of  humanity,  through  the 
institution  of  marriage,  in  the  service  of  humanity's  future  as  broodmares  and  the 
educators of their  daughters. They are a permanent moral lesson; an always weaker 
antagonistic 'opponent' that men could continually test their virtue against in a struggle 
over their own animal desires and weaknesses. Secondly,  to produce workers with a 
leaning to universalism disciplined into them at a young age, malleable enough to turn 
their  abilities  to  whatever  needs  supported the pragmatic  desires  of  the (non-moral) 
intelligentsia,  which  would  in  turn  contribute  to  the  global  expansion  of  western 
capitalism and moral dominance. The second educational system both relies on, and 
reinforces selfishness through economism, continually leading to increasing levels of 
economic inequality and suffering, though absent war and military strife. Thirdly, for 
the  education  of  elite  boys  to  a  cosmopolitan  morality,  who  take  on  the  duty  of 
educating the intelligentsia (and more specifically the emulator elites) towards truth and 
the service of humanity, encouraging them to establish laws facilitating ever increasing 
commerce. His political scheme, capped with his international political propositions and 
pacific  federation,  was  by  necessity  a  social,  political,  economic,  and  educational 
project designed to re-engineer human interaction in a way that would facilitate the 
establishment  of  global  laws and processes,  eventually binding all  of  humanity into 
specific ways of thinking, acting, moralising, doing and being.
This scheme established a permanent hierarchy which institutionalised a specific way of 
perceiving human interaction through asocial sociability - struggle, conflict, and contest 
– which morally justified suffering and increasing levels of inequality to achieve legal 
advancement, by which progress could be measured. Finally, it awarded the ‘full’ status 
306 The Beautiful and the Sublime (1764a), Anthropology (1798a), Physical Geography (1802) etc.
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of human to only to a small and select group of moral philosophers and self-manifesting 
geniuses, although given the internal nature of morality, and the perceptive aspect of 
recognising morality in others, this  category is porous and diffuse.  Telling apart  the 
three categories of the intelligentsia between cosmopolitans, cosmopolitan emulators, 
and  non-cosmopolitan  socio-econo-political  influencers,  as  well  as  the  distinction 
between male subjects and citizens is subjective307. By contrast, his arguments required 
the denial of the non-white races from any claims to the possession of morality, the 
removal of all bar the Asian race from the perceived capacity to develop and make use 
of empirical reasoning, and the explicit rejection of agency and morality for all women. 
The categories of black, brown, and woman are as a result sharp, clearly defined, and 
eternal, within his system.
As a result of their collective reliance on specifically Kantian cosmopolitan principles 
and norms, Pogge, Benhabib, and Ingram's arguments, all contain within them these 
same underlying logics that exist in Kant's own structure. Pogge's and as a result Rawls' 
closeness  is  clearest,  and their  responses  to  challenges  that  produces  an  interesting 
aspect of the theorising of universal cosmopolitanism. When Kant was challenged on 
race by Georg Forster, his response was the recognition of the inimical nature of slavery 
through Cosmopolitan Right – a lesser subsidiary concept to his core arguments, which 
was  moderated  further  by  its  emphasis  on  the  morality  of  white  people  over  the 
suffering  of  the  black  people  enslaved.  Pogge's  response  to  the  claims  of  disabled 
people on institutional injustice and provision produced, in similar fashion to Kant's, an 
additional  rights  response  –  giving  them guide  dogs  rather  than  (or  in  addition  to) 
changing the accessibility of traffic lights so that they would also work for disabled 
people.  When  Okin  challenged  Rawls  on  gendered  political  inequality  within  the 
institution of the household, his (indirect) response was the deliberate removal of gender 
inequalities in the home from his updated institutional system.
As with their  theoretical constructs, so too is there a marked tendency, (as I argued 
earlier  in  relation to the incorporation of difference,  for state systems that prioritise 
generalised, reason, universal etc.) to act as limiters to the inclusion and acceptance of 
difference rather than as facilitators. This is not just for disabled people (2.2.2) with 
variant  needs,  homosexual  or  bisexual  people  (2.3.2)  who  experience  and  express 
choice-less individualities within a  state,  but also more widely for any marginalised 
307 Kant recognised that there was a level of ambiguity to the categories of subject and citizen, within a  
state with a civil constitution, for men.
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group  with  both  perceived  difference  and  at  the  lower  ended  of  the  binary.  Their 
challenges to the universal are, as was the case for Kant, Pogge and Rawls, sidestepped 
or redirected into lesser theoretical structures because universal systems are unable to 
accommodate  sustained  difference  and  particularity.  Inevitably  as  a  result  they  are 
incapable  of  resolving  historical  injustices  and  inequalities.  Benhabib's  attempt  to 
balance  the  generalised  with  the  concrete  is  in  this  respect  conceptually  similar  to 
Ingram's  cyclical  movement  between  the  universal  and  particular  through 
cosmopolitics. Ultimately, the problem here is the production of a universal system that 
cannot help but ahistoricise itself - because it is in the nature of universal systems to be 
ahistorical.
Another aspect of Kantianism that can be traced through to contemporary arguments is 
in the perception of cultures either as illusions that can be taken up or cast aside at will, 
or through the lens of always struggle and conflict. Pogge aligns with the former here – 
merging  together  a  variety  of  different  forms  of  human  groupings  into  a  single 
conceptual bag that all compete on the lesser additional rights level (again with little 
accommodation towards historical or existing inequalities). Ingram reluctantly accepts 
the  latter  and  attempts  to  reverse-engineer  it  into  a(n  always  on  the)  bottom-up 
cosmopolitics. Benhabib takes both aspects, although in her case time features more 
explicitly in the democratic iterations she argues for, slowly shifting the marginalised 
culture into the greater cultural polis, towards universalism and cosmopolitanism. There 
is a tendency towards ahistoricism 'over time' for Benhabib and Ingram, either in the 
slow democratic iterations creeping forwards, or in the cyclical swinging between the 
universal and particular. These tendencies cannot, as a result, but essentialise both the 
positive and negative aspects that make up their respective systems. All claims against 
them, or indeed interaction within them, have to be linguistically framed in a such a way 
that they conform to the concepts and structures inherent in the universal.
These positive and negatives are, as I noted previously (and which are also a key feature 
of  Bracher's  arguments),  formed  into  two individually reinforcing  chained series  of 
concepts  that  work to  reinforce a  binary logic  across  multiple  concepts.  Firstly,  the 
universal, general, justice as fairness, objective, reason, public and male, to which could 
be added white, straight, cosmopolitan etc.. Secondly, the particular, concrete, justice as 
care, subjective, emotion, private and female, which also implicitly includes non-white, 
and communitarian. Each link in the chain reinforces those it is connected to, and the 
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chain as a whole, just as the antagonism and contestatory nature of the binary reinforces 
the  importance  of  the  opposing  side  as the  opposite.  The  ahistorical  nature  of  the 
universal establishes this binary as a permanent unchanging feature of human existence. 
Due to the prominence of Kant's cosmopolitanism, each element of his hierarchical and 
exclusionary political system is mutually reinforcing and these underlying antagonistic 
binaries and concepts are all carried through to contemporary cosmopolitan approaches 
that make use of the universal nature implicit in his works and its thumbnail history.
The situation is such that, considering Kant's works more directly, simply rejecting a 
belief  in  God,  for  example,  is  not  a  solution  to  the  role  that  God  plays  in  Kant's 
arguments and political system, because God is part of his interwoven structure that 
incorporates the principles, actions, and influences of Nature and Providence, as well as 
relying on the distinctions between good/evil and bad/better. This requires a response – 
and the provision of alternative reasons – to replace those concepts that Kant makes use 
of in his arguments to justify his cosmopolitan project within a binary logic dynamic. 
Whilst God, Nature, and Providence might be dismissed as irrelevant to the modern 
secular era, the same processes (can) instead latch onto ideas like 'fate', human 'nature', 
and (an ultimately unquantifiable) belief in progress that would rely on democracy vs 
authoritarianism,  capitalism  versus  communism,  and  universal  human  rights  versus 
parochialism. Different elements in this chained binary system mutually reinforce the 
structure  of  binary  logic  itself  such  that  engagement  with  the  universal  ultimately 
justifies the need for the universal. The removal of God, religion, Nature or Providence, 
extends far more widely than simply stripping small sections from his arguments on 
Perpetual Peace (1795b). It requires the reconsideration of other aspects of his works 
such as his justification for asocial sociability, a gender hierarchy, the need to believe, 
progress, commerce, and emotions, not least because Kant justifies asocial sociability, 
and the dynamics of his ethico-civil communities, in his religious texts.
In a similar way, If his construction of the idea of pure practical reason (and thus his 
justification for the promotion of universal morality) is a point of disagreement, then 
this wholesale impacts on the entirety of his moral educational project, which in turn 
affects his religious arguments, the hierarchy he reinforces with the antagonistic male-
female binary in the home and in society more generally. Even more profoundly, this 
then  fundamentally  changes  the  category  of  'human'  in  his  works  as  well  as  the 
importance of empirical reasoning. This in turn affects the role of emotions in theorising 
and actualising cosmopolitanism. Rejecting one aspect  of his  racial  arguments – for 
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example by taking the position that there was 'value' in the lives of the Tahitians, or that 
there  is  some kind  of  inherent  value  in  tribal  communities  in  the  Amazon,  ripples 
outwards into a critique of his grounds for pure practical reason as a moral argument 
concerning one's duty to humanity at large. It also breaks the core of his argument on 
the fundamentality of asocial sociability, and the necessary international developments 
needed to move towards his Kingdom of Ends. 
Alternatively, if more laws are not or should not be considered the main measure by 
which to judge humanity's moral progress, then this lack of significance of such laws 
impacts on the whole structure of  Kant's cosmopolitan vision and the arguments he 
constructed to justify its importance. If instead we consider a category such as relative 
inequality,  or  even  happiness(!)  as  a  surer  indicator  of  human  progress  and  moral 
development than law, this then echoes throughout his arguments. This affects not just 
the political, but also his philosophical and religious arguments too – and extends to his 
assessment of human nature and intellectual and emotional development.
The selective use of Kant's works requires responses to all of the ways in which other 
aspects that we might disagree with impact on the elements of his works that might be 
considered by us in our theorising of cosmopolitanism. To argue that Kant's perpetual 
peace or cosmopolitan right are systems that we should work towards or make use of 
requires both an engagement and resolution, rather than avoidance of the other, often far 
more  problematic,  aspects  of  his  system that  determine  his  arguments  on  perpetual 
peace and cosmopolitan right, as well as the reinforcing chained binary that establishes 
universalism as the level where it must be engaged with.
Bracher's solution to the issue of these hierarchies, as it pertains to the translation of 
empathy and sympathy into acts of compassion, is to try to avoid the tendencies of 
(invidious) comparison by focussing on the universal through similarity, to see the best 
of the other's humanity reflected in ourselves, followed by unity and integration (2013, 
p.14). The problem here is that whilst it engages with the problem of binaries, it tries to 
resolve them by moving the recognition from the negative to the positive side of the 
binary.  In addition, avoiding this invidious tendency does not resolve the underlying 
emotional  issue  of  the  negative  aspects  of  fear  and  comparison  that  premise  both 
Kantian and contemporary cosmopolitan theorising. Whilst he argues that compassion 
can be triggered by sidestepping the issue and drawing on (Rawlsian) justice as fairness, 
it reifies the grounding of Kantian asocial sociability rather than trying to counteract it.
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When we connect the Hannah Spector's approach to Kant's argument, and the elements 
he constructs to make his system work, aspects such as her critique of economism are in 
direct  contradiction to Kant's  reliance on commerce.  When Spector  firstly notes  the 
increasingly  pragmatic  nature  of  education,  and  secondly  that  increasing  levels  of 
economism have  led  to  the  increasing  bureaucratisation  of  the  “economic-industrial 
complex” - and thus the increasing immoralisation of education, this has a direct impact 
on the possibility of the development of Kant's moral men. The heroic struggle between 
these men, against the needs of the state that has bureaucratised and neoliberalised its 
own home - academia - has stripped away the moral component that Kant relied upon to 
make his educational  arguments,  and thus his  cosmopolitan vision.  The battle  for  a 
Kantian  cosmopolitan  future  appears  to  have  been  comprehensively  (and  perhaps 
inevitably,  given  his  support  for  commerce)  lost.  Kant's  reliance  on  international 
institutional  systems  is  affected  by  this  same  bureaucratisation  issue  –  the 
immoralisation of cosmopolitanism through their unavoidably bureaucratic natures.
The dialectic between the establishment of a binary logic which favours universalism 
alongside  international  political  and  economic  systems  also  leads  to,  through  their 
influence  on  education,  a  “self-imposed...  limit  to  agency”  (Spector  2017)  that 
undermines the free imaginative capacities of those who are raised in an economistic 
educational system set up to privilege the universal over the particular in a competitive 
either/or binary.  This Kantian international system, linked as it is to an international 
political system and global institutions, as well as global commerce and an international 
economy system308, not only reinforces asymmetric dynamics between different groups 
at the state level and lower, but established a global binary system, which all lower level 
interactions are forced to respond to and/or accept.
The Kantian system, as I set out in chapter three, only allows for the development of 
imagination within his cosmopolitan system, but it also sharply restricts access to those 
who have received an education in virtue. In many respects this is, in broad terms, the 
path that education took through the two centuries following his demise. The harnessing 
of education for the explicit purpose of solidifying the people of a nation into a state 
institution, under a binary logic of us/them, connected to the developing sciences was, 
308 Linking Kant to international economy I believe falls in line with his favouring of commerce and trade 
as the means to establish a global system by which to establish universal norms of morality.  The 
struggle  between  his  moral  men  and  emulators  seems  to  have  been  one  not  only  that  he  was 
responding to in his system, but also one that his system relies upon to drive forwards progress. 
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as Popkewitz suggests, emblematic of much of western Europe and the US (2007). It 
was used to socially re-engineer or erase undesirable social, cultural, and personal traits, 
as well as whole societies and cultures. An economistic education was essentially the 
education Kant prescribed to his  non-elite  subjects,  something which was replicated 
across the wester world, for the express purpose of the state's economic success, and 
whether  we accept  his  gendered  and racial  arguments  or  not,  the bulk of  humanity 
experienced one version or another of this economistic education alongside the advent, 
establishment, and normalisation of global capitalism. Effectively, the world became re-
conceived through opposing binaries.
In  this  section  I  have  argued that  the  primacy of  Kantian  thought  has  given prime 
position  to  the  institutional  and international  political  dynamics  of  cosmopolitanism 
theorising.  Along side  his  hierarchical  and  exclusionary  politics,  this  establishes  an 
implicit  binary  within  cosmopolitan  theorising,  and  a  universalised,  ahistorical 
framework that reinforces a binary framing of cosmopolitanism. The ongoing theorising 
of cosmopolitanism in binary terms, and its enactment in institutional ways, each serve 
to reinforce the framework in which cosmopolitanism fits within, and encourages both 
binary approaches to imagining cosmopolitanism, as well as the importance of rational 
over emotional interactions with cosmopolitanism.
5.5 Nonbinary Cosmopolitanisms
In this section, under the broad banner of 'nonbinary' cosmopolitanisms, I firstly explore 
in more detail Herder's arguments in relation to the theorists I have previously engage 
with in chapter two. I then draw on Herder's approach to language and translation to 
support my 'turn to Herder' in an explicitly nonbinary cosmopolitanism. I then engage 
with  Ling's  trialectical,  Daoist  approach  to  world  politics  which  draws  on  similar 
language to Herder, from a non-western perspective.
5.5.1 Turning to Herder
Kant's cosmopolitanism, as I have touched on previously, establishes a binary with clear 
borders, which he sets hard limits between. His distinction of bad to better as distinct 
from evil to good is only one of a series of such opposing binaries. It sets the binary as 
the structure. Herder's system, by contrast, does not have a border that is a barrier – his 
monads have windows. The border, whilst defined, serves, for Herder, as a feature of 
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besonnheit – a place we extend from and contract to as we reflect. It is not fixed, and 
information and change flows in a way that Kant is uncomfortable with.
Only Ingram's framing of cosmopolitanism in chapter two, through his reinterpretation 
of false universals replacing false universals comes close to responding to this wider 
binaried situation, but his response – whilst in some ways both reasonable and perhaps 
even necessary, cannot help but reinforce the binary logic because it is forced to use the 
framework of universalism to reject and replace universalism. Linking this to Herder's 
view on language,  the medium of  Ingram's  dialectic  is  universalism and so what  is 
produced  cannot  help  but  also  be  universalist  in  nature,  and  thus  it  is  always  a 
movement from a false universal towards an (in theory) more universal false universal. 
The fundamental problem with this  is  that other universals  are also involved in the 
process. As I noted when examining Benhabib's recourse to a larger institution (a larger 
generalised) in the case of the First Nations situation (See section 2.3.1), the recourse to 
the 'universal, justice as fairness, reason, male, general' of Canada because of structural 
sexism within the 'universal, justice as fairness' of the First Nations, does not resolve 
sexism.  It  rather  exchanges  it  for  the  sexism  of  Canada.  The  binary  between  the 
particular and universal is maintained, and the interconnections of justice as fairness, 
generalised, universal, male, public etc. are reinforced.
In each of  the theorists  I  explored in  chapter  two,  there is  the  presumption,  or  the 
explicit assertion, of particularism, care, etc. within the family and home. This then, at 
one point or another encounters the universal, and in each of their schemes, it must give 
way, which involves the reinforcement of the universal over the particular. For Pogge, it 
features a political engagement and moral diversion for additional rights, in Benhabib's 
case  the  universal  enforces  its  dominance  at  the  social  and  cultural  level,  and  for 
Ingram, more broadly, at the post-structural level. What Ingram's approach does allow is 
not  just  the  reversal  of  focussing  on  inequality  rather  than  equality,  but  more 
importantly, it incorporates an inwards turn and temporary hardening of marginalised 
group identity, which also features in Herder's arguments. This inward turn allows for 
the re-establishment and firming of that which makes the group the group, and activates 
a collective response to the universal, but because of the existing universal dominance, 
the response is required to come in the language of the universal, which also influences 
the internal dynamics of the group. Herder's framing by contrast requires responses in 
particularities, i.e. multiple different framings, in line with his resolution of the One and 
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the Many, that expands the imaginative boundaries outside a single limiting Kantian 
universal because each case has different boundaries at multiple levels, not defined by 
institutional and political (and by implication economic and bureaucratic) universalisms. 
It  does,  to  be  sure,  rely on  a  thin  moral  (cosmopolitan)  universalism,  but  it  is  the 
bureaucratic, institutional, and political, that are deliberately avoided.
At the heart of this binary system though is not a single binary. It is two chained, and 
opposing, binary 'knowledge structures' as Bracher might put it. Each link represents 
one  aspect  of  these  knowledges  with  one  side  dominant  that  links  to  universal, 
generalised, justice as fairness, equality, objective, reason, public and male, to which 
can be added white, logic, and cosmopolitan. The other 'submissive' side incorporates 
particular, concrete, justice as care, bias, subjective, emotion, private and female, which 
also implicitly includes non-white, and communitarian. If we then link this to the impact 
that  economical  norms,  in  conjunction  with  the  institutional  and bureaucratic,  these 
three features allow for the whole dominant chain to reinforce its own chained logic.
A nonbinary meta-framing of cosmopolitanism, based on this, would in turn prevent the 
dominance  of  binaries,  whilst  accepting  that  binaries  are  one  lens  by  which  to 
understanding  inhabitation  of  the  world.  But  more  than  this,  a  move  from binary 
framing to a wider nonbinary framings would by necessity need to reframe, avoid or 
reject the dualisms already inherent in cosmopolitan approaches where the dualistic, or 
binary framing of cosmopolitanism enclosed all into particular vs universal, fairness vs 
caring, public vs private, mind vs body, reason vs emotion, white vs non-white, the west 
vs  the  rest,  subject  vs  objective  etc.  etc.  which  is  emblemic  of  contemporary 
cosmopolitan theorising at the international (utopian realism) relations, political theory, 
philosophical, and social and cultural levels.
Whilst there is a considerable amount of literature concerning how or where to position 
Herder's works between relativism and pluralism. Spencer (2007) makes the interesting 
point  that  Herder  should  more  rightly  be  seen  as  an  anti-dualist.  His  position  and 
approach features a blurring of monist, pluralist and relativist arguments such that the 
title seems somehow appropriate for a theorists who argued of both the danger of single 
systems developed by dominant groups, and against the possibility of an over-arching 
system  ever  being  discoverable.  But  more  critically,  he  attempts  to  weave  a  path 
between  particularism  and  universalism  that  both  incorporates  and  rejects  both 
positions.  His  approach  was  a  form  of  cultural  pluralism,  alongside  emotional 
Sahra Taylor Page 271 of 300 Feb 2019
(happiness) and virtue relativism (Sikka 2011, pp.35-39) underscored by the argument 
that humans are always already and cannot help but be intrinsically a part of cultures 
and society. That our understanding of ourselves and the world around us is therefore, 
always already partial because of the way in which language, as a cultural artefact, is a 
subjective  medium  that  we  cannot  remove  ourselves  from.  Partiality  is  therefore, 
according to Herder, always already the foundation of human existence.
Herder held that whilst there is a broad approximation of being (human nature) that can 
be identified, in part at least, there is not and can never be a single system of living 
(human experiencing) due to human 'plasticity' and natural cultural and environmental 
variability. 'Truths' that can be discovered are always subjective because understanding 
is always both relative, relational, and historical. He reproduces this in multiple ways; 
through the presentation of his works as 'fragments', 'ideas', 'leaves' and 'forestlets', his 
use of poetical-dialogical-dialectical language, and in his philosophical theorising. His 
arguments, though, do still rest upon a monist grounding of what is 'good' in that he is 
always  consistent  in  his  rejection  of  hierarchies  of  power  between  individuals  and 
groups (Sikka 2011,  p.18)  and as  such his  underlying  universal  good is  a  qualified 
'freedom', broadly defined, along with an inherent capacity to reason and love, language 
and a drive towards humanität (p.21). The rest of his epistemology falls roughly in line 
with contemporary pluralists, with an underlying monist foundation of universal values 
in conjunction with cultural plurality, he approaches from a perspective which underlies 
his approach to all cultures and societies (not just non-European ones). From this stems 
his  belief  in  the  importance  of  cultivating  individuality  through  emotional  and 
intellectual  education  as  he attempts  to  weave a  path  where  both  particularism and 
cosmopolitanism can, to put it in Hansen's language, be woven together as they move 
closer and closer apart, and further and further together (2011).
I  now  want  to  turn  to  some  specifically  university  educational  practices  that  are 
prevalent in the teaching of political (and international political) theory. Firstly, the use 
of  history,  which then leads  to  secondly the framing of  the teaching of  theory in  a 
modular educational system. Each of these feed back into the other, but I will start with 
history as this was a crucial aspect of Herder's works. 
On  a  purely  pragmatic  level,  history,  and  historical  narratives,  matter.  They  are  a 
common  tool  in  education,  frequently  used  to  introduce  and  situate  both  political 
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thinkers  and  theories  into  their  relevant  context.  The  incorporation  of  Herderian 
cosmopolitanism  into  the  historical  narrative  of  cosmopolitanism  problematizes  its 
overly  simplistic,  sanitized  and  very  western  'thumbnail  sketch'  that  Inglis  so  ably 
identifies (2014b). It adds a second equivalent strand, allowing Confucius to be played 
off against the Greeks and Romans, Spinoza, Michael de Montaigne and Maire le Jars 
de  Gournay  vs  the  universal  natural  rights  cosmopolitans,  before  reaching  the 
Enlightenment. This then sets Herder against Kant, as well as producing a historical 
strand from Herder's theorising which “would lead through Goethe, Hegel, and Marx to 
the  Frankfurt  School  and  the  post-structuralist  reaction  to  French  Marxian  theory; 
through  Romantic  psychology  to  Freud  and  the  psychoanalytic  dimension  of  post-
structuralism; from the experiments of the German Romantics to the rediscovery of the 
ruses of  writing in  Nietzsche and Derrida” (Noye 2014, pp.113-114)309.  In  addition, 
because Herder argues that any history told is inevitably history from that perspective it  
reinforces the necessity of multiple historical (and divergent) narratives in education. 
As I set out in section (4.2.5), Herder's method of exploring a topic is an intermingled 
discursive and gestural manner, but the teaching of theory rarely engages with or makes 
use of such a method. Instead, the principle technique is to provide a relatively linear 
trajectory for a theorist or theory, within a relatively linear modular format. A historical 
setting is provided, and the lecture, seminar or topic is 'top'ed and tail'ed' so that the 
pupil engaging with the subject can always know where in the narrative of the topic or 
theory they are. This method, crucially, follows a Kantian pattern that, as I suggested in 
(4.1.2) relies on the precision of the meaning of the text,  in a linear manner with a 
defined start and end point. Further, this method follows a progressivism pattern, also 
emblemic of Kantian cosmopolitanism. The issues that Spector refers to in her articles 
exemplifies the problems such a teaching pattern contributes to – the restriction of the 
imagination (2017).  The  progressive  method,  because  it  is  forced  into  a  modular, 
discursive, progressivistic formulation, directs the imagination along those lines, into a 
framework that is modular, discursive, and progressivistic. The 'universal' nature of this 
method, a mainstay of modular courses and teaching, within the university reinforces 
the (obviously subtle, yet significant) directing that occurs. This is compounded with the 
increasing costs and reduced time that significant numbers of students experience whilst 
working  to  support  their  education.  When  there  is  less  time  for  reflection,  less 
importance  placed  on  its  necessity,  and  less  emphasis  on  the  crucial  role  of  the 
309 See  also  Kleingeld's  exploration  of  Georg  Forster's  cultural  cosmopolitanism,  Novalis'  Romantic 
cosmopolitanism (1999a), and Walker's treatment of Thomas Paines as a cosmopolitan thinker (2000)
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imagination, these compound to produce the critiques that Spector, Biestla, Hansen and 
others  all  level  at  the  neoliberal  university  environment  and contemporary teaching 
practices more generally.
This is also the case in the typical teaching of international relations theory. It tops the 
module by establishing theory as a tool, critique or attitude (Zalewski 2010, pp.340-
353)  before  starting  with  the  most  important  theories:  realism and  liberalism.  This 
establishes the pragmatic and universalist theories as first and foremost. The critical and 
emancipatory theories are then presented, later in the module, within the framing of this 
universal.  It  produces  an  intellectual  binary  between,  essentially,  the  dominant 
pragmatic and the submissive moral. Given the addition of the inevitable tailing off of 
student  attendance  during  the  latter  part  of  the  term,  the  critical  and  emancipatory 
theoretical approaches encountered are of secondary significance.  The boundaries of 
thought are already suggested by the structure of the module, and the order in which the 
subject is engaged with. 
Following a Herderian path, requires us to take into account the fragmentary nature of 
the works and arguments of these theorists. To incorporate both the good and the bad of 
their works and try to feel one's way into the positionality of the theorist. If it comes  
about as besonnheit, then its purpose is not just to grasp the who, what and why of the 
theorist, but of theirs and our humanity. Not just because of the good in either of us, but 
more  importantly  the  vulnerability  and  suffering  we  have  experienced,  and  our 
engagement  with  these  topics  should  have  an  accepted  and  important  emotional 
component. This then emphasises the importance of imagination, necessary for the 'leap' 
beyond  the  logical  and  empirical  to  feel  oneself  into  their  position  of  being  and 
becoming. Our encounter with these topics and theorists would be political, moral and 
emotional. 
5.5.2 L.H.M. Ling and Daoist trialectics
In this final section, I go into more detail of L.H.M. Ling's approach to international 
relations. She approaches, as the previous section notes, as a “subaltern woman” and 
suggests, a trialectical interpretation which still uses the self and other, but incorporates 
the internal dynamics of the play off between the self and other within oneself as yin-
yang.  She  argues  that  “To  put  it  bluntly,  we  need  pre-Westphalian  trialectics  to 
emancipate us from Westphalia’s border-binaries so we can arrive at a more democratic, 
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less violent post-Westphalian world politics” (Ling 2017b, p.475). Ling's approach is a 
broader  response  to  international  relations  in  general,  rather  than  my own  towards 
cosmopolitanism,  but  the  principle  is  similar.  Only  by  breaking  the  borders  of  the 
western binary which sources it's arguments on a Hobbesian logic (p.478) of selfishness, 
and relies on the “gendering [of] borders and borderlands... [and] racialis[ing] them” 
(p.479) can this be achieved. 
L.H.M.  Ling  presents  an  interesting  example  of  this  in  her  review  of  Linklater's 
Violence  and  Civilization  in  the  Western  States-System  (2016).  Her  abstract  to  the 
review sets out what she sees as significant problematic aspects to his work:
“Given the gravity of these concerns, I decide to write this review as a personal 
journey. It allows me to speak honestly and from the perspective of a caring 
friend. After all, the West lives in me just as I live in the West. But – and this is 
the point – my experiences as a subaltern woman necessarily lead to different 
interpretations  and  understandings  of  the  West...  Too  often,  Westphalian  IR 
marginalises,  truncates,  or  dismisses  difference  under  calls  for  ‘rigour’  or 
‘parsimony’. Instead of abiding by these predetermined parameters of discourse 
that invariably shape its outcome, I resort to the art of play” (2017a, p.622)
Her review then continues with inter-spiced rhetorical questions310,  internal musings, 
sarcastic  quips311 and  'fourth  wall'  reflections312.  This  approach  is  reminiscent  of 
Herder's writing style (although Ling is considerably less sarcastic and biting). It is both 
revealing in its emotional and personal nature, and it incorporates vulnerability and fear, 
as well as a host of other emotions. 
Kenneth Booth's article Security and Self Reflections of a Fallen Realist (1994) follows 
a  similar  style  to  Ling's.  Their  articles  bring  into  academic  texts  reflection  as  an 
essential  part  of  their  theorising,  and  theorising  in  general.  Not  just  in  the  hidden 
background that contributes to the production of their  articles and books, but at  the 
forefront, as a integral aspect and driver of their works and arguments.
Ling's “Trialectical Alternative” draws from Daoism, and breaches the boundaries of 
310  “So far,  so good,  I  mutter  to myself.  Who could disagree?  But an eyebrow begins  to arch as  I  
continue reading” (p.622)
311 “How white of them. I cannot help this slip into a contemporary colloquial expression. It’s a person-
of-color thing. Still, it’s indicative.” (p.625)
312 “For this reason, I write this review as a personal journey. Rather than resort to the usual academic 
convention of couched phrases that say little but reveal much, I want to share my honest reactions to 
what I am reading. Not only is honesty the greatest form of respect, but it is also high time I voice  
myself to the discipline.” (p.635)
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dualism because  there  are  not  two  opposing  concepts,  but  a  range  of  inter-related 
concepts that mix and mingle. Dao “continuity produces multiplicity and change: ‘Dao 
gives rise to continuity/Continuity to difference/Difference to plurality/And plurality, to 
multiplicity’. And reciprocity facilitates continuity despite change: ‘Multiplicity gives 
rise to plurality/Plurality to difference/Difference to continuity/And continuity to the 
dao” (p.481) and prevents a simplistic break down into opposing camps because the 
overall  dynamic  is  circular  without  two  dominant  poles.  Yin-yang  relies  on  inter-
relatedness, of connections and relations that ripple out through ideas like border and 
boundaries.  This  resembles  but  is  not  identical  to  Kant's  'bad  to  better',  absent  an 
opposing, ideal category of 'good'. From bad to better is a relational scale that, absent 
good and evil, establishes relationality as the only means by which to understand them.
5.7 Conclusions
This  chapter  has  explored  the  relationship  between  Kant  and  Herder's  approach  to 
education and cosmopolitanism, as it applies to contemporary approaches.
By  engaging  in  detail  with  Immanuel  Kant's  works,  it  revealed  the  cosmopolitan 
educational  theme  that  extends  throughout  his  works,  and,  alongside  his  religious, 
nature, and pure reason developments, establishes the particularity embedded within the 
purpose and design for the setting out of his cosmopolitan vision. In addition, it set out 
the political structure by which his hierarchies could be seen to function, and support, 
his political project. In chapter two, Kant's binary logic, and Hobbesian assumptions 
come  through,  causing  Thomas  Pogge,  Seyla  Benhabib,  and  James  Ingram  to  all, 
perhaps unwittingly, grounding themselves into their own arguments. This led to the 
exploration of an alternative,  and highly contemporary theorist:  Johann Herder,  who 
argued for an anti-dualist approach for his own version of cosmopolitanism. His focus is 
on reflection, language, and humanität as a process of becoming, in marked contrast to 
Kant.
This  final  chapter  examined  the  works  of  contemporary  educational  theorists  of 
cosmopolitanism, identifying their essentially Herderian understanding of cosmopolitan 
education,  and determining that Kant's works were not only opposition to their own 
positions, but in the case of Hannah Spector's argument, when connected to Kant's own 
social  reconstruction  of  the  civil  state,  are  an implicit  rejection  of  his  political  and 
cosmopolitan project.
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